

# Cosmological Liturgy and a Sensible Priesthood

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In the field of theological studies, subdivided specialties have been separated from each other with such a watertight seal that those of us who regret such dissociation might find cause to applaud Mr. G. K. Chesterton's assessment of what made for his success as a journalist.

On the whole, I think I owe my success (as the millionaires say) to having listened respectfully and rather bashfully to the very best advice, given by all the best journalists who had achieved the best sort of success in journalism; and then going away and doing the exact opposite. For what they all told me was that the secret of success in journalism was to study the particular journal and write what was suitable to it. And, partly by accident and ignorance and partly through the real rabid certainties of youth, I cannot remember that I ever wrote any article that was at all suitable to any paper .... I wrote on a Nonconformist organ like the old *Daily News* and told them all about French cafés and Catholic cathedrals; and they loved it because they had never heard of them before. I wrote on a robust Labour organ like the old *Clarion* and defended medieval theology and all the things their readers had never heard of; and their readers did not mind me a bit.<sup>1</sup>

I wondered if a person of lesser genius than Chesterton could duplicate this feat. Could I tell liturgical students about medieval scholastic epistemology, and would they love it because they had never heard of it before? Could I tell metaphysicians embroiled in scholastic philosophy about the liturgical consequences of their work, and would they love it because it was a surprising application? And could I write about these things in such a way that readers might not mind me a bit? In my professional world one rarely finds scholastics and liturgists, Latin Catholics and Eastern Orthodox conversing with each other, but in my mind they do constantly, and what follows is the result. I should like to identify a capacity possessed by human beings which is a prerequisite for their liturgical priesthood. I will get at this capacity with a simple illustration and a little epistemology, but the persevering reader will discover a liturgical conclusion soon enough.

There is a word in the English language which, when printed, looks like this: “house.” The word can also be a sound, which the reader can experience if he or she would care to pronounce it aloud now. But words do not exist for the sake of print or speech, rather they exist so that people can mean something with them. What does the word “house” mean? To what does the writer or speaker refer when using that word? To what is the mind pointed? By my very act of asking the question, I hope the reader might now be imagining a variety of edifices: white picket-fenced versions, ranch or Tudor models, types made out of brick or wood or adobe, located in cities or suburbs or on the beach. Each of these edifices is a house. Since that is true, however, since the word can refer to them each and all, the word must therefore have another meaning, as well. The word “house” must be a concept in addition to being a designation. “House” is not only used to point to one particular existing edifice, it is also a concept in the rational mind. How did it get there?

To answer this question, let us perform an imaginative experiment. Let us remove one capacity from the faculty which creates concepts—as if to intentionally cripple the faculty by absenting something it requires—in order to understand the faculty at work. The capacity we shall remove is memory, and the faculty from which we shall remove it is the agent intellect.

Consider how impossible it would be to know without memory. I don’t simply mean the inconvenience of forgetting where the car keys are, or the embarrassment of not remembering someone’s name. What if we had no capacity for memory at all? In such a hypothetical case, we could not even know what this sentence says, because by the time we reached the period at the end we would have forgotten the first word. And under these conditions, the difficulty would not be eased by just writing shorter sentences. Neither would we find ourselves in any better situation in speech. We could not understand a word like “understand,” because without memory there would be nowhere to store the first syllable until we reached the third. And since time is infinitely divisible, it wouldn’t matter if the example was a two syllable word (“matter”) or even a one syllable word (“house”). They all take time to say; time is required to say them; their utterance occurs over time. In my experiment of imagining no memory at all, as opposed to just having a short memory span, one would lack the place to accumulate the parts of an experience.

It would be the same for experiences of the senses. If we were taken to one of the edifices mentioned above and given permission to explore, we could look at the south side, where the front door and mailbox and window-box petunias are to be seen, then go round to the north side to look at the back porch and screen door. Only, in the act of observing the

north side we can no longer perceive the south side. We cannot. We cannot perceive the north side and the south side simultaneously because in addition to being temporal creatures, whose lives are drawn out over the time it takes to read a sentence or pronounce a word, we are also spatial creatures who perceive from one vantage point in the world at a time. Perceptions of the house are received through the senses, and senses come into contact with different parts of an object successively. Thus, we can never see the whole house—all four sides—at once (and I haven't even mentioned the interior yet!). Therefore the idea must exist in the intellect. Our physical eyes do not see a house, they see the north side and the south side, the outside and the inside, the bricks and the beds and the basement. The "house" is constructed in our intellect. The mind is the loom on which the intellect warps and woofs the sensible experiences encountered during our daily time travel. It is where we make sense of the stream of sensations which the body feeds to the soul every minute.

I am not a solipsist for saying this. Do not think that houses only exist in our mind. They exist in the mind because we have been in sensible contact with real houses, but it is the mind which must do work upon what the senses perceive in order to know houses. "Doubtless there is nothing in the intellect which is not originally derived from sensory experience. But it is precisely the activity of the intellect which extricates from sense experience objects which the senses cannot uncover in things and which the intellect sees . . . That is the mystery of abstractive intuition."<sup>2</sup> We have a particular sense image of an external house since we experience this house with all its unique characteristics. And the faculty of the soul which has a power "capable of rendering the natures of material things actually intelligible" is called the agent intellect.<sup>3</sup> A concept, abstracted from the internal image can function as a universal idea, allowing us to speak of all those above mentioned styles of houses.

That we overlook the synthetic cooperation between sense perception and the intellectual conception which is required for knowing may be due to the disintegration of classic scholasticism in philosophers succeeding St. Thomas Aquinas, according to Fr. Joseph Maréchal. The Thomistic synthesis was gradually undermined by Scotus, on the one hand, and Ockham, on the other. "The middle way was barred; it took Kantian Philosophy to reopen it, and this only in part."<sup>4</sup> Hume awoke the German idealist from his dogmatic slumbers by reminding him that sensation should play a role in the formation of concepts, but this is not an original thought.

If this conception of the material function of the sense elements belongs to Kant, who established it against Cartesian ontologism, it had formerly been the common possession of all the scholastic philosophers, since the

most stubborn “dissidents” among them have held the peripatetic tenet that “There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses.” ... St. Thomas carefully avoids suggesting that the intelligence would only be a transposition and a duplicate of the senses. Sensation provides intellection with a starting point and some matter, nothing more. In his seemingly most “sensualistic” formulas he always safeguards the higher formal point of view of the intellect.<sup>5</sup>

For Thomas, writes Etienne Gilson, knowledge is the result of an action exerted upon us by some object, that is true. To know something means we are in some way impressed by it, and since the senses are passive, sense knowledge consists of knowing what impresses itself on the senses. But intellectual knowledge comes about by exercise of a twofold power. ‘First, a passive one similar to that of sense, for if nothing is acting upon it, the intellect has no object to know; next, an active power which enables the intellect to combine and distinguish its own concepts after it has formed them, and to do so in an active way, so to speak, at will.’<sup>6</sup> The intellect is active inasmuch as it forms an abstract notion; the qualities of the house impress themselves on the senses, but the concept “house” is not received, it is created. Of course it is not created in isolation from the sense perceptions of particular houses, with particular colours, and particular shapes, because our sense knowledge of the house consists of its colour, its size, the brick’s tactile roughness, but an internal image is formed from these particulars, and from that internal image a universal is abstracted. To refer to such universals is one use of certain words. Houses are material, but “house” is a concept, and to speak that word as a universal (with meaning, and not like a parrot would pronounce the phoneme) requires a being capable of conceptualization.

Everything in language is material except its meaning ... Thomas inquired into the conditions under which the fundamental fact of human language becomes possible. These conditions can be found nowhere else than in the structure of the knowing subject. There is only one subject able to turn sense perceptions of particular objects into signs of general notions—namely, man.<sup>7</sup>

Now here comes the liturgical conclusion of this foray into philosophers’ stone houses: without *anthropos*, the sensible world would not be known intellectually, and the splendour of the created world would not be mediated into the cosmic praise of God. Without *anthropos*, this material cosmos would not serve sacramentally or be offered eucharistically to God. Angels can understand the sensible world, and animals can experience it, but only *anthropos* is an embodied spirit who can both perceive and know the material world. Man and woman are the

cosmic priests of the visible world, and add the splendour of the created matter to the celestial praise of God when they offer it up in “reasonable worship” (Rom 12:1—*logiken latreian*). “Alongside ‘kosmos noetos’ (the intelligible world) Holy Tradition sets ‘kosmos aisthetos’ (the sensible world). This latter encompasses the whole realm of what belongs to the senses in the sacraments, in the liturgy, in icons, and in the lived experience of God ... The beautiful then is as a shining forth, an epiphany, of the mysterious depths of being, of that interiority that is a witness to the intimate relation between the body and the soul.”<sup>8</sup> The liturgical role of man and woman depends upon the twin capacities of sense and intellect, body and soul. It is a liturgy which neither angel nor animal can celebrate.

On the one hand, the angels know the idea of “house” even better than we do, however they do not receive that idea from brick and mortar, but directly from the mind of God. “Were we angels, instead of men, we would intuitively apprehend intelligible essences by means of innate intelligible species, without having to animate a body, to receive sensations, and to abstract from them general concepts.”<sup>9</sup> Thomas explains that the angels know in this manner because of their incorporeality and because of their proximity to God. God is the highest source of things, and as such, all things pre-exist supersubstantially in God.

Among other creatures the angels are nearest to God, and resemble Him most. Consequently, all material things pre-exist in the angels more simply and less materially even than in themselves, yet in a more manifold manner and less perfectly than in God ... Therefore, as God knows material things by His essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their intelligible species.<sup>10</sup>

Angels are beings with whom God shares the concept he has in mind, while humans are beings who know the idea of “house” in synthesis with their sense perception. This is due to a capacity which C. S. Lewis, in the spirit of Thomas, reminds us to celebrate.

Bless the body .... But for our body one whole realm of God’s glory—all that we receive through the senses—would go unpraised. For the beasts can’t appreciate it and angels are, I suppose, pure intelligences. They *understand* colours and tastes better than our greatest scientists; but have they retinas or palates? I fancy the “beauties of nature” are a secret God has shared with us alone. That may be one of the reasons why we were made—and why the resurrection of the body is an important doctrine.<sup>11</sup>

Beauty is the splendour of truth, because beauty, says Paul Evdokimov, “is not only an aesthetical reality but also metaphysical.” Splendour is inherent in truth, but not in some abstract truth. “In its fullness, truth

requires a personalization and seeks to be 'enhypostazied,' that is, rooted and grounded in a person."<sup>12</sup> The human person who by the intellectual faculty can perceive truth in objects (i.e. perceive objects truly) can then offer up the splendour of the *kosmos aisthetos* to God. The visible world is the ecstatic splendour of a God who overflowed himself, and it desires a being who, by knowing its truth, knows its splendour and can reflect it back to God (splendour derives from *splendêre* which means "to shine").

On the other hand, since animals function in the world successfully they must have an image of it in memory, but they do not "know" the idea of "house" in the manner human beings know. The reason *anthropos*—of all beings in the universe—is called microcosm is because this being, the human being, is equipped for both sense perception and intellectual vision. Microcosmic does not mean a fractionated part of a whole (a kitchen is not the microcosm of a house), it means everything to be found in the whole is to be found on a smaller order (a dollhouse is the microcosm of a house). *Anthropos* is microcosmic because in men and women is found everything that can be found in the entire cosmos: both matter and spirit. Gregory Nazianzus said God produced a being endowed with both natures, the visible and invisible. "... Thus in some way a new universe was born, small and great at one and the same time. God set this hybrid worshipper on earth to contemplate the visible world, and to be initiated into the invisible; to reign over earth's creatures, and to obey orders from on high."<sup>13</sup> No other creature is enrolled as citizen in both realms. As microcosm, *anthropos* was to be royal priest, ruling over matter in the light of God; men and women were created with the capacity to recognize the *logoi* of material things.<sup>14</sup> There is a world to be celebrated. The angels know it, but cannot experience it; the animals experience it, but cannot know it, in this sense. Only man and woman praise God for a world taken in through the senses and wondered at by the intellect.

"[T]he tradition of the Fathers has never admitted the existence of a material world apart from a larger creation, from a spiritual universe. To speak more precisely, for them the world, a whole and a unity, is inseparably matter and spirit. What we call the material world is only the reflection of a reflection. The world is primarily a living, free projection of the Ideas of God, all up till that point collected together in his divine Logos."<sup>15</sup> These Ideas became a choir of created spirits which are, in turn, the image of the Logos, the uncreated image of the Eternal Father. The visible world is administered by the invisible world, and tradition therefore thinks "of the material universe as ... the fringe of their garment: the waves of its light are like the scintillating robe with which the Creator has been pleased to adorn his invisible creature."<sup>16</sup>

And through this whole chain of Creation—extending from the triune fellowship of the divine persons, through the angelic hierarchy and to the least material creature—is to flow the creative *Agape* of God, and, in response, creation's *eucharistia*. That is the very definition of hierarchy, as Dionysius reminds us.

The goal of a hierarchy, then, is to enable beings to be as like as possible to God and to be one with him. A hierarchy has God as its leader of all understanding and action. Is forever looking directly at the comeliness of God. A hierarchy bears in itself the mark of God. Hierarchy causes its members to be images of God in all respects, to be clear and spotless mirrors reflecting the glow of primordial light and indeed of God himself. It ensures that when its members have received this full and divine splendour they can then pass on this light generously and in accordance with God's will to beings further down the scale.<sup>17</sup>

The command given in Genesis to have dominion over creation, then, does not mean human beings would dominate nature by imposing their own will upon it; it is a liturgical command, and liturgy is hierarchical. It means that, filled with divine splendour, man and woman would rule in accordance with God's will and pass on this light generously to the worlds beneath them. Thus the material world would be in the Kingdom, i.e. under the rule of God. Fr. Louis Bouyer compares this hierarchy to “an infinitely generous heart, beating with an unceasing diastole and systole, first diffusing the divine glory in paternal love, then continually gathering it up again to its immutable source in filial love.”<sup>18</sup>

This capacity as hybrid worshipper, both body and spirit, is the anthropological potential for the incarnation. The incarnation is not an after-thought of God, or simply an act of damage control. From the moment God produced a creature endowed with both natures, the mystery was under way (i.e. economized) toward incarnation. God would appear in the midst of his ecstatic product, material creation. Nicholas Cabasilas said that God created humanity in order to find a mother. But the Fall put a obstacle in the economy because the nature the Logos had planned on assuming became carnal:

Know then that you are double  
and that you possess two eyes,  
the sensible and the spiritual.  
Since there are also two suns  
there is also a double light,  
sensible and spiritual,  
and if you see them, you will be the man  
as you were created in the beginning to be.<sup>19</sup>



There could be no flaw in the material creation which could upset this hierarchical and iconic beauty, for God is the master of matter. But there could be, and was, a movement in the spiritual creation which could, and did, upset this beauty. There was a spirit which refrained from being attracted by the beauty of God. Lucifer was prince of this world, the morning star, the created power “on whom the last wave of light broke, the last echo of the great Eucharist resounded .... What happened then? What has intervened? Simply, pride.” The devil and those who followed him “formed a screen against the spontaneous movement of response which was rising up to the Creator from the remotest strata of creation, so eager were they to attract this to themselves.”<sup>20</sup> The fall of the angel, like the fall of *anthropos*, is a spiritual act: it is to desire what God deserves, to desire something other than God, to seize *theosis* instead of receiving it in God’s good time. By this fundamental lie, Lucifer situated himself in the place of the Logos. What was God to do?

God gave to the world “an extension which was not foreseen by the angels God raised up, in the very heart of that physical creation which had been defiled by a pure spirit, a spirit, clothed in flesh indeed, but whose innocence could restore the universe.”<sup>21</sup> A new spirit emerged from matter itself. An incarnate spirit. God breathed spiritual life into clay and made *anthropos*. This is a spirit “which will embrace matter in the ascensional movement of its own creation, and will establish it once more in the cycle of thanksgiving, of the cosmic eucharist which has been frustrated by Satan. Thus the World, fallen with its prince, will be liberated from darkness and death by one who was the very child of earth ...”<sup>22</sup> But Lucifer, who knows no humility, becomes enraged with hatred for the human race, as everyone who has suffered his onslaughts knows. Though he is incapable of touching the deep springs of *anthropos*’ intelligence and freedom, he has more than enough room to manoeuvre in the realm of sensual delight, and approaches the Woman and then the Man as Satan, “the Tempter.”

Man will yield. The potential redeemer of the earth will be the supreme conquest of the rebel spirit. Satan, incapable of repressing, will prove himself, alas, only too capable of seducing that liberty which he had felt surge up beneath him, as a possible taking back by God of the empire which the demon had stolen from him. And that is the second drama, an extension of the first: the fall of man re-echoes the fall of Satan. Instead of the world, in man, being snatched away from the empire of the devil, it was now, through man, thrown into the bondage of sin and death.<sup>23</sup>

When this happened, matter was affected. Matter cannot fulfil its function by consequence of the fall of *anthropos*. By turning their backs on the Creator, man and woman have made the creation nonsacramental.



That is why it groans in travail, waiting for the redemption of *anthropos*.  
St. Ephrem describes the reaction of the sun to human idolatry.

The sun bellowed out in silence to the Lord against his worshippers.  
It was a suffering for him, the servant, that instead of his Lord he was  
worshipped.  
Behold the creation is joyful that the Creator is worshipped...  
Since fools honoured the sun, they diminished him in his honour.  
Now that they know he is a servant, by his course he worships his Lord.  
All the servants are glad to be counted servants.  
Blessed is he who set the natures in order!  
We have done perverse things that we should be servants to servants.<sup>24</sup>

Biblical symbolism is rigorously concrete. "The psalms describe a sort of sacred dance in which 'the mountains jump around like rams and the hills like lambs' (Ps 114:4). This is not a simple allegory but the secret aspiration of every living thing ..."<sup>25</sup> No thing is evil; but no thing is unaffected by the injury *anthropos* has done it when he failed his liturgical vocation. The tradition is candid to profess that spirit can have such an effect on matter. "The Fall has its origins in the angelic world of pure spirits; evil, therefore, does not come from matter. It is the spirit which has profaned matter by turning it into an idol. Carnal sin is essentially the sin of the spirit against the flesh."<sup>26</sup>

We may be brief with the next chapter in the economy, because it is simply the Gospel. The Son became flesh in order to do what *anthropos* failed to do in the flesh. Jesus Christ is splendidous in human nature, and when his human nature, body and soul, ascends to heaven he restores eucharistic movement to the material cosmos, and makes it again a medium for the Father's *agape*. The world's liturgical capacity is released once more. The earth and the heavens are the substructure of a new humanity in the Kingdom's new earth and new heavens. "In the economy of the Incarnation, the spiritual and the corporeal have been integrated together," and at liturgy embodied spirits "hear sung chants, contemplate visible icons, smell incense, receive through the senses and eat matter in the sacraments."<sup>27</sup> The anthropologically mediated material liturgy is merged with the Christologically mediated eternal liturgy because the Son of God is also the Son of Man. The Son has included the material world in his eternal, filial liturgy, elevating matter to its real dignity and destiny.

The final destiny of water is to participate in the mystery of the Epiphany; of wood, to become a cross; of the earth, to receive the body of the Lord during his rest on the Great Sabbath .... Olive oil and water attain their fullness as conductor elements for grace on regenerated man. Wheat and wine achieve their ultimate *raison d'être* in the eucharistic

chalice ... The liturgy integrates the most elementary actions of life: drinking, eating, washing, speaking, acting, communing ... It restores to them their meaning and true destiny, that is, to be blocks in the cosmic temple of God's glory.<sup>28</sup>

All this is the fulfilment of the anthropological capacity and the cosmos' material potential. "The Church is nothing other than the world in the course of transfiguration ...".<sup>29</sup>

Being aware of this liturgy is not enough. To participate in Christ's liturgy and be restored to our vocation as eucharistic priests of the material cosmos requires more than understanding. Though ignorance is a sizable part of the problem, the passions are now what stand between us and our cosmic priesthood, so not until the passions are overcome can we share the work of the *eskata Adam*. A prerequisite for committing liturgy is the asceticism to which baptism leads. Fr. Aidan Kavanagh used to say that liturgy is doing the world the way the world was meant to be done, and until we discipline our proclivity to twist all things egocentrically, we cannot raise our hands in true *orans*. Evagrius of Pontus said the ascetical battle (*praktike*) which leads toward control of the passions (*apatheia*) enables one to see the world correctly (*physike*) and attain union with God (*theologia*) by prayer of the heart.<sup>30</sup> It would seem, then, that between being an ascetic and a theologian, one must become a physician. Not the medical kind. And not the scientific kind, either. This is the kind of physics which heals (like the former) by means of knowing the world (like the latter). A true physician knows the world to be a temple. "In the final analysis, we are talking of the ascetical rehabilitation of matter as the substratum of the resurrection and the medium in which all epiphanies take place."<sup>31</sup>

Maximus the Confessor counselled "Seek the reason why God created, for this is true knowledge."<sup>32</sup> This is essential knowledge in order to perform human liturgy. Let the angels do an ideal liturgy; it is enough for us to accomplish a sensible one.

- 1 *The Autobiography*, vol. XVI of *The Collected Works of G. K. Chesterton* (Ignatius Press, San Francisco, 1988) 177.
- 2 Jacques Maritain, *The Range of Reason* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952) 9.
- 3 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 54, 4.
- 4 *A Maréchal Reader*, edited and translated by Joseph Donceel, S.J. (New York: Herder & Herder, 1970) 21. Maréchal was a pioneer of the neo-Thomistic revival at the beginning of this century, dying in 1944, and one of the first and few Catholic philosophers to take Kant seriously. He modestly entitled his complex ruminations on philosophy *Cahiers*, which means "student's notebook," and Donceel's reader takes from these five *Cahiers*.

- 5 Ibid., 116.
- 6 Etienne Gilson, *The Elements of Christian Philosophy* (New York: Mentor-Omega Books, 1960) 114.
- 7 Ibid., 242, 243.
- 8 Paul Evdokimov, *The Art of the Icon. A Theology of Beauty* (Redondo Beach, California Oakwood Publications. 1990) 26.
- 9 Gilson., 248.
- 10 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 57,1 Jacques Maritain accuses Descartes of committing “the sin of angelism” when he “conceived human Thought after the type of angelic Thought.” *Three Reformers. Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* (New York: Thomas Crowell Company, Apollo Edition 1970).
- 11 C.S. Lewis. *Letters to Malcolm* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1964) 18–19.
- 12 Evdokimov 23, 24.
- 13 Cited in Olivier Clément, *The Roots of Christian Mysticism* (New York: New York City Press, 1996) 77.
- 14 This is reflected in the Biblical myth of Adam naming the animals: he called things as they are.
- 15 Louis Bouyer. *The Meaning of Monasticism* (London: Burns & Oates, 1955) 28
- 16 Ibid.
- 17 Dionysius. *The Celestial Hierarchy*, ch 3:2
- 18 Bouyer. 29.
- 19 Symeon the New Theologian, *Hymns of Divine Love*, transl. George A. Maloney (Denville. N.J.: Dimension Books. 1976)123. This is an appropriate place at which to mention the Immaculate Conception of the woman from whom God would take the human nature by which to make this appearance in material creation. “For the first time in the plan of salvation and because his Spirit had prepared her, the Father found the *dwelling place* where his Son and his Spirit could dwell among men” (CCC 721). Far from declaring Mary inhuman, this doctrine claims she is, by the grace of the very Logos she bears, a completely human nature. Her nature is complete, not fallen; she is the humanity which Adam should have offered his Lord, but didn’t preserve, so Mary, full of grace, was preserved from sin. The Immaculate Conception makes her an exception to the human race only if we believe that our fallen human nature is normal. Mary’s conception is abnormal only if we think that sin is normal. Edward Schillebeeckx says we are mistaken if we think Mary is exempt from redemption, for every human being needs redeeming, but in Mary’s case, it is redemption by exemption from sin. (*Mary, Mother of the Redemption* (New York: Sheed & War, 1964). As Symeon says, “If you see the double light, spiritual and sensible, you will be the man as you were created in the beginning to be.” Adam wasn’t; Mary was. Adam was blind in one eye, Mary is a human person being fully human. She is *anthropos* as man and woman were meant to be: fully microcosmic, hybrid, halfway between greatness and nothingness, at once earthly and heavenly, contemplator of the visible world and simultaneously initiated into the invisible (which is

- probably why legend said she was raised in the temple of Jerusalem, perfecting her vision among God's optometrists, the Jews). Mary is *anthropos* fully alive, fully participatory in God; that's why she's glorified.
- 20 Bouyer, 30.
- 21 Bouyer, 31. That God would give dominion over creation to Adam and Eve instead of Lucifer surprised the fallen angels; that God would exercise his own dominion over creation as a New Adam surprised the good angels. St. Chrysostom writes, "St. Paul speaks here of a mystery, because not even the angels knew it. The angels only knew that the Lord had chosen His people as His portion ... That is why we need not be surprised that they did not know this, since, properly speaking, it is the Gospel. God had said He would save His people Israel, but had said nothing about the nations. The angels knew that the nations were called, but could not imagine that they would be called to the same end and would be seated upon the throne of God." Cited in Jean Daniélou. *The Angels and Their Mission* (Maryland: Christian Classics, 1976) 33.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 Bouyer, 32. Thomas' formal reason for why God alone can move the will goes as follows: "A thing is by nature capable of being moved by, and of undergoing a passion from, an agent with a form by which the thing can be reduced to act, for every agent acts through its form. But the will is reduced to act by the desirable object which gives rest to its desire. Now, the will's desire finds rest in the divine good only Therefore, God alone can move the will in the fashion of an agent." *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Part II, ch 88.3. Of course, the importance for the argument is found in the question, "Whether the Devil is the Cause of Sin? *On Evil*, Question III, Article 3.
- 24 St. Ephrem, "Hymns on the Nativity," *Ephrem the Syrian. Hymns* (New York: Paulist Press, Classics of Western Spirituality. 1989), p. 180–81.
- 25 Evdokimov, 107.
- 26 Evdokimov, 104.
- 27 Evdokimov, 28.
- 28 Evdokimov, 117.
- 29 Olivier Clément, *The Roots of Christian Mysticism* (New York: New York City Press, 1996) 95.
- 30 See Evagrius Ponticus, *The Praktikos & Chapters on Prayer*, transl. John Eudes Bamberger (Kalamazoo: Cistercian Publications, 1981) and Jeremy Driscoll, *The 'Ad Monachos' of Evagrius Ponticus* (Rome: Studia Anselmiana 104, 1991).
- 31 Evdokimov, 28.
- 32 Maximus the Confessor, "The Four Hundred Chapters on Love," 4:5 in *Maximus Confessor: Selected Writings* (New York: Paulist Press, The Classics of Western Spirituality, 1985), p.76.