One misses too the home-spun quality of Orthodox parish life and evidence of the sturdy faith of the ordinary people which has survived centuries of moslem oppression and now makes its witness under atheist communism. Orthodoxy is the least sophisticated of all contemporary Christian traditions and in this lies much of its charm and approachability for Catholics and Protestants alike, giving that sense of recognition and timeless continuity one finds only in the company of the very young and very old.

Père Le Guillou touches delicately on the problem of educating the will, and the disparity between faith as professed by the Church and as expressed in the lives of its members. He sees Eastern piety in danger from 'an external worship', Christian life made to look as if it consists in the liturgy alone with no direct influence on day-to-day living. This of course is not a problem confined to the Orthodox and Père Le Guillou's analysis here is hasty and open to question. The peculiar problem for the Orthodox is that the normative piety for the faithful has been presented traditionally as the ascetic discipline of early monasticism, and this has been reinforced by the hesychasm of Gregory Palamas and his followers who have extolled the 'angelic life' as the model of spirituality even for the devout layman. Since this is incompatible in any practical sense with the natural conditions of human society, it has opened the way to a 'double standard' in Christian life. It is significant that all reform movements within Orthodoxy contain a strong puritan element.

These however, are minor criticisms of a book which is a valuable addition to the literature on the Orthodox Churches. There is on introduction by the Director of the *Centre Istina*, Père C. J. Dumont, O.P., and Mr Donald Attwater is responsible for the excellent translation.

HELLE GEORGIADIS

ON CONSULTING THE FAITHFUL, by J. H. Newman, edited by John Coulson; Chapman, 12s. 6d.

This small book has an importance out of all proportion to its size. The greater part is taken up with Newman's essay, which it seems is less widely known than generally supposed. He is urging that the Church has, when formulating her doctrines, to take into account the *sensus fidelium*. Newman points out that what the faithful believe is of paramount importance, and that to 'consult' them is one of the necessary parts of taking the laity seriously, a part of treating them as responsible members of the body of Christ. He makes clear that his use of the word 'consult' does not imply the hierarchy's submission to the views of the laity; 'it is doubtless a word expressive of trust and deference . . . It includes the idea of inquiring into a matter of *fact*, as well as asking a judgment . . . Doubtless their advice, their opinion, their judgment on the question of definition is not asked; but the matter of fact, viz. their belief, *is* sought for, as a testimony to that apostolical tradition, on which alone any doctrine whatsoever

can be defined'. He goes further than this in many ways, particularly in the section in which he points to the failure of the episcopate to play their part in the preservation of pure doctrine at the time of the Arian heresy. With a sledge-hammer of historical detail Newman shews the laity as responsible for frightening the bishops into the truth.

At no point in his argument does Newman go as far as Karl Rahner in *Free Speech in the Church*, but then it would be absurd to expect it. What is of interest is that he goes a good deal further than most of the clergy or, indeed, laity in this country would be prepared to go. He says of those clerics to whom the idea had been explained: 'The hearer is first of all startled and then disappointed; he ends by asking, Is this all? It is a curious phenomenon in the philosophy of the human mind, that we often do not know whether we hold a point or not, though we hold it; but when our attention is once drawn to it, then forthwith we find it so much a part of ourselves, that we cannot recollect when we began to hold it, and we conclude (with truth), and we declare, that it has always been our belief.'

John Coulson, in his excellent introduction, shows how Newman's episcopal and clerical opponents spent much of their time indicating quite clearly by their words and deeds that it had not always been and, indeed, never could be their belief that the faithful should be consulted in matters of doctrine. Even Ullathorne could ask 'Who are the laity?'; it could be and was said by Talbot of the laity that: 'they are beginning to show the cloven hoof . . .' Then comes the famous question: 'What is the province of the laity? To hunt, to shoot, to entertain. These matters they understand, but to meddle with ecclesiastical matters they have no right at all.'

Mr Coulson's account of the battles surrounding, and engendered by, the offending essay is exciting, but above all it sheds so much light on the current situation. Things have improved out of all knowledge, but there is still an air of good-natured paternalism in the attitude of many of the clergy, to be seen, for instance, in the way in which they tend to over-simplify the teaching of the Church, on the ground that it will be above the heads of the laity; there is still a failure to implement the working *conspiratio* of clergy and laity so dear to Newman. There is, of course, far more freedom of discussion now than in Newman's day. He wrote of his age; 'If a private theologian said anything free, another answered him. If the controversy grew, then it went to a bishop, a theological faculty, or to some foreign university. The Holy See was but the final court of ultimate appeal. *Now*, if I, as a private priest, put anything into print, Propaganda answers me at once. How can I fight with such a chain on my arm? It is like the persians driven to fight under the lash. There was a true private judgment in the primitive and medieval schools,—there are no schools now, no private judgment (in the religious sense of the phrase), no freedom, that is, of opinion. That is, no exercise of the intellect. No, the system goes on by the tradition of the intellect of the former times.' But we cannot see too much evidence of freedom as Newman wanted it. A consequence of the system was,

as Newman saw, that matters of theological import were considered diplomatically, what was of importance was the impression that would be created, Propaganda had its eye, not on the truth, but on the interplay of personalities. Newman wrote in 1863: 'And who is Propaganda? Virtually one sharp man of business, who works day and night, and dispatches his work quick off, to the East and West.'

How familiar all this seems. Well, things are changing in Rome, and the sharp man may easily be out of business. But change comes more slowly in England, and we are the heirs of the situation described so well by Mr Coulson. His account and Newman's essay will enable us to see more clearly the issues involved and help us to begin to be intelligent about the Church.

NEIL MIDDLETON

LOVE ALMIGHTY AND ILLS UNLIMITED, by Austin Farrer; Collins, 21s.

Anglican dogmatic theology has sometimes appeared to be no more than pastoral: no more, that is, that the answering of difficulties that are felt by congregations at Evensong, people in the street, and specialists in senior common rooms. Very often the creative endeavour, the point of growth in its development, has seemed to lie in the perplexities laymen face in philosophy, through microscopes, on couches, and in the pages of popular writing of one sort or another. No one is better qualified than Dr Farrer to deal with the diversity of modern questioning, and this book is full of helpful patient answering. Dr Farrer, however, has a habit of questioning his answers, and as he moves into the swing of his familiar dialectical style we begin to see that he is asking the questions, and it is the traditional answers that are being questioned.

The subject of this study is the traditional theological account of evil in the physical world, amongst animals, and in the structure of redemptive theology. There are no simple answers for the difficulties that Dr Farrer uncovers in the traditional apologetics. Everybody knows that our view of the human situation in the world has changed quite drastically in all kinds of ways since the days of St Augustine and St Thomas. It takes courage to be prepared to drop the slogans and open the arguments we have inherited to contemporary seriousness. Amongst the many attractions in Dr Farrer's writings, the essential quality has always been his concern and the thoroughness of it.

This is, of course, a moral problem, and, as we would expect, certain structural difficulties arise when moral concepts like 'evil' are made to perform the duties of theoretical concepts. Although all comes right in the end, Dr Farrer allows himself to take a strangely moral view of the physical world; a view that I suspect the early empiricists picked up from certain elements in scholastic thought. The world as open to a quasi-moral assessment stands over against man, and develops its own use for concepts like 'law' and 'cause'. One would expect moral words to behave peculiarly when they go on holiday into the physical