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The Attitudes of Russian Officials in the 1880s Toward Jewish Assimilation and Emigration

The significance of the reign of Alexander III as a turning point in the history of Russian Jewry is beyond dispute. This reign witnessed a sharp deterioration in the Jews' economic, social, and political condition. Jewish hopes for emancipation from the prevailing discriminatory legislation were dashed. Instead of emancipation, the Jews were presented with new restrictions, on their residence rights, educational opportunities, economic and professional pursuits, and participation in the institutions of local government. Faced with starvation, many thousands of Jews chose to leave the Russian Empire. Others chose to convert to Christianity in order to throw off the yoke of persecution. Moving in the opposite direction, many Jewish intellectuals who had previously believed in the beneficial results to be achieved by assimilation began to question this assumption. Some began to turn to Zionism. Others turned to active Jewish self-defense.

Historians of Russian Jewry have been deeply impressed by these developments. Most have subscribed to the interpretation of Russian policy found in a statement generally attributed to Konstantin P. Pobedonostsev, director general of the Holy Synod and influential adviser of Alexander III and Nicholas II. According to this statement, the government expected one-third of Russia's Jews to die out, one-third to emigrate, and one-third to convert to Christianity.¹ How accurate a reflection of official thinking in the 1880s is

1. See, for example, Robert F. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought* (Bloomington, 1968), p. 207; Michael Davitt, *Within the Pale: The True Story of Anti-Semitic Persecutions in Russia* (New York and Philadelphia, 1903), pp. 49–50; Semen Markovich Dubnow, *History of the Jews in Russia and Poland*, trans. I. Friedlaender, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1916–20), 3:10; Leo Errera, *The Russian Jews: Extermination or Emancipation?*, trans. Bella Loewy (London, 1894), p. 18; A. S. Rappoport, "Pobedonostsev, the Apostle of Absolutism and Orthodoxy," *Fortnightly Review*, n.s., 81 (May 1, 1907): 871; Yehuda Slutsky, "Pobedonostsev, Konstantin Petrovich," in *Encyclopedia Judaica* (Jerusalem, 1971), 13:664–65; Yehuda Slutsky, "Russia," in *Encyclopedia Judaica*, 14:446; Edward C. Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Seattle, 1964), pp. 199, 248.

Thaden states, "Pobedonostsev made this remark in the course of a conversation

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this popular description? Have historians, judging by the results of Russian law, interpreted the intentions of Russian officials accurately?

The reactionary Jewish policy adopted under Alexander III paralleled the reactionary relapse which took place all along the line in Russian policy during the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth. Still, Alexander III's reign does not present a picture of unrelieved reaction and anti-Semitism. In contemporary discussions of Jewish policy an unexpected diversity of well-developed and well-articulated viewpoints is to be found. Officials supported and elaborated arguments both for and against Jewish emancipation. The debates among officials indicate that the question of Jewish emancipation was more open, and the potential for continuing and even going beyond Alexander II's liberal policies was greater, than one might deduce from a mere review of the manner in which Russian Jews were treated during the period. But this potential for a liberal policy was not realized. Those officials who opposed Jewish emancipation determined Russian policy. They will be the main focus of attention in the following pages.

A significant number of reports and debates on the Jewish question were produced during the 1880s. Count P. I. Kutaisov, who was sent on special assignment by the tsar, and various local officials submitted reports on the anti-Jewish pogroms that took place in the spring of 1881. In the fall of that year special commissions (*gubernskie kommissii*) were established in each guberniia of the Pale of Jewish Settlement to debate the Jewish question. In addition, a Committee on the Jews, attached to the minister of the interior, Count N. P. Ignatiev, was established in St. Petersburg. At the beginning of March 1882 the Committee of Ministers debated the minister of the interior's proposals for new anti-Jewish legislation. As a result of this debate a High Commission for the Review of Existing Laws Concerning the Jews in the Empire was established in February 1883. Count K. I. Pahlen served as its president after the early death of L. S. Makov. The High Commission continued its work, receiving reports and conducting debates until May 1888. Through these reports and debates the official thinking in the 1880s can be analyzed in some detail.

The notion that Russian officials thought extermination or partial extermination of the Jews a legitimate aim for Russian policy can be dismissed

with Alexander Zederbaum, the editor of the Jewish journal *Hamelitz*." His source for this statement is Rappoport. Byrnes, who carefully gives references for the preceding and the following paragraphs, as well as for almost every other paragraph in the chapter, gives no references for the paragraph in which he cited the "one-third" statement. According to Errera, "The iniquitous saying . . . is attributed to him [Pobedonostsev]. . . . But we need not inquire as to whether M. Pobedonostsev did actually pronounce these words or not: the acts which he has inspired and still continues to prompt being unhappily sufficiently eloquent."

rather quickly. From the available reports of both public and private opinions of officials, it appears that such a policy was simply never discussed. Sergei Witte recorded in his memoirs how he once told Alexander III that if one admitted the impossibility of drowning all the Russian Jews in the Black Sea—as one must, according to Witte’s obvious, though tacit, assumption—then one must recognize their right to live and so create conditions “which will enable them to carry on a human existence.” He went on to say, “In that case, gradual abolition of the disabilities is the only adequate solution of the Jewish problem.” Then he added, “His Majesty said nothing, but he never showed that he disapproved of my attitude toward the Russian Jews.”² In Witte’s view, then, Alexander III in no way contemplated the extermination of Russian Jewry.

Support is lent to this notion by the dismay and disapproval Alexander expressed privately in regard to the 1881–82 pogroms, which resulted in the deaths of some Jews and could have resulted in the deaths of many more. In a notation on a report dated April 27, 1881, Alexander labeled the riots “very deplorable” (*ves'ma priskorbno*) and called for order to be restored as quickly as possible. On April 28 he called the participation of a military officer in the riots “disgraceful” (*bezobrazie*). On April 30 Alexander found “very sad and disturbing” the report that troops sent to quell the riots would probably have preferred to attack the Jews. He was “surprised” by reports of the population’s “deep hatred” of the Jews. The tsar thought the rioters, and especially the instigators, should be punished swiftly and severely, and he called the inefficiency and lack of skill of the administration in suppressing the riots “very sad” (*ves'ma grustno*). Insofar as can be determined from the available evidence, only in a notation on a report dated May 10, 1883, did Alexander express anti-Semitic opinions. There he wrote, “Very sad, but I see no end to this; these Jews make themselves too repulsive [*slishkom oprotiveli*] to Russians, and as long as they continue to exploit Christians this hatred will not diminish.”³ While sharply critical of the Jews, these words are not those of a man contemplating genocide.

In a letter to Alexander III, dated June 6, 1881, even Pobedonostsev expressed opposition to the anti-Jewish pogroms, in line with his opposition to all forms of popular disorder and mass passion.⁴ Some writers have accused

2. S. Iu. Vitte, *Vospominaniia: Tsarstvovanie Nikolaia II*, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1922), 1:188–89; Count Serge Iulievich Witte, *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, trans. and ed. Abraham Yarmolinsky (Garden City, N.Y., 1921), p. 376.

3. R. M. Kantor, “Aleksandr III o evreiskikh pogromakh 1881–83 gg.,” *Evreiskaia letopis'*, 1 (1923): 150, 152, 154, 156.

4. K. P. Pobedonostsev, *Pis'ma K. P. Pobedonostseva k Aleksandru III*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1925), 1:344. Also see Hans Rogger, “The Jewish Policy of Late Tsarism:

Minister of the Interior Ignatiev of actively supporting the pogrom movement. But in his official capacity, at least, he found it necessary to condemn popular violence, even if it was directed against the Jews.⁵ Count Dmitrii Tolstoy, minister of the interior from June 1882 to June 1889, issued a circular early in his ministry holding local officials personally responsible for the outbreak of anti-Jewish disorders. The pogrom epidemic ceased quickly thereafter.⁶

Apart from active violence there was the possibility of extermination by starvation. Indeed, the poverty of many Jews in late nineteenth-century Russia threatened them with starvation. Proemancipation officials often spoke of this dire poverty, which they thought Russia's Jewish policy had created.⁷ But none of them saw it as an intentional aim of the government. State Secretary E. A. Peretts, in his diary entry of November 16, 1882, accused ex-Minister of the Interior Ignatiev and others of having wanted the "almost total destruction of the Jews" (*chut' ne pogolovnogo istrebleniia evreev*).⁸ This judgment can be taken literally. Its context, however, suggests that it should be interpreted as Peretts's subjective evaluation of what the potential results of Ignatiev's program were—that is, it might cause the destruction of the Jews' economic position and thus their physical well-being. In practice many Jews starved. This fact has, of course, greatly concerned historians of Russian Jewry, as well as proemancipation officials, but such a result was

A Reappraisal," *Wiener Library Bulletin*, 25, nos. 1 and 2 (1971): 44; Byrnes, *Pobednostsev*, pp. 207–8.

5. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:272, 312–14; Iulii I. Gessen, "Graf N. P. Ignat'ev i 'vremennyya pravila' o evreiakh 3 maia 1882 goda," *Pravo, ezhenedel'naia iuridicheskaia gazeta*, no. 30 (July 27, 1908), p. 1632; Iulii I. Gessen, *Zakon i zhizn': Kak sotsialist' ogranichitel'nye zakony o zhitel'stve evreev v Rossii* (St. Petersburg, 1911), p. 154; Rogger, "Jewish Policy," pp. 44–45.

6. David V. Chichinadze, ed., *Sbornik tsirkuliarov Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del za 1880–1884 gg.* (St. Petersburg, 1886), pp. 283–84; Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2: 314–17; Rogger, "Jewish Policy," p. 44; Hans Rogger, "Tsarist Policy on Jewish Emigration," *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, 3, no. 1 (1973): 29.

7. See, for example, Pavel Pavlovich Demidoff [Demidov], prince of San Donato, *The Jewish Question in Russia*, 2nd ed., trans. J. Michell (London, 1884), pp. 80–91; Iulii I. Gessen, "Graf N. P. Ignat'ev i 'vremennyya pravila' o evreiakh 3 maia 1882 goda," *Pravo, ezhenedel'naia iuridicheskaia gazeta*, no. 31 (Aug. 3, 1908), p. 1679; Gessen, *Zakon i zhizn'*, p. 157; Nikolai Dmitrievich Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia na zapisku kniazai Golitsynnykh o cherte osedlosti evreev* (St. Petersburg, 1886), pp. 115–16, 155; A. P. Subbotin, *Obshchaia zapiska po evreiskomu voprosu* (St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 78, 120–21, 124–26, 130, 140, 151, 193–94; *Trudy Vilenskoï Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 1, pt. 1 of *Trudy Gubernskikh Kommissii po evreiskomu voprosu*, 2 parts (St. Petersburg, 1884), pp. 96–98, 104–5, 108 (hereafter *TGK*); *Trudy Vitebskoï Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 4, pt. 1 of *TGK*, pp. 6–7; *Obshchaia zapiska Vyssheï Kommissii dlia peresmotra deistvuiushchikh o evreiakh v Imperii zakonov (1883–1888)* ([St. Petersburg?], [1888]), pp. 119–21, 150–56, 281–82.

8. Egor Abramovich Peretts, *Dnevnik E. A. Perettsa (1880–1883)*, ed. A. A. Sergeev (Moscow and Leningrad, 1927), p. 141.

probably not the intention of antiemancipation officials or the government as a whole.

The notion that Russian officials thought expulsion or partial expulsion an acceptable and feasible way to deal with the Jews is less easy to dismiss. It might be assumed that many antiemancipation officials, considering the difficulty of getting Jews to assimilate, viewed the continued existence of the Pale of Jewish Settlement as a solution to the Jewish question preferable to allowing Jews to settle everywhere in the empire, but less desirable than excluding them from Russia altogether. For these officials, one might expect, Jewish emigration raised the prospect that Russia would eventually get rid of all or almost all her Jews. As M. L. Peskovsky, a Russian publicist of the period, noted, for ten years prior to 1881 the Judeophobe press had called for measures to encourage Jewish emigration, on the assumption that the exclusion from Russia of all Jews was the simplest and best means of solving the Jewish question.⁹ Clearly the idea of encouraging Jews to emigrate was not unknown at the time, and was even popular in some circles. This being so, one would imagine that if officials wanted to rid Russia of her Jews, then they would have widely repeated the suggestion of the Judeophobe press.

A number of historians of Russian Jewry have indeed painted such a picture of Russian officialdom. S. M. Dubnow and Louis Greenberg are foremost among those who have argued that many Russian officials did want to get rid of the Jews. Both of them quoted the Kiev public prosecutor, Strelnikov, who said in a speech on May 18, 1881, "If the Eastern frontier is closed to the Jews, the Western frontier is open to them; why don't they take advantage of it?"¹⁰ Both quoted Ignatiev, who in January 1882 said, "The Western frontier is open for the Jews."¹¹ In Dubnow's view, "The Jews were publicly told that the Government wished to get rid of them, and that the only 'right' they were to be granted was the right to depart; that no enlargement of the Pale of Settlement could possibly be hoped for, and that only as an extreme necessity would the Government allow groups of Jews to colonize the uninhabitable steppes of Central Asia or the swamps of Siberia."¹² Later Ignatiev denied

9. Matvei Leontevich Peskovsky, *Rokovoe nedorazumenie: Evreiskii vopros, ego mirovaia istoriia i estestvennyi put' k razresheniiu* (St. Petersburg, 1891), p. 388.

10. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:264–65; Louis Greenberg, *The Jews in Russia*, 2 vols. (New Haven, 1944–51), 2:25. Also see Iu. Gessen and S. Pozner, "Aleksandr III," in *Evreiskaia entsiklopediia* (St. Petersburg, 1906–13), 1:838, and I. D. Sosis, "K istorii antievreiskogo dvizheniia v tsarskoi Rossii," *Trudy Belorusskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta v gorode Minske (Pratsy)*, no. 12 (1926), p. 86.

11. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:285; Greenberg, *Jews in Russia*, 2:62. Also see *Evr. ents.*, 1:838, and Samuel Joseph, *Jewish Immigration to the United States from 1881–1910*, vol. 59, no. 4, whole no. 145 of *Studies in History, Economics, and Public Law*, ed. Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University (New York, 1914), p. 68.

12. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:285.

making such a statement,¹³ and even told one Jewish leader that “the endeavors to stimulate emigration [were] ‘an incitement to sedition,’ on the ground that ‘emigration does not exist for Russian citizens.’”¹⁴ In any case, some Jewish leaders of the time, and Dubnow and Greenberg after them, believed that Ignatiev’s remark encouraging Jewish emigration was the true expression of the government’s aim—to rid Russia of her Jews.¹⁵

According to Dubnow, after Ignatiev left office in May 1882 the government abandoned its plans to promote Jewish emigration. Then, at the end of the 1880s, it once again became interested in this idea. In 1888 and 1890 the governors of Podolia and Kiev Guberniias argued in reports to their superiors that “the removal of the Jewish proletariat [that is, the mass of Jews] from the monarchy would be very desirable”; and Alexander III added in a marginal note, “and even very useful.”¹⁶ Dubnow went on to state, “Whereas in the course of the eighties the Russian Government wished to give the impression as if it merely ‘tolerated’ the departure of the Jews from Russia—although in reality it was the ultimate aim of its policies—in the beginning of the nineties it suddenly cast off its mask and gave its public sanction to a Jewish exodus from the Russian Empire.”¹⁷

At the beginning of 1890, with I. N. Durnovo as minister of the interior, the Palestine colonization movement was legalized when the constitution of the Society for Granting Assistance to Jewish Colonists and Artisans in Syria and Palestine was sanctioned. On May 8, 1892, the government sanctioned the establishment in Russia of branches of Baron Maurice de Hirsch’s Jewish Colonization Association, which was to aid Jewish emigration to Argentina. The government agreed to help by issuing free emigration permits to emigrants sponsored by this association and by relieving them of their responsibility to be available for military service, on the condition that they must never return to Russia.¹⁸ Apparently, then, after 1890 the government welcomed Jewish emigration. According to Dubnow, “It may be easily understood how sympathetically the Government received the proposal of the Jewish Colonization Association in London, which had been founded by Baron de Hirsch in

13. G. Ia. Krasnyi-Admoni, ed., *Materialy dlia istorii antievreiskikh pogromov v Rossii*, vol. 2: *Vos’midesiatye gody, 12 aprcl’ 1881–29 fevral’ 1882* (Petrograd and Moscow, 1923), p. 526.

14. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:306.

15. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:306–7; Greenberg, *Jews in Russia*, 2:62.

16. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:414; *Evr. ents.*, 1:838; Komitet Ministrov, Kantseliariia, *Istoricheskii obzor deiatel’nosti Komiteta Ministrov*, 5 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1902), 4:184; Rogger, “Tsarist Policy,” p. 30.

17. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:377. Also see *Evr. ents.*, 1:837–38.

18. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:419–21. Also see “Evrei,” in *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar’* (Moscow, 1911–34), 30:461; *Evr. ents.*, 1:838; Joseph, *Jewish Immigration*, pp. 64, 68, 82–83.

1891, to remove in the course of twenty-five years 3,250,000 Jews from Russia," especially since the official estimate of the total number of Russian Jews was 3,250,000.¹⁹

Another writer on Russian Jewish history took the same view. Writing in 1903, Michael Davitt reported that an "educated Russian official," whom Davitt considered a representative of Russian officialdom, told him, "A fusion with us [Russians] is impossible. . . . The only solution of the problems of the Russian Jew is his departure from Russia."²⁰ Davitt also cited the "one-third" statement often attributed to Pobedonostsev. He reported, when noting the strikingly large Jewish emigration from Russia, that there was a "saying attributed to a conspicuous personality in the Tsar's confidence, that the Russian Jewish question would be ultimately solved by the action of the 'May Laws,' as these would force one-third of the Jews to emigrate; one-third more would become converted to the Orthodox Church; while the other third would perish of hunger!"²¹ In other words, the Jews would disappear from Russia.

Such were the casual scraps of evidence from which previous authors drew their sweeping conclusion that many Russian officials, and the decision-makers in particular, favored inducing Jewish emigration in order to rid Russia altogether of her supposedly unassimilable Jewish population. This evidence demands more thorough analysis.

In the crucial case of Pobedonostsev, the statement attributed to him cannot be properly documented. And even if it were, it would show that at most he expected only one-third of the Jews to emigrate. In other words, Pobedonostsev was well aware of the impossibility of expelling all the Jews.

Ignatiev made a statement encouraging Jewish emigration and then denied having made such a statement. As Professor Hans Rogger notes on this point, "there was . . . reason to ask whether Ignatyev was stating policy or giving vent to his prejudices." It was one thing to want Russia free of Jews; it was something else to take the rigorous steps necessary to realize such a goal. Under existing laws emigration was illegal for *all* Russian subjects. To encourage Jewish emigration under such circumstances was therefore no simple matter. Nevertheless passports were speedily issued to many Jewish applicants during Ignatiev's ministry.²² As for the legalization of the Palestine coloniza-

19. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:414–15. Also see p. 417, where the removal of three million Jews in twelve years is mentioned.

20. Davitt, *Within the Pale*, pp. 65–66; Errera, *Russian Jews*, p. 18.

21. Davitt, *Within the Pale*, pp. 49–50. The "May Laws" of 1882, a reflection of Ignatiev's anti-Semitic policies, prohibited Jews from settling anew or acquiring real estate in any rural district of the Pale and from doing business on Sundays or Christian holidays.

22. See notes 9–12 above and Leib Krippe, "Iz zapisok emigranta," *Evreiskaia starina*, 4 (1911): 380–81; Rogger, "Tsarist Policy," pp. 27–28.

tion movement and the sanctioning of the establishment in Russia of branches of Baron de Hirsch's Jewish Colonization Association, neither signaled a complete reversal of policy. Emigration did not become an unqualified right, officially sanctioned or encouraged. It remained hedged around with formalities, expenses, lack of organized advice and information, and other hindrances of various sorts for all but those few who came under the patronage of the JCA.²³

If high government officials such as Pobedonostsev and Ignatiev did not express the extreme views attributed to them, perhaps Russian officials at lower levels of the bureaucracy did express such views. What do the available reports of meetings reveal about the attitudes of other government officials toward the notion that encouragement of Jewish emigration should be used to end the Jews' presence in Russia? Many of the written reports were confidential among government officials; many of the meetings whose minutes have been preserved were closed to the public; those who wrote the confidential reports or took part in the closed meetings had no idea that what they said would eventually be revealed publicly. It may therefore be assumed that they spoke candidly, even if they were concerned not to have their ideas made public. To be sure, many officials in the 1881 guberniia commissions seem to have slanted their views to please Ignatiev.²⁴ But his circular establishing the commissions gave no indication of his views on Jewish emigration, and indeed could have been interpreted more in favor of than against it.²⁵ There was no reason, then, for any official who strongly favored using emigration to rid Russia of her Jews not to say so.

The antiemancipation majority of the Volynia Guberniia Commission stated that it would have liked to exclude all Jews from Russia, but gave up the notion as being too difficult financially and politically to achieve "even in the distant future." Regarding emigration, it suggested that some Jews might leave Russia if they were expelled from the villages of the Pale, and that a special society for regulating the relations of Jews to Christians, which it proposed be established, might seek means to settle Jews outside Russia.

23. Rogger, "Tsarist Policy," pp. 29–30.

24. A few of those who sat on the 1881 guberniia commissions were not officials, strictly speaking. However, for the purposes of this article this fact may be disregarded. All members on the various commissions were invited to serve by the respective governors (see Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:272–73; Greenberg, *Jews in Russia*, 2:26–27; Krasnyi-Admoni, *Materialy*, 2:385–86, 510–16), which indicates that the members had close ties with officialdom even when they were not officials themselves. In addition, by serving on the commissions the members became officials insofar as they were participating in a formal, albeit marginal, way in the formulation of government policy.

25. The text of Ignatiev's circular, dated September 3, 1881, is reprinted in James W. Buel, *Russian Nihilism and Exile Life in Siberia* (St. Louis, 1883), pp. 525–27; *Evr. ents.*, 1:827; Gessen, "Graf N. P. Ignat'ev," pp. 1632–33; Gessen, *Zakon i zhizn'*, p. 154; Krasnyi-Admoni, *Materialy*, 2:512–13.

The structure projected for this special society, however, leaves the impression that promoting Jewish emigration would be only one of its duties and that its main task would be to end "abnormal Jewish-Christian relations." In other words, the Volynia Guberniia Commission majority did not expect all Jews to leave Russia. In expressing the wish for such exclusion the commission was clearly giving vent to its hostility to Jews and its irritation at having to take the trouble to promote Jewish assimilation. It undoubtedly did, however, believe Jews were assimilable.²⁶ N. D. Gradovsky, a proemancipation consultant to the High Commission majority, asserted that the Volynia Commission was not at all serious when it suggested excluding all Jews from Russia. It merely wanted to emphasize to the central government the damage Jews willfully did to society and to portray the Jews as a people in relation to whom the denial of all human rights and any repressive measures were justified.²⁷

In a report cited by the Kherson Guberniia Commission, one of its anti-emancipation members, Privy Counsellor K. M. Bazili, also considered, and rejected, the possibility of expelling the Jews from Russia. In his view, Russian legislation, on the basis of economic and fiscal considerations, had allowed Jews to gain economic dominance in those places where they lived in large numbers. Currently the government faced a severe dilemma: should it allow the continued strengthening of the Jews economically, which entailed the impoverishment and corruption of the Russian people and Russian officials and the danger of popular disturbances encouraged by revolutionaries, or should the government take measures to expel the Jews, even though such action would greatly harm local business and fiscal interests for many years to come and arouse the censure of West European public opinion? In other words, the Jews in Russia were harmful but economically necessary. The government must aim, Bazili concluded, to overcome the strength of Jewry without expelling the Jews. It could do so, he thought, by destroying Jewish communal solidarity. This done, the Jews would become trustworthy Russian citizens, merge with the other subjects of the tsar while preserving their religion and those innate tribal abilities that might bring benefits to the state and society, and finally cease evoking popular hatred and violence on the part of the Russian masses.²⁸

In their antiemancipation book *O cherte osedlosti evreev*, Princes F. S. and N. N. Golitsyn, both members of the High Commission, came very close

26. *Trudy Volynskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 5, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 561, 569–70, 598, 608–9, 622, 655–56.

27. Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia*, p. 113. Gradovsky, like other proemancipation officials, generally emphasized the role played by legal restrictions on the Jews in creating "abnormal Jewish-Christian relations." He thought that even the Volynia Guberniia Commission recognized this role but, bowing to its own and Ignatiev's anti-Jewish prejudices, preferred to portray the Jews' harmfulness as being willful on their part.

28. *Trudy Khersonskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 9, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 124–25.

to favoring a Russia free of Jews, mainly because they thought the task of reforming the Jews and of promoting their assimilation so difficult and complex, but also because they thought there was an "historiconational" policy of intolerance to Jews. In the past this policy had led to the actual exclusion of all Jews from Russia. The Golitsyns admitted, however, that since the partitions of Poland such a program of exclusion was impossible and had been replaced by a program of localizing the Jews as an evil which should not spread all over Russia. In short, the Golitsyns were not exclusionists. At worst they envisioned an eternal struggle between Russians and Jews, with the Jews kept somewhat separate from the mass of the Russian population—perhaps only until that population became strong enough to defend itself—by the existence of the Pale of Jewish Settlement.²⁹

Another illuminating case is that of state counsellor and zemstvo member P. M. Miklashevsky, who served in the Ekaterinoslav Guberniia Commission. He proclaimed himself a strong defender of "Russia for the Russians" and the principles of "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality." He believed that Russia was destined to enlighten and free the oppressed peoples of the Asiatic East and that a merging of all nationalities into one "humanity" would not take place until far in the future, when each nationality had realized its destiny and made its unique contribution to the general treasure house of human civilization. Until then Russia must preserve its cultural and political purity. In practice, this did not mean altogether excluding the Jews from Russia. It only meant limiting their participation in the general educational institutions and excluding them from any positions of authority in the state and society. Miklashevsky asserted that Russia did not intend to make the Jews social pariahs, as they had been in medieval Western Europe. Indeed, Jews and Russians should be equal before the law and in taxation. Let the Jews remain unassimilated, maintaining their separate identity for the present; they would do so in any case, unless mixed marriages became common, a highly unlikely prospect. Let Jews acquire any unofficial position in society that their education and abilities warranted; enlightened Jews would always be accepted and acquire influence among educated Russians; this was an inherent right of every person which no law should violate. Let Jewish capitalists engage in railroad building and banking, both so vital to Russia, and all Russia would thank them. However, he concluded, Jews should not be allowed to acquire authority in any Russian public institution. Such authority was granted by the government to persons whom it chose; and these persons should all be Russians. If the Jews, who always tried to monopolize any occupation in which they en-

29. F. S. Golitsyn and N. N. Golitsyn, *O cherte osedlosti evreev* (n.p., 1885); Gradvovskiy, *Zamechaniia*, pp. 2-3, 55-57, 191, 205-6, 229.

gaged, were allowed to hold offices in the Russian administration, they would soon take it over, and the government would be unable to fulfill its obligations to the land and nation. The government, then, should concern itself with establishing conditions in which Russians and Jews could live together peacefully, but without any Jewish influence on governmental matters. It is clear that for this antiemancipation official the principle "Russia for the Russians" in no way implied excluding Jews from Russia.³⁰

An even more striking example of views that were very hostile to Jews but stopped short of advocating expulsion is offered by the antiemancipation member of the Vilna Guberniia Commission whose name was given simply as Skoblin. He noted that in every land where Jews had settled they were tolerated for awhile, then subjected to persecution and expulsion because of the hostility they evoked. Jews had never assimilated with the local population among whom they lived, he continued. They always pursued separate, selfish, caste goals, usually harmful to the native population. They considered no land of their settlement as their fatherland, but only as a temporary shelter and source of enrichment. Their culture was completely foreign to European Christian civilization; they borrowed nothing from the latter and looked on Christians with contempt. They lived at the expense of the neighboring Christians and did not consider them neighbors. The Jews, internationally united and always carrying on bitter economic warfare with non-Jews, were a mobile state within the state, always hostile and harmful to it. Everyone knows, he asserted, the maxim: the number of Jews in a state is in inverse proportion to the national welfare. At this point in his argument, however, Skoblin sharply changed his tone. Not all Jews were so ignobly ungrateful to the lands giving them shelter as the majority of Jews portrayed above, he said. There were, of course, exceptions to the general rule. Indeed, "education could bring even Jews closer to general human justice." But because Jewish culture was already centuries old, it would probably be centuries before education could affect the majority of Jews. Until that time, he concluded, governmental measures must be directed against the harmfulness of the Jewish majority and toward their education as true and productive citizens of the state.³¹

A more surprising conclusion from the premises this official presented is hard to imagine. If anyone favored excluding Jews from Russia, it should have been Skoblin. Yet in no way did he advocate such a policy. Hostility to Jews, even extreme hostility, in the logic of nineteenth-century Russian officials, did not necessarily entail the intention, or even the desire in some cases, to rid Russia of her Jewish population.

30. *Trudy Ekaterinoslavskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 2, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 338–43, 359, 393–94, 398–401.

31. *Vilna Trudy*, pp. 5–10, 13, 17.

The antiemancipation majority of the Mogilev Guberniia Commission presents another striking example of this phenomenon. The commission majority was very hostile to Jews. It considered them to be by conviction anti-Christian, antistate, contenders for domination of the world, and very hard to assimilate. In its view, granting them civil equality would not promote their assimilation but would make them more dangerous to the native population. It thought the number of Jews in Mogilev Guberniia needed to be reduced, because the Jews, refusing to engage in productive occupations, lived at the expense of the Christian producers and thus created dangerous social tensions. The commission majority opposed allowing Jews to live everywhere in Russia, because it thought this would only spread their harmful activity. The easiest solution to the problem, one would have supposed, considering the commission majority's deep antipathy for Jews, would have been to expel them from Russia altogether. Yet the commission majority did not come to this conclusion. The aims it suggested for government policy were again to break up Jewish solidarity, turn Jews into beneficial citizens of the state by promoting productive occupations among them, and protect the non-Jewish population. It thought only a 50 percent reduction—a relatively small amount in view of the commission majority's basic assumptions about Jews—of the Jewish population of Mogilev Guberniia was necessary to diminish tensions there. To accomplish this population reduction it proposed establishing a special Jewish region within the empire where Jews would be induced to take up agricultural and industrial occupations. It also proposed making emigration easier. Clearly, though, despite its deep antipathy for Jews, the Mogilev Guberniia Commission majority had no intention of evicting them one and all from Russia.³²

Other antiemancipation officials also favored the establishment of a special Jewish region or regions within the Russian Empire. Obviously they were not thinking in terms of freeing Russia of Jews.³³ This was true even of the author of an anonymous report cited in the papers of the Kherson Guberniia Commission. He believed Russia should be first of all for the Russians. He also thought the Jews—as a caste unable to merge with the native population through intermarriage and blood ties and destined either to dominate or submit to the Russian people—would become harmless and submissive only when they were an insignificant proportion in the population. To achieve this end the anonymous reporter proposed not mass expulsion but a separate Jewish region within Russia.³⁴

32. *Trudy Mogilevskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 5, pt. 1 of *TGK*, pp. 1–41.

33. For examples see Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia*, pp. 132–33; *Trudy Grodnenskoii Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 3, pt. 1 of *TGK*, p. 32; *Trudy Kovenskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 2, pt. 1 of *TGK*, pp. 13, 22, 30; *Trudy Podolskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 10, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 125, 127; *Vilna Trudy*, p. 3.

34. *Kherson Trudy*, pp. 1233–35, 1242.

Some antiemancipation officials stated openly that their intention was to thin out, not obliterate, the Jewish population of the Pale by means of emigration.³⁵ Some did not mention Jewish emigration at all and spoke only of their expectation that sometime in the future Jews would assimilate into Russian society and become beneficial citizens.³⁶ Some even favored partial or total abolition of the Pale. Like proemancipation officials, they had no intention of ridding Russia of her Jews.³⁷

From the example of Minister of the Interior Tolstoy it appears that some antiemancipation officials actively opposed encouraging or even allowing Jewish emigration altogether. Soon after becoming minister of the interior on June 25, 1882, Tolstoy published a circular directed against Jewish emigration and threatened anyone who instigated it or aided it in any way with strict accountability.³⁸ Until the 1890s the laws prohibiting emigration and requiring passport recipients to pay various fees before being allowed to leave Russia were maintained in full force; no organized assistance to emigrants was allowed; and the frontiers were closely guarded. These conditions naturally discouraged Jewish emigration somewhat, indicating that until very late the prevailing opinion opposed the unconditional advocacy of Jewish emigration.³⁹

The available evidence thus strongly indicates that very few, if any, Russian officials actually looked upon the Jews as totally unassimilable and Jewish emigration as a means to exclude Jews from Russia altogether. Many officials must have believed that the Jews' presence in the state was more beneficial than their leaving. Others, perhaps the majority, must have believed that the Jews might eventually become beneficial citizens, although for the present and perhaps far into the future they were a baneful influence which the government must strive to minimize by means of education, legislation, and administrative supervision. To be sure, there were officials who wished to see

35. For examples see Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia*, pp. 90, 152–53; *Grodno Trudy*, pp. 26, 30, 32; *Kherson Trudy*, pp. 1106, 1108; *Trudy Kievskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 3, pt. 2 of *TGK*, p. 410; *Kovno Trudy*, pp. 13, 21–23, 30; *Podolia Trudy*, p. 127; *Vilna Trudy*, pp. 3–4; *Vysshaia Kommissiia*, *Obshchaia zapiska*, pp. 199–200.

36. For examples see *Ekaterinoslav Trudy*, 251, 268, 271–72, 276; *Trudy Khar'kovskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 1, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 97–98; *Trudy Odesskoi Gradonachal'stvennoi Kommissii*, sec. 8, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 996, 1053–54, 1069–71; *Podolia Trudy*, pp. 88–92, 113; *Trudy Poltavskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 7, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 860, 870–71, 921, 964.

37. For examples see *Trudy Bessarabskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 6, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 735–36, 777; *Ekaterinoslav Trudy*, p. 238; Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia*, pp. 90–93; *Grodno Trudy*, pp. 26, 30; *Kherson Trudy*, p. 1106; *Kovno Trudy*, pp. 13, 22, 30; *Vilna Trudy*, pp. 138, 163.

38. Peskovsky, *Rokovoe nedorazumenie*, pp. 389–90; Subbotin, *Obshchaia zapiska*, p. 136.

39. Dubnow, *History of the Jews*, 2:377, 419–21; *Ents. slovar'*, 30:461; *Evr. ents.*, 1:838; Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia*, p. 200; Joseph, *Jewish Immigration*, pp. 64, 68, 82–83; Rogger, "Tsarist Policy," pp. 29–30.

Russia free of Jews. But even they stopped short of the rigorous steps this would require, and they generally concluded by expressing the hope that sometime in the future the Jews would assimilate, thereby ending an affliction that had to be borne.

The government was not pursuing a policy of expulsion. This was so, even if certain Jewish leaders of the period got the opposite impression, perhaps because of their personal and emotional involvement in the matter, or because of the deeply antagonistic views of many officials, or because of the vociferousness of the Judeophobe press. It was one thing for the government to want to exclude all Jews; it was another for the Jews to interpret government policies, which may have had other motives, as being exclusionist. That the government perceived its aim as one thing and the Jews perceived it as another is perfectly understandable given the different vantage points from which each side viewed the problem.

Yet it must be admitted that many antiemancipation officials, including some who exercised a determining influence over Russian policy (though excluding Minister of the Interior Tolstoy), were willing to tolerate, or even favored inducing, some Jewish emigration. The new restrictions which were put on Jews during the period under discussion (particularly the 1882 prohibitions on Jews settling anew in the villages in the Pale and acquiring land there and the 1891 expulsion of twenty thousand Jews from Moscow), along with the 1881–82 pogroms, led to a massive emigration movement. And after 1890 the government manifestly relaxed its antiemigration policy. These developments demonstrate the administration's willingness to tolerate the departure of large numbers of Jews if this exodus could be accomplished at little cost to the state. To tolerate or even hope for such an exodus was, however, quite different from a deliberate commitment to total or partial expulsion.

Some officials who did not particularly favor Jewish emigration must have considered it tolerable as an unavoidable by-product of the new restrictions on Jews. These restrictions, they felt, were more important and useful, as protection for non-Jews against Jewish exploitation, than Jewish emigration was harmful. By allowing Baron de Hirsch's association to become active, in the view of these officials, the government was merely sanctioning what it could not avoid.

Other officials must have welcomed Jewish emigration. They did so not because they expected or wanted to get rid of all the Jews but because Jewish emigration raised the prospect that the crowded conditions of the Pale might be partly relieved and the harmful consequences of crowding, for both Jews and non-Jews, reduced. The final cessation of the harm Jews did in Russia would take place by means of secular education, the destruction of the Jews' peculiar

traits, and the strengthening of the Russian people intellectually and economically.

Why were antiemancipation officials so ambivalent in regard to a policy of expulsion? On the one hand, they tended to opt for such a policy; on the other, they rarely if ever took this line of thought to its logical conclusion. Why did this tendency exist? And what inhibited officials from acknowledging the full implications of their arguments?

Russian policy for at least eighty years, in both its repressive and its emancipatory aspects, had aimed at transforming the Jews by checking and eliminating their allegedly harmful traits and by bringing them closer to the Russian population politically, economically, culturally, and socially. Officials who derided the possibility of success in this endeavor could easily move to support policies which tolerated, promoted, or forced Jewish emigration. But most officials continued to talk as if Jewish assimilation was a real possibility—if not immediately, then sometime in the future. For this majority, the tendency to opt for a policy of expulsion must have resulted from an inner conflict. Since the 1860s Jewish assimilation had to some extent become a reality, and Jews began taking important and conspicuous positions in society. As this occurred the Russian upper classes, including most officials, began to be concerned about preserving the dominant status of the Russian nationality in the state and their own political, economic, cultural, and social pre-eminence in particular. The irrational element present in all anti-Semitic thinking also began to play a stronger role. Having invested so much emotional energy in hating Jews, the officials balked at the prospect of real Jewish assimilation and the necessity of welcoming Jews as fully acceptable members of society. Some began to advocate a policy tolerating Jewish emigration; some began to think in terms of expelling the Jews altogether.

Another factor may have been the uncertainty of these officials concerning the power and validity of Russian cultural values. Many held generally condescending and perhaps unconsciously disparaging views on the Russian people. They saw Russians, among whom they included the Orthodox Christian population in the Pale, as often the almost defenseless victims of Jews. The Russians were supposed to have fallen to this status because they were so ignorant, poorly financed, disunited, and disorganized, and also because they were less crafty, less unscrupulous, and less forceful than the Jews.⁴⁰ Such was the sorry condition the claimant for the role of pre-eminent nationality found itself in. Surely it was a situation that expulsion would have helped remedy. Hence, committed to Jewish assimilation, yet lacking confidence in Russia's ability to accomplish it in a way consistent with the survival and supremacy

40. Examples of this negative view of the Russian people abound in the sources which reveal the antiemancipation officials' views.

of Russian values, whatever those were, some officials began thinking of getting rid of the Jews.

Russian officials frequently manifested fears about the Jews as a demographic factor. They habitually exaggerated the number of Jews living in the empire and were haunted by the notion that the Jews maintained exceptionally high birth and growth rates.⁴¹ These apprehensions, too, were likely to promote thoughts about expulsion.

What, then, inhibited Russian officials from openly advocating this policy? The fear that Jewish emigration would reflect badly on Russia, and perhaps also complicate Russia's diplomatic relations by flooding other lands with unwanted Jews, undoubtedly played a role here, just as it probably did with those Russian officials who actively opposed Jewish emigration. The reasons for opposing Jewish emigration advanced by proemancipation officials may also be involved to some extent. These included concern that the best Jews—those most productive and economically better off—would leave Russia, that Russia would lose needed taxpayers and military recruits, that mass emigration would disrupt public order and safety, that it would adversely affect trade, industrial, and financial interests, domestically and internationally, and that Russia needed immigrants, to become workers and to settle and make productive her vast empty spaces, rather than emigrants.⁴²

There is another possible explanation of what inhibited the officials from openly advocating expulsion. To paraphrase a quip made in a different context: late nineteenth-century Russian officials were not above expelling the Jews (or exterminating them either, for that matter), they were just not yet up to it. To put it differently, advances in thinking seem to occur generally in gradual stages. Russian officials in the 1880s had reached the stage of thinking about promoting Jewish assimilation. Some had perhaps begun to reject this goal. But they had not yet moved on to adopt, clearly and without reservations, the notions of expulsion or extermination. They saw no practical ways in

41. Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia*, pp. 205–6, 220–23, 229; *Kiev Trudy*, pp. 421, 424–25; *Mogilev Trudy*, pp. 10–12; Rogger, "Jewish Policy," p. 50; Rogger, "Tsarist Policy," p. 30; *Vilna Trudy*, pp. 9–10, 96–97, 100, 115; *Vitebsk Trudy*, pp. 41–42, 55–56; Vysshiaia Kommissiia, *Obshchaia zapiska*, p. 24.

42. Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia*, p. 259; *Kiev Trudy*, pp. 421, 426; Peskovsky, *Rokovoe nedorazumenie*, pp. 389–90; Subbotin, *Obshchaia zapiska*, pp. 136, 140–41. For proemancipationists labeling the policy of expulsion "nonsense" see: Gradovsky, *Zamechaniia*, pp. 18–19, 198; N. S. Leskov, *Evrei v Rossii: Neskol'ko zamechaniia po evreiskomu voprosu* (Petrograd, 1919), p. 26; Peskovsky, *Rokovoe nedorazumenie*, p. 388; Subbotin, *Obshchaia zapiska*, p. 198; Vitte, *Vospominaniia*, 1:188–89; Witte, *Memoirs*, p. 376. All the factors listed above, along with the state's traditional unwillingness to loosen the reins on society, even by granting the right of free movement across the borders, must have played a part in deflecting the government away from the more moderate policy of legalized, regulated, and unhindered emigration. See Rogger, "Tsarist Policy," pp. 27, 33–35.

which these aims could be accomplished under existing circumstances, so they dismissed them—extermination more quickly than expulsion. As a result of their ambivalence they supported policies which destroyed the economic position and physical well-being of the Jews and tolerated their departure from the empire.

Still, the vast majority of government officials in the 1880s gave little thought to the notion of exterminating the Jews and viewed the Pale of Jewish Settlement not as a way station to expulsion but as a more or less temporary expedient, to be kept only until the Jews could be turned into beneficial, loyal, and assimilated citizens of the Russian state. Did they think, in conformity with the statement attributed to Pobedonostsev, that it was possible to convert large numbers of Jews to Christianity?

Pobedonostsev's biographer, Robert F. Byrnes, cites the statement concerning one-third of the Jews dying out, one-third emigrating, and one-third converting to Christianity, and assumes it to be authentic. Then Byrnes goes on to assert that Pobedonostsev thought the realization of this program a "very remote and even unlikely solution." Indeed, according to Byrnes, "Pobedonostsev indicated . . . that he had no hope of spreading Christianity among the Jews because of their concept of the chosen race, the power of family ties, and their long tradition of holding fast to their religion. Moreover, he considered Jewish converts to Orthodoxy unreliable. The Church, therefore, made no organized effort to convert Jews."⁴³

The vast majority of both kinds of officials who expressed opinions on this matter in the documents used for this study felt much the same way. Some few spoke of allowing mixed, Jewish-Christian marriages to take place—even if the Jews did not convert.⁴⁴ But beyond this there was no talk of promoting Jewish conversions. Indeed, some even opposed the policy of offering material inducements to Jews who converted, since such converts often had no real sympathy for, or even knowledge of, Christian teachings. Many officials of both kinds expressed the opinion that Jews must be allowed complete freedom of religion. The law must in no way interfere in purely religious matters. At the same time, it should in no way patronize institutions of the Jewish religion. Apart from this, the only way the state could hope to influence religious changes in the Jews was by their moral re-education, according to both antiemancipation and proemancipation officials—by forcing them to see the error of their ways, according to antiemancipation officials; and by improving their living conditions, according to proemancipation officials. Some officials thought that the Jews would preserve some of their distinctive religious and other traits

43. Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev*, p. 207. Also see Rogger, "Jewish Policy," p. 48.

44. Among antiemancipation officials see *Ekaterinoslav Trudy*, p. 359; *Kherson Trudy*, pp. 1233–34; *Kovno Trudy*, p. 22. Among proemancipationists see *Poltava Trudy*, pp. 953–54; *Peskovsky, Rokovoe nedorazumenie*, p. 391.

even when assimilated and that these would benefit Russian society. To show that merely the moral reform of the Jews and not their conversion was what was needed to accomplish assimilation, some officials referred to the example of the legally equal yet religiously distinctive Karaite Jews.⁴⁵

The reign of Alexander III was a transitional period. A new hostility to Jewish assimilation was just emerging. The old justifications and explanations of Russian policy still seemed plausible. The new attitude was not yet publicly acceptable. So the struggle over Jewish policy continued to be fought in the old terms—carrot or stick, emancipation or repression, as stimulants to assimilation. But these terms were already obsolete. Russia was due, judging by the trends her Jewish policies had followed in the past eighty years, to move toward Jewish emancipation. The reign of Alexander II had pointed to this possibility and had prepared officials ready to move toward it. This helps account for the strength of proemancipation opinion, such as it was, in the reign of Alexander III. Yet the foundations for such a move had already been destroyed. Alexander II's caution had allowed the forces of reaction, the forces favoring the continued dominance of the Russian people over all others, to see that they did not really want what government policy had for so long been advocating. Having glimpsed the features of Jewish assimilation, not fully, but clearly enough, in the form of those Jews who took advantage of Alexander II's relaxations in Jewish legislation, the reactionaries who controlled government policy recoiled from a full confrontation. Jewish assimilation and emancipation, before being fully realized, encountered determined assailants.

45. See especially the antiemancipationists in *Kherson Trudy*, p. 1227, and the proemancipationists in *Vysshaia Kommissiia, Obshchaia zapiska*, p. 286. For antiemancipation officials see also Judith Ellen Cohen, "Count Dmitrii Andreevich Tolstoi as Minister of the Interior, 1882-1889" (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1961), pp. 54-55, 67-68; *Ekaterinoslav Trudy*, pp. 340-42, 359, 388; *Gradovsky, Zamechaniia*, pp. 191, 230; *Grodno Trudy*, pp. 32-33; *Kharkov Trudy*, pp. 49, 97-98; *Kherson Trudy*, pp. 1227, 1231-34; *Kiev Trudy*, pp. 412-13; *Kovno Trudy*, p. 21; *Krasnyi-Admoni, Materialy*, 2:371; *Odessa Trudy*, pp. 995, 1059-62, 1069, 1073; *Podolia Trudy*, pp. 88-92; *Vilna Trudy*, pp. 6-8, 13-15, 22, 27-28, 127; *Volynia Trudy*, pp. 564-65, 615-16; *Vysshaia Kommissiia, Obshchaia zapiska*, pp. 90-91; *Obzor postanovlenii Vysshei Kommissii po peresmotru deistvuiushchikh o evreiaikh v Imperii zakonov (1883-1888): Prilozhenie k "obshchei zapiske" Vysshei Kommissii* ([St. Petersburg?], 1888), p. 158; Judith Cohen Zacek, "Champion of the Past: Count D. A. Tolstoi as Minister of the Interior, 1882-1889," *The Historian*, 30 (May 1968): 419-20, 424.

For proemancipation officials see also *Ekaterinoslav Trudy*, p. 303; *Gradovsky, Zamechaniia*, pp. 23, 33-34, 47-49, 151-52, 165, 199, 230-34, 242-44, 252-56, 259-61; *Leskov, Evrei v Rossii*, pp. 74-76, 96; *Peskovsky, Rokovoe nedorazumie*, pp. vi-vii, 380, 391; *Poltava Trudy*, pp. 789-90, 953-57; *Trudy Tavricheskoi Gubernskoi Kommissii*, sec. 4, pt. 2 of *TGK*, pp. 516-17; *Vilna Trudy*, pp. 186, 188; *Vitebsk Trudy*, p. 13; *Vysshaia Kommissiia, Obshchaia zapiska*, pp. 252, 264, 274-76, 286; *Vysshaia Kommissiia, Obzor postanovlenii*, pp. 34-36, 57-58, 62-63, 68-69, 133.