
REVIEW ESSAYS

PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE IN THE ANDES

Enrique Mayer

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

PODER Y VIOLENCIA EN LOS ANDES. Edited by Henrique Urbano. (Cuzco: Centro de Estudios Regionales Andinos, Bartolomé de Las Casas, 1991. Pp. 419.)

HOUSEHOLD AND CLASS RELATIONS: PEASANTS AND LANDLORDS IN NORTHERN PERU. By Carmen Diana Deere. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991. Pp. 368. \$40.00.)

PEASANTS ON THE EDGE: CROP, CULT, AND CRISIS IN THE ANDES. By William P. Mitchell. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991. Pp. 264. \$30.00.)

DESARROLLO CAMPESINO EN LOS ANDES: CAMBIO TECNOLÓGICO Y TRANSFORMACIÓN SOCIAL EN LAS COMUNIDADES DE LA SIERRA DEL PERU. By Daniel Cotlear. (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1989. Pp. 325.)

WAR OF SHADOWS: THE STRUGGLE FOR UTOPIA IN THE PERUVIAN AMAZON. By Michael F. Brown and Eduardo Fernández. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991. Pp. 280. \$29.95.)

When reading any book on Peru these days, one feels an irresistible yet disconcerting urge to search for clues to understanding the current situation, even if the work at hand was not originally intended to describe the antecedents of the current crisis and violence. This searching perspective will guide my review. These five books all deal in one way or another with rural areas and peasants' problems, the role of the state,

and violence. Their pages are populated by cruel landlords, outraged Indian peasants, distant and disconcerted bureaucrats, misguided armed revolutionaries, and sanguinary soldiers unleashing waves of repression. The reader also finds acts, real or reported, of savagery: cruel killings, frenzied disfigurements, and sadistic torture. Equally important is the imagery, mythology, and stereotyping of cruelty. Collective rebellions have included "justified eliminations" as well as unjustified persecutions of innocents. Another element is elite fear of racial, ethnic, or class warfare "from below," an aspect that must be assessed carefully. Satanization is as much of a weapon in situations of conflict as real acts of intimidation, violence, and murder. One must therefore stare at violence with a cold and steady gaze to avoid the morbid fascination evoked by its inchoate images.

The publications under review consist of four book-length case studies and one edited conference volume. Each takes a different theoretical approach and uses distinctive disciplinary discourses. The authors include two economists (Cotlear and Deere), three anthropologists (Mitchell, Brown, and Fernández), and an interdisciplinary group of historians and other scholars brought together in Quito by CLACSO (Concejo Latinoamericano de Ciencias Sociales). Mitchell made a long-term community study in the department of Ayacucho. Deere undertook a regional survey covering eighty years of change in the department of Cajamarca. Brown and Fernández reconstruct events that occurred in the central lowlands when the Ashaninka ethnic group got involved with Guevarist guerrillas in 1965. Cotlear surveyed peasant farmers in three regions in Peru in 1983 looking for clues to potential for agricultural development among peasant *comuneros*. The diverse historical contributions edited by Father Urbano include essays on the tribunal of the Lima Inquisition, diaries of eyewitnesses during the siege of La Paz by the Indian rebel Vilca Apaza in 1781, trials following the Tupac Amaru uprising in 1781–1783, and a study of rebellious royalist Iquichano Indians during the wars of independence in the province of Huanta. More recent subjects include studies of tax revolts during the nineteenth century and of landlords extorting peasants and peasants killing policemen in the twentieth. The collection also features discussions of images of violence and power among *gamonales*, policemen, peasants, anthropologists, young Senderistas, and even urban housewives in contemporary Lima.

The thematic arrangement of the Urbano collection invites confirmation of the cliché that Andean society has been always characterized by violence. Such a resigned observation may serve as a consoling thought during these times of *chaqwa* (an Ayacucho Quechua word best translated as "times of chaos").¹ Yet long periods of peace occurred between the

1. According to Robin Kirk, *chacua* "refers to something confused, disorganized; the literal dismantling of the universal order between two diametrically opposed forces." See

sporadic outbursts of violence highlighted in this volume. Another point worth underscoring is that violence has been present even during peaceful times, in a form that has been labeled “structural violence.”² Also, it is too easy to identify increasing trends toward poverty with the causes of violence. The Mitchell and Deere studies show that there have been periods of growing immiseration without outbreaks of violence. The biological image evoked by the *caldo de cultivo*, which implies that poverty is the breeding medium for violence, is frequently cited as a cause of violence,³ but it is an insufficient explanation. More often the cause is perceived or real injustices. Even within such an ambiance, questions remain: what sparks outbreaks of violence, why does it escalate, when does it reach intolerable levels, and how does it abate? These questions are important, but they are not so easily answered by looking exclusively at proximate causes. The state of violence differs qualitatively from “peaceful times.” How often did Andean society cross this boundary, who defined it, and what caused it?

Most of us find violence repugnant most of the time. Yet perpetrators of violence are quickly categorized as either justified or cruel and criminal. It is impossible not to judge, which leads to asking how Peruvian society has defined “legitimate defense” over time. Peasants invoke it in an uprising, as do landlords and the state in repressing peasants. Revolutionaries invoke the concept of “just war” to impose a new order, while counterinsurgency specialists rationalize their response with surgical metaphors of the need to extirpate cancerous growths from the body politic. Innocent bystanders get sucked into vortexes of escalating violence as terrorists take revenge on “traitors,” and the army avenges itself on villagers when soldiers cannot ferret out “the enemy.” Individuals take advantage of chaos to settle private grievances. Thus it becomes more

the book jacket of Kirk’s *The Decade of Chaqwa: Peru’s Internal Refugees* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1991).

2. In 1990 the Comisión Especial del Senado sobre las Causas de la Violencia y Alternativas de Pacificación en el Perú devoted three chapters to analyzing “structural violence” in Peruvian society. See *Violencia y pacificación* (Lima: DESCO and the Comisión Andina de Juristas, 1990). The commission perceived structural violence as a historical, cumulative, and ingrained process “to the extent that the very constituted order of things, its legality, and the organization of power become expressions of a structural violence that accumulates, replicates itself, and tends to perpetuate itself, impelling under certain circumstances actual violent behavior in its diverse manifestations” (p. 34). Two general trends were cited as causes of structural violence: a gradual buildup from historical discontinuities, displacement of people, disintegration, marginalization, lack of communication, authoritarianism, centrism, and the absence of a national project; second, the patterns of social relations between groups, including unequal status, domination, racism, and gender domination (pp. 120–30).

3. Ernest V. Siracusa, Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Embassy in Lima in 1966, also makes this argument: “The failure of Peru to address long-term social grievances helped to provide the breeding ground for discontent and promote the opportunity for continuous exploitation by communism” (cited in Brown and Fernández, *War of Shadows*, p. 189).

significant to ask what causes violence to escalate rather than who provoked it. Answers about causes may yield lessons that help create conditions in which violence can be avoided and pacification can begin.

Violence has its own logic, culture, and imagery that are linked less to poverty than to domination, the exercise of styles of power, resistance, and revolutions. The Urbano collection of essays ranges far and wide over these topics without offering any theoretical guidance. Yet two lingering questions can be discerned throughout the book. First, to what extent are there long-term institutionalized patterns of violence that have been imposed by state, church, and ruling elites? Second, regarding the responses from below, is there an Andean cultural pattern of violence?

Peru's most famous man of letters, Mario Vargas Llosa, subscribes to the idea of an endemic pattern of violence. The protagonist of his novel, who is investigating the life of revolutionary Alejandro Mayta, visits the Museo de la Inquisición. On leaving, he muses: "Instructive, fascinating. Condensed in a few striking images and objects, there is an essential ingredient, always present in the history of this country, from the most remote times: violence. Violence of all kinds: moral, physical, fanatical, intransigent, ideological, corrupt, stupid—all of which have gone hand in hand with power here. And that other violence—dirty, petty, low, vengeful, vested and selfish—which lives off the other kinds."⁴

Violence "from Above"

Father Henrique Urbano's collection, *Poder y violencia en los Andes*, opens with three studies of the Catholic Inquisition in Lima. Ana Sánchez, Javier Flores Espinoza, and Gabriela Ramos all find a fairly constant number of trials for *hechicería* (witchcraft) in the Lima archives. These were punctuated by intermittent waves of trials against upper-class heretics, mainly merchants accused of being Jews or *conversos*, individuals who had been conveniently chosen to get rid of unwanted competition. *Indios* were excluded as a category from the Inquisition because they were subject to a parallel institution in the *visitas de idolatrías*. Nevertheless, the Inquisition also persecuted acculturated Indians living in the cities who practiced their professional roles as curers.⁵ Usually, the accused were ordinary soothsayers who plied their trade among members of the popular classes, many of them women, and were fingered by peculiar accusations of jealousy. A common piece of evidence presented to incriminate

4. Mario Vargas Llosa, *The Real Life of Alejandro Mayta*, translated by Alfred McAdam (New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1986), 109.

5. This point has been noted by Irene Silverblatt, *Moon, Sun, and Witches: Gender Ideologies and Class in Inca and Colonial Peru* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1987); and by Michael Taussig, *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1987). Taussig shows that the image of the "wild Indian" is believed to be a powerful source of healing in mestizo popular culture.

the curers was the use of coca leaves during their rituals. The medieval demons persecuted by the Inquisition inhabited the minds of the prosecutors, not those of the accused. The baffled *curanderos* considered their practices common and beneficial. It took torture for them to learn how to confess, and until they admitted that they indeed trafficked with the devil, the torture continued.

The Inquisition instrumentalized violent practices by incorporating torture into legal proceedings. It also institutionalized fear in creating opportunities to persecute individuals for behaviors that were ordinary aspects of popular culture. Worse still, the Inquisition established a secret network of informers in all walks of life who were rewarded with economic benefits. Links to the Inquisition also endowed powerful elites with the opportunity to use it to further their own economic interests. Abuse of power and corruption permeated the institution. By assuming the existence of conspiracies, the Inquisition also created them. Vargas Llosa is correct: these patterns continue to resonate in official institutions in modern Peru.

Charles Walker's contribution examines the court cases that ensued four decades after the indigenous rebellion in 1781–82 had been quelled and its leaders executed in theatrical acts of public terror. Because the stability of the state had been badly shaken by these uprisings, the crown instituted reforms to respond to the causes of the rebellion, but it also employed the judiciary to prevent any possible recurrence. Meanwhile, the Indians sought recourse in these same courts to prevent or minimize abuses. The court consequently became the arbitrator in defining what were "acceptable" limits of exactions, what were "abuses" by authorities, and what forms of physical punishment exceeded shifting cultural definitions of what was "normal." Walker cites one defendant's rationale: "If the Indians are not corrected with whips, their arrogance, drunkenness and laziness cannot be held in check" (p. 137). Walker also studied many cases presented by commoner Indians against their own Indian authorities. If all else failed, the Indians resorted to mutinies and rebellions, which brought their causes to the attention of what was too often an insensitive bureaucracy.

Walker pushes the analysis of violence a significant step further in positing that shifting definitions of everyday violence, repression, and coercion were established through complex interactions between different levels of authority and institutions. Outbreaks of violence were never wanton or random. They appeared as a last recourse, often triggering dire consequences as the forces of repression were unleashed on them. Only after the movement was quelled were the reforms the Indians had originally demanded partially instituted, merely to be gradually eroded away again.

Two essays on taxation of Indians during the late colonial and

early republican times demonstrate how the cycles outlined by Walker repeated themselves. Víctor Peralta points out that despite the promise to lower taxes following the Tupac Amaru rebellion of 1782 (the main grievance), the Indian head tax actually increased. All the coercive mechanisms previously used to gather this tribute were reestablished by the vast patrimonial bureaucracy ranging from Indian authorities in villages to the fiscal mestizo and criollo officers of the viceroyalty. Peralta also describes the reasons why, despite ideological and emancipatory declarations after independence, the Indian head tax continued to be an important source of revenue in the days of the early republic. Augustín Gamarra, the presidential caudillo of southern Peru, justified taxing Indians: "because this obligation would force them to develop lucrative trades and professions" (p. 157). More to the point, it was the main source of revenue.

Christine Hünefeldt's contribution to the Urbano volume demonstrates that in Puno, abusive and coercive tax-collecting practices continued unabated even in the republican era. Tax collectors in that area used the funds for their own commercial and money-lending businesses, multiplying their value several times for their personal profit before passing the monies along. Combining the position of tax collector with those of hacienda owner and merchant proved to be a lucrative arrangement. Hünefeldt correctly points out this tax was based on ethnic and racial criteria and thus perpetuated the status of "indio," with all the semantic, symbolic, and social complexities conferred by this ethnic, racial, and class label. The head tax was also one of the most primitive and brutal forms of capital accumulation underwriting the mercantile economy of the highland regions. This tax was abolished only after guano exports rendered it anachronistic in the mid-nineteenth century.

Three other essays deal with the power styles of hacienda owners. Nelson Manrique rebaptizes them as *gamonales*⁶ and links their rise to the growth of the international wool market in the nineteenth century. Deborah Poole expands on Manrique's ideas by describing the swaggering symbolic power styles of the Chumbivilcas *gamonales* in contemporary southern Peru. One characteristic was their refusal to bow to constituted state authority. When bands of *gamonales* openly defied state representatives, they gained local popularity. Virtuosity was imputed to legendary cattle rustlers whose intrepid raids were gleefully retold with local pride. Intellectuals in Cuzco wrote about these tales and thus created a positive image for the characterization of Chumbivilcanos as fiercely autonomous, a regional identity that supposedly melds Indian

6. According to Deborah Poole, "The term *gamonal* derives from the name of a virtually indestructible perennial plant of the lily family, the *gamón* (asphodel). . . . As a metaphor for the particular class of bilingual, bicultural and horrendously abusive landlords it describes, this name could not be more precise." See Poole, "Landscape of Power in a Cattle-Rustling Culture of Southern Andean Peru," *Dialectical Anthropology* 12 (1988):372.

fierceness with male gamonal bravado. Bolstering the myth of the Chumbivilcano “cowboy” are the well-attended bullfights and rodeos celebrated in the region. Here machismo is demonstrated by facing not one but many bulls in the ring, with the accolades for valor going to those who get gored. These bloody festivals have actually gained legitimacy through state-sponsored educational and cultural institutions under the rubric of folklore celebrating cultural authenticity.

Andrés Guerrero’s essay on the reconstituted rituals of San Juan in a former Ecuadorian hacienda in Otavalo is perplexed by the apparent paradox that despite the fact that agrarian reform in Ecuador has made most of the residents independent of the hacienda, peasants nevertheless insist on enacting a traditional ritual in the patio of the hacienda. In this custom, the former hacendado (now the new capitalist “dairy farmer entrepreneur”) graciously listens to the children of the progressive leaders (who once led revolts against him) reciting the biblical story of Saint John the Baptist and then liberally rewards them with rolls of money. As a reinvented tradition, this ritual of obeisance thus has been refunctionalized to fit new social contexts and meanings.⁷ It is nevertheless an apposite comment on power relations between unequals. More interesting is the fact that these feasts are celebrated at the insistence of the workers, neighbors, and other individuals formerly linked to the hacienda that used to exploit them.

Violence “from Below”

Mark Thurner’s contribution to the Urbano collection examines the culture of terror and warfare conducted by Julián Vilca Apaza during the siege of La Paz in 1781, a major event in the Tupac Amaru–Catari–Apaza uprisings against the Spanish Crown. This study follows up on issues raised at a 1984 symposium on resistance, rebellion, and consciousness in the Andean World.⁸ Led by Apaza (who renamed himself Tupac Catari), the uprisings aroused between thirty and forty thousand Indian supporters and sealed off La Paz completely. Thousands of Indians repeatedly attacked the outskirts of the city, captured Spaniards, and executed them in Apaza’s camp.

Thurner focuses on cultural strategies for staging theatrical acts as means of terrorizing Spaniards and mobilizing Indian attackers for war. Apaza’s camp became as much a ceremonial and political center as a strategic command post. Ceremonial drinking, distribution of coca and food, expressions of loyalty by Aymara and Quechua ayllus, and even the

7. E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

8. *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*, edited by Steve Stern (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).

celebration of Catholic rituals all took place there. The larger purpose was to forge unity among different segments of Indian groups. Similarly, during the Indian attacks on La Paz, as much attention was paid to ceremonial expressions of hostility as to tactical aspects of military strategy. For example, La Paz was constantly harassed by organized crowds of Indians who descended from the Apaza camp to scream, dance, taunt, set off fireworks, and fire salvos of gunfire at the beleaguered criollo and mestizo residents of the city.⁹ Any Spaniard caught by the Indians was promptly hanged on Apaza's gallows, and the body was often mutilated. Counter-executions were staged in the plaza of La Paz, which the Indians could see from their encampments on the hills above the city.

Apaza attempted to create a counter-hegemonic state out of the elements of late-colonial society, which included the trappings of the state and key aspects of Andean social organization. Political leadership was clearly symbolized by Apaza's name change to Tupac Catari, which conflated the names of the two main cacique leaders of the rebellion in Cuzco (Tupac Amaru) and in Chayanta (Tupac Catari). The three leaders claimed to have direct authority from the king of Spain to rebel against the abuses being committed against the Indians. Ideological, religious, and moral justifications reiterated the view that the rebels—not their enemies—were the true Christians. Procedures for organizing military and civil actions were established, and clear definitions of the enemy expounded. The rebellion also mobilized representatives of all segments of Andean society: the caciques, their wives, local leaders, mestizos, and tens of thousands of peasant Indians. But not everyone participated. Some Indians and caciques sided with the mestizos and Spaniards. The rebellion succeeded in taking over the rural areas, but despite attempts like those of Apaza, the rebellion ultimately failed to capture the cities that were the locus of Spanish power in the colony. Hence came the rebels' ultimate defeat.

Peruvian historiography generally concurs that during the wars for independence, the Indians remained passive bystanders in a fight conducted by criollos. Thus the case of the Iquichanos near Ayacucho represents a double anomaly in that they not only participated in the wars but sided with the royalists.¹⁰ It is interesting to note that the 1983 massacre of eight journalists by peasants in Uchuraccay,¹¹ who supposedly supported the military, has revived interest in the question of why the Iquichanos championed the "wrong side." Cecilia Méndez's con-

9. This tactic was also employed by U.S. invaders in Panama when they set up deafening rock and roll music outside Manuel Noriega's bunker.

10. This information was originally reported by Jorge Basadre in *La multitud, la ciudad y el campo en la historia del Perú*, 2d ed. (Lima: Editorial Huascarán, 1947). He thus established the stereotypical view of the Iquichanos as "particularly barbarous residents of Huanta and La Mar provinces, descendants of the Pokras, tribes of the Chanca race" (p. 226).

11. Enrique Mayer, "Peru in Deep Trouble: Mario Vargas Llosa's 'Inquest in the Andes' Reexamined," *Cultural Anthropology* 6, no. 4 (1992):466–504.

tribution describes the earlier incidents. After the battle of Ayacucho in December 1824, the Indians of the Iquicha region in the highlands of Huanta declared themselves in rebellion. They sacked haciendas, appropriated stock and agricultural goods of republican hacendados, elected their own officials and tax collectors, and resisted the expeditionary forces sent to quell the rebellion. Their leader, Antonio Navala Huachaca, was a muleteer from the highland punas who elevated himself to the rank of general, claiming to have been commissioned by Viceroy José de la Serna. Huachaca soon made contact with the provincial priests and a group of refugee Spaniards. He then proceeded to liberate the town of Huanta in November 1827 when thousands of Indians descended on the city. Next they laid siege to Ayacucho but failed to capture it. The Iquichano Indians returned home, and their leaders fled to the remote coca-growing regions of the eastern Andes. The expeditionary force sent by the republicans took seven months to cross the region, burning villages, massacring Indians, and capturing most of the leaders, their Spanish allies, and the priests. Huachaca himself was never caught. Three years later, a similar rebellion in the same area broke out, this time without the royalist element in the declaration. The Iquichano Indians disliked republican caudillo Gamarra just as vehemently because he intended to levy taxes.

Méndez finds this movement easy to understand. The coca grown on the eastern slopes by Spaniards and priests on their haciendas was transported through the difficult terrain of the punas by Iquicha *arrieros* (muleteers) and traded extensively through Huanta by mestizos. This lucrative enterprise was severely disrupted by the wars, and the rebels quickly sought to protect it. Thus when the state was weak, the Iquichanos appropriated the tax themselves and established what today might be called “a liberated zone.”¹² Huachaca administered justice, organized labor parties to repair bridges, mediated disputes between laborers and hacendados, and established strict moral codes that had to be obeyed—even by the Spaniards.¹³ Ideology in terms of principled adherence to republican or royalist forms of government had little to do with any of it.

Martha Moscoso’s essay describes the social characteristics of peasant leaders in Azuay, Ecuador, in the early 1920s. Indians around Cuenca rebelled against land-registration efforts, a land tax, and a shortage of salt. These uprisings were termed “strikes” rather than rebellions. In reality, they were organized “demonstrations” in marketplaces, towns, and seats of power. During the night, the Indians would congregate in the

12. Another case in the Central Highlands in the aftermath of the war with Chile has been reported by Florencia Mallon in *The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983).

13. In the twentieth century, similar roles have been assumed by guerrillas of the MRTA and Sendero Luminoso in the coca-growing areas.

outskirts, drinking, playing threatening music, and shooting off guns and firecrackers. At dawn they would descend on the town in an organized takeover of the main plaza to capture local seats of power. *Cabecillas* (ringleaders) coordinated the marches and provided strategic advice. Soldiers were sent to repress these attacks, often killing and wounding many demonstrators. Occasionally, the Indians achieved their goals, as in obtaining a promise to remove proposed taxes or cease the land registrations. Indians threatened minor officials and record keepers, demanding that important papers be either burned or handed over to them. The Indians also shrewdly exploited their image as “savages” to achieve their own goals by sharpening machetes and threatening to kill officials and drink their blood.

Benjamin Orlove focuses not so much on events as on the differing narratives of violent encounters between Indians and authorities. He is interested in the images the actors have of each other and themselves. Orlove’s essay examines conflicts that had violent and nonviolent moments and involved “rebellious” peasant Indians on one side and state officials (mainly police) on the other. One such incident occurred in 1931, when a group of five notables (three policemen, a civil authority, and his hacendado relative) set off to an Indian village to make an arrest and settle a land dispute. On arriving, the police killed the man they were supposed to arrest. The victim’s wife then rounded up her relatives to recover his body. In the process, they beat the hacendado, killed two of the policemen, and mutilated the bodies.

To the residents of the town of Yauri, these actions constituted a rebellion. Orlove presents telegrams sent out from Yauri for reinforcements, in which references to “mutinous Indians,” “assassins,” and “ferocious Indians proclaim[ing] communism” clearly voice the townspeople’s panic. A police force quickly assembled from surrounding towns returned days later to the “rebel” rural area, where it burned houses, killed more than one hundred Indian peasants, and captured thirty to fifty more. The Spanish military jargon for these kinds of actions is *escarmiento* (a lesson learned from punishment). The Cuzco press sensationalized the event, describing lavishly the mutilations and tortures committed by the Indians. They were portrayed as “epileptic” and “bestialized” in their frenzy. Yet informants’ recollections of these events, as recounted to Orlove forty years later in 1972, vary. Townspeople emphasized their role as victims, dwelling on the mutilations and torture perpetrated by “criminals” who resisted arrest. Indians remembered it differently, citing the land-expansive tendencies of the hacendados, the coldblooded killing of the peasant Domingo Tarifa when he tried to escape arrest, and the police’s refusal to hand his body over to his wife for burial. They also dwelled on the reprisals and the prison terms. Thus while the mestizos of Yauri emphasized the mutilations of the policemen, the Indians tended to omit it,

calling their own response “an attack.” In these accounts, one hears echoes of the contemporary reporting and editorializing about Sendero Luminoso and police and army brutality in the local, national, and international press: a sensationalism that employs morbid images to compress issues and exacerbate polarization.¹⁴ Senderistas, for their part, cultivate the “heroic” mode of portraying events in which they were the principals.

Orlove concludes that peasants defend themselves and their territory by using a variety of strategies that always start peacefully and escalate only when they feel threatened. They often feel a need to make themselves “respected,” which may entail using firmness and occasional violence as a deterrent. They greatly fear surprise attacks by police, violent dispossession of land or property, and long prison terms. On the other side, one finds the perennial issue of “law and order,” which the state can claim has been transgressed. The tendency is to qualify every kind of opposition as a “rebellion,” accompanied by the notion that if the rebellion is not quashed decisively, it will spread. The forces of law and order perceive themselves as being weak and outnumbered in the rural areas and therefore fear the peasants. For their part, peasants feel that they have little control over what kind of action sparks the repressive excesses of the police. In sum, each side views itself as victim rather than aggressor, and hence attacks are mentally transmuted into defensive actions.

The image of the savage Indian persists in Peru. María Isabel Remy’s contribution takes on this issue by studying a custom known in the Andean anthropological literature as ritual battle (*chairaje*), particularly one annual event that takes place in January and February in the high punas of Cuzco on the boundaries shared by three peasant communities. On set days, members of the three communities meet in ritual battles. These violent encounters, in which men on horseback and on foot confront each other with slings, *boleadoras*, and whips, are considered “entertainment” by the locals. This custom has also aroused the curiosity of tourists, folklorists, and anthropologists. According to urban popular opinion (influenced mainly by the newspapers and folklorists), Indians believe that if blood flows or a death occurs, the agricultural year will be good, also that the winning side has a right to rape the women of the losing side.

Remy takes issue with imputing these kinds of beliefs, especially when they are woven into complex anthropological analyses prone to exoticizing and essentializing. She first traces this belief to its spurious origin, having been perpetrated by Cuzco poet and linguist Andrés Alencastre and then picked up by French anthropologist Georges Dumézil in the 1950s. Anthropological analysis relating these customs to themes of

14. See also Susan C. Bourque and Kay B. Warren, “Democracy without Peace: The Cultural Politics of Terror in Peru,” *LARR* 24, no. 1 (1989):7–34.

ancient ancestry going back to Inca ritual sacrifices may have some validity, but when they are transformed into literary texts by popularizers of Andean culture that rhapsodize about the chairaje, they become distancing mechanisms. As an example, Remy cites Alfonsina Barrionuevo's characterization of chairaje: "death loses its grotesque mask and becomes a magical offering to the most fierce of all mamapachas" (p. 263). These kinds of interpretations only reinforce the image held by urban Peruvians of Indians as savages.

When Remy observed a chairaje in 1990, participants called it a "custom" and referred to the fight as a "game." She concluded that danger is carefully controlled. Long hours of preparation, strutting, and taunting precede a set battle in which the two sides try to conquer and defend certain hills. Distances are kept between the warring parties to minimize the effects of their weapons. A lunch break or halftime features food, drink, singing, and companionship. The second half takes place in the afternoon, and women get closer—but not too close—to their men to see how their favorite players are faring. In Remy's view, "Death is a possibility that no one expects or wants, neither for themselves nor for their rivals." Similarly, seduction is the theme enacted by the women who come to watch how brave their men really are, not the rape scene that has been popularized. Sports metaphors might be the more appropriate ones for comparison. Although such activities can be analyzed as rituals, Remy condemns the tendency to read too much into it all as a dangerous practice. She points out that when constructs place undue and unexplained emphasis on magico-religious imperatives toward violence and ascribe them to peasants, such interpretations underscore fears that peasants have dangerous and irrational tendencies that must be brutally suppressed. Remy also faults the explanations sent by the commission investigating events in Uchuraccay for engaging in this same kind of discourse.¹⁵ The image of the "violent Indian," the fearsome other, has not been created gratuitously but as part of a political practice that is pervasive in the Andes.

If fearful mestizos have created the image of the savage Indian, then fearful Indians have in turn created images of savage mestizos. For example, *pishtacos* are feared figures believed to be white marauders who capture Indians and kill them for human grease to be used to cast especially sonorous bells, to pay Peru's international debt, or to sell abroad to run complex machinery like spacecraft.¹⁶ Thus in popular belief, *pishtacos* are quintessential outsiders who use advanced technology to per-

15. These points are also stressed in Orin Starn, "Missing the Revolution: Anthropologists and the War in Peru," *Cultural Anthropology* 6, no. 1 (1991):63–91; and Enrique Mayer, "Peru in Deep Trouble."

16. Juan Ansión and Eudósio Sifuentes, "La imagen popular de la violencia, a través de los relatos de degolladores," in *Pishtacos: de verdugos a sacaños*, edited by Juan Ansión, 61–105 (Lima: Edición Tarea, 1989).

petrate their crimes in order to convert the bodies of Indians into monetary profits.

When this myth migrated to the Lima shantytowns, it acquired urban content. Gonzalo Portocarrero's essay describes a panic that broke out in December 1988 among poor Lima housewives. Rumors spread that gringo or black doctors were stalking the shantytowns to kidnap children and take their eyes out to sell abroad for organ transplants. Fearful mothers took their children out of school and locked them up. During that time, a medical team researching nutritional insufficiencies in one shantytown was nearly lynched.

Portocarrero's analysis of these events elucidates deep-seated fears of modernization and progress. He finds echoes of dependency theory in popular culture, particularly in Indians' belief that they are victims of the metropolis. Two elements exacerbated the 1988 panic in Lima. One was plausibility: modern medical technology is indeed capable of carrying out procedures such as organ transplants. And there *are* ruthless individuals who conceivably could undertake such an activity for profit. After all, a common tactic of the guerrilla Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) has been to kidnap industrialists for ransom. After the regime of President Fernando Belaúnde dismissed hundreds of corrupt policemen in 1984, they too became professional kidnappers.

The second element contributing to the panic was an understandable generalized fear induced by the clandestine nature of terrorism. Peruvian guerrillas take on a double identity, and Sendero slogans painted on walls proclaim that the "party has a thousand eyes and a thousand ears." Security employees, narcotraffickers, arms dealers, grave robbers, and police all operate underground. Terrorists dress up as police, while police personnel don Sendero guise to carry out acts of unauthorized violence. Is it any wonder that no one can trust anyone in Peru? Everyone feels spied upon, stalked, and endangered. Private security firms do a booming business, but customers wonder about the real identity of the dark-skinned uniformed patrolman who has been hired. Middle-class Limeñas also distrust their maids. If one were to call the police, it would probably be necessary to bribe them into action. Meanwhile, Senderistas routinely extort money from business owners. In such a climate, terror thrives and frequently sparks collective acts of outrage that are sometimes directed at innocent people. For example, individuals caught stealing from the poor in the shantytowns have at times been brutally lynched by outraged housewives.

Linda Seligmann's contribution to Urbano's *Poder y violencia en los Andes* presents a totally different image in focusing on the litigious Indian. Even when illiterate in Spanish, speakers of Quechua and Aymara have demonstrated a remarkable capacity to seize up on the written word and interpret the complexities of legal tenets emanating from the state. They

have frequently used Peruvian law to press their moral principles and their rights to land, water, community membership, and social justice. Seligmann's extensive archival work focused on the legal dialogues conducted in the bureaucracy of the agrarian reform office in Cuzco during the early 1970s. She examined these documents for the kinds of "presentations of self" that were undertaken. Prevalent among them was the stress on being victims: "we are subjected to the most iniquitous exploitation by the hacendado" (p. 367). Another theme is the need for land and usually the fact that their land has been taken away from them. It is interesting to see that landlords also defend their properties by using some of the same moral justifications. Seligmann shows that the peasants too have learned the tricks of the *tinterillos* ("ink-mongers") in using the law and the bureaucracy to achieve opportunistic personal gain.

What are missing from Urbano's *Poder y violencia en los Andes* are accounts of the successful, mostly nonviolent land invasions and peasant strikes that took place in the 1960s in Cuzco, Junín, Pasco and elsewhere in Peru. These actions were orchestrated by coordinated efforts from below with support from regional and national peasant federations and left-wing political parties. Such movements form a pattern of peacefully organized protest movements that have largely achieved their aims. For example, the movement in La Convención raised wages and obtained land titles for squatters after organizing successful strikes.¹⁷ In Junín and Andahuaylas, similar groups succeeded in occupying hacienda lands and containing police and army repression.¹⁸ In those heady days, Indians called themselves *campesinos* and carried Peruvian flags in their marches, somewhat like the civil rights movement in the United States. It is important to remember that models of peaceful social change do exist in Peru, especially in the pessimistic atmosphere of the past decade in which violent options seem to be the only solution.

Decline of the Haciendas

In *Household and Class Relations: Peasants and Landlords in Northern Peru*, Carmen Diana Deere describes the long but rather steep decline of the haciendas in Cajamarca. Since colonial times, haciendas had expanded in that department, although unevenly because smallholders dominated some districts. By 1940, hacienda expansion had peaked, with 28 percent of the population living on haciendas in Cajamarca. Two-thirds

17. Wesley Craig, "Peru: The Peasant Movement of La Convención," in *Latin American Peasant Movements*, edited by Henry Landsberger, 274–96 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1969).

18. Gavin Smith, *Livelihood and Resistance: Peasants and the Politics of Land in Peru* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989); and Rodrigo Sánchez, *Toma de tierras y conciencia política campesina: las lecciones de Andahuaylas* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1981).

of the land was occupied by haciendas, some as big as the stereotypes of legend.

Some hacienda income came from populating empty hacienda land with peasants (*colonos*), who were required to supply labor and other kinds of payments to the landlords in exchange for occupying an allotment. Colonos were outnumbered by sharecroppers and renters, however, who enjoyed more advantageous arrangements with the landlords. Haciendas expanded production by attracting and competing for sharecroppers (*feudatarios*). In fact, more income was garnered by hacendados from sharecropping and rental agreements than from the sale of direct hacienda production. The most dynamic activity, cattle production, was predominantly in the hands of peasants.

On each hacienda, differences among households were determined by the personalized relationship developed by each peasant family with the landlord, which in turn determined the size of the plot, number of duties, obligations, and privileges. Other differentiating factors were time of entry into the hacienda, the amount of debt colonos had accumulated with the landlord, and the ways in which they were able to pay it off. An alternative was migration to the coast to work on the sugar plantations under the system of *enganche*, in which contracts with labor recruiters paid highlanders advances against future work. Landlord domination and abuse of peasants were constrained by competition among landlords to fill empty spaces with resident peasants who had various options. They could move away in search of better arrangements or resist or complain. In some cases, peasants took legal recourse to make favorable legislation stick.

While absolutist and hierarchical, relations between landlords and peasants were not always conflictual. Deere reports, "Research suggests that Cajamarca in the first half century was not a conflict-ridden region as other highland departments were" (p. 87). When struggles arose, usually initiated by peasants to resolve legitimate and limited grievances, they relied on legal recourse and the outcome often favored the peasants. Violence or threat of it was used prudently by the peasants in this context to back up their legal demands. Repression by hacendados—while automatic, brutal, and often backed by representatives of the state—tapered off as other means of resolving conflicts emerged.

In 1949 a subsidiary of the Nestlé Corporation established a milk-processing plant in Cajamarca, inaugurating a period of agricultural transformation. Landlords began to improve pastures and herds on small portions of their immense haciendas. Land values rose, especially in comparison with the previous period. Slope land was sold off to the peasants on the haciendas. Such sales provided landlords with capital to invest in the transformation and the labor to carry it out while clearing estates ready for enclosure. Because the new production rationale required

a smaller workforce that was more skilled and more disciplined, milk haciendas pioneered in establishing a mainly female wage-earning workforce.

This process, which has been called the “private reform of Cajamarca,” resembles the one that occurred in highland Ecuador, where the best valley bottom lands became dairy land and the slopes and distant natural pastures were sold to peasants for mixed agro-pastoral peasant forms of production. This trend created a new relationship between peasants and landlords and forestalled social conflict. Peasant purchase of slope lands from haciendas was financed through paid labor on the coast, the sale of animals, loans, and local wage work. In this transformation of some thirty years, the feudal *patrón* became the capitalist *compadre* of the newly independent peasant purchaser. For most of the time, the two groups were allies rather than adversaries.

The trend nonetheless reproduced dualism. Former hacendados became capitalist entrepreneurs working a smaller portion of the best land intensively. Meanwhile, the independent peasant sector grew in population and proportion of land owned but also in internal differentiation. A new group of middle-level peasants became important, and they too participated in the dairy boom. Agricultural wages rose, and participation in wage work became generalized. The overall effect of the land sales was to provide the material base for a middle and rich peasantry. Yet the way in which land was sold, the amount of access to cash that peasants had to pay for it, and previous differences in land allotments on the hacienda reproduced great inequalities in land tenure among the independent peasants. Deere shows that the land was expensive, smaller units of land sold for more money, and women who acquired a significantly smaller proportion of land ended up paying more for it than men did.

The 1970s brought the agrarian reform sponsored by the administration of General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968–1975), which had been presaged by much debate, agitation, and mobilization throughout Peru. In Cajamarca landlords scrambled to complete the sales and enclosures of their meadows in order to avoid being expropriated. In what has been characterized as one of the most radical agrarian reforms in Latin America,¹⁹ officials proceeded rather ruthlessly to expropriate all large landholdings. In Cajamarca as elsewhere, a significant gap opened between the enunciated principles of the reform (expropriation of inefficient haciendas and the promotion of family and medium-sized farms) and its practice.

Officials implemented various forms of collective agrarian organizations in Cajamarca. Worker-managed cooperatives were installed on

19. Alain de Janvry, *The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

the expropriated milk estates. By 1974, thirty-four estates were in the hands of workers. Worker pressure caused the dairy enterprises to be reduced to fifty hectares (*el mínimo inafectable*), no matter how well they had been managed. These workers were generally amenable to forming production cooperatives. Moreover, Deere notes, “as the wage workers became organized, they began to press for the full expropriation of the farm” (p. 237). On haciendas still being worked by sharecroppers, opposition to cooperatives arose quickly. Peasants wanted titles to the land they worked, as promised by the initial legislation on land reform. The cooperative solution had been imposed from above on an often reluctant peasantry, and the state eventually acceded to peasant demand for individual land titles. Peasant farmers received 46 percent of the expropriated land, representing 58 percent of the beneficiaries in the department. The cooperatives took 32 percent of the land, while 24 percent of the families benefited. Expropriation of the lands of efficient milk capitalists effectively excluded the landlord class as such from exerting much political influence.

One significant change was that the reform process often pitted the diverse actors—landowners, members of cooperatives, peasant groups—not so much against each other as against the state, which seemed to be imposing unwelcome policies on everyone. Although the state had often supported the landlords and at times the peasants, it now became the focus of discontent on all sides. Even so, divided local interests precluded the formation of broad coalitions, and the state used negotiation, rather than repression, as its main tactic, often giving in to peasant demands.

During the 1980s, the agrarian reform process consolidated in two ways. First, expropriations ceased when the government declared in 1979 that that process had been concluded. Second, most if not all of the collective enterprises entered a period of economic difficulties and began to slide into peasant forms of production. The second Belaúnde administration allowed cooperatives to dissolve if they wished to and parcel out the land among themselves in 1981. By the end of the 1980s, most cooperatives in Cajamarca had dissolved, their members becoming instead effective smallholding peasants.

In forty years’ time, the feudal haciendas had disappeared and all their land had passed to a smallholding peasantry via sale, direct adjudication, or dissolution of the cooperatives that had been created on the dairy farms. Although this process was disorderly and fraught with disputes and politicization, it was largely a peaceful one. Insofar as the Cajamarca example can be considered representative of the rest of Peru, it can be said that the problem of unequal land distribution—cited so often from the 1940s through the 1970s as a potential cause of violence—has not been a direct cause of the current violence in Peru.

Population Pressure

Haciendas did not play a major role in the department of Ayacucho, a situation reflected in William Mitchell's twenty-five-year study of the large district of Quinua, *Peasants on the Edge: Crop, Cult, and Crisis in the Andes*. This area is also a collection of peasant communities. The basic forces of change there have been population growth on a fixed resource base with limited possibilities for expansion. Population growth rates have increased from 1.2 percent in the 1960s to 2.8 percent in 1980. When excess population migrates, too few workers are left to tend the fields adequately. By 1987 more than half of those born in Quinua were living elsewhere, and those remaining in Quinua were being sustained to varying degrees by remittances of money and locally produced food. Such trends have created a mostly young village population with more adult women than men. Land in Quinua is limited and unproductive. No significant expansion of agricultural land has taken place in Quinua, nor has the considerable investment needed to extend the irrigation system been allocated. Thus Quinueños, unable to survive on their agricultural base, have been forced to turn massively to seeking sources of income beyond their farms.²⁰

Intensification

Given this kind of population pressure on a limited land base, one solution attempted widely has been to intensify agricultural production by working the land harder. In *Desarrollo campesino en los Andes: cambio tecnológico y transformación social en las comunidades de la sierra del Perú*, Daniel Cotlear reports on two interrelated processes: diminishing fallow land and intensifying production via improved seed, fertilizers, and chemical inputs. Population growth combined with the desire to expand land for cash crops puts pressure on community lands. Accordingly, the communities Cotlear studied began to dismantle the communally organized sectorial fallow system by changing the institutional arrangements under which usufruct rights are enjoyed by household members.²¹ Dis-

20. For a more detailed discussion of other issues raised by Mitchell in *Peasants on the Edge*, see my forthcoming review in *Peasant Studies*.

21. The sectorial fallow system in Andean communities is an aspect of communally managed patterns of land use. It is associated with higher lands (3,400 to 4,000 meters in altitude), no irrigation, cultivation of tubers and hardy European grains, and use of the foot plow as the main tool. Crop rotation and fallow sequences are organized by the community and managed by the enforcement of communal rules and controls over many production decisions. In fallow years, the land is used for pasture with free access, but when it is under cultivation, farmers have the right to exclusive use of their plots. See Enrique Mayer, "Production Zones," in *An Interdisciplinary Perspective on Andean Ecological Complementarity*, edited by Craig Morris and Shozo Masuda, 45–84 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1985); Benjamin S. Orlove and Ricardo Godoy, "Sectorial Fallow Systems in the Central Andes,"

mantling the sectorial fallow system is yet another step toward privatizing land within the communities while relaxing control by community authorities over peasant farmers. Although the amount of land available increases immediately, reducing the years that land is left fallow increases erosion and requires the use of fertilizers and chemicals to combat pests.

According to Cotlear, both processes of intensification can raise the highland peasants' currently low levels of agricultural output. At the time of his study (1983), increased investment in the "green revolution" was producing monetary profits and absorbing employment because prices for the products being sold were favorable. Two years later, however, inflation turned most peasant cash-cropping strategies into losing propositions.²²

Cotlear's study shows how uneven this process really is. When farming households are divided into four groups and productivity results are compared, the best farmers are found to be eight times more productive than the least productive farmers in the most developed region. The most productive farmers in the least developed region approach levels of the poorest quartiles of the most developed region. If productivity within each region were to rise to the levels of the most productive group and each region could on average improve its performance compared with the most developed region, then agricultural production could easily double on the same available land.

Cotlear concedes that this process will weaken the structures of communal control but argues that this trend is a good thing. Through progressive measures of reducing the amount of fallow land and abandoning communal regulations of the agricultural calendar, the peasant farmer becomes free to engage in entrepreneurial innovation. Cotlear argues that the march toward private property associated with a greater degree of technological innovation could provide an important measure of internally generated development in the peasant regions of the highlands of Peru. His chapter on animal raising on communal pastures makes a similar point. Invoking Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons, Cotlear argues that current practice of grazing animals on communal pastures leads to overgrazing, ecological degradation, and reduced income from stock raising. The measures he recommends are privatizing the communal lands, fencing, privately improving pasture lands, and using more agriculturally raised fodder along with fewer but more productive animal stocks.

Journal of Ethnobiology 6, no. 1 (1986):169–204; and *Comprendre l'agriculture paysanne dans les Andes centrales (Pérou-Bolivie): Ecologie et aménagement rural*, edited by Pierre Morlon (Paris: Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 1992).

22. See Enrique Mayer and Manuel Glave, "Rentabilidad, costos e inversión en el cultivo de papa," in *La chacra de papas: economía y ecología*, edited by Enrique Mayer (Lima: Centro Peruano de Investigación Social, 1992), chaps. 1 through 5. Similar findings are reported in the works under review here by Deere (p. 280) and Mitchell (p. 95).

The results reported by Cotlear in *Desarrollo campesino en los Andes* should be examined with a pessimistic view. Significant questions should also be asked. For instance, why are the gaps between the regions and those between the quartiles within each region so big? How many farmers in each region are in the most efficient group, what proportion do they represent of the total group of farmers, and what proportion of the total amount of land is in their hands?

Despite a significant distribution of land through agrarian reform, the vast majority of the peasants in highland Peru still have too little land to make a living. The less productive farmers of Cotlear's sample average between 1.1 and 1.5 hectares per household; the middle ranges between 2.7 and 3.9 hectares; and the highest group works from 5.2 to 8.8 hectares, with a greater degree of land concentration in the more developed region of the Mantaro Valley.²³ The rich peasants of the upper quartile own about half the land, a distribution pattern confirmed by Deere's data for Cajamarca in 1971. The near landless group (with an average of 0.16 hectares) constituted 17 percent of the total of Cajamarcan households. Smallholders with an average of 1.3 hectares accounted for more than half of the farming population (59 percent). Middle peasants with a viable average size of 5.8 hectares made up only 17 percent of the total, while a group of rich peasants averaging 15.9 hectares accounted for 8 percent of the Cajamarca peasantry. Efficiency in farming and increasing productivity are still found mainly among the minority of peasant households who also enjoy better land endowment. For the majority of rural households in this region, insufficient land endowment as well as ecological degradation continue to be the facts of life that engender grinding poverty.

Agricultural activities generate a shrinking portion of total income for most peasants. In 1973 in Cajamarca, agriculture and animal production generated only 19 percent of total income for the near landless households, with wages accounting for 55 percent, commerce 10 percent, and remittances 4.7 percent. For smallholders, the figures are 20 percent from agriculture, 48 percent from wages, and 7.5 percent from trading. Only the rich peasants, who earn 66 percent of their total income from the land, can be described accurately as farmers. Cotlear found similar proportions: farm income in the modern region of the Mantaro Valley generates 86 percent of total income for rich peasants but only 60 percent for the lowest quartile. Temporary migration and local wages provide about 10 percent of income for the rich but 30 percent for the poor. In the traditional region, wages make up 16 percent of total income for the

23. Successful agriculture in the Yanamarca area may be due to the fact that peasants in this area had successfully taken over haciendas two decades before the agrarian reform of 1969. See F. LaMond Tullis, *Lord and Peasant in Peru* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).

richest segment of the sample but account for 24 percent for the poorest group.

Deere compares peasant income in 1973 with data garnered from hacienda records dating back to 1917. Well over half of rural households in the 1970s were earning incomes lower than the minimum estimated household income for the poorest peón households on the haciendas in 1917. It is evident that the situation has become desperate when, despite all the positive changes, peasant incomes continue to show a long-term decline. It is no wonder that the departments of Cajamarca and Ayacucho (along with Puno) have demonstrated the greatest rates of rural emigration.

Power Vacuum

The Peruvian educational system exhibits an urban orientation, an integrating mission, and unobvious messages of what supposedly constitutes “progress” versus “backwardness.” Thus it is not surprising that Quinueños have been actively engaged in changing the cultural institutions and practices that they regard as obsolete, particularly the ones viewed as markers of “backwardness” or Indianness, synonymous terms in Peru.

Mitchell’s *Peasants on the Edge* focuses on the decline and disappearance of the *varayoq* system and on the soaring Quinueño rate of conversion to evangelism. The *varayoq* system is the Andean version of the Latin American civil-religious hierarchy, which was also closely linked to the Indian tax-collecting structures described by Víctor Peralta and Christine Hünefeldt in the *Urbano* volume. *Varayoc* (holders of the *vara*, the symbolic staff of authority) oversaw the recruitment of tributary labor needed to repair the infrastructure of the area. They were also responsible for maintaining the moral order, mediating domestic and inter-family disputes, and overseeing proper performance of fiestas, processions, and collective work. The rural Indian *varayoq* were nevertheless subordinate to the mestizo townspeople of the central part of Quinua as well as to provincial authorities and church officials. The *vara* system was strongly associated with an agricultural way of life. But as the prominence of agricultural concerns declined and individuals aspired to success beyond the local world, some began to associate the system with embarrassingly quaint country customs. In particular, the subservience traditionally shown to elders and townsmen came to be considered demeaning. Moreover, the state’s development-oriented bureaucracy and the modernizing Catholic Church discouraged the system. In Quinua the *vara* system gradually declined and disappeared entirely by 1972.

The new converts to evangelism view their change of religion as a progressive and enlightening step away from obscurantism and ignorance. It is suggestive to consider what is being repudiated. Conversion to

evangelism represents a rejection of collective commitment to the locality that used to govern itself and run its affairs in a fairly autonomous way. Now individual strategies of social climbing are emphasized instead.

Although it may be true that the antiquated varayoc system associated with colonial structures of domination had become obsolete in the eyes of peasants eager to modernize, the major political functions performed by this old system do not seem to have been replaced effectively. The new structures and institutions replacing them may have been very weak. The *comunidad campesina*, the associations of migrants or local organizations concerned with school matters or political parties, appear to be unable to defend the community from attacks by Sendero Luminoso. How many peasants have joined the Shining Path movement instead of converting to evangelism? Senderistas too reject the vara and cargo system, and Sendero threatens local authorities with assassination. Mitchell cites a report on the impact of this guerrilla threat: "As many as 259 towns throughout the country were reported as without local authorities in May 1989" (p. 10).

In Cajamarca, peasants have begun to create their own viable institutions to govern themselves and defend their gains. Some studies (made after Deere's) have found that atomized colonos and feudatarios are gradually developing more inclusive peasant organizations. Strenuous efforts are being made at the local level to structure strong new organizations, one example being *rondas campesinas*.²⁴ Peasants used to rely on self-help vigilantism to defend themselves from cattle rustling, and today such organizations have become viable models of peasant resistance to guerrillas.

The contrast between Cajamarca and Ayacucho is striking. In Ayacucho, peasant communities largely have been unable to resist takeovers by Sendero forces. Nor could they convince the army and the *fuerzas vivas* (influential sectors) of society that they were not involved with the guerrillas. The army assumed that peasants were harboring guerrillas or were involved in Sendero activities and quickly resorted to its traditional response of putting down yet one more "peasant uprising." The Peruvian army learned its new anti-terrorist tactics from Argentine-style dirty wars but also from U.S.-sponsored counterinsurgency strategies. In combination, Sendero, the army, and the police have virtually exterminated

24. See John Gitlitz and Telmo Rojas, "Peasant Vigilante Committees in Northern Peru," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 15, pt. 1 (1983):163–97; Orin Starn, "I Dreamed of Foxes and Hawks: Reflections on Peasant Protest, New Social Movements, and the Rondas Campesinas of Northern Peru," in *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America*, edited by Arturo Escobar and Sonia E. Alvarez, 89–111 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992); and Hans Jürgen Brandt, "Legalidad, derecho consuetudinario y administración de justicia en comunidades campesinas y zonas rurales andinas," in *Justicia popular*, edited by Hans Jürgen Brandt, 101–66 (Lima: Centro de Investigaciones Judiciales de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la República, 1987).

any viable form of peasant organization in Ayacucho. Caught between the terror of violent impositions of power by Sendero and by the armed forces, peasants have found their options for self-defense stifled. It has become humanly impossible to resist the level of terror unleashed since the 1980s. What started as an economic process of outmigration has become a massive flood of refugees abandoning a war-torn countryside.²⁵

Yet the different responses in Ayacucho and Cajamarca deserve some qualification. Ayacucho was the area hit first by Sendero and then by the army's repressive system. By the time Sendero tried to take over the Cajamarca countryside, some lessons had been learned. Peasants and supporting political organizations were more prepared to respond, and the armed forces have scaled back the brutality of their repressive measures. Even so, Cajamarca is not entirely free of Sendero activists and terrorist attacks.

Enter the Guerrillas

In *War of Shadows: The Struggle for Utopia in the Peruvian Amazon*, Michael Brown and Eduardo Fernández carefully reconstruct the events associated with the guerrilla column of the Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) in the jungles of Central Peru in 1965. Overall, the movement was a miserable failure. This account, written in an engaging style yet admirably researched, is a serious exercise of what the authors call "anthropological history." Some thirty years after the events, Brown and Fernández interviewed former combatants, widows of fallen guerrilleros, survivors of government bombing raids on Ashaninka villages, a priest whose mission deep in the jungle provided respite for an exhausted guerrilla column fleeing army pursuers, and army officers. The authors also tracked down U.S. missionaries to find out how their renegade son (an adventurer who may have been involved in the revolutionary actions) disappeared without a trace. These recollections were then carefully collated with newspaper accounts, reports, and documents. Brown and Fernández are acutely aware that memory can play tricks and that reminiscences are complicated to evaluate, particularly in situations where mythmaking has become as much a part of confrontation as real events. Newspaper accounts also offer instances of fictionalization. Peruvian authors Manuel Scorza, Roger Rumrill, and Mario Vargas Llosa have all used characters and events in 1965 as material for their novels, and these interpretations too find a place in *War of Shadows*. The scenes shift around among Lima, the jungle, Paris, Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles. Given the tendency to romanticize guerrillas, the authors devote much atten-

25. Robin Kirk offers a figure of at least 150,000 refugees by 1986, but it is extremely difficult to estimate the outmigration with any accuracy. See Kirk, *Decade of Chaqwa*.

tion to debunking myths about these events, a valuable contribution. In truth, much of what really happened is sordid.

In 1965 two columns of guerrillas led by young Lima intellectuals were operating on the eastern slopes of the Andes. Inspired by the successes of the Cuban Revolution, they became convinced that the time was ripe to begin a similar process in Peru. Untrained, totally ignorant of conditions in rural areas, and misguided, the inept movement was quickly put down by combined actions of the Peruvian police and armed forces. As happened in Bolivia when Ernesto Ché Guevara tried to open a similar front, the Peruvian Quechua peasants showed little interest in supporting the guerrillas. The Peruvian guerrilla column then moved further into the steep foothills of the jungle, a conflict-ridden mosaic of Ashaninka areas interspersed with large sections of land colonized by highlanders. Here coordinated pincer movements by parachuted army columns soon surrounded the guerrillas, killing or capturing all of them except leader Guillermo Lobatón, who was disappeared.²⁶

Brown and Fernández discovered that small groups of Ashaninka did in fact cooperate with the guerrillas, who gave them arms and training. The question the authors seek to answer is, why? In historical terms, this area was the site of an important rebellion in colonial times that succeeded in closing the area to Spanish influence for almost three centuries. Here mythology and visions of messianic salvation that characterize Ashaninka cosmology have intermingled with notions of salvation propagated by missionaries. Another factor has been the role of myth as a sparker of violence. Ashaninka shamans evaluated the guerrillas' presence in terms of their own cosmology of messianic redemption. After 1900 this frontier area was opened rapidly to sugarcane, coffee, and fruit production. Native jungle groups were displaced and pushed around. The colonizers' image of the Ashaninka as primitive but fierce savages became part of the process of dispossessing them of their lands and converting them into cheap labor. Abuses of all kinds were common, particularly sexual abuse of Ashaninka young women and trickery with money and trade goods. The guerrillas told the Ashaninka that all this victimizing would stop. They distributed arms and invited the indigenous peoples to join them in running the patrones and police out of the area. One Ashaninka shaman persuaded himself that the guerrillas, particularly Lobatón, were mythical godlike figures who had come to defend

26. Brown and Fernández note (as I did in 1991) that in Latin America, the intransitive verb *disappear* has become a transitive one as well, as in "to disappear a person." An example of how this process works was given by an army officer describing what happened to one woman guerrilla: "She didn't talk. What happened is that they put her into a helicopter, flew away, and came back empty a half-hour later. That is why I think they took them up in the helicopters to make them talk. And if they didn't, they were pushed out" (*War of Shadows*, p. 182).

them, and he committed his followers to supporting the rebels. Other Ashaninka were divided on this issue, however. Some remained skeptical, and others aided the army and the police or acted as informers.

How much and in what ways the Ashaninka actually helped the guerrillas is now difficult to reconstruct. Their memories are sharper on the kinds of actions that ensued. One recalled a horrifying example: "Within a week the troop of Rangers arrived. They came quickly. They had uniforms. Well armed. They were frightening! They brought us all together and told us: 'You received these people, we ought to kill you too. You are all subversives!' . . . It happened that the Rangers grabbed a boy, one of my people, no? They hung him by the balls. Yes! With a rope they tied his testicles and hung him from a tree branch. While he was hanging there they made a fire underneath and smoked him. . . The poor boy began to give names" (p. 139).

In 1965 cocaine trafficking was not a factor related to violence. It is now, particularly in the jungle areas where coca is cultivated. Guerrilla groups like the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (MRTA) and Sendero Luminoso have filled the power vacuum existing between the producers and the traffickers in order to regulate the trade and control the excesses created by an illegal boom economy.²⁷ The terrorists earn hefty commissions, which fund their activities. At this point, coca growers, "Colombian narcos," and terrorists all share a common interest in keeping the state apparatus at bay.

This development has brought about a sad coda to Brown and Fernández's *War of Shadows*. The Ashaninka are once again caught up in a war in their area. The MRTA and Sendero have made significant inroads in imposing themselves among the Quechua-speaking highlanders and jointly pressuring the Ashaninka. This time the Ashaninka are fighting both the guerrillas and the narcos.

Events subsequent to the book's publication have been analyzed in a study by Margarita Benavides,²⁸ which describes three local situations in the current war. In the Pichis area, the Ashaninka are still fairly well endowed with land and are not involved in coca growing. They formed a federation that in 1989–90 effectively resisted an incursion of MRTA guerrillas. In December 1989, the guerrillas assassinated an Ashaninka leader, accusing him of an act that harked back to the 1965 incidents described by Brown and Fernández: he allegedly was responsible for handing over one of the MIR guerrilla leaders to the armed forces. In response, the Ashaninka formed an army, attacked MRTA positions, and protested to the

27. See "Coca, the Real Green Revolution," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 17, no. 6 (1989); and Deborah Poole and Gerardo Rénique, *Peru: Time of Fear* (New York: Monthly Review Press, Latin America Bureau, 1992), chap. 6.

28. See Margarita Benavides, "Los Ashaninka y la violencia política en la selva central del Perú," paper presented to the Congress of Americanists, 7–11 July 1991, New Orleans.

press. Outnumbered and embarrassed, MRTA leaders decided to abandon the Pichis area.

The Ashaninka population of the Satipo area is much more intermingled with highland colonos. Ashaninka there have only tiny plots of land and earn their living as coffee producers and temporary laborers on the colonos' farms. Rival Ashaninka political organizations have formed, and resistance to Sendero Luminoso has proved to be much less effective than in the Pichis area. At one point in 1990, one Ashaninka group attacked members of the other and seven died. Although attempts have been made to resolve the differences, intra-Ashaninka rivalry has precluded forming a united front against the guerrillas. Nor has the colono population joined Ashaninka efforts to resist Sendero domination. In August 1993, Senderistas armed with machetes and bows and arrows attacked several settlements of highlanders and Ashaninka families, killing more than fifty persons and mutilating several children and pregnant women.

In the Ene river area, in contrast, coca production is important. The area has been settled massively by migrants from Ayacucho, and Sendero has become powerful there as the intermediary between the coca producers and the narcotraffickers. The Ashaninka have resisted peasant land settlement and are therefore perceived by the guerrillas as retrograde. The Ashaninka, unable to create their own self-defense association, are under the tutelage of a U.S. priest running a Franciscan mission there. Senderistas have repeatedly attacked this mission. Some Ashaninka fled into the jungle, but others were forced to join the guerrillas. In September 1990 in a dramatic act highlighting Ashaninka helplessness, Father Mariano Gagnon organized an airlift to move the refugees in the jungle to safer areas.²⁹

Benavides points to internal organization and degree of autonomy as two factors in the successful defense staged by the Ashaninka against MRTA guerrillas in the Pichis area. The limiting factor is that Sendero Luminoso is more ruthless than the MRTA and therefore much more difficult to confront. Finally, cocaine production is playing a key role in coca-growing areas because they are contested more violently. Benavides also points out that the army has offered little help in these conflicts, despite appeals from the beleaguered Ashaninka. The situation remains unclear and will require first-rate investigative skills like those displayed by Brown and Fernández to disentangle what is actually happening.

Overall, revolutionary guerrillas constitute a new element intruding into an established social situation. They use the existing circumstances to effect violence either from above or from below. In Marxist

29. Gustavo Gorriti, "Terror in the Andes: The Flight of the Ashaninkas," *New York Times Magazine*, 2 Dec. 1990, 40–48, 68–72.

language, they are the vanguard that effects social change according to a plan that is to go into effect when social conditions are deemed to be correct. Brown and Fernández recapitulate the Guevarist theories of guerrilla tactics by recalling the debate about the *foco revolucionario*.

The theory of the *foco* is that guerrillas gain a measure of autonomy from the state by establishing themselves in remote rural areas while educating rural peoples about the realities of their situation. Once the peasants join the guerrillas, the government will respond with ironfisted tactics to regain control. As Brown and Fernández explain, "Official savagery, the theory continues, unmasks the true nature of 'pseudodemocracies' such as Peru" (p. 83). Thus terror is consciously built into the equation and used to tip the balance in the guerrillas' favor. Despite Sendero denials, this is indeed their tactic. Gustavo Gorriti, a highly respected expert on Sendero Luminoso, describes how the movement is highly selective and strategic in planning its assassinations.³⁰ Senderistas have to learn how to kill in systematic and depersonalized ways and must also be prepared to sacrifice their own lives for the cause. Killings are carefully calibrated to provoke state reactions of blind rage. The more excessive the reaction, the easier it is to transfer guilt to the state.

When Sendero started its war, it too found peasants to be uncooperative or unwilling to participate. Sendero leaders thus found it necessary to impose their will. Killing and terror among peasants are calculated to inspire fear and submission. Sendero tactics toward the peasants are not that different from those of an occupation army, but the change in terminology is significant. The areas under Sendero control are termed "liberated territories." Senderistas thus use the horror of killing to impose their authority over the villages. They also curry the villagers' favor by staging summary trials of shopkeepers, adulterous husbands, and abusive exploiters. At the same time, they intimidate the population by threatening and killing "informants" or "collaborators." For example, on 3 April 1983, Senderistas attacked the town of Lucanamarca and murdered eighty villagers in the square. Abimael Guzmán, chairman of the Partido Comunista del Perú-SL, made this comment on the event:

Lucanamarca: Neither they nor we have forgotten it, to be sure, because there they saw an answer that they could not imagine. There more than 80 were annihilated, that is the truth. And we say it, there was an excess. . . . In some occasions, as in that one, it was the Central Leadership itself that planned the actions and gave the instructions, it had been that way. There the principal thing was that we dealt them an overwhelming blow, and we checked them and they understood that they were dealing with another type of combatants of the people, that we were not the ones that they had combatted before, that was what they understood.³¹

30. Gustavo Gorriti, *Historia de la guerra milenaria en el Perú* (Lima: Apoyo, 1990), 174.

31. Abimael Guzmán, "Presidente Gonzalo rompe el silencio: entrevista en la clandestina," *Sendero*, 1983, 10.

The difference was that unlike the situation in 1965, the “combatants of the people” came from a different background. The new revolutionaries are overwhelmingly young, highly mobile, better-educated provincial migrants earning a precarious living in occupations far below the levels that their education had led them to expect.³² The revolutionary foot soldiers are recruited among those migrants who fit well the profile described by Mitchell in *Peasants on the Edge*. Carlos Iván Degregori gathered testimonies of former rank-and-file Senderistas in Ayacucho, which were published in his contribution to the Urbano collection. One member recalls hearing from his compañeros that “when we win, those with more militancy will be ministers.” The desire to be somebody important, to *superarse*, to have boots and arms and to be able to command is overwhelming. To belong to Sendero, to be initiated into its closed world is empowering. Lacking better models, the cadres emulate patrón, gamonal, and mestizo styles of power that include swaggering aggressiveness, severe corporeal punishment, humiliation, and swift death as expressions of their determination to control. The single innovation is that Senderistas use dynamite very effectively. The deadly explosions they stage also serve as powerful symbolic statements that achieve enormous psychological impact on the civilian population.

The guerrillas of the younger generation know the social and physical terrain much better than their predecessors or the army units did. Senderista entry may also have been eased by the power vacuum created by social changes resulting from the disorderly agrarian reforms described earlier. The reason that these guerrillas are willing to unleash ruthless terror against those they are supposedly going to save, and whose conditions are so intimately familiar, is not so mysterious: an underlying drive to escape the miserable condition of being a rural peasant at all costs.

Two of Sendero’s favorite slogans are “Everything but power is an illusion” and “Power is born from the muzzle of a gun.” Compared with the older patterns of violence reviewed here, Sendero represents a new invention of violence with fewer social antecedents than imagined. It is not an Andean movement but a much more deadly replay of the adventurist attempts of the guerrilla experiences of 1965. One can imagine the Senderistas gloating with provincial pride about their successes where the Limeño guerrillas of 1965 failed.

The hunger for power is so overwhelming that Sendero Luminoso has no political program for the peasant sector of Peru nor for the rest of

tinidad,” originally published in *El Diario*, 24 July 1988. An English version, “Interview with Chairman Gonzalo,” was published by Red Banner in 1988.

32. Denis Chávez de Paz, *Juventud y terrorismo: características sociales de los condenados por terrorismo y otros delitos* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1989).

society. When analyzed, Sendero statements break down into nothing more than denunciations and recitations of ideological mantras in a belligerent language expressing defiant attitudes. Sendero activities are basically destructive, as evidenced by their attacks on popular self-help organizations via military strategies such as assassinating women leaders of soup kitchens.³³ Sendero spokespersons justify current “heroic” actions as war policies that will not change until power has been captured completely. Contrary to pro-Sendero propaganda disseminated in the United States and Europe, Sendero Luminoso has not distributed land in peasant areas. The peasants themselves have done so through the collapse of the cooperatives, which they and government policies systematically undermined. Communal work parties and communal agricultural production are ancient practices among Andean peasants, emphatically not Sendero innovations. Despite Senderista claims, eliminating local civilian organizations and substituting Sendero-imposed militarized vertical organization under the command of an autocratic party is not a step toward greater democracy for the masses.³⁴

The guerrilla practice of forcing young men and women to join their organization at gunpoint has also alienated many potential sympathizers. Senderistas govern through fear and terror, but government by terror has built-in limits. To impose itself, a terrorist regime must escalate violence, which eventually breeds resistance. When the tight controls become counterproductive enough, Sendero Luminoso could collapse, leaving its perpetrators prey to the terrible revenge that is sometimes exacted from captured guerrillas.

The twelve-year guerrilla war in Peru continues, but significant shifts and changes have emerged in its course. Sendero has modified its tactics and is now concentrating more heavily on urban areas like Huanayo and Lima. Different Senderista strategies developed in the department of Puno have resulted in a stalemate.³⁵ In Ayacucho, Sendero has gone underground, and the military presence is very strong. The armed

33. See Poole and Rénique, *Peru: Time of Fear*. María Elena Moyano, the popular leader of Lima's Villa el Salvador, was assassinated by Sendero Luminoso because she organized opposition to its infiltration. In response to the outrage against this brutal killing (she was blown up in front of her children), Sendero Luminoso has embarked on a campaign to smear her reputation. The U.S.-based Maoist International Movement that supports Sendero echoed this perspective in justifying her elimination because she was the vice mayor of Villa el Salvador, ran government programs to distribute food, and organized patrols to defend the area against Sendero. See *MIM Notes*, 13 Jan. 1993 (published in Ann Arbor, Michigan).

34. One U.S.-based academic who propagandizes pro-Sendero stances that accord with her personal political agenda is Carol Andreas. See *When Women Rebel: The Rise of Popular Feminism in Peru* (Westport, Ct.: L. Hill, 1985).

35. In the department of Puno, Sendero Luminoso led a frontal attack against the Partido Unificado Mariateguista (PUM) to dislodge it among peasant villages and town councils. See José Luis Rénique, “La batalla por Puno: violencia y democracia en la sierra sur,” *Debate Agrario* 10 (1991):83–108.

forces have also begun to modify their strategies, although they continue to be rightly criticized for abusing human rights.³⁶ On 12 September 1992, Abimael Guzmán was captured in a middle-class suburb of Lima. After being exhibited to the world in a cage, wearing striped shirt and pants reminiscent of cartoon prison garb, Guzmán was quickly sentenced to life imprisonment. The intent was undoubtedly to humiliate him and his followers.³⁷ Although Senderistas concede the severity of this blow, the movement has not yet collapsed or splintered into factions. Guerrilla attacks have continued throughout 1992 and 1993.

Even if the guerrillas are to be defeated or give themselves up, a long road will have to be traveled toward pacification before Peru returns to "normal." It is to be hoped that the new "normal" will be qualitatively different and better than it was before the terrorists decided to declare war on the state and Peruvian society. Contravening all standards of human decency, Sendero Luminoso has unleashed the four horsemen of the apocalypse on Peruvian society.

The works under review here do not address the relationship of the profound and complex economic crisis in Peru since the 1980s to the current patterns of violence. Nor is it possible to analyze here the short-term anti-subversive policies of the Belaúnde, García, and Fujimori governments and how they have helped modify longstanding patterns of violence in Peru.³⁸ My objective has been instead to examine the antecedent patterns that may have a bearing on the current crisis.

The five books reviewed here reveal that fundamental positive changes took place in Peru from the 1940s through the 1970s. Although inherently conflictive, social change in the right direction generally took place with little violence. When violence occurred, it was in controlled forms, particularly when it emerged from below. This time around, the reprehensible methods of repression from above have been appropriated by guerrillas seeking their own ends. Moreover, state repression no longer intimidates committed terrorists. Far more worrisome is the thought that the common soldier, the police officer, and the revolutionary Senderista all come from the same social background of provincial lower-class peas-

36. See Amnesty International, *Peru: Human Rights in a Climate of Terror* (New York: Amnesty International, 1991); and *Peru: Human Rights during the Government of President Alberto Fujimori* (New York: Amnesty International, 1992).

37. See Alma Guillermoprieto, "Letter from Lima: Down the Shining Path," *The New Yorker*, 8 Feb. 1993, pp. 64–75.

38. The latest published works include Simon Strong, *Shining Path: The World's Deadliest Revolutionary Force* (London: Harper Collins, 1992); Poole and Rénique, *Peru: Time of Fear*; and *The Shining Path of Peru*, edited by David Scott Palmer (New York: St. Martin's, 1992). For two reviews of current literature, see Carlos Iván Degregori, "Campesinado andino y violencia: balance de una década de estudios," in *Perú: el problema agrario en debate SEPIA IV*, edited by Degregori, Javier Escobal, and Benjamín Marticorena, 413–40 (Lima: Universidad Nacional de la Amazonía Peruana y Seminario Permanente de Investigación Agraria, 1992); and Orin Starn, "New Literature on Peru's Sendero Luminoso," *LARR* 27, no. 2 (1992):212–26.

ant origin. All three have enrolled in their respective military units with high hopes of upward social mobility, and in order to achieve their goal, they must kill each other.

These studies do not demonstrate that the Sendero phenomenon was inevitable. It could have been avoided at several moments when wrong policy decisions were made on economic, social, political, and military matters. The books under review also point toward the directions in which Peruvian society will have to move in the future. The tremendous energy and drive toward social change and political participation that arises from below, on which Sendero has thrived, could be channeled toward constructive purposes by implementing appropriate policies. So far, such policies have not yet appeared on the horizon.