

Voter Demands for Patronage: Evidence from Indonesia

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*In this article I seek to explain the microfoundations of patronage politics in the developing world. Two distinct approaches have evolved in the literature. One puts emphasis on the demand side, arguing that patronage persists because poor voters tend to desire individualistic goods over policy. The other focuses on the supply side: few politicians offer programmatic policy, so voters have no alternative but to vote for the politicians who distribute patronage. In this study I test those competing theories using original data from Jakarta, Indonesia. I find evidence supporting the demand-side theory: when both patronage and policy are offered, poor, less-educated voters tend to demand patronage, such as jobs and money, over national programs like free education and universal health care, whereas well-off, better-educated voters tend to prefer the national policies. However, the study also reveals that demands for patronage are affected by level of participation in politics: those who voted in previous elections and those who affiliate with a political party are more likely to demand patronage. This microfoundational evidence helps to explain the persistence of patronage politics in places of widespread poverty. **KEYWORDS:** patronage politics, voter demands, political participation, developing world, Indonesia*

NOTWITHSTANDING THE ADVERSE EFFECTS OF PATRONAGE POLITICS ON government efficacy (Hicken and Simmons 2008), the distribution of targeted goods by patrons in exchange for loyalty from their clients remains a prominent feature of politics in much of the developing world (Chandra 2004; Gomez and Jomo 1997; Hamayotsu 2004). Less clear, however, is why this system of exchange persists. One perspective on the microfoundations of patronage politics places emphasis on the demand side: poorer voters tend to desire individualistic goods over policy owing to the short time horizons facing poor voters and their inability to monitor the distribution of perhaps

more valuable public goods, and political leaders are thus incentivized to meet those demands (see, for example, Desposato 2006; Scott 1972; Shin 2013). A second view suggests that the prevalence of patronage politics in the developing world derives from the supply side: few politicians offer to deliver programmatic policy, so voters have little alternative but to vote for politicians who distribute patronage and particularistic benefits (see, for example, Montinola 1999; Quimpo 2007; Ungpakorn 2002).¹

I aim to test those competing theories using microlevel data from Indonesia. The competing perspectives on patronage politics result mainly from a lack of empirical tests regarding whether the poor prefer particularistic goods to programmatic goods, under the key condition in which both types of goods are available. Studies have shown that poor voters are more likely to demand patronage such as jobs, compared with their wealthier counterparts (see, for example, Nichter 2008; Stokes 2005); it is not evident, however, that the poor maintain their demands for individualistic benefits where programmatic policy such as free education is offered as well. I thus pose the question: How do the socioeconomic conditions of voters affect their preferences for patronage and individual benefits, such as jobs and money, over national programs like free education and universal health care? If socioeconomic hardship is associated with a relative preference for patronage goods over public goods, some advantage can be assigned to the demand-side perspective. Conversely, if the socioeconomic standing of voters is unrelated to their preferences over individualistic goods and national programs, the demand-side perspective would be undermined. The question is not a trivial one; though it may seem evident that poorer voters would prioritize direct handouts to a greater degree than their wealthier counterparts, conventional views of rational voter interests hold that poor and wealthy voters should both seek to maximize their individual goods, since voters who demand policy receive only policy in return but those who demand patronage benefit from both the patronage and the policy (Lyne 2007, 162–163).

I find greater support for the demand-side perspective: when both individualistic goods and programmatic policies are offered, poorer and less-educated respondents tend to prefer patronage to policy, whereas wealthier and better-educated respondents tend to prefer policy to patronage. The findings indicate that even if programmatic goods are offered, poverty and undereducation tend to drive voters to desire patronage over policy. Thus, the socioeconomic standing of

individuals can be viewed as an important microfoundational explanation for the persistence of patronage politics more broadly.

Additionally, however, I find that active participation in politics increases the demand for patronage: those who voted in previous elections and those who affiliate with a political party are more likely to demand patronage. These findings signify that in contexts where politicians focus on the delivery of individualistic benefits, the voters who are actively engaged in political processes and party organizations reinforce politicians' incentives to deliver patronage. This study thus suggests that not only poverty and undereducation but also citizens' participation in politics are driving forces behind persistent patronage networks in less-developed countries.

In contrast, I find that a small proportion of voters who feel represented by the current parliament are less likely to demand patronage. The finding suggests that as the proportion of these voters increases, demand for patronage is expected to decline.

Understanding the foundations of patronage politics is an important undertaking because the process of direct exchange between patrons and clients is typically viewed as a threat to well-functioning government. Where politicians strive to deliver particularistic benefits to voters, universal benefits, such as free education and social welfare programs, are less likely to be provided, even when voters desire these programmatic goods (Chang 2007; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Desposato 2006). Moreover, recent research shows that political particularism weakens accountability and undercuts government performance. Since individualistic goods are often distributed to constituents to help politicians build personal reputations, government resources spent on public services (e.g., education) are allocated less efficiently (Hicken and Simmons 2008), and government programs that promote general interests (e.g., health care reform) are blocked by those who advocate more narrow interests (O'Dwyer 2006). For all of these reasons, patronage should be viewed as a scourge to good governance and development, and yet, the practice of exchanging targeted goods for votes persists across the developing world, from South America (Stokes 2005), to Africa (Arriola 2009), to Asia (Tomsa and Ufen 2013).

In this study, I draw on data from the Indonesian context. Indonesia offers an opportune environment in which to test the microfoundations of patronage politics for several reasons. First, since the Suharto era, informal handouts and corruption have been viewed as commonplace. More recently, democratic developments in

Indonesia have made the practice of cultivating votes through illicit, informal, or targeted distributions of goods an increasing concern, since those practices might now have real effects on political power both locally and nationally (Bünthe and Croissant 2011; Hadiz 2010; Ufen 2006). Second, notable variation exists in the socioeconomic standing of Indonesians, not just across regions but also across subdivisions within the capital city of Jakarta. This variation, in which sectors of the city can be classified as wealthy and poor, provides an opportunity to gather data on a wide range of individuals within a limited number of localities, thus shedding important light on the microfoundations of patronage politics. Finally, Indonesia represents one of an increasingly long list of countries with fairly new democratic institutions, economic opportunities and openness, and persistent poverty. Insofar as this study aims to explain the foundations of patronage politics in environments like these, where patterns of informal political exchange have important effects on the conduct of government, I view Indonesia as a country well-suited for examination, not just on this topic but on a range of important and broad topics in political science, from voting behavior to distributional politics to institutions. Nevertheless, with some notable exceptions,² Indonesia remains an underutilized context in the study of comparative politics.

Theoretically, this study adds insight to a long-standing debate between demand-side and supply-side perspectives of patronage politics. In arguing that politicians build on the short time horizons of poor voters in the construction of political context, I side with the demand-side theorists. However, the empirical tests reveal that the way citizens are connected to political processes and organizations affects their demands for patronage as well. This finding sheds important light on the mechanism linking demographic characteristics and levels of political participation to patronage politics in the developing world; in settings characterized by particularism and patronage, demands for patronage are likely to arise not only from the poor but from those who are more actively engaged in politics.

To construct and test my claims regarding patronage politics in Indonesia, I outline in the next section the demand-side and supply-side perspectives and introduce insights that form the foundation of my testable hypothesis. Next I describe the study's research design, then in the following two sections I present the data and the empirical findings, and in the final section I conclude with a discussion of the study's shortcomings, contributions, and implications.

Theories of Patronage Politics

A topic of unceasing debate is whether voters or politicians are responsible for patronage politics. Voters often blame self-interested politicians for the political particularism that hinders public goods provision in many places. Politicians, however, often claim that they feel compelled to deliver individual benefits because their constituents desire such benefits.

Demand-side theories suggest that poor, less-educated voters tend to prefer tangible benefits provided to the individual, because poverty gives them shorter time horizons: if critical needs are not met today, longer-term well-being is of little consequence, so the poor tend to prefer benefits that can provide relief directly and immediately, even at a reduced overall value (Desposato 2006; Scott 1972). Furthermore, individual benefits are easy for poor constituents to monitor, unlike programmatic goods (Geddes 1994). It usually takes more time to receive programmatic goods than particularistic goods, and the poor often do not want to wait for programmatic goods to be delivered (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 25). Even when they are willing to wait, the poor and less educated often have no way of telling whether promised programmatic benefits have been delivered. The information requirements for democratic monitoring of those benefits are considerable (Geddes 1994).

In places where most constituents are poor and less educated (and thus, according to the demand-side argument, desire patronage), candidates who deliver such particularistic benefits presumably enjoy better electoral prospects than those who deliver programmatic benefits. Furthermore, knowing that their representatives prioritize delivering patronage and that those representatives typically deliver the individual benefits to constituents who express a desire for them, a minority of constituents who would otherwise have preferred programmatic goods will also demand particularistic goods from politicians (Shin 2013). Thus, in less-developed countries or districts where voters tend to be poor and less educated, almost all voters are likely to prefer that their representatives deliver individual benefits, and patronage politics thus prevails (O'Dwyer 2006; Quimpo 2005; Tanzi 1998; Treisman 2007; Van de Walle 2007).

Conversely, well-off and better-educated voters tend to care more about programmatic goods, because wealth and good education not only help to meet basic needs but also provide longer time horizons and information for monitoring universal benefits (Desposato 2006; Geddes 1994). Hence, these voters tend to be more willing to wait

until programmatic goods are delivered, and they are better able to tell whether promised programmatic benefits have been delivered, compared with their poorer counterparts. Even for voters who desire programmatic goods, however, a strong incentive exists to seek particularistic goods, since they might then receive patronage on top of the public goods, a classic collective action problem (Lyne 1999, 2007). Yet, insofar as political particularism harms the efficient delivery of programmatic goods (Hicken and Simmons 2008), voters in these environments should condemn particularistic transactions that are more costly than beneficial, which will lead to few voters' demanding individualistic benefits. Thus, in developed settings where the majority of voters are well-off and better educated, voters are likely to desire programmatic goods.³

Supply-side theories emphasize the political context created by politicians, under which voters cast a ballot. Typically, the arguments assume that only governments can provide politicians with sufficient resources for patronage (see, for example, Horiuchi and Lee 2008; Landé 1965). Therefore, governing party candidates with access to government resources stand as the preeminent providers of patronage to their constituents. The most effective strategy for the opposition to garner support is thus to focus on delivering programmatic goods instead of patronage. Supply-side arguments further assume, however, that such programmatic opposition in developing countries never gains electoral strength, because the opposition politicians often switch to the governing party or vote with the president for access to state resources (Hicken 2009; Kasuya 2009; Sherlock 2004; Slater 2006). In these contexts, voters would be offered few policy packages during an electoral campaign. A cost-benefit analysis would thus leave them with little alternative but to vote for a politician who delivers patronage. The supply of robust programmatic platforms is simply too inconsequential to constitute a viable option.

Studies also put emphasis on party strategies as a means to garner votes in less-developed settings. Where social mobility is limited and voters belong to durable social networks, monitoring is easier and parties thus rely more on clientelistic exchange (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 26). Conversely, in affluent societies where most voters are not entrapped in rigid social networks, parties often emphasize programmatic policy owing to the difficulty of monitoring particularistic exchange. In addition, where the majority of voters are well-off, or where the number of votes that parties need to win is large, it is expensive to purchase votes (Cox 1987). In more-

developed countries or those with a large district magnitude, therefore, parties should deliver policy, not because patronage is not desired but because it is too costly to deliver such individualistic benefits.

Scholars have explored the supply and demand sides of patronage using a variety of contexts and approaches. For instance, Robinson and Verdier (2013) demonstrate formally that the demand for employment by constituents creates patterns of patronage politics, leading to inefficiencies in the supply of public goods. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) find that the types of benefits delivered to constituents vary according to the gender of leaders: exploiting the random reservation of village council seats for women in India, they find that, when councils are headed by women, resources are more often targeted to local needs that directly affect the activities of rural women, such as water and fuel provisions.

These two paths to patronage politics—through the demands of poor voters and the supply of particularistic goods by politicians—are not mutually exclusive, since voter demands for patronage and the patronage-centric context created by politicians can interact. In less-developed countries where voters tend to be poor and are thus assumed to desire patronage, for example, opposition parties that promise to deliver policy are rare; hence, few programmatic alternatives are offered to voters during electoral campaigns (Calvo and Murillo 2004; Quimpo 2005; Ufen 2006). Moreover, clientelistic parties that thrive in poor regions or countries often hinder the area's economic development and further spur a demand for political particularism (Hicken and Simmons 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 26). In this context, political participation of citizens can fortify patronage networks reinforcing politicians' incentives to deliver individualistic benefits.

However, even though voter demands and the political context can interact to contribute to patronage politics in developing countries, the former remains a first-order concern for politicians and thus affects the political context that they create. The ultimate goal of politicians is to win elections (Mayhew 1974). Political leaders and aspirants should thus strive to deliver the goods that voters most desire, in order to increase their electoral chances. They should then shape the political context toward that end. For example, where voters tend to desire patronage, politicians have a strong incentive to side with the president or the prime minister, who controls access to state resources (Desposato 2006). As a consequence, the (program-

matic) opposition tends to be scarce in developing countries. Voter demands for patronage, therefore, can be considered a cause of the clientelistic political contexts. If this argument correctly describes voters' and politicians' interests, I should expect to see voter demands shape the political context, and not the other way around. That is, the expectation is that voters' socioeconomic conditions will affect the type of benefits that they desire from their representatives. Conversely, the type of benefits offered by politicians should not affect voter demands.

Hypothesis: Poor, less-educated voters tend to prefer tangible, individualized benefits even if universal benefits are also offered.


Research Design

To test this hypothesis, I must employ data that allow me to distinguish between wealthier, well-educated voters and poorer, less-educated ones, in order to establish a correlation between socioeconomic status and preferences for patronage. Observational techniques can do this effectively, provided an adequate number of observations and sufficient variation in the independent variables of interest (i.e., socioeconomic factors). The key challenge in addressing the demand-side versus supply-side debate, however, is that the socioeconomic status of respondents is confounded with the type of policies offered: residents of poor countries are overwhelmingly exposed to patronage rather than programs, which helps to explain the protracted nature of the debate. Thus, a research design that creates variation in policy types for all socioeconomic levels of voters is needed. In order to effectively evaluate whether voter demands vary depending on the type of benefits provided by politicians, I presented respondents with both targeted, individual benefits and untargeted, national benefits and asked for ranked preferences.

Data were collected in January 2011 from over 550 respondents in Jakarta, Indonesia, to understand the correlations between demographic factors and preferences over policy types. The study was organized in the following manner.

First, I drew on information from colleagues and experts in local research institutes to identify three out of the thirty-one subdistricts in Jakarta for inclusion as enumeration areas in the study (see Figure 1). One of those subdistricts, Cilincing, is located in North Jakarta (Jakarta Utara), a part of the city that is less developed than other

Figure 1 Research Sites



parts of Jakarta and that offers fewer educational and social services for residents. A second, Tebet, is located in the central part of the city, and the third, Pasar Minggu, lies in South Jakarta (Jakarta Selatan). Both Tebet and Pasar Minggu are considered relatively well-off subdistricts. This design ensures the inclusion of a sufficient number of observations from both ends of the socioeconomic spectrum. Given that I find both wealthier residents living in the poorer Cilincing subdistrict and poorer residents living in the wealthier Tebet and Pasar Minggu subdistricts, the design also generates enough cross-diagonal observations to distinguish individual-level characteristics from the characteristics of each of those subdistricts.

Next, I identified participants for inclusion via a randomized, clustered sampling procedure with stratification by gender. I used six sub-subdistricts (SSDs) from Cilincing and three from both Pasar Minggu and Tebet as clusters. In each of the twelve SSDs, I selected forty-eight respondents via a randomized household protocol. The design generated responses from 286 respondents in the less-developed district (LDD) of Cilincing and 275 respondents in the more-developed districts (MDDs) of Tebet and Pasar Minggu (see Table 1).⁴

To evaluate the effects of individual-level socioeconomic status on preferences over patronage versus public goods, I presented respondents with a list of five types of goods that politicians can

Table 1 Randomization Design

	Sub-subdistrict	Total Observations
Less-developed subdistrict		
Cilincing	Cilincing	48
	Kali Baru	48
	Marunda	47
	Rorotan	47
	Semper Barat	48
	Semper Timur	48
		<u>286</u>
More-developed subdistricts		
Pasar Minggu	Jati Padang	48
	Pejaten Barat	48
	Pejaten Timur	35
Tebet	Kebon Baru	48
	Tebet Barat	47
	Tebet Timur	49
		<u>275</u>
Total observations		561

offer, and I asked them to rank those goods in order of preference. Included were two targeted, individual benefits (cash transfers and jobs) and three programs of national benefit (a social health insurance program, a free school program, and a price control program).

I used pretest focus groups to ensure that these benefits are known, understood as personalistic or national, and important to Indonesian voters. Jobs may be considered a programmatic good instead of a particularistic good in the sense that they can derive from a general improvement of the national economy. Thus, respondents were told that jobs are individual benefits like cash transfers that are delivered directly by their district representatives. The social health insurance program (*Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat*), the free school program (*Program Sekolah Gratis*), and the price control program (*Nine Basic Needs: Sembilan Bahan Pokok*) have all been issues of widespread debate. The *Nine Basic Needs* program controls the prices of nine basic materials that include rice, sugar, salt, vegetables, beef, milk, and kerosene. To eliminate the possibility that respondents understand the *Nine Basic Needs* as a particularistic good, they were explicitly told that it is about national-level price controls of those materials.

If poverty drives voters to desire patronage, as the demand-side perspective suggests, I should expect to see poorer, less-educated voters (particularly in the LDD) favoring the individual benefits over the national programs, whereas better-off, well-educated voters (particularly in MDDs) should demonstrate a relative preference for national benefits.

This design allows me to test both the demand-side and the supply-side perspectives. If respondents rank the goods such that low-income and less-educated voters prefer patronage over policy to a greater degree than their better-off counterparts, I can infer that the policies pushed by politicians have little impact on voter demands, which would lend support to the demand-side view of patronage politics. Conversely, if the socioeconomic standing of voters is unrelated to their preferences over patronage and policy, the demand-side perspective would be undermined and the supply-side claims more plausible.

Model and Data

Do the poor still prefer patronage even when public goods are offered? Do the wealthier prefer policy when individualistic benefits are also available? To answer this question, I create a dependent variable, *patronage_i*, that represents the average of respondent *i*'s rank values for money and jobs. Once respondents ranked the goods in order of preference, from 1 to 5, I then assigned reverse values to each selection, such that one's first priority would receive a value of 5, her second priority would receive a value of 4, and so on. Thus, if respondent *i* ranks money first and jobs second, *patronage_i* will have a value of 4.5; if she ranks jobs second but money at the bottom of her list of five items, *patronage_i* will have a value of 2.5. Values for the dependent variable in my dataset range from 1.5 to 4.5, with a mean of 3.08.

Given the argument and hypothesis outlined above, the expectation is that *patronage* will decrease as respondents' socioeconomic conditions improve. To substantiate these claims, I operationalize voters' socioeconomic conditions, and some key control variables, as follows.

Voters' Socioeconomic Conditions

Income_i is the level of respondent *i*'s family income per month. I used family income based on the convention established by other survey researchers in Indonesia, which can include formal salaries as

well as informal income (East-Asian Barometer 2006); my survey enumerators did not encounter more than minimal reticence from respondents about providing this information. $Income_i$ is coded 1 if respondent i 's monthly family income is less than Rp. 500,000 (about US\$55 in late January 2011); 2 if the monthly family income is between Rp. 500,001 and 2,000,000 (about US\$222); 3 if the monthly family income is between Rp. 2,000,001 and 10,000,000 (about US\$1,108); and 4 for monthly family incomes greater than Rp. 10,000,000. The mean of the income variable in the dataset is 2.50, with differences across subdistricts: in the LDD of Cilincing, the mean value for the income variable is 1.99, whereas in the MDDs of Tebet and Pasar Minggu the mean value stands at 3.03.

$Education_i$, representing the highest level of education that respondent i has completed, is coded on a seven-point scale, where 0 indicates elementary school and 6 represents completion of a graduate degree. The education variable has a mean value of 3.44 (2.40 in the LDD; 4.53 in MDDs). I expect both *income* and *education* to have negative effects on *patronage*.

Because better-educated people tend to earn higher incomes, those two variables may be highly correlated. Indeed, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient shows that *education* correlates closely with *income* (Spearman's $\rho = 0.69$, $p < .01$). To check for multicollinearity, I thus run three separate models—the first without *education*, the second without *income*, and the third with both variables—and compare the results across models.

Control Variables

In addition to those key variables of interest, several other factors may contribute to preferences for patronage at the individual level. Based on arguments from Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), Wantchekon (2003), and others, *gender* may affect the type of benefits that voters desire. I thus include a dummy variable for gender, coded 1 for male; 50.6 percent of respondents in the dataset are male. *Age* is also included in my dataset, with a range from 17 to 72 and a mean of 38.9.

Respondents who are actively engaged in politics may value patronage and public goods differently from the unengaged, so I include $vote_i$ as a measure of political participation; the variable is coded 1 if respondent i voted in the 2009 legislative election and 0 otherwise. In my dataset 93.2 percent of respondents stated that they voted in the previous election, a figure perhaps somewhat inflated

but in line with voter turnout rates consistently around 90 percent in national elections in Indonesia (IDEA 2013). Similarly, interest in politics may shape voters' preferences, so I include the variable *remember_i*, coded 1 if respondent *i* remembers who was elected from her constituency in the 2009 legislative election and 0 otherwise; 28.3 percent of respondents accurately remembered the name of one of their representatives.⁵ Feeling represented by the current political system could also affect voters' demands for patronage; the variable *represented_i* is coded 1 if respondent *i* feels that her interests are being represented by the current parliament, an outcome that describes just 7.0 percent of respondents. Respondents who are satisfied with their lives (for instance, those who have decent jobs) may be more likely to feel represented by the current political system. There is no statistically significant correlation between this variable and income or education, however. Finally, I include the variable *party_i*, which is coded 1 if respondent *i* is currently a member of a political party and 0 otherwise; 29.4 percent of respondents indicate membership in a political party.

Members of different parties may have varying preferences for patronage. Because ruling parties are granted access to state resources for patronage, ruling party supporters should expect to receive more patronage than opposition party supporters (Shin 2013; Wantchekon 2003). In Indonesia, the president generally builds a grand coalition including most major parties, and the membership of the governing coalition often varies. In the 2009 presidential election, for instance, Yudhoyono built a coalition with four major Islamic parties and defeated Megawati (PDI-P: Indonesian Democratic Party–Struggle) and Jusuf Kalla (Golkar: Party of the Functional Groups). After the election, however, the Golkar party joined the president's coalition (Slater 2006). Thus, instead of dummy variables for ruling parties and the opposition, I created dummies for the four major parties that control over 10 percent of the parliamentary seats (after the 2009 legislative elections): President Yudhoyono's *Demokrat*, *Golkar*, *PDI-P*, and *PKS* (Prosperous Justice Party).

In addition, the control variables for those who are actively engaged in politics—*vote*, *remember*, *represented*, and *party*—may be highly correlated with each other. Party members, for instance, would be more likely to vote, remember their representative(s), and feel represented by the current parliament. Spearman's rank correlation coefficient shows that *remember* correlates significantly with the others, and that *party* correlates with *represented* ($p < .01$). To check

for multicollinearity, I compare the results with all the variables to those without *remember* and *party*.

In the results that follow, I present the effects of socioeconomic status on preferences for patronage. Then, given the possibility that other factors may be correlated with both the socioeconomic variables and the outcome of interest, I analyze the findings in a regression framework. Since the dependent variable used in this study is a continuous measure from 1.5 to 4.5 with seven possible values, I use an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model to estimate voters' demands for patronage.⁶

Empirical Results

First, I conduct a simple comparison of preferences from residents of the LDD and residents of the MDDs. Table 2 presents the average rank and the median preference order for the five different benefits evaluated in the survey: jobs, money, social health insurance, a free school program, and a price control program.⁷ As the table makes clear, jobs and money, the two most individualistic goods, constitute the most-preferred benefits for voters in the LDD, whereas a universal health care program and the free education program are the most popular types of benefits for voters in the MDDs. From this preliminary take, it seems evident that the poor prefer patronage over policy, while the well-off prefer policy to patronage.

While that preliminary analysis is revealing, numerous factors may be correlated with the zone of residence that also affect a respondent's preference for patronage over public policy. Thus, I turn now to the multivariate regression analyses, which incorporate the control variables described above.

Table 3 displays model estimations of voter demands for patronage. All results match my expectations. The coefficients on *income* and *education* are thus consistently negative and significant, indicating that a voter's low socioeconomic status leads her to desire patronage over programmatic policy.

To check for multicollinearity between income and education, I run models including only one of the two variables first. In column 1 of Table 3, I present the OLS regression results with income, along with the series of control variables. Findings from predicted probabilities calculations indicate that, in moving from the lowest income category to the highest, respondents' ranking of patronage (the average ranking of jobs and money) drops from 3.60 to 2.24. This change

Table 2 Average Rank and Preference Order of Five Benefits

Type of Benefits	Less-Developed District		More-Developed Districts	
	Ave. Rank ^a	Preference Order	Ave. Rank ^a	Preference Order
Patronage				
Money	3.17 (1.37)	2	1.81 (1.15)	5
Job	3.79 (1.35)	1	2.87 (1.26)	3
Policy				
Social health insurance (Jaminan Kesehatan Masyarakat)	2.73 (1.23)	4	3.91 (1.09)	1
Free school program (Program Sekolah Gratis)	2.88 (1.25)	3	3.57 (1.14)	2
Price control (Nine Basic Needs: Sembilan Bahan Pokok)	2.49 (1.48)	5	2.85 (1.42)	4
<i>N</i>		286		275

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.

a. Reversed rank in which one's first priority receives 5 and the last priority receives 1.

is substantial given that, in Table 2, the average rank for patronage benefits ranges from 1.81 to 3.79. In column 2 of Table 3, I include *education* instead of *income*. In moving from a level of primary school education to completion of graduate school, respondents' ranking of patronage decreases from 3.83 to 2.24.

Column 3 of Table 3 incorporates both income and education; doing so does not alter the results substantially. I can thus safely discard the multicollinearity concern. Both variables are strongly and negatively correlated with preferences for patronage: it is predicted that in moving from the lowest income category to the highest, respondents' ranking of patronage drops from 3.29 to 2.55, all else equal. In moving from the lowest education category to the highest, respondents' ranking of patronage decreases from 3.50 to 2.49, all else equal. These findings are consistent with my claim that low socioeconomic status pushes voters to desire targeted patronage over broader but harder to monitor national public policies, in keeping with the demand-side perspective.

These results are robust to the omission of two control variables—*remember* and *party*—that are correlated with other control variables (see column 4 of Table 3), and to the inclusion of variables

Table 3 OLS Regression Analysis of Voter Demands for Patronage

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Income (4-item scale, 1–4 range, mean = 2.50, S.D. = 0.79)	-.452** (.050)		-.247** (.069)	-.223* (.069)	-.234* (.070)
Education (7-item scale, 0–6 range, mean = 3.44, S.D. = 1.42)		-.266** (.028)	-.167** (.039)	-.199** (.039)	-.185** (.040)
Gender (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.51)	.343** (.080)	.351** (.080)	.354** (.079)	.370** (.079)	.347** (.080)
Age (range 17–72, mean = 38.9, S.D. = 10.9)	-.022** (.004)	-.027** (.004)	-.025** (.004)	-.025** (.004)	-.025** (.004)
Vote (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.93)	.469* (.158)	.553** (.158)	.529* (.156)	.576** (.156)	.533* (.158)
Remember (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.28)	-.027 (.093)	.001 (.092)	-.012 (.092)		.040 (.091)
Represented (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.07)	-.576** (.157)	-.554** (.157)	-.554** (.155)	-.473* (.154)	-.502** (.155)
Party (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.29)	.425** (.090)	.302* (.091)	.342** (.091)		
Demokrat (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.04)					.012 (.212)
Golkar (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.01)					.067 (.382)
PDI-P (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.03)					.618* (.224)
PKS (0–1 dummy, mean = 0.04)					.178 (.203)
Intercept	4.223** (.229)	4.124** (.220)	4.334** (.227)	4.439** (.227)	4.334** (.227)
Adjusted R ²	0.24	0.246	0.263	0.246	0.263
N	560	561	560	560	560

Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ** $p < .001$; * $p < .01$.

for membership in different parties instead of the simple *party* dummy (see column 5 of Table 3).⁸

Several control variables deserve attention. Respondents' gender and age affect their demands for patronage. The coefficients on *gender* are positive and significant, indicating that male voters are more likely to desire patronage than female voters. This finding is in keeping with results from other studies, which indicate that males tend to prioritize individualized goods to a greater degree than women (see, for example, Wantchekon 2003). Conversely, the coefficients on *age* are negative and significant, meaning that older voters are less likely to desire patronage. Younger voters in Indonesia tend to be bread

earners for their families, which might explain why they are more likely to demand money and jobs.

More importantly, as noted in the introduction, several variables for participation in politics have substantial impacts on demand for patronage. The coefficients on *vote* and *party* are both positive and significant, indicating that those who voted in the previous election and those who claim membership in a political party are more likely to desire patronage than are their counterparts. These findings may be taken as evidence that, within the structure of formal party politics, Indonesian voters tend to view parties and politicians as the outlet through which to obtain desired patronage goods. Thus, those who might otherwise desire policy demand patronage once they are politically engaged. This is also true when affiliation for different parties is taken into account, as the coefficients on *Demokrat*, *Golkar*, *PDI-P*, and *PKS* are all positive. It is noteworthy, however, that only the coefficient on the PDI-P party is significant; its positive sign signifies that supporters for PDI-P desire patronage to a greater extent than their counterparts from the president's party or the other major parties. This is somewhat counter to expectations, because PDI-P is generally considered to place a greater emphasis on national public policies than do the other parties. The PDI-P supporters' stronger demands for patronage would be worth investigating in future studies.

These findings shed light on the mechanism linking citizens' participation in politics to stronger support for patronage networks in less-developed countries. Where the majority of voters are poor and thus desire patronage over policy, politicians should have strong incentives to deliver such individualistic benefits to increase their electoral chances. Knowing that their representatives focus on the delivery of patronage, the poor, especially those who are actively engaged in politics, in turn, tend to demand more patronage, which reinforces politicians' incentives to deliver those particularistic goods. In this context of political particularism, it is expected that even well-off voters will demand individualistic benefits if they are politically active, because they know that politicians deliver few programmatic policies, and because they can receive the patronage on top of the policy that benefits everyone (Lyne 2007, 162–163).

Table 4 supports that expectation. The predicted ranking of patronage for high-income respondents (*income* = 4) is 1.96 when they are not engaged in politics (*vote* = 0; *party* = 0). Yet, that ranking increases to 2.83 when they are engaged in politics (*vote* = 1; *party* = 1). The ranking for these engaged high-income respon-

Table 4 Income, Participation in Politics, and Demand for Patronage

Participation in Politics	Low Income	High Income
Engaged	3.57	2.83
Unengaged	2.70	1.96

dents is actually higher than the ranking for their unengaged low-income counterparts (*income* = 1), although the difference is not statistically significant. The result indicates that politically active, wealthy voters tend to desire patronage as strongly as do politically inactive poor voters. Controlling for income, therefore, I find that participation in politics strongly affects demands for patronage as well. Such demands for patronage come not only from the poor but from middle-income and even high-income citizens who participate in politics.

In contrast, the coefficients on *represented* are negative and significant, meaning that those who feel that they are represented by the current parliament are less likely to desire patronage. This suggests that perhaps voters have the impression that, while individual parties and politicians strive to deliver patronage, politicians working within the parliament tend to focus on debating policy. Or it may be that those who care about policy are likely to feel that the parliament represents their interests; it is thus uncertain what leads these voters to desire patronage to a lesser extent. Given that only 7 percent of respondents feel represented by the parliament, this question is left for consideration in future studies. Nevertheless, the implications for patronage politics are important: the finding suggests that as the proportion of these voters increases, demand for patronage should wane.

Conclusion

The political distribution of targeted goods at the expense of national programs can undermine programmatic accountability and government performance. Yet, patronage politics remains a centerpiece of political exchange, particularly in developing countries. In this article, my aim has been to explore why patronage politics persists. To some, it is a function of demands made by voters; to others, the persistence of patronage politics hinges on the dearth of alternatives

supplied by politicians. I have aimed to adjudicate between those perspectives. In addition, I have explored how voters' participation in politics affects their demands for patronage in the less-developed context.

Using data from over 550 participants in Jakarta, Indonesia, I have shown that the socioeconomic status of voters shapes their demand for patronage: when both patronage and policy are offered, poor, less-educated voters tend to desire patronage over policy, while well-off, better-educated voters tend to desire national public goods. That the well-off, better-educated voters tend to prefer policy such as free education and universal health care over patronage is not a trivial finding in the sense that, following the Meltzer-Richard model, the wealthy are generally expected to oppose social welfare programs for which they pay more than what they get (Meltzer and Richard 1981). The type of benefits supplied by politicians, therefore, seems to be a function of voter preferences rather than a driver of those preferences. These findings lend some support to the demand-side theory, since poor voters with short time horizons tend to desire tangible benefits over universal benefits, thus incentivizing politicians to provide patronage. The findings are less consistent with the supply-side view of patronage politics, which holds that patronage politics persists because no political party has an incentive to provide other kinds of platforms. Even when programmatic policy was made available, poor voters' preferences remained a function of their socioeconomic status.

While poverty and undereducation do matter, particular forms of political engagement and involvement are also germane: whether you vote, whether you are a member of a party (and which one), and finally whether you feel represented all impact preferences for patronage. The study reveals that those who voted in the previous election and those who affiliate with a political party—especially with PDI-P—are more likely to demand patronage. This suggests that citizens' active participation in politics fortifies patronage networks in less-developed countries. It is a demand-side finding in the sense that a particular group has a higher demand for patronage. Nonetheless, it is also a supply-side finding in that patronage expectations from parties cement voting and party membership. Party attachments, in other words, are the channel through which patronage is expected to flow. Although the respondents who feel represented by the current parliament are less likely to demand patronage, the reason remains unclear.

The implications of this study are important if not optimistic. Given the finding that not only poverty and undereducation but also political participation are driving forces behind patronage politics, it can be inferred that, in the choice between emphasizing targeted goods or public goods, political leaders will tend to respond to the demands of voters. In this context, better-functioning government hinges on improving the socioeconomic conditions of citizens and on decoupling parties and organizations from the distribution of patronage. Yet, there is ample evidence that patronage politics hinders the very socioeconomic development that those countries need, because the delivery of particularistic benefits tends to result in government resources that are distributed less efficiently (Hicken and Simmons 2008). Moreover, politically active voters may deter any attempt to undermine existing patronage networks. This vicious cycle tends only to spur more political particularism.

Thus, to break free from the constraints imposed by voter demands in low-income settings, exogenous means of promoting policy-oriented politics must be developed. Electoral reforms that move away from candidate-centered systems toward party-centered ones, for example, may enable the incentives that politicians face to counter some of the adverse incentives that poor voters face. The results of this study suggest, however, that even changes to the electoral system may not be enough, since voter demands stemming from their socioeconomic conditions would be robust to manipulations of the political context when it comes to the basic choice between patronage and public goods. Furthermore, party activists may induce party leaders to bring the old system back eventually.

The limited scope of this study presents opportunities for future research. One important point to note is that I conducted this research in an ethnically and religiously homogeneous setting, as most residents of the enumeration areas in Jakarta are Javanese and Muslim. This strategy allowed me to control for diversity in identity types across the enumeration areas, but it sidesteps a potentially important driver of informal, targeted distribution. Since ethnic diversity has been linked to patronage politics in other studies (Corstange N.D.; Lemarchand 1972; Lindberg and Morrison 2008), a next step might be to explore the interaction of socioeconomic drivers with identity group drivers of patronage demands. I have also left mobilization efforts out of this story. In supplying a set of policy priorities, politicians might engage in mobilization efforts to generate support for their favored positions. Mobilization efforts could in turn alter the preferences of supporters in ways that I can-

not capture here. Follow-up studies that incorporate distinct mobilization strategies may yield a better understanding of the impact that political leaders can have on their supporters' demands for patronage, beyond the straightforward supply of patronage or public policies. Finally, I recognize that the observational survey methods I employ here are subject to the same criticisms that befall most studies relying on these tools: I am not able to fully account for the unobserved individual-level characteristics that may correlate with both socioeconomic status and preferences regarding patronage. Nevertheless, the survey methods offering different types of benefits to respondents have the advantage of allowing me to evaluate both the supply and the demand sides of patronage, and to consider the important role that political participation plays in shaping policy preferences. The study thus provides some much needed insight into why patronage politics remains so persistent in settings of widespread poverty.

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Notes

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1. For a detailed discussion of the demand-side and the supply-side perspectives on patronage politics, see Kurer (2001) or Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007, 24–28).

2. Scott has written extensively on the Indonesian context. See Scott (1972, 1977). See also Olken (2007, 2010), Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani (2012), and Ross (2001).

3. For this reason, most studies of elections and parties in affluent democracies in Western Europe and North America are based on the assumption that parties seek political power to deliver national public policy (see, e.g., Downs 1957; Richman 2011; Samuels and Shugart 2010).

4. The research team surveyed one eligible voter every five households, starting from the center of each SSD. The total number of respondents differs slightly across districts because of the different population and the availability of respondents among those SSDs.

5. In the multimember district system, a respondent is considered to remember her district representatives if she remembers at least one of their names.

6. I supplement the analysis with an ordered probit model; the choice of models does not alter the significance of results.

7. Recall that after respondents ranked the goods in order of preference, from 1 to 5, I assigned reverse values to each selection, such that one's first priority received a value of 5 and her last priority received a value of 1.

8. The results do not change when dummies for the other small parties are included.

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


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