

conflated. Field has unanswerably demonstrated the emergence of a new inclusivity in the wartime conception of the nation. Nevertheless, his own account clearly shows how changing representations need to be distinguished from the persisting inequalities which they could also help to dissimulate, and on which basis changing representations could themselves just as quickly change again. There was an international dimension to the wartime political shift which Field here barely notices. Nor, by the same token, does he fully register the fact that postwar full employment and higher wages were in no way a specifically British phenomenon, or that the promise of a more thoroughgoing transformation was everywhere eviscerated by the Cold War. Field has provided a superbly documented account of the centrality of class to the history of wartime Britain. What perhaps he also shows is how these real but limited advances could in time become effaced in Britain's collective memory, in just the way he describes in his final pages. That only underlines the importance of his timely corrective.

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SMITH, SCOTT B. *Captives of Revolution. The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Bolshevik Dictatorship, 1918–1923.* [Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies.] University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 2011. xix, 380 pp. Ill. \$45.00. doi:10.1017/S0020859012000715

This book is an important contribution to the literature on the Russian Civil War and the development of the Soviet state. The author seeks to explain Civil War politics through a focus on the Soviet state's struggle against socialist and radical resistance after the October Revolution. The Socialist Revolutionary Party (PSR) was at the heart of this struggle, and this book provides a compelling explanation of why the PSR, apparently riding on a wave of mass popular support in 1917, was unable to put up effective resistance to the Bolsheviks. The book is organized chronologically, with the first chapter tackling post-October politics, chapters 2 to 5 evaluating the politics of resistance on the Eastern Front up until 1919, and chapter 6 taking us through the endgame and the PSR's final defeat. The final chapter looks at how the Bolsheviks' experiences in resisting and finally defeating the PSR illuminated "the deeper workings of the Bolshevik imagination" (p. 240) and shaped the subsequent treatment of its own renegades.

Smith's sketches of the PSR at the end of 1917 help us understand the relative impotence of what was apparently Russia's largest and most popular political party. The PSR was profoundly divided well before the October Revolution, lacked a single charismatic leader, and was something of an illusory mass party, which disintegrated throughout 1917, not just after the Bolshevik seizure of power in October. The divisions within the PSR were not superficial; rather, they reflected the party's core belief in heterogeneity and pluralist democracy. Mass party politics was a relatively new phenomenon for Russia, and class and estate self-definitions outweighed party political labels.

The Bolsheviks' success in shaping and delineating the discourse of the Civil War is the focus of Scott's analysis. The PSR's defeat in this sphere is apparent in the commonly accepted terminology of the Civil War. The Bolsheviks consistently represented the Civil War as a class war, and as a battle between the binary opposites of Red and White, revolution and counter-revolution. The PSR meanwhile sought to define their position as a third force, for revolution, against counter-revolution, but also against a dictatorial Bolshevik one-party state. A key problem for the PSR's search for Civil War terminology,

however, was that they were uncomfortable with the discourse of Russian statehood, and this alienated many of their natural allies, and ensured an enduring split in opposition forces to Bolshevism. While the PSR tried to use the language of pre-revolutionary struggle to condemn the Bolsheviks as an authoritarian government, the Bolsheviks used the language of class war to polarize and to demonize all opposition.

In the aftermath of the Brest Litovsk treaty, the PSR tried to represent the Civil War as a continuation of World War I, a necessary revolutionary struggle against forces of German imperialist domination. The PSR regarded Bolshevik policies as “against democracy”. Initially, the PSR eschewed armed struggle against them, and decided instead to embark on a “war of words”, but their position hardened after May 1918, when they shifted away from a position of legal opposition and towards an uprising to establish a new government, reconvene the Constituent Assembly and continue war with Germany. The formation of *Komuch* (the Committee of members of the Constituent Assembly), which was dominated by the PSR, offered an alternative to the concentration of power in the hands of the military, as happened with General Kolchak, or party control of the military, as with the Bolsheviks. The failure of *Komuch* reflected its inability to tackle the problems that bedevilled all sides in the Civil War; the reconstitution of state authority, the place of political parties and class-based institutions in the new state, and the difficulties of procuring grain and conscripts from the countryside.

The PSR had a deep fear of the right, and were programmatically inclined towards a leftist revolutionary position. Opposition to the Soviet state became more difficult to explain and justify when the threat from the right seemed to increase with the successes of General Kolchak in the east and General Denikin in the south. The PSR further fragmented over collaboration with the Bolsheviks, and expressed willingness to collaborate with the Bolsheviks against rightist forces in 1919. The PSR played an instrumental role in the overthrow of Kolchak in Siberia, but the Bolsheviks consistently rebuffed any proposals of collaboration. Moderate socialist belief in the necessity of a united socialist front against forces of counter-revolution was not shared by the Bolsheviks.

Smith’s first chapter looks at concrete examples of how the war of language played out, mainly among the urban working class, in the first months of 1918. The overwhelming impression is of overarching economic crisis, rising violence, and workers’ increasing loss of control over workers’ institutions. Smith points to evidence of widespread worker dissatisfaction with the Bolsheviks, and a rise in non-party affiliations. Opposition to Bolshevism was particularly strong in areas of defence production, and weaker in textile centres. Red Guard intimidation and violent suppression of any opposition from the working class marked the Bolshevik response.

Smith looks at two regional centres of worker opposition, Sormovo and Tula, then proceeds to draw on a range of examples from across Russia of worker opposition to the Bolsheviks, and Bolshevik violence in response. Smith highlights a central contradiction for the PSR. While the PSR did have strong support from some urban workers in mid-1918, opposition to civil war was a key tenet of this support. The inexorable development of the Civil War in 1918 meant that the socialist opposition could no longer campaign to “end the fratricidal war”, but those who supported the PSR did not support armed opposition to the socialist state. The Red Terror underscored the state’s willingness to use violence against its enemies, and helped to define the war as class-based. Smith argues that the terror had a strong theatrical component, and that its main audience was not the bourgeoisie, but urban workers to be converted to the rhetoric of the Civil War as a mortal class struggle.

I struggled at the outset to establish the book’s key thesis. I would have preferred a more explicit introductory section, which would also have helped in placing the discussion of Siberian regionalism in chapter 4, for example, within the broader argument. This book’s argument builds steadily as the chapters progress, however, and becomes increasingly compelling. Smith does not relate his work sufficiently to the rich recent historiography of the

Civil War: engaging explicitly with the arguments of, among others, Aaron Retish, Peter Holquist, Erik Landis, and Alex Rabinowitch would have added to the resonance of his argument. The treatment of PSR supporters is sometimes hazy. Smith's focus is generally on the urban, rather than the rural population, and this, along with scattergun regional references, can be hard to follow. Smith has not consulted regional archives. A closer reading of a particular region would have provided a more compelling exploration of Smith's arguments, and his extensive treatment of *Komuch* would surely have been enriched by material from the local archives. Though there are some sensitive and penetrating analyses of peasant involvement in the Civil War, as in chapter 3 on peasant support for *Komuch*, overall the paucity of discussion of rural issues is surprising, given the PSR's reputation as a rural party. Finally, Smith rarely takes time to dwell on the individuals that emerge in his text. I would have liked to know more about some of the personal narratives that made up Smith's bigger picture.

Despite these caveats, I found this book to be a convincing explanation of how the shaping of language and discourse about the civil war played a central role in deciding its ultimate winners and losers. It will provide valuable reading for upper level undergraduate reading lists, as well as to subject specialists, and to anyone with an interest in the formation of the Soviet state.

Sarah Badcock

GARCÉS-MASCAREÑAS, BLANCA. *Labour Migration in Malaysia and Spain. Markets, Citizenship and Rights*. Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2012. 251 pp. € 39.95. doi:10.1017/S0020859012000727

This book is an impressive work of scholarship, innovative and timely. In terms of the latter aspect, I first began reading this book in Australia in mid-2012 when the dust had just settled on a national debate on the rights and wrongs of labour migration.

The debate was inspired by the world's richest woman and one of Australia's most prominent mining magnates, Gina Rinehart, who had successfully sought a labour agreement (an "Enterprise Migration Agreement") to bring in 1,700 foreign workers to work on the Roy Hill iron ore mine in outback Australia. Many commentators were up in arms about the decision to award foreign workers jobs that should have been earmarked for Australian citizens, regardless of the fact that the agreement also ensured that at least 5,000 Australians would be employed on the project. The fact of the matter is that most Australians are unwilling to relocate from east coast urban centres to the vast, and unforgivingly hot, expanses of the West Australian outback. For one thing, the salaries for mineworkers may be excessively high, but so are the food, accommodation and transport costs. Moreover, the adverse social effects associated with temporary mineworkers who are isolated from family and friends are only now coming to light in the Australian media, with little scholarly evaluation of the true impact.

Throughout the world, while locals in the receiving country are unwilling to take on the so-called "dirty work" for some or all of the reasons outlined above, temporary labour migration from the developing world fills the gap. For migrant workers, no matter how hot, poor, or degrading the conditions in the receiving country, the wages are much better than what they would get at home. *Labour Migration in Malaysia and Spain: Markets, Citizenship and Rights*, impressively and in intense detail describes the situation in Malaysia and Spain, but many important lessons can be gleaned from this book for the people and governments of other countries, including Australia.