

Vasvár. The Gólyavár is neither a city nor a village, as Professor Spira leads us to believe, but a building in the courtyard of the University of Budapest. As for the accuracy of references, the lengthy quotation about the Hungarian Soviet Republic's constitution, attributed to Frank Eckelt, was actually written by this reviewer.

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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BALKAN NATIONAL STATES, 1804–1920. By *Charles Jelavich* and *Barbara Jelavich*. A History of East Central Europe, vol. 8. Edited by *Peter F. Sugar* and *Donald W. Treadgold*. Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1977. xvi, 358 pp. Maps. \$18.95.

This is a welcome addition to the multivolume *History of East Central Europe* published by the University of Washington. The admirable Jelavich couple, to whom we are already indebted for numerous excellent works in the East European and Russian field, have put us still further in their debt. To compress the complexities of Balkan history, through the whole nineteenth century and the first fifth of the twentieth, into slightly over three hundred pages, is no mean achievement. Students and history teachers will find this book invaluable. The style is clear, the right words are used with economy, and there is no padding or gobbledegook. Possibly those readers who are accustomed to not more than one fact in a page, or more than one idea in five, will not like it; if so, that is their loss. There are some verbal infelicities, very few misprints, some mistakes of detail or curious omissions: for example, Vranje was acquired by Serbia in 1912, not by Yugoslavia in 1919 (there is apparent confusion with Bosiljgrad on page 302); and even a brief survey of Rumanian literature in the years before 1914 (pp. 278–79) should not leave out Octavian Goga, one of the great poets of that language. But these are minor blemishes. This reviewer feels that the account of the positions of Pašić and the Yugoslav Committee is a little out of focus; but it is, of course, an occupational disease of academic reviewers to over-emphasize the points about which they have specialized knowledge.

Every historian of this region and period is at once confronted with the question, "What are the Balkans?" The purist doctrine of Nicolae Iorga (Yugoslavia is a Dinaric state, Rumania a Carpathian, Albania an Adriatic, Greece a Mediterranean, and only Bulgaria is a Balkan state) is not acceptable in practice. The authors have fixed their eyes firmly on the emergent states in preference to the nations. Thus, from the beginning, "the Balkans" extends to the northeast as far as Jassy, but in the northwest it does not go beyond the Sava until the eve of the Great War. At this point we are given an extremely competent, but excessively brief, account of the affairs of the South Slavs of the Habsburg Monarchy and a much less satisfactory summary of the Habsburg Rumanians, which omits Bukovina altogether. There is nothing about conditions in Bessarabia before 1919. This is not a carping criticism. The authors' approach is perfectly defensible. There is no infallible way of handling such complexity, and brevity in a book is a great virtue; nevertheless, these gaps must be pointed out.

In contrast to Professor Sugar's bibliographical essay in volume 5 of this series, the Jelaviches have confined theirs to works in English. For student readers, this is probably the best procedure; and reading through the essay, it is pleasant to be reminded how many excellent books there are in English, mostly published in the United States. The argument which one sometimes hears in British academic circles, that Balkan history cannot be taught to undergraduates because there is no literature, is here revealed as the nonsense that it is. The Jelaviches' work is, of course, also based on much wider research in many languages.

A thoughtful concluding chapter draws a tentative balance of one hundred twenty years of development. There is a sympathetic discussion of the predicament of Balkan politicians who found themselves dependent on foreign Great Powers. There might have been a little more sympathy for the predicament of Great-Power politicians and diplomats confronted with Balkan affairs: greed for money, territory, profits, and power was not significantly more widespread among citizens of big than of small states. The authors write: "Undoubtedly, the major problem of the new Balkan nations was economic, not political" (p. 322). Is this more than half true? Was it not more social than either? The main gap in this book is that, though a good deal is said—and said well—about the peasantry, there is no analysis of the formation, outlook, and influence of the main middle-class groups: bureaucrats, those in intellectual professions and in business, including such important phenomena as pig merchants transformed into capitalists, revolutionaries turned into pashas, and successive generations of alienated young intelligentsia.

The authors' belief that the record is, on balance, positive is right. The best proof is to compare the Balkan achievements before 1920 with the human costs and human results in other states which have faced or are facing similar problems: the South American and African new states, and the subject peoples of the Soviet empire. The word "Balkanization" became, in the mid-twentieth century, a term of abuse. To hear Nkrumah or Mobutu declare that his country must escape the horrors of Balkanization creates, in one who knows anything of Balkan history, a strange impulse to giggle or to weep. If only they could have leaders of the caliber of Pašić or Stambolov—warts and all—how fortunate they would be.

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NATIONALISM IN A NON-NATIONAL STATE: THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE. Edited by *William W. Haddad* and *William Ochsenwald*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1977. x, 297 pp. \$15.00.

This collection of essays, dedicated to Sydney Nettleton Fisher, seeks a common theme in the role of nationalism in the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, most of the authors pay scant attention to the overall impact of the mutually antagonistic nationalisms which helped destroy the Ottoman state. Instead, the majority of their articles deal with trends and developments which became of major importance only in the very last years of Ottoman rule or after the collapse of the empire itself. This lack of proper balance and focus is attributable to an inordinate emphasis upon the history of the Arab lands during the last few decades of Ottoman rule. More than twenty different ethnic or national groups were under the rule of the sultan at various times. At no time before the Balkan Wars (1912–13) did the Arabic-speaking element come even close to representing anything more than a significant minority of the empire's total population. Nor were the Arab provinces in any way more important than the Ottoman possessions in either the Balkans or Asia Minor. Yet, seven of the eleven studies in the present volume are devoted to the Arab territories. Most of these essays examine the origins of Arab nationalism, which is generally understood by historians to be a largely post-Ottoman phenomenon greatly stimulated by the collapse of the empire as the principal political expression of orthodox Islam and by the incursion of the "infidel" imperialisms of the European powers. Thus, Suleiman Mousa's essay, "The Rise of Arab Nationalism and the Emergence of Transjordan," is most concerned with British imperial policy during and after World War I. Similarly, Russel Yates Smith's "The British and Sa'd Zaghlul, 1906–1912" is a contribution to the history of modern Egypt, but relates only indirectly to the regions under direct Ottoman administration.