

# THE INDIVIDUAL IN HISTORY: Five Latin American Biographies

*Alberto Ciria*  
*Simon Fraser University*

- ARTURO ALESSANDRI: A BIOGRAPHY.* By ROBERT J. ALEXANDER. (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1977. Pp. 986 in two volumes. \$59.50.)
- CASTELLO BRANCO: THE MAKING OF A BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT.* By JOHN W. F. DULLES. (College Station and London: Texas A & M University Press, 1978. Pp. 487. \$24.50.)
- PRESIDENT CASTELLO BRANCO: BRAZILIAN REFORMER.* By JOHN W. F. DULLES. (College Station and London: Texas A & M University Press, 1980. Pp. 557. \$27.50.)
- GUATEMALAN CAUDILLO: THE REGIME OF JORGE UBICO, GUATEMALA, 1931–1944.* By KENNETH J. GRIEB. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979. Pp. 384. \$16.00.)
- DON PEPE: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY OF JOSE FIGUERES OF COSTA RICA.* By CHARLES D. AMERINGER. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1978. Pp. 324. \$16.50.)
- SANDINO.* By GREGORIO SELSER. Translated by Cedric Belfrage. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981. Pp. 250. \$16.00.)

Recent Latin American scholarship has shown methodological sophistication in the use of multiple-level and structural analyses, experiments in quantitative history, and engaged scholarship.<sup>1</sup> In the field of biography, however, many traditional approaches are still being practiced, as will be shown in this review. Leaving aside the dangers of psychological reductionism (even psychohistory) or class absolutism, a majority of the books under consideration here—those by Robert Alexander, John Dulles, Kenneth Grieb, and Charles Ameringer—engage in a documentary and occasionally overanecdotal rendering of their subjects' life histories, renderings that sometimes have a revisionist intent. Part of this overabundance of extraneous data reflects these biographers' full access to their subjects' private papers, perhaps linked to a failure to scrutinize these resources with a sufficiently critical mind. Only one of the biographers in this group, Gregorio Selser, has at-

tempted to discuss the subject in the context of his times, with encouraging results.

The first of two South American biographees is Arturo Alessandri (1868–1950), El León de Tarapacá, who addressed his followers as *querida chusma* (“beloved rabble”) in early twentieth-century Chile. Alessandri’s eventful life should provide fascinating insights into Latin American politics via a long list of appropriate topics: relationships between civilian and military establishments, limited democracy and gradual expansion of the electoral franchise, working-class and bourgeois politics, the participation of strong personalities in politics (Alessandri and his archrival Carlos Ibáñez dominated several decades of Chile’s modern history), the role of Freemasonry, the prehistory of populism with its emphasis on social justice to prevent abrupt social change, and the syndrome of reforms from above.

Unfortunately, Robert J. Alexander’s *Arturo Alessandri: A Biography* does not begin to address these topics and the questions they would raise. The two volumes belong instead to the genre of external chronological assessment in which the subject is portrayed in the most favorable light and is even emotionally defended against harsh critics. The major incidents in Alessandri’s public life are scrupulously noted, but with minimal references to the private person. Polemical issues, on the contrary, are quickly disposed of by relegating them to the notes.

Alexander’s overall evaluation of Don Arturo is that “he took the leadership of change to forestall a great social upheaval which he saw coming if the reformers didn’t act first” (p. 16). This synthesis contains much common sense, but it is not comprehensively explored in the lengthy volumes. Although the work is crowded with details, it nonetheless fails to integrate them with the larger political structures and processes to assess the role that Alessandri played for much of the first half of this century. Instead, Alexander generously romanticizes his subject, a tendency that suits the larger-than-life persona of Arturo Alessandri. As a young, agnostic lawyer, he played a minor part in opposing President José Manuel Balmaceda, who was overthrown and led to suicide by the 1891 revolution. From those years stemmed Alessandri’s affiliation with the Liberal party during his lengthy public career. He was first elected to Congress as a deputy and became Minister of Finance in 1913. He and his wife, Rosa Esther Rodríguez, also started a Chilean political and economic dynasty. One of their sons, Jorge, would become a successful businessman and president of the republic (1958–64).

Alexander traces the emergence of Alessandri “El Agitador” and “El Demoledor” to his 1915 senatorial campaign in the province of Tarapacá, when his charismatic personality transformed him into a “catalyst” for a broadly based reform movement. Membership in the

senate and a brief tenure as Minister of the Interior in 1918 developed Alessandri into a genuine national leader whose speeches dealt with the needs of the popular classes. By 1920 he had become a serious contender in the presidential election. His acceptance speech at the convention of the Alianza Liberal still reads like a general program for populist movements. Furthermore, his cross-country tours began to cement a relationship between himself and the masses that often transcended party labels. But this theme is not really elaborated by Alexander.

Alessandri finally became president only after defeating legal challenges. But once the nitrate bonanza ended following the invention of synthetic substitutes during World War I, he faced a situation bordering on national economic catastrophe. His program of reforms was opposed by the conservative forces controlling the senate. Among the proposals that they criticized were the establishment of an income tax, the creation of a central bank, and a labor code drafted by Moisés Poblete Troncoso. The labor reforms Alessandri sought were not only based on the need to redress the appalling conditions of workers and to adapt Chilean realities to the recommendations of the International Labour Organization. On a more fundamental level, those reforms attempted to mitigate the dangers of class war on a world scale prompted by the 1917 Soviet Revolution.

Although Alexander devotes many pages to the story of a president fighting opposition parties and *camarillas* in the congress, he fails to elucidate the relationships between parties and economic forces. Nor does he illuminate the expanded role of the army in Chilean society and politics. A string of anecdotes cannot replace structural analysis, and minutiae on Don Arturo's infighting with his rightist and leftist opponents leave the reader overwhelmed by the props and confused about the scenery and the main actors.

Alessandri insisted on a series of reforms to expedite the day-to-day business of government and make the executive branch less dependent on the congress. These reforms were finally approved in February 1924. In the process, the real or alleged dictatorial ambitions of Alessandri became an integral part of the polemics that surrounded him thereafter. The hollow victory in the 2 March 1924 parliamentary elections, in which Alessandri used the army for crudely partisan purposes, was followed in September by the interference of the military in Chilean politics, which was to last more than eight years. But Alexander says little about the reasons for this crucial event beyond trite remarks on low salaries and discontent about promotions in the ranks. What emerges is a story based on secondary sources about meetings, discussions, and maneuvers among the Alessandri forces, opposition groups, and some officers.

A *junta militar* was formed, and a petition with a variety of demands was presented to Alessandri. In just one sitting, the previously reticent congress passed the reform bills in question, including labor legislation for urban workers. But Don Arturo resigned his office, feeling himself betrayed by the young officers' pronouncements. He was granted asylum in the U.S. embassy and soon went into political exile for the first time. Alexander simply argues here (as in other instances) that the evidence on Alessandri's real position in the September 1924 events is split, leaving unresolved the questions of whether he coasted on the crest of the military wave or exploited the movement for his own purposes. Dissension within the ranks that led to a coup by junior officers and politicians on 23 January 1925 is also treated anecdotally by Alexander, as is the growing rivalry between then Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Ibáñez and Alessandri. The latter was finally recalled to Chile, where he "assumed once again his duties as constitutional president" (p. 428). Ibáñez was retained as Minister of War, the congress was not convened, and constitutional reform became paramount to stabilize the political system. A 121-member consultative commission was charged with drawing up the new document; although politicians constituted a majority, the commission also included military officers. A plebiscite approved the constitution, which went into effect on 18 September 1925.

Alexander views Alessandri's main reason for resigning the presidency in 1925 as the need to block (temporarily at least) Ibáñez's presidential ambitions. Again the reader is left with the impression of a Chilean duel between two powerful adversaries rather than the complex and fluid panorama of personalities and events. Alessandri's "six years in limbo" from 1925 to 1931, which included a lengthy exile in France, are dealt with routinely, with sundry references to Ibáñez's dictatorship. Alessandri's contacts with other Chilean exiles are also recorded.

In due time, Ibáñez was ousted, and it was Alessandri's turn to go back to Chile and become a presidential candidate, with the support of several parties. But the October 1931 elections were won by Radical party leader Juan Esteban Montero, who had gained fleeting popularity from his greater involvement in Ibáñez's exit. Alessandri waited in the wings. A military coup overthrew Montero on 4 June 1932 and proclaimed a short-lived "socialist republic."<sup>2</sup> The failure of this peculiar experiment led to still another presidential election in October 1932, and this time Alessandri was victorious. But the roars of El León were now tempered by political prudence, his middle-class support, and the depths in the Great Depression. Backed on the occasion by the Radical party and its new president, Gabriel González Videla (a student and future practitioner of Alessandri's skills in the 1940s), Don Arturo's tri-

umph opened a new chapter in his life. His goals were to restore civilian supremacy over the military by means of a constitutional government and to rebuild the depression-wracked Chilean economy. The reformer of the 1920s became the law-and-order leader of the 1930s. Alessandri not only tried to place trusted officers in command of the armed forces, but he also supported a paramilitary citizens' group, the *Milicia Republicana*, as a possible counterweight to the military establishment (the *Milicia* played a limited role in the stabilization of the regime and then dissolved in July 1935).

Alexander describes Alessandri's handling of mutiny and insubordination in the forms of a 1936 pro-Ibáñez putsch and the 5 September 1938 attempted coup by the *Partido Nazista*, which was bloodily repressed.<sup>3</sup> Alexander also records Alessandri's use of "extraordinary powers" legislation and the enactment of a 1937 law for the internal security of the state that restricted individual liberties, including freedom of the press. The biographer summarily absolves President Alessandri of any dictatorial proclivities and justifies his "strong leadership" by the need to curtail further military disruptions of the political system (p. 622).

Alessandri's orthodox economic policies did not generally benefit the popular sectors, who rightly called Gustavo Ross the "Ministro del Hambre." These policies resembled those applied by conservative governments throughout Latin America during this era. Reforms were limited in comparison with those of Don Arturo's previous administration and tended to favor white-collar workers, including a law of preventative medicine and improvements in the educational field. Alexander again points out an "intriguing paradox" in Alessandri's rule from 1932 to 1938: his sympathies for European nazism and fascism and his visceral anticommunism, which culminated in Chile's withdrawal from the League of Nations in May 1938. The biographer attributes these preferences to his subject's difficulties with the Chilean Left during that decade. Alessandri was also cool toward Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico and Alfonso López of Colombia, accepting the reactionary advice of Agustín Edwards, Chilean ambassador to Great Britain and the League of Nations. Alexander alludes to the events that led to the formation of the *Frente Popular* in April 1936 only when superficially discussing the new Socialist party, the Communist party, and other leftist forces opposing Alessandri's government. These developments brought about a changed role for the Radical party as the leading component in the *Frente Popular* coalition seeking to replace "a government of the Right." This characterization represents both Alexander's and Alessandri's evaluation of the 1932–38 administration (p. 761).

After 1938 the Alessandri saga slowly winds down. The candidate of the *Frente Popular*, Radical Pedro Aguirre Cerda, won the presi-

dency over the extremely unpopular Ross, and on 24 December 1938, the aging León de Tarapacá left the executive office for the last time. As an elder statesman, Alessandri fought successfully to clear his name of judicial accusations by the Partido Nazista, endured a transitory period of public repudiation, and traveled to Europe, where he had one final talk with Mussolini.

After his return to Chile, Alessandri spent his days writing political-historical tracts and memoirs. President Aguirre Cerda's death in late 1941 prompted new elections in accordance with the 1925 constitution. The resilient Ibáñez became a candidate in 1942 with the support of the Conservative and Liberal parties, while Juan Antonio Ríos represented the Frente Popular. Alessandri's enduring antagonism toward Ibáñez led him to endorse Ríos (another former political foe) and to stage a formidable comeback. His address at a mass meeting in the Plaza Bulnes restored Alessandri to his role as "star performer" among the leftist speakers. Alessandri reentered the senate following a 1944 by-election, with the support of Liberals, Conservatives, and the right-wing Falange Nacional. By May 1945, he had been designated as president of that body. In 1949 Alessandri was reelected senator—this time in alliance with the Socialists, yesterday's enemies (his rival Ibáñez also won a seat, but no reconciliation ever took place between the two). In the presidential arena, new elections were occasioned in 1946 by the death in office of Ríos. González Videla became president with Radical and Communist support as well as Alessandri's endorsement. Relations between Alessandri and González Videla remained cordial, with Alessandri embracing González Videla's newfound anticommunism. When Don Arturo died in 1950, public honors and middle-class grief characterized his funeral.

In a postscript, Alexander reemphasizes the progressiveness of Alessandri's social legislation in the 1920s and the reestablishment of civilian democracy in the 1930s. He goes on to dismiss critical views of Alessandri's impact on Chilean politics. Here Alexander is too partial to his subject, never coming to terms with the essential opportunism that apparently pervaded every stage of Don Arturo's public life. Alexander utilized Alessandri's copious writings and part of his correspondence, as well as previous biographical essays, elementary secondary sources on Chile, and a series of open-ended interviews, but one nevertheless misses a more analytical and reasoned examination of the data.

Another detailed biography in two volumes is John W. F. Dulles's *Castello Branco: The Making of a Brazilian President* and *President Castello Branco: Brazilian Reformer*. Dulles has worked extensively on Mexican political history and more recently on Brazilian contemporary history and politics. His subject, Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco (1897–

1967), is the career army officer who became Brazil's first president during the 1964 military regime.

The first volume takes the story up to April 1964 and follows closely Castello Branco's public life, emphasizing his military advancement and conservative ideas. Born in Ceará to an army family, Castello Branco emerges as a high-minded soldier, devoted husband, loving father, and strict disciplinarian—"a legalist during rebellious times" (1:33). He did not join the *tenentes* movement and opposed the 1930 rebellion that brought Getúlio Vargas to power. Castello Branco not only survived the Vargas years but moved upward in the ranks to become one of the chief organizers of the Força Expedicionária Brasileira (FEB) during the Second World War. In Italy Castello became friends with the "American liaison Major Vernon Walters" (1:91).<sup>4</sup> Dulles provides a useful record of the military campaign, underlining the close relationships between U.S. forces and the Brazilian contingent. Promoted to colonel in June 1945, Castello traveled to the United States and then entered the Brazilian general staff school in an attempt to reform the old French doctrine of National Security by "Brazilianizing" some of its tenets (another military officer, Eurico Gaspar Dutra, had been elected president in December 1945, after the Vargas demise).

By 1950 Vargas had been reelected president, and by 1952 Castello had been promoted to brigadier general. Later that year, he became commander of the army's tenth military region at the headquarters in Fortaleza, Ceará. During those years, the new general supported the "Democratic Crusade" with strong anticommunist views that intensified at the national war college, the Escola Superior de Guerra (1:201). Colonel Golberi do Couto e Silva played a pivotal role in developing a "Brazilian Sorbonne" whose military instructors became increasingly concerned with what they perceived as demagogic appeals by politicians to labor (1:213–14). They were critical of the friendly relations of then Minister of Labor João Goulart with Argentina's Perón, fearing a *república sindicalista*, a nation run by labor unions (1:202). Castello's ideas solidified during the confusing period following Vargas's suicide in 1954. President Juscelino Kubitschek's inauguration on 31 January 1956 ended the political-military minuet, and General Castello Branco was transferred to the national war college. Interestingly enough (although Dulles does not pursue the issue in relation to the 1964 coup), from that period emerged Castello Branco's solid reputation in business circles, as civilians and military officers took part in national security courses.

What Dulles calls "Brazilian Military Doctrine" was being developed by 1957 in the national war college and other venues, and Castello Branco contributed his no-nonsense approach and strong preference

for stability (1:216). For instance, when prophetically analyzing the different roles played by the armed forces in Latin American countries, he “declared that the principal purpose of the Argentine armed forces was to overthrow and organize governments” (1:216). In spite of clashes with the Minister of War, Castello was promoted to the rank of divisional general in 1958. By 1959 he was army commander in the vast Amazônia. In the presidential election year of 1960, his concerns increased as did his hostility toward Goulart, who eventually succeeded Jânio Quadros after the latter resigned in August 1961.

From his high position in the army as chief of staff, Castello Branco pessimistically observed the short-lived “parliamentary solution” imposed on Goulart, read voraciously on communism, and developed his ideas in such speeches as “Military Duty in the Face of the Ideological Struggle,” which he delivered in December 1961. When a referendum paved the way for a return to presidentialism, Castello warned of the dangers of “Communist infiltration” in public administration, universities, and other official places (1:270). According to Dulles, between September 1963 and early 1964, Castello Branco attempted to achieve a peaceful negotiated solution to what most of the army perceived as dangerous excesses in Goulart’s policies. Dulles asserts that Castello initially did not support the ongoing conspiracy headed by General Osvaldo Cordeiro de Farias, an FEB veteran.

But once Goulart’s overthrow had occurred (Dulles’s narrative insists on the strictly military aspects of the coup), Marshal Castello Branco was selected as Brazil’s new president by the congress meeting in Brasília, which had been conveniently purged of forty members considered subversive by the victorious military. In reality this body merely ratified the wishes of the top brass. On 14 April 1964, Castello was formally inaugurated. Roberto Campos was appointed Minister of Planning and Economic Coordination,<sup>5</sup> General Artur da Costa e Silva remained as Minister of War (held over from the interim regime that had replaced Goulart), and Couto e Silva was promptly placed at the head of the powerful Serviço Nacional de Informações.

Dulles treats cavalierly the beginnings of the so-called Operação Limpeza (Operation Cleanup), which eventually deprived many Brazilians of their political rights and punished those suspected of having been “subversive or corrupt” by summary procedures without constitutional guarantees (2:29). Dulles’s discussion of the five institutional acts issued by the government appears as marginal to the Castello story. Dulles deals with the early political and economic reforms of the regime and its pro-American foreign policy from a perspective consistent with that displayed in the first volume on Castello Branco’s military career: he offers an institutional rundown that emphasizes Castello’s role as a reformer trying to contain the hardliners within the ranks. This biogra-



phy does not suggest, much less analyze, the relationships between the military and the industrial-financial groups, including the U.S. government and U.S. corporations. The work also lacks any critical appraisal of the regime's repressive policies.<sup>6</sup> These gaps contrast with the inordinate amount of space given to such topics as Guanabara Governor Carlos Lacerda's disagreements with the administration he helped to install and the successful positioning of General Costa e Silva to replace Castello Branco as president, thanks to decisive support from "most of the active military officers" (2:275).

Dulles also fails to consider a fascinating aspect of the Brazilian dictatorship—the limited role played by the congress as a rubber-stamp legitimizer of policies decided upon elsewhere, especially during the regime's first years. Always lenient toward his subject, Dulles nevertheless permits the reader to see the ideological continuity in foreign policy of Castello's sending troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965. While trying to make Castello's alleged democratic intentions compatible with an authoritarian system, Dulles details the president's personal participation in the government-inspired formation of two major parties, the official *Aliança Renovadora Nacional* (ARENA) and the official opposition party, the *Movimento Democrático Brasileiro* (MDB).

In a few instances, such as a chapter on protests and demonstrations against the regime during 1966, Dulles addresses the serious social consequences of the government's economic policies and gives some information on the universities and Dom Hélder Câmara. Dulles states that "subsequently, the student movement became so violent that it made the occurrences before 1968 seem mild," and that in relation to the radical Catholic church, "developments became much worse after Castello left office" (2:313). Organized labor is alluded to only in passing by suggesting that its relative calm during Castello Branco's presidency was due to the removal of some of its "most effective labor leaders" and the enforcement of new legislation on strikes (2:314).

Dulles traces the process that led to the promulgation of a new constitution on 24 January 1967. He also discusses the economic and financial policies implemented by the military, as well as dispensing generous coverage of barracks rivalries. The draconian press law that Castello favored and approved belies much of his biographer's fervor in attempting to portray him as the "reformer" president (2:420–21).

The last months of Castello Branco's rule were marked by a devaluation of the *cruzeiro* and by the further suspension of political rights for forty-four individuals. The national security law put into effect on 13 March 1967 was the president's brainchild. On 15 March, Castello Branco left the executive office in the hands of General Costa e Silva. Dulles characterizes the latter as having worked hard and well to reach the position.<sup>7</sup>

Between March and July of 1967, Castello Branco retired to live in Rio de Janeiro and made a private trip to Portugal, France, and Belgium. On a sentimental journey to his Ceará hometown, he died in a plane crash near Fortaleza on 18 July 1967.

John Dulles never elaborates on his reasons for characterizing Castello Branco's professional and political story as "a study in leadership" (2:493). He states that the former president had "the principles of a God-fearing man" and favored teamwork (2:494). Despite having consulted such diverse sources as Castello's personal papers and letters, interviews with people who knew him, U.S. Embassy materials, and U.S. National Security files, Dulles fails to provide his readers with a perceptive evaluation of Castello Branco's role in Brazilian politics. Nowhere in the two volumes does Dulles provide any substantive clue as to why an obituary by Hélio Fernandes would describe Castello Branco as "cold, merciless, vindictive, ruthless, inhuman, calculating, easily offended, cruel, frustrated, without greatness, without nobleness, dry inside and outside, with a heart that was a true Sahara Desert" (2:488).

Kenneth J. Grieb's *Guatemalan Caudillo: The Regime of Jorge Ubico, Guatemala, 1931–1944* focuses on this regime as a leading example of the "modernizing autocracy" type in Latin America. This biography of Jorge Ubico (1878–1946) belongs squarely in the revisionist tradition that attempts to vindicate Latin American "villains," in contradiction to the fictional literature on dictators and dictatorships.<sup>8</sup> The book claims to be the first comprehensive "scholarly assessment" of Ubico's reign in the context of his time (p. x). Grieb tries to present the "progressive, developmentalist" aspects of Ubico's rule along with the "oppressive dictatorship" that it also constituted (p. xi).

*Guatemalan Caudillo* scarcely provides enough background to explain satisfactorily Ubico's rise to power: trite references to dictatorships as antidotes to chaos and civil wars do not suffice. Grieb takes as his starting point General Ubico's election as the only candidate running 6–8 February 1931, with the sympathies of the U.S. legation. Grieb's psychological sketch depicts this scion of an aristocratic Guatemalan family as a vain, despotic recluse who was also energetic and pragmatic. An avid sportsman with a passion for trifles, Ubico also had a vengeful nature that inflamed the popular mythology surrounding his tenure. He preferred extremely centralized rule, with a compliant legislature and a subservient judiciary: Ubico's executive branch *was* the government. Although he dealt individually with his ministers, private secretary Ernesto Rivas had much more influence in the Ubico administration; however, the director of police, head of a vast spy system and a network of secret surveillance activities, reported not to the Home Minister but directly to President Ubico.

Grieb asserts that the main objective of Ubico's regime was economic development, but a few lines later, he points to the highway construction program as the state's "major contribution" to economic expansion (p. 32). Even from the evidence amassed by Grieb, it is clear that Ubico's agenda was "peace and order": peace for private investors (domestic and foreign) and property owners, and order for the subordinated classes, especially the Indians (p. 33). Anticommunism was present as a fundamental *idée fixe*, particularly after the brutally repressed 1932 uprising in El Salvador. Paternalistic measures and symbolic access to the national *patrón* during Ubico's yearly inspection tours of Indian villages were some features of his policies on the rural labor force. Systematic torture and the *ley de fugas* took care of real or potential adversaries of the regime, which also favored a top-heavy army as a privileged tool of power and social control. The press was conveniently censored and self-censored.

Commercial production for export based on large holdings in coffee, bananas, and chicle was seriously affected by the Depression during the 1930s, as was the case in other Latin American countries. The trade decline meant less foreign exchange and less governmental revenue for President Ubico, who took office when Guatemala "seemed on the verge of economic and political collapse" (p. 55). Attempts to fight endemic corruption were mixed with foreign loans and rigid austerity measures to balance the budget. His conservative economic policy also limited public works projects. Relative recovery from the Depression was enjoyed by the wealthy classes in Guatemala, but Ubico's program "simply ignored the masses of the populace" and "precluded direct relief to the poor" (p. 66).

In foreign affairs, Jorge Ubico took a "stridently pro-American stance" while simultaneously seeking a special status for Guatemala in Central America (p. 71). For obvious historical reasons, Mexico was considered Guatemala's immediate rival for hegemony in the isthmus. The United States was Guatemala's main trading partner, its principal market, and the source of most of its imports. *Guatemalan Caudillo* scarcely documents the role of imperialism and its internalization in Guatemala through the United Fruit Company (UFCO), with its integrated local production and U.S. marketing of bananas.

Both regionally and in Pan American diplomatic gatherings, Guatemala was a staunch supporter of the United States. Relations with neighboring Central American nations were conducted from Ubico's perspective of dominating, if not unifying, the area. El Salvador was his traditional adversary (Ubico's tenure paralleled that of Maximiliano Hernández Martínez); other focal points of Ubico's attention were Honduras and Nicaragua. Costa Rica, however, maintained a certain

aloofness vis-à-vis the Guatemalan dictatorship during the 1930s. A partial détente and accommodation took place in the mid-1930s between Guatemala and her neighbors. Grieb duly covers Guatemalan relations with Mexico and conflicting claims over Belize. Two examples of the antagonism between the two countries were Ubico's opposition to the progressive aspects of the Mexican Revolution and Lázaro Cárdenas's characterization of the Guatemalan president as a feudal tyrant. Another permanent source of friction was the flow of Guatemalan exiles into Mexico. A temporary rapprochement occurred, particularly while General Manuel Avila Camacho was Mexico's president, but it was soon replaced by bouts of "mutual suspicion and rivalry" (p. 247). Grieb deals adequately with the impact of the Second World War, especially the balancing act Ubico attempted vis-à-vis the United States and Germany. After Pearl Harbor, however, Guatemala closed ranks with the United States on such issues as restrictions on enemy aliens, lend-lease agreements, and military defense commitments.

Grieb makes a case for Ubico having somewhat improved the lot of the Indian masses and thereby gaining their support. Some of Grieb's evidence points in the opposite direction, however. Improvements in roads and transportation (the railroads were controlled by International Railways of Central America, a subsidiary of UFCO) were directed toward "increasing exports" and not toward national integration (p. 126). Grieb specifies that a system of forced Indian labor based on the old Spanish *mita* was the means Ubico chose for building roads and governmental offices and that only one-fifth of the unskilled labor was salaried (pp. 129–31). Grieb also observes that "although education received some attention it was clearly not a high priority item, as Ubico placed greater emphasis upon physical development than upon mental improvement" (p. 173). Except for his summary of the regime's modest attempts at agricultural diversification beyond coffee and bananas, Grieb offers only a brief chapter dealing with foreign investment in Guatemala. The role of large corporations such as UFCO is not elaborated upon nor are Great Britain's involvement in financial affairs and Germany's in agriculture and retail business discussed. Not everyone would agree with the notion that transactions between the Guatemalan government and UFCO were "an entirely separate sphere from Guatemalan–U.S. relations" (p. 182).<sup>9</sup>

*Guatemalan Caudillo* is useful in describing the *continuismo* tactics employed by Ubico to have himself reelected in a plebiscite through a carefully orchestrated campaign for constitutional reform in 1934–35. His success was tacitly approved by the United States and provided a political model for other Central American dictators. Grieb notes that the regime became "highly security-conscious" (that is, it perfected its repressive apparatus) by the late 1930s and that another *continuismo*

ploy was engineered in 1943 (p. 266). He belatedly acknowledges that middle-class discontent was on the rise and included professionals and university students. This dissatisfaction proved fatal to Ubico's chances of becoming El Señor Presidente for life. His resignation in 1944 represented a last attempt to control the results of an insurrection by stepping aside and leaving matters in the hands of a military junta. The participation of "underpaid junior officers" led to the October 1944 revolt that finally put an end to *ubiquismo*. By December former exile Juan José Arévalo was elected president in a free election. Ubico died in New Orleans on 14 July 1946, and his remains were not returned for burial in his native land until 1963.

Ubico's legacy is scantily discussed by Grieb. While he rightly alludes to its polemical nature, he falls back on his original premise that Ubico was responsible for the first steps in Guatemala's "economic modernization," drawing parallels with Porfirio Díaz (p. 282). Grieb's conclusion that Ubico "began the process of change, but dealt with only the material aspects, ignoring the social sphere" should not be taken as the implicit endorsement of a bloody tyrant that Grieb's rather aseptic narrative sometimes seems to imply (p. 283). What Grieb might term the "social costs" more than cancelled any alleged material improvements in the country's productive system.<sup>10</sup>

*Don Pepe: A Political Biography of José Figueres of Costa Rica* is Charles D. Ameringer's political biography of one of the key representatives of the so-called Latin American Democratic Left, a group that also included Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, Rómulo Betancourt, and Luis Muñoz Marín. José Figueres (b. 1906) was a modern agriculturalist, a man of action, his party's founder and leader, and twice president of Costa Rica (1953–58 and 1970–74). He acted for many years as a spokesman for a reformist, middle-of-the-road approach to the ills of Latin America.

Ameringer had access to Figueres's archives, especially those covering the years from 1950 to 1970, and utilized a variety of contemporary Costa Rican sources. He also conducted extensive interviews with his subject. Ameringer acknowledges that his methodology was a response to the availability of source materials and that "I am part archival historian, part oral historian, and part chronicler" (p. ix).<sup>11</sup>

The son of Spanish parents from Barcelona, Figueres early in life became a self-taught, progressive farmer in Costa Rica after living and studying in the United States. From the start, he combined his skills as a businessman with ideas on social reform and a vocation for politics. His main rival for the leadership of the country was Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, who had been elected president in 1940. Figueres and other members of his generation joined forces in forming the strongly anticommunist Centro para el Estudio de los Problemas Nacionales and

in opposing the corruption and personalism of Calderón Guardia's regime. The center, under the influence of Haya's Aprismo and the cooperative movement, became in turn a precedent for the later development of the Partido Liberación Nacional (PLN). By 1942 Figueres had left for Mexico in a partially self-imposed exile that was to be a stepping-stone in his march toward center stage in Costa Rican politics.

The Mexican interlude served Figueres well. His moderate social democratic ideas became consolidated around the main tenet of the "solidarity of all classes" (p. 23). Armed action also became paramount in Figueres's mind as the necessary means to establish democracy firmly in his country, particularly after the fraudulent election of February 1944 (while in Mexico, he had gotten acquainted with other exiles struggling against Ubico, Hernández Martínez, Anastasio Somoza, and Tiburcio Carías Andino). By May 1944, Figueres returned to Costa Rica to unite opposition groups into a planned uprising. After a brief association with the Partido Social Demócrata (founded in 1945), Figueres and his followers resumed with their insurrectionary plans, which included strengthening ties to other antidictatorial groups in Central America and the Caribbean. The 1948 elections provided the final push. Opposition candidate Otilio Ulate's victory was annulled by the congress, which lent momentum to Figueres's partisans. The mixed group of moderate reformers and political conservatives organized into a citizens' militia, which soon became known as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional, and managed to defeat militarily the government in power.

On 28 April 1948, Figueres's troops paraded through the streets of San José. Their leader proclaimed the goal of the Segunda República based on free elections and an independent judiciary: social planning would guide national reconstruction according to the utilitarian principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number" (p. 65). A temporary junta was placed in charge of the transition process (8 May 1948–8 November 1949). Its goals were to convene a constituent assembly, to dissolve the national army (and replace it with a well-trained police force), and to provide interim rule until Ulate finally took over the presidency as the first constitutional executive of the Second Republic. Ameringer gives a rundown of the efforts of Figueres and his junta colleagues acting as ministers. *Primus inter pares*, Figueres was perfecting his skills as a conciliator. A neoliberal economy was emphasized along with the need for higher productivity and social cooperation; middle-class values such as hard work, self-sacrifice, and moderation went hand in hand with nationalization of the banks and a 10 percent tax on wealth (p. 70). Ulate's Partido Unión Nacional carried the day in the elections to the constituent assembly, defeating the more reformist wing in the junta led by Figueres. The 1949 constitution retained the individual freedoms and guarantees of its 1871 predecessor and incorporated social security

legislation and a labor code. The state was empowered to direct and stimulate production as well as to assure a more equitable distribution of wealth. At the same time, the constitution incorporated the concept of autonomous state agencies, created a veritable fourth branch of government in the Supremo Tribunal Electoral, and extended suffrage to women.

From this point, *Don Pepe* follows the political activities of Figueres in Costa Rica and Latin America. As a "rival-partner" of Ulate, Figueres set out on his path to electoral power with the same drive and pragmatism with which he had prepared the 1948 insurrection (p. 92). While he cultivated his image as a moderate, antidictatorial "Democratic Leftist" in the region, he also made influential friends in the United States as a cold warrior. On 12 October 1951, Figueres and his team founded the PLN; the party advocated a mild social-democratic creed, a mixed economy, the "social function" of private property, and many other features of populist movements in Latin America. The 1953 presidential campaign featured Figueres as a domestic reformer and a blunt anticommunist in foreign affairs. He won 65 percent of the popular vote and was inaugurated on 8 November 1953.

In gradualistic fashion, Figueres began his term by negotiating with the local UFCO until a new contract was signed on 5 June 1954 (a vivid contrast to developments in Guatemala under Jacobo Arbenz). A series of essential reforms were implemented, education and public health were strengthened, and a variety of autonomous state agencies reinforced such functions of government as housing and social security. In May 1958, Figueres handed over his office to a victorious opposition candidate and returned to the international scene. The Costa Rican political system seemed stable enough. Figueres represented the anti-communist, pro-U.S. position on the present and future of the hemisphere, but the late 1950s were signaling a more radical approach that was to culminate in the Cuban Revolution. The former president was influential in founding both the Instituto de Educación Política (IEP) at San José in 1958 and the journal *Combate*. In due course, both the institute and the journal became organs of the "Democratic Left."<sup>12</sup> After sympathizing briefly with Fidel Castro's struggle against Batista, Figueres (like Haya and Betancourt, his associates on *Combate's* editorial board) bitterly criticized the ensuing stages of the Cuban Revolution.

Figueres enthusiastically heralded the election of John F. Kennedy and, via key members of the U.S. president's think tank, became an advocate of the Alliance for Progress (although he considered the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 a badly timed fiasco). Nevertheless, the failure of IEP and *Combate* to live up to their original expectations coincided with the early signs of a tarnishing of Figueres's image, even in the United States. He was still active in Costa Rican politics (his good

friend Francisco Orlich had been elected president when the PLN returned to power in 1962) as well as in private financial activities, while relishing his role as statesman-at-large in U.S. intellectual circles. But Kennedy's assassination in 1963 symbolically initiated a decline in Figueres's influence in hemispheric affairs, as was demonstrated in the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic. President Lyndon B. Johnson called upon Figueres, Betancourt, and Muñoz Marín to act as mediators in the situation, but their time of influence had already passed.

The final chapters of the book describe Figueres's comeback toward a second term as president in 1970–74. Daniel Odúber, the PLN standard-bearer at the time, had lost the 1966 elections to a little-known representative of a powerful coalition of opposition groups. Luis Alberto Monge, then a close collaborator of Figueres, implemented a needed overhaul in the PLN while strengthening political links with the Second International and obtaining financial aid from the West German Ebert Foundation.

A more conciliatory Figueres won his party's nomination for the presidency, defeating former protégé Rodrigo Carazo, who represented more closely the PLN's original reformist platform. Ameringer describes Figueres's skills as a campaigner in 1970, when touches of the old populist-paternalist leader combined with his heavy-handed tactics in party affairs. At this point, he emphasized agricultural diversification and diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. Figueres was elected with 54.8 percent of the popular vote.

The record of Figueres's second term was a pale echo of his previous administration. He behaved more and more like the manager of a system he had helped to consolidate in the 1940s and 1950s. He even succeeded in reaching a *modus vivendi* with Cuba's Castro and some Latin American military dictatorships. Figueres's second presidency was punctuated by anticommunist rightist reactions, rumors of a coup d'état in 1971, clashes between the executive branch and the legislative assembly, and the Costa Rican activities of international financiers Clovis W. McAlpin and Robert Vesco (pp. 268–79). According to Ameringer, this issue was "the most serious scandal of Don Pepe's career," and one that has clouded Figueres's reputation ever since.

*Don Pepe* ends with a few paragraphs on José Figueres's role in Costa Rican politics that disappointed this reader's expectations by failing to provide a thorough evaluation of the book's subject, a complex personality tainted by past associations with the CIA and more recently by shady financial deals, a man of the people with touches of megalomania. It would seem that Figueres's fate parallels that of Costa Rica.

Since *Don Pepe* was published in 1978, the country has been faced with the crisis of its post-1948 economic model, which Figueres was so influential in developing. While preserving liberal-democratic institu-



tions, Costa Rica has not escaped the common Latin American destiny. During the 1970s and 1980s, traditional exports like coffee, cotton, and bananas simply did not provide the dynamic engine to run a system that relied on expansion of the state apparatus and an industrial sector almost entirely dependent on imported inputs. Borrowing abroad to keep the economy going brought about a huge foreign debt (exceeding 4.2 billion U.S. dollars in 1983), inflation, and unemployment. Rodrigo Carazo, who had split from the PLN to lead a Christian Democratic coalition, was finally elected president in 1978, and Luis Alberto Monge returned Figueres's party to office in 1982. Since then, an attempt to attract international agribusiness corporations has been combined with financial austerity measures and the strengthening of ties with the United States and the International Monetary Fund. As was the case with the elder Somoza and Figueres in 1955 (pp. 117–25), relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua will remain crucial for years to come. Carazo's sympathies and support for the Sandinistas in their struggle to overthrow the younger Somoza has contrasted with Monge's visceral anticommunism and his critical stance toward the Managua regime. Costa Rica's civil guard, an internal security force seven thousand strong, has been increasing its capabilities and has received arms supplied by the United States.

Noticeable gaps exist in the domestic makeup of Costa Rican democracy at both the political and the economic levels. Moreover, the proclaimed "perpetual neutrality" of the country could be severely menaced by the growing regionalization of the conflict centered in El Salvador and Nicaragua.<sup>13</sup> In that case, the problems that leaders like José Figueres tried to solve may yet come back to haunt Costa Rica.

Gregorio Selser's *Sandino* is a documented militant biography of Augusto C. Sandino (1895–1934), the legendary Nicaraguan guerrilla leader who fought domestic troops and the U.S. Marines from 1927 to 1933. Selser's book deals mostly with Sandino's years of struggle and does not engage in crude forms of armchair psychology. The vagueness of Sandino's nationalism (even his "political ingenousness"), his messianism, his idiosyncratic religious views, and his lack of a rigid ideology are linked in Selser's analysis with the Latin American and world impact awakened by Sandino's efforts to make the "Yankees go home" (p. 202). A hero of the international intelligentsia of the day (Henri Barbusse in a 1928 letter called Sandino the "general of free men"), the Central American patriot achieved posthumous glory when young Nicaraguan guerrillas took his name and example to build the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional. Since the 1979 victory over the son of Sandino's nemesis, the revolutionaries have revered Sandino as the national hero of Nicaragua, a position similar to that held by José Martí in post-1959 Cuba.

Gregorio Selser is a prolific Argentine writer and political journalist who is currently living in Mexico. His previous books and articles on Argentina, Guatemala, Panama, and Chile as well as the role of the CIA and other U.S. security agencies in Latin America comprise a most useful repository of data and interpretation, mostly based on U.S. sources. Selser's anti-imperialist, yet nondogmatic, focus places his work in the best tradition of the first José Vasconcelos, José Ingenieros, Manuel Ugarte, Alfredo L. Palacios, Vicente Sáenz, Jesús Silva Herzog, and Carlos Quijano. On several occasions, Selser has been among the first to document and denounce American intervention in Latin America, before events became common knowledge either inside or outside the United States.<sup>14</sup>

The history of the writing and publication of *Sandino* are characteristic of Selser. The original, two-volume edition appeared in Buenos Aires in 1955 under the title *Sandino, general de hombres libres*. Selser acknowledges in the abridged English language edition that he "wrote it in the heat of moral and political indignation at the overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, constitutional president of Guatemala, in June, 1954." In the course of researching recent events in Guatemala, Selser explored Central American relations with the United States and in due course "came upon the figure of Augusto Calderón Sandino, who moved, captured and held me" (p. 205). The original biography in Spanish, together with his *El pequeño ejército loco: Operación México-Nicaragua* (1958), focused the attention of Latin American readers, particularly the younger generations who lacked first-hand recollections of Sandino's struggle, on this important component of a collective anti-imperialist heritage. Selser's 1955 biography partially helped overcome the Balkanization of Latin America as the several authorized and non-authorized printings of the book (especially in Central America and the Caribbean) reached students and activists alike.

Selser begins *Sandino* with a skeleton outline of U.S.–Central American relations since the nineteenth century and then zeroes in on Nicaragua. The staple topics of American interventions, frustrated episodes like Benjamín Zeledón's 1912 revolt, connections between U.S. government and business interests are depicted by Selser within a nationalist and anti-imperialist framework based on reliable sources. He then realistically summarizes the facts of the guerrilla's life with emphasis on Sandino's starting a war in Nicaragua against the U.S. Marines and their domestic supporters. It is interesting to learn that Sandino's struggle was portrayed in North America as a Bolshevik plot when in fact substantial ideological differences existed between Sandino and the local Communists.<sup>15</sup>

Other interesting historical parallels can be drawn between the humane behavior of Sandino's guerrillas with their disciplinary code

and Fidel Castro's fighters in the Sierra Maestra. After a year's absence in Mexico, during which time Sandino raised funds and contacted anti-dictatorial groups of Latin American exiles, he returned to Nicaragua in 1930. In the middle of a slander campaign carried on by United Press and Associated Press, the U.S.-trained National Guard (which included Anastasio Somoza moving up through its ranks) became the main antagonist of Sandino's guerrillas while learning from their tactics. The United States "supervised" another Nicaraguan election, and Sandino preached abstention in the "electoral farce" (contemporary parallels with El Salvador can be readily detected). Juan B. Sacasa was finally declared the winner and took office on 1 January 1933. The U.S. Marines departed, and in the months that followed, Sandino's political naiveté deprived him first of his influence and then of his life on 21 February 1934. Selser recounts the story of the Sacasa-Sandino truce, Somoza's activities, and the National Guard's involvement in the guerrilla leader's assassination (pp. 151–79). The biography closes with a brief chapter on Somoza's consolidation of power in Nicaragua, a coda on Sandino's renown, and an afterword by the author.

*Sandino* well exemplifies Latin American engagé political writing. For North American readers, it performs the additional service of retrieving from the not-too-distant past the books of progressive American authors who also combined scholarship with a degree of militancy.<sup>16</sup>

The life histories of men and women in the context of their time should be a major concern of writers on Latin America. They allow their readers to contemplate a variety of topics that often do not receive adequate treatment in history or political science tracts. Biographies are also valuable in underscoring the personal component of structures and processes so frequently ignored by some sophisticated analysts. Having said as much, one must nevertheless acknowledge that although good biographies can be excellent complements to social science research, they can never replace it.

## NOTES

1. See Joseph S. Tulchin, "Emerging Patterns of Research in the Study of Latin America," *LARR* 18, no. 1:85–94.
2. On the Chilean military, see Frederick M. Nunn, *Chilean Politics, 1920–1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970); and *The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations, 1810–1973* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1976). On Chilean socialism during Alessandri's last two decades, see Paul W. Drake, *Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932–52* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1978).
3. Alexander spends seventy pages explaining this attempt at armed insurrection that linked the Nazis with Ibáñez's supporters. The discrepancy of sources on the key question as to what specific orders Alessandri gave to his commander of carabinieri to reestablish public order, which resulted in the death of sixty rebels, is not really

- dealt with by Alexander. Nor is the president's role clarified by Alexander's statement that he was "symbolically responsible" for the massacre (p. 707).
4. Retired General Vernon Walters, special roving ambassador for U.S. President Reagan and since 1985 U. S. Ambassador to the United Nations, is one of the most interesting secondary characters in Castello's biography. Walters was U.S. Army Assistant Attaché in Brazil from 1945 to 1948 (1:189) and was appointed U.S. Defense Attaché in October 1962 (1:276). His relationship with Castello was very friendly before and during the latter's presidency. Later on, Walters became CIA Deputy Director during the Watergate affair and published a bowdlerized autobiography, *Silent Missions* (New York: Doubleday, 1978). His confidential adventures made headlines as recently as the 1982 Malvinas/Falklands war; see Oscar R. Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum, and Eduardo van der Koy, *Malvinas: la trama secreta* (Buenos Aires: Sudamérica-Planeta, 1983).
  5. This person is the same Roberto Campos who contributed a laudatory foreword to Dulles's first volume (1:xi-xvii).
  6. An introduction to these and related topics is found in Kenneth P. Erickson, *The Brazilian Corporative State and Working Class Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); Jan Knippers Black, *United States Penetration of Brazil* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977); Peter Flynn, *Brazil: A Political Analysis* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978); and *Authoritarian Capitalism: Brazil's Contemporary Economic and Political Development*, edited by Thomas C. Bruneau and Philippe Faucher (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981).
  7. Curiously enough, the CIA reported on the lack of camaraderie between the U.S. military and Costa e Silva, who did not serve with the FEB in the Second World War (2:442).
  8. A revisionist evaluation is Michael C. Meyer, *Huerta: A Political Portrait* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972; Spanish translation, 1983). On the theme of the dictator in Latin American novels, see Roberto González Echevarría, "The Dictatorship of Rhetoric/The Rhetoric of Dictatorship: Carpentier, García Márquez, and Roa Bastos," *LARR* 15, no. 3:205-28; and Jorge Castellanos and Miguel A. Martínez, "El dictador latinoamericano como personaje literario," *LARR* 16, no. 2:79-105.
  9. An introduction to these topics from a radical standpoint is the excellent volume edited by Susanne Jonas and David Tobis, *Guatemala* (NACLA: Berkeley and New York, 1974).
  10. Grieb provides a bibliographical essay describing the primary sources utilized in his study (343-63). They include U.S. State Department papers, the archives of the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Relations, interviews with former officials and Ubico's associates, and local newspapers. The important books by Luis Cardoza y Aragón, Manuel Galich, and Guillermo Toriello are cited but not really incorporated into the discussion of the 1944 revolution.
  11. A companion piece to this biography is Charles D. Ameringer, *Democracy in Costa Rica* (New York: Praeger, 1982).
  12. Ameringer's biography introduces characters such as fund-raiser Sacha Volman and CIA operative Cord Meyer, who at times played suggestive roles in Figueres's activities, with the latter's knowledge.
  13. On statistical evidence that Costa Rica is not "a land of farmers" but in fact a country where land redistribution is extremely skewed, see "Behind the Myth of Rural Equality," *Latin American Weekly Report*, WR-83-38, 30 September 1983, pp. 10-11. For President Luis Alberto Monge's comments on the difficulties of a perpetual Costa Rican neutrality, see "Nous méritons d'être aidés autant sinon plus que le Nicaragua," *Le Monde*, 22 May 1984, p. 5. The crisis of the Figueres's model for Costa Rica is appraised in Marc Edelman, "Costa Rica: Seesaw Democracy," *NACLA Report on the Americas* 17, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1983):40-43.
  14. In May 1958, Gregorio Selser, representing the major organization of university students in Buenos Aires, queried Vice President Richard Nixon about U.S. participation in the 1954 overthrow of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz. Nixon, who was attending the presidential inauguration of Arturo Frondizi, responded in the negative and

- emphasized the "Communist conspiracy" theme. His words were translated into Spanish by Colonel Vernon Walters, a key Nixon aide on the occasion (see note 4). Selser's *El guatemalazo: la primera guerra sucia* (Buenos Aires: Iguazú, 1961) substantiated the extent of U.S. participation in Guatemalan affairs.
15. For the differences between Sandino and the Salvadoran Communist Agustín Farabundo Martí, for instance, see Neill Macaulay, *The Sandino Affair* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), especially pp. 160 and 226.
  16. Among the books Selser utilized are Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966; originally published in 1926); Charles D. Kepner, Jr., and Jay H. Southill, *Banana Empire: A Case Study of Economic Imperialism* (New York: Russell, 1967; originally published in 1935); George Seldes, *One Thousand Americans* (New York: Boni & Gaer, 1948); William Krehm, *Democracia y tiranías en el Caribe* (Mexico: Unión Democrática Centroamericana, 1951); John Kenneth Turner, *Shall It Be Again?* (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1922); and Carleton Beals, *America South* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1937).