

manifestations of socialism and of capitalism—and here we catch echoes of Charles Bettelheim, Ernest Mandel, and even Trotsky—but there is general agreement on the characterization of the USSR as a bureaucratic class state, on the continuing clash of interests between technocrats and bureaucrats, and on the fundamental weakness of the Soviet economy and its need to turn to the world market. These themes are presented most cogently in Antonio Carlo's central essay on the structural causes of the Soviet coexistence policy.

A recurrent conclusion found in the book is the direct relationship between the Soviet Union's dependence on the capitalist world market and its choice for an international policy of *détente*. Whether this choice means abandonment of a "socialist" foreign policy, as some Marxist observers deplore, is beside the point, for, as Rainer Rotermundt and Ursula Schmiederer make clear, this question involves the application of a moralistic or ideological standard with little relevance to the facts of power within the country and to the facts of the international system. If the Soviet Union's foreign policy has been "conservative" (according to Jahn) or "weak" (according to Carlo), there are good political, economic, and even class reasons for it.

Whatever the interpretations—and these essays are still theoretical disquisitions rather than the empirical inquiry the editor calls for—the Soviet system does not emerge as having positive choices for the future. It cannot seem to reform itself and it cannot solve its problems without trade and coexistence with the West, but the price of relations with the West is further economic dependence and social tension.

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THE ILLUSION OF PEACE: FOREIGN POLICY IN THE NIXON YEARS.

By *Tad Szulc*. New York: The Viking Press, 1978. x, 822 pp. \$20.00.

Tad Szulc's impressive book provides a narrative history and analysis of American foreign policy during the Nixon years. It contains abundant evidence of the high priority which President Nixon gave to foreign policy and of the uniqueness of the Nixon-Kissinger team in conducting it. The book also substantiates the charge, widely heard at the time of pervasive suspicion and mistrust in the White House, an atmosphere which easily begot Watergate and which contributed to the passion for secrecy in the making of foreign policy.

The portrait of Henry Kissinger will not be the subject's favorite. It shows him conspiring from the day of the inauguration for control of foreign policy, displacing Secretary Rogers ("the despair of his associates at the State Department" [p. 281]), by-passing and humiliating distinguished American ambassadors, and conducting such a distinctly personal diplomacy that "virtually nobody—possibly not even Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford—knows precisely what promises and commitments Kissinger made to foreign leaders during his eight years in power: to Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, Brezhnev and Dobrynin, Le Duc Tho, Sadat and King Faisal, Golda Meir, or any number of other foreign presidents, foreign ministers, and ambassadors" (p. 776).

Nixon and Kissinger receive praise for the basic concepts guiding their diplomacy, especially involving American-Soviet *détente* and the new relationship with China. But Szulc challenges the illusion that "confrontations are altogether behind us," finding it part of the larger "illusion of peace" which provided the guiding theme of Nixon's diplomacy. Upon this illusion was founded the Nixon-Kissinger "linkage" theory—"that the Soviet Union would restrain itself from overextending its influence in exchange for a general *détente* with the United States" (p. 432). The absence of meaningful linkage was apparent in Soviet Middle Eastern policy, yet faith in the notion led both Nixon and Kissinger greatly to oversell *détente*, and especially the significance of the strategic nuclear weapons agreements contained in SALT I. Szulc's description of the SALT negotiations, the conduct of which was apparently greatly

influenced by the idea of linkage, provides evidence of haste and superficiality in negotiations on the part of Nixon and Kissinger and asserts that "they lacked the technical competence to comprehend the issues fully" (p. 569).

The presentation of Vietnam policy is, of course, a central concern of the book. Szulc feels that the administration repeatedly misled the public about both the motives and the content of its policy, and that it eventually negotiated terms which made the military position of the Saigon government untenable. His criticisms of Vietnam policy are sharp, as are his criticisms of policies for other world areas. But they are well-documented and the book provides important insights into both the essentially ephemeral features of the Nixon administration and the ways in which its legacy in foreign policy remains influential today.

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U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT. By *Lawrence Freedman*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. xvi, 235 pp. Tables. Figures. \$22.50.

Are the Russians coming? This remarkable book does not attempt to answer the question, but it helps us understand why honest, hard-working analysts give conflicting appraisals of Soviet strategic might. It is not just that the actual Soviet threat (capability multiplied by intentions) may differ from its perception in the West, but that both real and perceived threats depend upon Western capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions, and strategies.

To be sure, intelligence community estimates may be affected by bureaucratic infighting and partisan pressures, but intelligence predictions can deviate from actual Soviet deployments for many other reasons: the Russians may change their minds, Kremlin rationality may not conform to Washington rationality, or older weapons may be retained rather than retired, thereby inflating inventories. Indeed, U.S. forecasts underestimated actual numbers of Soviet long-range missiles from 1963 through 1972. The miscalculation occurred in part because of the Kremlin's strong reaction to its 1962 Cuban debacle and to the impunity with which American forces attacked Vietnam in the mid-1960s, factors which led Moscow to accelerate missile deployment while keeping older missiles in service longer than Washington had expected.

The next time the Pentagon seems to cry "Wolf!" ("Bear," "Bison," or "Backfire"), this book should be consulted in order to recall past charges about whether a sheep or monster is standing in the wings. Aside from the analytical and historical merits of the book, it is written with a grace and clarity that should help even the Luddites among us to grasp the differences between an SS-11 and an SS-9, an MRV and a MIRV.

Lawrence Freedman wrote most of this book in London. Let us hope that Soviet writers on the United States will some day match his gift for empathy at a distance. And let us await even more fervently the day when Western (or Eastern) writers can accomplish a similar feat in understanding Soviet perceptions of the U.S. strategic posture.

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SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. By *Morton Schwartz*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. viii, 216 pp. \$12.50.

In this substantial, occasionally provocative, study Morton Schwartz presents an image of the United States obtainable from the publications of Soviet "Americanists." He characterizes these official researchers as Soviet "scholar-publicists of détente" (p. 161). Rewarded for their efforts by trips to the United States and opportunities to