

of widely accepted generalizations about the nature of the process of industrialization in Russia, including the celebrated "Gerschenkron hypothesis" on the economics of backwardness. In effect, Crisp turns the Gerschenkron hypothesis on its head. The weakness of the "autonomous forces" of the Russian economy (that is, the private sector) was not nearly so great as Gerschenkron implies. Insofar as they (it) were (was) weak, such weakness resulted from the continual interference of the state from the time of Peter the Great onward—which Gerschenkron and others have asserted was necessitated by that very "weakness"—at least as much as by other indigenous factors. Crisp's evidence on the important role of the Russian banks, from an earlier essay, and her generally favorable review of McKay's book on foreign entrepreneurs, support her contentions.

All in all, this is a very important book, essential to a correct understanding of the Russian economy in the last century of tsardom.

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THE GREAT REVIVAL: THE RUSSIAN CHURCH UNDER GERMAN OCCUPATION. By *Wassilij Alexeev* and *Theofanis G. Stavrou*. Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1976. xvi, 229 pp. Illus. \$21.95.

Alexander Dallin's seminal study of Nazi occupation policies during World War II, *German Rule in Russia, 1941-1945*, identified the crucial role of the churches in providing a means for the subject population to maintain its social and cultural identity. During some three years of mounting hardships—starvation, forced labor, requisitions, and a reign of terror—religious institutions operated with a freedom they had not known since 1917. Despite heavy-handed and contradictory attempts by the German authorities to manipulate ecclesiastical forces, the nascent church groups were generally able to perform their spiritual tasks at the cost of only perfunctory tributes to their "liberators."

Now we have this survey of what the authors term "the second baptism of Russia." The work embodies Professor Alexeev's doctoral dissertation, detailing by geographical region the experiences of Russian Orthodox hierarchs and parishes. An opening chapter and epilogue, evidently by Professor Stavrou, deduce the essential religiosity of Russia from sources as diverse as Kazantzakis and Solzhenitsyn. The connection between the two sections is tenuous, unless one accepts the implicit assumption that national spirituality rather than special wartime circumstances was the major cause of the Russian church revival.

That assumption is questionable, in the light of the historical evidence as well as the findings of Peter Berger, among others, on the correlation of modernization and secularization. It is further undercut in the Russian case by the ease with which Khrushchev erased most of the wartime gains of the churches by the mid-sixties, closing half of them.

Alexeev is at his best in piecing together biographies of the bishops who guided the reconstruction of the church. They emerge, on the whole, as resourceful and dedicated leaders, able to steer a narrow course between the pressures of Nazi overseers and nationalist extremists. Alexeev does not seem to be sufficiently critical, perhaps out of regard for their status in Western emigration, of those who succumbed to such pressures. Neither does he question the dubious methods by which some of the clerics were ordained.

Relying primarily on refugee interviews and German reports, Alexeev presents accounts of church services in a number of localities. By their nature, such data are

episodic and do not support statistical conclusions covering the entire occupied area. A more convincing picture would have had to take into account the cresting of the religious revival after German civilian authorities unfolded their policies of enslavement, in the wake of military commanders who had sought to placate the people. In this respect, it is significant that the most dramatic religious upsurge took place on the approaches to Leningrad, beyond the borders of the "Ostland."

Alexeev is to be commended for the patience with which he has assembled the fragmentary data to indicate the sweep of the religious movement that affected most of the German-occupied region and played its part in convincing Stalin to come to terms with the church at home. Unfortunately, the pedestrian style of this work and its failure to sketch in the social background of the religious drama limit its usefulness to specialists in the field.

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THE RUSSIAN VERSION OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR: THE HISTORY OF THE WAR AS TAUGHT TO SOVIET SCHOOLCHILDREN.  
Edited by *Graham Lyons*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, Shoe String Press, 1976. xviii, 142 pp. Plates. \$10.00.

Graham Lyons has edited (from translations made by Marjorie Vanston) a valuable addition to the literature on Soviet history and historiography available in English. *The Russian Version of the Second World War* is actually two books under one cover. The first and main portion of the volume consists of passages selected and translated from two Soviet modern history texts assigned to tenth form secondary school students throughout the USSR. Both texts are authored by a group of Soviet historians and published by Prosveshchenie, under the aegis of the USSR Ministry of Education, in Moscow. One source, *Istoriia SSSR (History of the USSR)*, as Mr. Lyons tells us in his introduction, deals mostly with the military aspects of World War II, while the second, *Noveishaia istoriia (Modern History)* covers the political aspects of the war. In fact, the distinction between the texts is not so pat as this statement would indicate.

The second portion of the volume—called, somewhat misleadingly, the Appendix—is a set of selected excerpts from popular histories and memoirs for Soviet adult general readers, dealing with what Mr. Lyons describes as "the three most controversial actions of the Soviet Union in the period 1939–45: the signing of the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939; the Russo-Finnish War, 1940–41; and the Russian refusal to help the insurgents in the Warsaw Uprising" (p. 89). It is puzzling that the comprehensive and authoritative popular history—*The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945*—published by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the Central Committee in 1970, was not used, since it represents a closer parallel to the school texts than the military reminiscences of any individual. Each Soviet account is prefaced by a brief statement in which the editor summarizes the prevailing Western historical version of events, which he also refers to as "the Cold War or anti-Soviet positions on these events" (p. 89), a rather unfortunate phrase given his very laudable intent to present to the reader the Soviet text without editorial comment.

As the preceding comment suggests, the purpose of this book is educational. Mr. Lyons has "conceived this book for the general reader rather than for scholars," and within this framework he has probably been successful. The fact that he has deliberately avoided "cluttering the text with footnotes" will indeed prove an annoyance and diminish its usefulness to those historians who pick it up, although Mr. Lyons