

Confessions of an Existentialist: Reading Augustine After Heidegger

Part I

James K.A. Smith

§ 1. Preface: Reading (Heidegger's) Augustine

Our task is to read Augustine *after* Heidegger, in a double sense: first, *chronologically*, returning to read Augustine after having passed through Heidegger, re-reading the *Confessions* after reading *Being and Time*. But in a second *hermeneutical* sense, we are reading Augustine *after* Heidegger; that is, we are reading Augustine after/as Heidegger read him in the period of his earliest development. By doing so, we mean to let Heidegger's sketch of factual life (*Existenz*) function as a "hermeneutical situation" of our reading of Augustine as well indicate the way in which Augustine's *Confessions* functions as a horizon for *Being and Time*.

The impetus for returning to Augustine is found in Heidegger's turn to the *doctor gratiae* in his early work on the phenomenology of religion. In the young Heidegger's work in the phenomenology of religion, it is as much phenomenology as religion which is at stake; that is, the rigorous questions of phenomenological method find a limit case in the consideration of religious experience. Thus, a phenomenology of religion functions as something of a 'testing ground' for phenomenology understood as a hermeneutics of facticity. As Jean Greisch has noted, these "questions of method, which have an effect on the philosophy of religion, primarily take up the question of the status of phenomenology itself, and even the status of philosophy itself in the sense of an appropriate conceptuality."¹

Along with key figures such as Aristotle, Kierkegaard, and St. Paul, Augustine plays a significant role in the development of the young Heidegger's "hermeneutics of facticity" forged during his early Freiburg period (1919–1923). It will not be our task here to repeat the historical investigations of Kisiel and Van Buren which have documented the details of these matters.²

As part of a broader project which sought to disrupt "philosophy" by exposing it to otherwise than philosophical sources, such as Greek ethical life (Aristotle) and the experience of primal Christianity (Paul)³, Heidegger

turned to a sustained analysis of Augustine's interpretation of Christian factual experience. The firstfruits of this research were unveiled in a lecture course offered in the summer semester of 1921, titled *Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus*⁴, in which Heidegger undertakes a close reading of the tenth book of the *Confessions*.

It is in these lectures that we begin to see sketches of what will become central themes in the published version of *Sein und Zeit*, particularly the structure of "care" (*cura*, *Bekümmern*) as a "fundamental characteristic of factual life" (Ga 60 §12), the "temptation" and "trial" (*tentatio*) of being-in-the-world (Ga 60 210f; 283f. Cp. later, in *Sein und Zeit*, where Heidegger asserts that "[b]eing-in-the-world is in itself tempting." See Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 7th. ed. (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1953), s. 177 [marginal page references included in Ga. 2, Hg. F.-W. von Hermann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977)] / *Being and Time*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 165), the "fall" of the self into the world (as seen, for instance, in *curiositas*), and the "resolve" of the "continent" self in the face of dispersion. These themes, and more, first surface through Heidegger's reading of Augustine—a reading which operates in the voice of commentary. However, the reader familiar with *Sein und Zeit* readily recognizes these themes as antecedents to the structures of existence uncovered in the *Daseinanalytik*. But there, in *Being and Time*, these *existentialia* are not linked to a determinate, existentiell interpretation such as Augustine's Christian construal of factual experience; rather, within the project of a fundamental ontology, such 'characteristics' are understood as universal structures of *Dasein*. What Heidegger has effected, therefore, is a "formalization" of Augustine, whereby Augustine's determinate interpretation of factual lived experience is "formalized"—emptied of its determinate (i.e., Christian) "content" in order to distil the ontological structures which it has uncovered. In the language of *Sein und Zeit*, the existentiell interpretation of experience offered by Augustine is formalized in order to produce an existential interpretation of existence. This project of "formalization" is grounded in Heidegger's understanding of philosophy as "methodologically atheistic."⁵

Our task in this two-part article, we might suggest, is a process of "de-formalization;" that is, as a post-critical project, we will return to read Augustine *after* Heidegger, whose own interpretation and formalization will operate as the "hermeneutical situation"⁶ for our reading of Augustine, opening to us 'another' Augustine. However, our work of de-formalization will not be a simple return, a mere re-constituting of Heidegger's contentful Augustine; instead, we seek a *productive* de-formalizing, a reading after Heidegger which produces more than Heidegger, and otherwise than Heidegger. Taking our impetus from Heidegger's Augustine and its

formalization, our reading of Augustine will be productive in two senses: (1) we will consider not only the tenth book of the *Confessions*, but will undertake an analysis of the narrative from Books I–IX, uncovering the existential structure of Augustine’s self; (2) our reading will be a *critical* return to Augustine after Heidegger, offering a challenge to Heidegger’s fundamental critique of Augustine’s “Neoplatonism.” Our reading, then, will focus on the texts of Augustine, particularly the *Confessions* and other early texts; we will engage Heidegger as an interpreter of Augustine, though his reading and its formalization in *Sein und Zeit* also function as the horizon for our interpretation.

In this first part, we will focus on the structure of self as unfolded in the *Confessions*; in the second and concluding part of the article we will consider the movements of the “inauthentic” self and the redemptive, authentic “return” to the self.

A. The Origin of the Self and the Question of Existence

§ 2. Adventures of the Prodigal Self:

The Structure of Augustine’s Existential Anthropology

One of the most rigorously Augustinian themes which has influenced the existentialist⁷ tradition is the priority of the self for an understanding of being or existence; an understanding of being (which we might describe as an ontology) is integrally linked to self-knowledge. In the opening of the *Soliloquies* we have an encapsulation of this fundamentally Augustinian theme concerning the relationship between the knowledge of God and the knowledge of self:

For long I had been turning over in my mind many various thoughts. For many days I had been earnestly seeking to know myself and my chief good and what evil was to be shunned. [...] *Reason*.—What then do you wish to know? *Augustine*.—All that I have mentioned in my prayer. *Reason*.—Briefly summarize it. *Augustine*.—I desire to know God and the soul. *R*.—Nothing more? *A*.—Nothing less.⁸

The Delphic injunction ‘Know thyself’ is radicalized by Augustine; indeed, the very genre—a dialogue *with oneself*—marks an *inward turn*: the question of knowledge is precisely a question of *self-knowledge*, the question of being is a question of one’s *own* being. Conversely, to know oneself is always already to raise the question of being as the question of one’s Origin (*Sol.* 1.1.2)—which for Augustine is God, “who hast made man in thine own image and similitude, which every one acknowledges who knows himself” (*Sol.* 1.1.4).

For Augustine, then, to ask the existential “Who am I?” is to ask

“Where have I come from?”, “What is the origin of the source of my being?” — as opposed to the Cartesian and scholastic question, “*What am I?*,” a question answered in terms of *substantia*. Augustine, of course, does ask this question, particularly in Book VII of the *Confessions*, the most Neoplatonic book and that which most specifically anticipates the Cartesian and Kantian egos. Our task here is to effect a certain “deconstruction” of Augustine in this regard, reading the existential (and Christian) lines of his thought against its Neoplatonic elements. In this, we follow Heidegger’s *Destruktion* of Augustine’s Neoplatonism which attempts to retrieve the elements of “primal Christianity” still resounding in Augustine under the layers of Greek philosophy (see, e.g., Ga 60 286–287). However, as will become clearer below, we will challenge some of the specifics of Heidegger’s *Destruktion*.

As an existential question, this is not so much a question of *causality* as one of *meaning*. As Hannah Arendt comments, for Augustine the Creator/Origin is the “determinant” of the being of the self: “the creature in its createdness derives its sense of meaningfulness from a source that precedes its creation, that is, from the Maker who made it.”⁹ Augustine’s project is not an “ontotheological” one, in the strict Heideggerian sense.

Thus the question of self always raises the question of being as *origin*—as that which defines or gives meaning to the self. The origin determines what the self *ought* to be (anticipating the theme of “authenticity”). The same theme is found in the opening of the *Confessions* and, indeed, determines the entire structure of the text. There he asserts that “you have made us for yourself, and our heart is restless until it rests in you.” (C 1.1.1).¹⁰ Because the self is *made* (*fecisti*, from *facio*) by and for God, it is *restless* if it departs from this. As the *imago Dei*, the self finds its definition and meaning in its origin, and insofar as it does not understand itself within this horizon—the definition of the self as the image of God—it is restless, anxious. For Augustine, to be without self-knowledge (which is also to be without knowledge of God) is to experience an intense *anxiety*, to feel a deep sense of *Angst* about one’s own identity. As he will later describe this experience, “I had become to myself a vast problem” (C 4.4.9): he was ‘not himself,’ not ‘at home’ with himself but rather constantly ‘restless.’

As we see in C 1.2.2, the question of self-knowledge becomes a question of *place* or *regionality*—a problematic of *topos*: *Where* is God that I should call upon him? What place is there within me wherein God could enter and dwell? The very need to call God to ‘come’ implies a *distance* between God and the self. It is not, however, a departure by walking or moving through space (C 1.18.28), but rather a ‘spiritual spatiality’ (cp. Heidegger’s ‘existential spatiality’), an alienation. But this

alienation from God—from the self's origin—is also a *self*-alienation; thus in 1.6.7, the question of 'origin' is a question of 'place': "I do not know whence I came to be in this mortal life or, as I may call it, this living death? I do not know where I came from." We might say that for Augustine, "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*) is not ontological, but rather the 'experience' of the soul which has departed from God, the soul which does not know itself (as *imago Dei*) and thus does not understand itself within the horizon or definition of its creator. The wandering soul finds itself "dying by my alienation from you" (1.13.20) when it abandons its origin (which is also its highest good) in order to "pursue the lowest things of your creation" (1.13.21).

One of the keys to understanding Augustine, and the *Confessions* in particular, is to appreciate the way in which he here philosophically translates the parable of the Prodigal Son as found in Luke 15:11–32. The soul, in proud defiance of its maker, asks for its share of the wealth, the property (*ousia*). So the riches that the soul departs with are precisely that which has been given to it by its creator. The soul then leaves home and *departs* for a "journey to a distant country". Far from *home*, the soul "squandered his estate", used up the property in "loose living", dissipated upon the things of the world. In fact, the soul spends its being to the point of nothingness, spends everything (v. 14). No longer what it was intended (created, *fecisti*) to be, the soul has sunk to a kind of animality, even lower than unclean swine. Once given everything, the soul is now given nothing (v. 16). He is not himself (v. 15–16). Far from home, with nothing, anxious and lost, the soul "comes to itself", is awakened to its plight, and begins to question itself and reflect on its origin, its home (v. 17). And so the soul *returns* to its maker, to its origin, where it once again enjoys the bounty of the maker's property and substance. The one who was lost has been found; the one dead has come to life. At home once again, the soul finds happiness (v. 24).

In the culture of the time, to ask for one's inheritance was to wish one's father were dead. Jean-Luc Marion's commentary on this passage is very perceptive: "Therefore he asks not so much for his share of the *ousia*—since he has always enjoyed that—but not to have to owe that share of the *ousia* to a gift; he demands less the *ousia* than 'the share of the *ousia* that is coming to him' as out and out property—not the *ousia* but the possession of the *ousia*. Ultimately one even would have to say that he asks that one deprive him of something he already has: he has the enjoyment of the *ousia* as given, he asks for the *ousia* with the concession, the *ousia* less the gift, the *ousia* without concession—without having to concede that it comes to him by a gracious concession. The son requests that he no longer have to request, or rather that he no longer have to receive the *ousia*. He asks that one grant that he no longer receive any gift—precisely no longer

have to receive the *ousia* as a gift [...] The son wants to owe nothing to his father, and above all not to owe him a gift; he asks to have a father no longer—the *ousia* without the father or the gift”.¹¹

Augustine, in the first book of the *Confessions*, explicitly takes up this ontological interpretation of the Prodigal Son, noting that the distance travelled is not one of physical space or motion: “One does not go far away from you or return to you by walking or by any movement through space” (C 1.18.28). It is a spiritual movement, a spiritual departure: “To be far from your face is to be in the darkness of passion.” Or as he later explains, “My sin consisted in this, that I sought pleasure, sublimity, and truth not in God but in his creatures, in myself and other created beings.” One departs from God—and hence from oneself—by becoming absorbed in the world, failing to see it *as created*. Thus the fall away from God is also a self-alienation,¹² a loss of identity and meaning which is to be found *in relation* to the Origin.

§ 3. The Transcendence of the Self: Meaning-in-Relation

a) *The Meaning of the Self*

For Augustine, the self finds its “meaning”—its identity and definition—in its *relations*, in its “love” as its intentional aim (*intentio*). In other words, the self is defined by what it loves, by what it directs itself toward, what it refers itself to.¹³ For Augustine, consciousness is intentional; however, the priority is not on perception (as in Husserl) but “love” as an intentional mode of consciousness. The self is, in a sense, “ek-static”, necessarily transcending and referring outside of itself and beyond itself in order to find “meaning”.¹⁴ “Since man is not self-sufficient,” Arendt comments, “and therefore always desires something outside of himself, the question of who he is can only be resolved by the object of his desire.” (Hannah Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, p. 18).

The *inauthentic* self—which is “not itself”—directs its love toward the “world,” departing from the relation where it is at home and finds its meaning. “My sin,” Augustine recounts, “consisted in this, that I sought pleasure, sublimity, and truth not in God but in his creatures, in myself, and other created beings” (C 1.20.31). Its love is misdirected, absorbed in the world, thereby dissipating and dissolving the meaning and identity of the self who is divided and anxious. The inauthentic self is the prodigal self who attempts to find meaning in the world, which lacks transcendence; but the soul cannot be nourished in a “distant land” experiencing famine. In contrast, the *authentic* self directs its love and finds its meaning in its Creator and is thus defined as *imago Dei*. It has returned home for the feast.

b) The Ambiguity of the Self

The meaning of the self is a question precisely because of the fundamental *ambiguity* of the self, the mystery of one's own being. The self is not transparent to itself, cannot be made an "object" for itself. The same emphasis on the non-objectification of the self is found in Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.3.3.¹⁵ The odyssey of the soul is toward self-knowledge, "to know as I am known" (C 10.1.1), precisely because there are things about myself which I do not know, which exceed my grasp, yet are laid open to God—for "to your eyes the abyss of human consciousness is naked" (10.2.2). While St. Paul remarks that "no man knows the being of man except the spirit of man which is in him" (1 Cor. 2:11), "yet," Augustine continues, "there is something of the human person which is unknown even to the 'spirit of man which is in him.' But you, Lord, know everything about the human person" (C 10.5.7); in fact, "I nevertheless know something of you which I do not know about myself." Thus, his confession—which is for his own sake, not God's—is a confession of a lack of self-knowledge, a confession of the mystery of his own selfhood: "let me confess what I know of myself. Let me confess too what I do not know of myself. For what I know of myself I know because you grant me light" (10.5.7). The confession, then, is ultimately a question: Who am I? Who am I, who has become an enigma (10.33.50), a question to myself (4.4.9)?

c) The Interiority of the Self

The mysteriousness and ambiguity of the self, for Augustine, is grounded in the *depth* of the soul's interiority. In the quest of the soul to answer the question, "Who am I?"—which is always already to ask, "Who is my God?"—Augustine turns away from the external world into himself, an inward turn towards reflection on himself (C 10.6.9). The first half of Book 10 recounts this inward turn, couched in the Neoplatonic metaphor of interior ascent, a journey from the outer world to the secret recesses of the soul. Thus, he begins by considering the external world, then to the self as body, on to the self as soul, through the stages of vegetative and sentient soul, and finally to memory (10.8.12ff.). While portrayed in terms of ascent to a height (*pace* Plotinus), it is in fact more of a *descent* into an abyss (cp. 10.2.2), penetrating deeper and deeper into the soul until reaching the "caves and caverns of my memory" (10.17.26; 10.8.13). Rather than an ascent to mountain heights, Augustine's quest for self-knowledge is construed in terms of a journey to the centre of the earth.

It is in these interior caverns that the self becomes even more mysterious; it is as though, by penetrating to the heart of the soul, one were to find at its centre a bottomless abyss which could not be sounded. Indeed, as Augustine reflects on the powers of memory, he is struck and overwhelmed by an *infinity*:

This power of memory is great, very great, my God. It is a vast and infinite profundity. Who has plumbed its bottom? This power is that of my mind and is a natural endowment, but *I myself cannot grasp the totality of what I am*. Is the mind, then, too restricted to compass itself, so that we have to ask what is that element of itself which it fails to grasp? Surely that cannot be external to itself; it must be within the mind. How then can it fail to grasp it? This question moves me to great astonishment. Amazement grips me (C 10.8.15).

The self cannot grasp itself, cannot conceptualize itself, not because it is external or outside of itself; rather, the self eludes itself because of its own depth which opens onto an infinity. The odyssey into the recesses of the soul brings the self face-to-face with its own mystery, with the secret which cannot be made present (except to God, for whom “the abyss of human consciousness” is an open book). The self also eludes conceptualization precisely because it eludes language; as a radically private interiority, it is incommensurate with the public traffic of language. Thus, the strategy of “confession” plays an important role in this problematic.¹⁶

It is here that we encounter difficulty: “I at least, Lord, have difficulty at this point, and I find my own self hard to grasp. I have become for myself a soil which is a cause of difficulty and much sweat” (C 10.16.25). Again, this encounter with memory—with himself—is understood as an encounter with infinity which causes amazement: “Great is the power of memory, an awe-inspiring mystery, my God, a power of profound and infinite multiplicity. And this is mind, this is myself” (10.17.26). But we are still left with the question: “What then am I, my God?” (Ibid.) The mystery or ambiguity of the self, then, is grounded in its interiority, which signals an interior transcendence—an infinity whose end I never reach (10.17.26).

d) The Transcendence of the Self

The ambiguity of the self, grounded in the interiority and depth of the self, points to the transcendence of the self as always already referring beyond itself to its other, its Origin. As discussed above, the self finds its meaning *in relation* to something other than itself. The withdrawal into the cavernous depths of the self did not solve the question, but rather made manifest a deeper mystery, a fundamental ambiguity which continued to point the self elsewhere, to the Infinite. Thus, the question, “Who am I?” becomes, for Augustine, a question concerning God, the Infinite. The self will find its authentic meaning in relation to its Origin, its Father; the fundamental relation which determines this meaning is found in the intentional structure of *love*. In other words, the meaning of the self is determined by the object of its love. Thus, the question becomes, “What do I love when I love my God?” (C 10.6.8) “What is the object of my love?” (10.6.9). At what does my love aim (*intentio*)? Where do I look for meaning? To the world? “We

are not your God,' they responded; 'look beyond us'" (10.6.9). To myself? The depths of the self, *memoria*, continues to refer me beyond itself (C 10.17.26). To God? But what is it that I love when I love my God? "What Augustine expects of God," Arendt comments, "is an answer to the question, 'Who am I?'—the certainty of which all previous philosophy had taken for granted. Or, to put it another way, it was because of this new quest for the self that he finally turned to God." (Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, p. 25).

The self seeks meaning outside of itself; as suggested above, this might be described as the "ek-static" character of the Augustinian self. What is in question is just where the soul will look. As we will see below, there is an authentic and an *inauthentic* love. For Augustine, the self's quest for meaning, which is also its quest for God, is inextricably linked to the quest for the *beata vita*, the happy life (C 10.20.29). It is a *structural* characteristic of the self to seek its own happiness, but that search can take different *directions*, either finding its joy in the world instead of God (C 10.23.34), or the "authentic happy life" which finds its happiness in the *fruitio Dei* (10.22.32). In Part II we will turn to an analysis of these different directions of the self: first, to the *inauthentic*, fallen self who enjoys the world (§§ 4–5), and then the *authentic* self who constitutes the world differently (§§ 6–7).

- 1 See Jean Greisch, "Bulletin de philosophie herméneutique: Heidegger, Schleiermacher, Ricoeur, Gadamer, Misch, Abel," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 80 (1996), p. 640. For my analyses of early Heidegger's phenomenology of religion, see my "Liberating Religion From Theology: Marion and Heidegger on the Possibility of a Phenomenology of Religion," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion* 46 (1999), pp. 17–33; on the revised phenomenological method derived from this, see my "Taking Husserl at his Word: Towards a New Phenomenology with the Young Heidegger," *Symposium: Journal of the Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmodern Thought* 4 (2000), pp. 89–115.
- 2 For their landmark research, see Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 149–219; and John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), pp. 157–202.
- 3 For an outline of this project, see my essay, "Alterity, Transcendence, and the Violence of the Concept: Kierkegaard and Heidegger," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 38 (1998), pp. 376–380.
- 4 An edition of this lecture course, along with that of Wintersemester 1920/21, and notes for a course on mysticism which was never offered, have been collected and published in Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens: 1. Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion. 2. Augustinus und der Neuplatonismus. 3. Die philosophischen Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik*, Ga. 60, Hg. Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly, and Claudius Strube (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1995). Henceforth abbreviated in the text as Ga 60.
- 5 For a critique of this assumption, see my analysis in "The Art of Christian

Atheism: Faith and Philosophy in Early Heidegger," *Faith and Philosophy* 14 (1997), pp. 71–81.

- 6 For Heidegger, the “hermeneutical situation” represents the conditions of interpreting and understanding; and it is the task of hermeneutic phenomenology to explicate this situation. For a discussion of the “situation” which conditioned his early reading of Aristotle, see Martin Heidegger, “Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation,” Hg. Hans-Ulrich Lessing, in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* 6 (1989), esp. pp. 237–254; “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation,” trans. Michael Baur, in *Man and World* 25 (1992), esp. pp. 358–376.
- 7 We refer to Augustine and the “existentialist” tradition, inclusive of Heidegger, cognizant of the fact that *Sein und Zeit* is not, properly speaking, an “existentialist” anthropology but ultimately an ontological project. Here we are concerned with the *Daseinanalytik* as a self-contained analysis, ‘bracketing’ its ontological telos. Augustine does also play a role in the more properly existentialist movement of Sartre and Camus. See, for instance, Camus’ thesis (submitted for the Diplôme d’études supérieures), *Métaphysique chrétienne et Néoplatonisme* (1936).
- 8 *Soliloquies* 1.1.1; 1.2.7. We follow the Latin text in *Obras de San Augustin*, Tomo I, 3d ed., ed. P. Vicotrino Capanaga (Madrid: BAC, 1957), employing the translation of J.H.S. Burleigh in *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, LCC (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953). Henceforth abbreviated in the text as *Sol*.
- 9 See Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, trans. Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 50.
- 10 We refer to the edition in CCSL XXVII, ed. Lucas Verheijen (Turnhold: Brepols, 1981) and will employ the translation of Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Henceforth abbreviated in the text as C, followed by book, chapter, and paragraph reference.
- 11 Jean-Luc Marion, *God Without Being*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991], p. 97.
- 12 For a lucid consideration of the Augustinian theme of “self-alienation” and its development in western thought, see Edward Booth, OP, *Saint Augustine and the Western Tradition of Self-Knowing* (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1989).
- 13 For a similar development within the phenomenological and Augustinian tradition, see Herman Dooyeweerd, *In the Twilight of Western Thought: Studies in the Pretended Autonomy of Philosophical Thought*, Collected Works, B4, ed. James K.A. Smith (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998), ch. 2, “The Concentric Character of the Self.”
- 14 Below (§ 4a) we will explicate the structure which undergirds this valuation, viz., the distinction between “use” (*uti*) and “enjoyment” (*frui*).
- 15 For a discussion, see Sara Rappe, “Self-Perception in Plotinus and the Later Neoplatonic Tradition,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 71 (1997), pp. 433–450.
- 16 For development of these themes, see my “How (Not) To Tell A Secret: Interiority and the Strategy of ‘Confession,’” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 74 (2000), pp. 135–151, where I also consider the parallels with Kierkegaard’s notion of an “essential secret” and the thematics of “indirect communication.”