

SOLIDARITY FOREVER?

Latin American Unions and the International Labor Network

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AIFLD IN CENTRAL AMERICA: AGENTS AS ORGANIZERS. By TOM BARRY and DEB PREUSCH. (Albuquerque, N.M.: The Resource Center, 1986. Pp. 76. \$5.00 paper.)

TUNNEL VISION: LABOR, THE WORLD ECONOMY, AND CENTRAL AMERICA. By DANIEL CANTOR and JULIET SCHOR. Policy Alternatives for the Caribbean and Central America (PACCA) Series on the Domestic Roots of United States Foreign Policy. (Boston, Mass., South End Press, 1987. Pp. 87. \$5.00 paper.)

U.S. LABOR AND LATIN AMERICA: VOLUME 1, 1846–1919. By PHILIP S. FONER. South Hadley, Mass.: Bergin and Garvey, 1988. Pp. 228. \$36.95.)

REFRESHING PAUSES: COCA-COLA AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA. By HENRY J. FRUNDT. (New York: Praeger, 1987. Pp. 267. \$34.95.)

HARD LABOUR, SOFT DRINK: GUATEMALAN WORKERS TAKE ON COCA-COLA. By MIKE GATEHOUSE and MIGUEL ANGEL REYES. (London: Latin America Books, 1987. Pp. 40. \$4.00 paper.)

THE AFL-CIO IN CENTRAL AMERICA: A LOOK AT THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR FREE LABOR DEVELOPMENT (AIFLD). By AL WEINRUB and WILLIAM BOLLINGER. (Oakland, Calif.: Labor Network on Central America, 1987. Pp. 41. \$3.50 paper.)

In the late 1960s, scholars first turned their attention to U.S. labor foreign policy in Latin America and the related theme of international working-class solidarity. The initial burst of studies evolved from a new historiography that sought to examine the nuts and bolts of the “empire.” Revisionist historians like William Appleman Williams often inspired this work, as did progressive research groups that had grown up outside the university and were consciously seeking to reach a broad audience.¹ During the 1970s, a smattering of scholarly studies probed labor foreign policy, and writings in a more popular and often partisan vein examined outside influences on Latin American labor movements and links between labor and U.S. government agencies.²

In the 1980s, the question of U.S. labor foreign policy has come again to the fore, this time sparked by the national debate in the United States about Central America. The works reviewed here examine diverse aspects of relations between Latin American labor and the outside world. With the exception of Philip Foner's historical work, the titles under review focus on contemporary issues and more specifically on Central America. Not one of the authors defends the status quo, and all of them foresee significant changes looming on the horizon as more workers north and south become aware of the issues at hand.

Tom Barry's and Deb Preusch's *AIFLD in Central America: Agents as Organizers* covers the same general topic as *The AFL-CIO in Central America: A Look at the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD)*, by Al Weinrub and William Bollinger. The considerable common ground in these two short works leaves the reader with the impression that a lot of cross-fertilization took place between the two projects. Weinrub and Bollinger begin with a short historical overview of first AFL and then AFL-CIO foreign policy, which culminated in 1962 with the founding of the Federation's main Latin American policy arm, the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD). Weinrub and Bollinger look at AIFLD's social projects, training programs, and agrarian efforts, briefly touching on AIFLD's involvement in or support for right-wing coups in Brazil (1964), the Dominican Republic⁶ (1965), and Chile (1973). The authors demonstrate that the institute's funding comes primarily from USAID rather than from labor sources. Two chapters focus on AIFLD in El Salvador and Nicaragua while another sketches AIFLD attempts to shore up its position at home in the face of rising opposition to its Central American policies. Two short appendices touch on labor and AIFLD's role in Guatemala and Honduras.

Weinrub and Bollinger provide a critical examination of AFL-CIO foreign policy as currently formulated and carried out. The booklet is packed with information designed to give union activists grounds for questioning both the general Cold War assumptions behind that policy and its wisdom as applied in Central America. *The AFL-CIO in Central America* argues that AIFLD is more interested in generating support for U.S. policies in the region than it is in building a strong (much less, independent) union movement there. AIFLD's largest undertaking, the Salvadorean agrarian program, organizes *campesino* cooperatives that emphasize individual effort rather than militant union action, and AIFLD encourages export-oriented agriculture—sometimes to the detriment of production for the local market. According to critics such as Weinrub and Bollinger, this kind of program helps make foreign-debt payments to transnational bankers at the expense of local standards of living.

Weinrub and Bollinger claim that AIFLD has a record of creating

unions and federations that it supports only as long as they back its policies. In the space of a few years, it created and tried to destroy no less than three federations in El Salvador alone. AIFLD uses its substantial monetary and material resources to shore up or undermine a particular organization and has been openly accused of trying to bribe union officials and rig union elections. Weinrub and Bollinger conclude that AIFLD does not represent the true interests of workers but rather the interests of big business and the U.S. government.

Barry and Preusch's *AIFLD in Central America* also begins with a general overview of official U.S. labor foreign policy and its close involvement with government from the start. The authors examine the question of CIA involvement in the labor movement, and specifically in AIFLD. Like Weinrub and Bollinger, they conclude that the evidence points to considerable clandestine activity on the part of AIFLD over the years. Indeed, it is hard to read these two works and not arrive at similar conclusions.

AIFLD in Central America goes on to examine the organization's finances and programs, which clearly demonstrate strong government connections. The question arises: can an institute that is 95 percent government-funded really pursue an independent course or adequately represent the working class, which is so underrepresented in government? In narrating their account, Barry and Preusch (like Weinrub and Bollinger) profile key figures such as past and present AIFLD Executive Directors Serafino Romualdi and William Doherty, Jr. Barry and Preusch also include important statistical information on programs and finances taken mostly from official AIFLD, AFL-CIO, or government publications.³

One lengthy chapter examines programs in Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. This chapter tries to show how AIFLD has manipulated Central American labor for its own purposes by creating and destroying organizations at will. *AIFLD in Central America* firmly suggests that the institute is actually a formal arm of U.S. foreign policy rather than a labor organization helping Central American workers organize to improve their lives or exercise basic rights. In Nicaragua, for example, AIFLD supports an anti-Sandinista union representing less than 1 percent of the organized work force, a tiny minority that sides with forces sympathetic to the Contras. AIFLD officials claim nevertheless that this union's lack of following stems from Sandinista harassment, not from its unpopular political stands.

Barry and Preusch's last section is the most original in its detailing of the close connections between the AFL-CIO and the New Right. This chapter examines the roles of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), a heavy funder of AIFLD programs, and of the Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI, part of the AFL-CIO) in promoting a conserva-

tive and anticommunist agenda for labor. *AIFLD in Central America* charts interconnections among NED, AIFLD, Friends of the Democratic Center in Central America (PRODEMCA), FTUI, as well as other groups like the Committee for a Free World, Coalition for a Democratic Majority, Freedom House, the Hudson Institute, and similar organizations. Key members of most of these groups are individuals belonging to the Social Democrats USA and their associates who have heavy input into AFL-CIO foreign policy. This shadow party seems to exist purely to support Cold War policies abroad and, to a lesser degree, at home.

Despite the digging done by these two teams, much material remains unexamined because AIFLD does not make public the destination of all its funding nor does it reveal the details of many of its programs. The institute adamantly denies the allegations cited by Barry and Preusch. It rejects claims that AIFLD is not independently representing the best interests of American workers overseas and helping Latin American workers to build a "democratic center" against both the "totalitarian right and the totalitarian left."⁴ AIFLD claims that such a center is represented in El Salvador by the Duarte government, thus ignoring this regime's persistent anti-union stances and tolerance of wholesale repression of unions and labor activists. The studies by Barry and Preusch and Weinrub and Bollinger actually form part of a larger pamphlet war being waged for the past several years between AIFLD and its critics, ostensibly over the issue of trade-union freedoms in Nicaragua and El Salvador but really over the larger issue of which foreign policy best represents U.S. workers and, therefore, everyone.⁵

Until about 1980, AIFLD kept a very low profile. Daniel Cantor and Juliet Schor, however, demonstrate that this is no longer the case in *Tunnel Vision: Labor, the World Economy, and Latin America*. At the last two AFL-CIO conventions (in Anaheim in 1985 and Miami in 1987), the issue of foreign policy spilled out on the convention floor, centering around Central America and focusing on the question of support for the Contras. Not even at the height of the Vietnam conflict did a debate of this kind take place at a national AFL-CIO convention. The ninety-minute exchange in October 1985 marked the first open discussion of foreign-policy issues and one of the only times that floor pressure has forced the top labor bureaucracy to compromise on a formal resolution. Speaker after speaker strode to the microphone and, often in wrenching personal testimony by those who had visited Central America, contradicted the official version of labor conditions in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Suddenly, an era had passed: no longer would foreign policy be the exclusive preserve of the AFL-CIO Department of International Affairs (DIA). By the time union members convened in Miami in the summer of 1987, unions representing over 50 percent of AFL-CIO mem-

bership had expressed disagreement with the federation's Central American policy. Although the Miami convention produced no outright victory for the dissidents, once again they forced a compromise.⁶

Tunnel Vision is both a product of these changed circumstances and a means for continuing change. Cantor and Schor first depict the contemporary crisis confronting U.S. workers by citing falling rates of unionization, anti-union drives, declining real incomes, rising real unemployment (versus official claims), low-paying jobs, and general deterioration in the quality of life. They then link these conditions to structural changes in the world economy such as capital flight, slowing U.S. economic growth, and increasing international competition. Cantor and Schor argue that all these conditions are a logical outcome of the world economic system built after World War II, which they call Wall Street internationalism. This system was founded on the principles of free trade, mobility of capital and profits, and free exchange of foreign currencies. According to the authors, the social accord that sets the rules between management and labor reflects the domestic side of Wall Street internationalism. In exchange for economic gains, workers give up any right to decisions on producing, pricing, and investment. Labor also promises not to challenge the basic system. Cantor and Schor argue that although workers benefited in material terms during the economic expansion after 1945, the system is no longer working.

One of the underlying ideological underpinnings for Wall Street internationalism is anticommunism. At home, it is used to purge progressives and keep the accord working. Abroad, anticommunism undergirds labor's role in helping tame the opposition and maintain Wall Street internationalism. This approach led U.S. labor organizations to work with agencies like the CIA to undermine leftist unions in postwar Europe and to split a briefly united world labor movement (the World Federation Trade Union) by forming the pro-capitalist, anti-leftist International Federation of Free Trade Unions. In Latin America, first the Organización Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores and, after the Cuban revolution, AIFLD have carried out AFL-CIO foreign policy. Indeed, in 1985 the AFL-CIO spent more money overseas than at home (forty-one million dollars as compared with thirty-nine million).

By the 1980s, however, Wall Street internationalism was no longer providing workers with rising material benefits. Other economies had gained strength, but while capital went international, U.S. labor remained national. As a result, U.S.-based multinational companies maintained their global share of production and trade, but the domestic economy lost ground. Capital flight cost jobs and income and led U.S. companies to force wages down to meet the foreign competition, often from U.S. investment abroad. Further, under programs set

up by the International Monetary Fund, other countries have increased exports to the United States while severely cutting U.S. imports, thus placing increased pressure on the national economy.

As a result, Cantor and Schor maintain, labor must now develop new strategies that should include a revamped foreign policy, the point at which Central America comes in. The region could become another Vietnam where thousands of working-class young men would die. Such a development would cost billions of dollars, distort spending priorities, and force domestic budget cuts, which hit the working class particularly hard. Further, Central America represents a perfect example of U.S. support for anti-labor regimes. Such governments may help create safe investment climates for multinationals, but runaway shops make the situation ever more precarious for U.S. workers. Finally, labor has a long tradition of international solidarity, which should require labor to support Central American workers who toil under the worst of conditions. Solidarity, the morally correct position, forms an integral part of global labor strategy. Furthermore, the support of the far right committed to anti-unionism at home (such as Senator Orrin Hatch and the Coors family) for current official U.S. labor foreign policy and AIFLD's actions underscores the argument that labor should oppose such policy and actions.

In *Tunnel Vision*, Cantor and Schor call for a reexamination of AFL-CIO foreign policy. They question the "for us or agin' us" labels of the AFL-CIO Department of International Affairs in Nicaragua and El Salvador, correctly pointing out that foreign workers may have legitimate reasons for not supporting "free market" capitalism or U.S.-backed regimes. Such positions do not automatically make unions "communist" and therefore enemies. Cantor and Schor propose that union rank and file, rather than the DIA, should set the terms of the foreign-policy debate. Proposed guidelines for a new approach include respect for the right to self-determination of workers in other countries, greater labor participation in decisions on economic development (including capital flows), a reorientation of domestic priorities by lessening the myth of foreign competition, and accountability by institutions such as AIFLD.

Tunnel Vision should achieve considerable impact within the labor movement. Schor, an economist teaching at Harvard University, and Cantor, a labor activist who has worked for the National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, combine his knowledge of economics with her inside view of the labor movement. One happy result is that the text contains few fancy economic or sociological terms and explains concepts that may be unfamiliar to most readers. Although tinged in places by a certain anti-Soviet-

ism (the motto seems to be “A plague on both your bureaucracies”) and apparently accepting of the liberal reformist vision of U.S. society in which capital and labor can happily share the wealth, this book nonetheless asks key questions and lays the groundwork for future debate within the house of labor. Predictably, the AFL-CIO hierarchy has not reacted favorably to *Tunnel Vision*. A recent AFL-CIO review accused Schor and Cantor of being “far left” and their approach of “paving the way for dictatorships of the left.”⁷

While Cantor and Schor focus on growing opposition to AFL-CIO policy toward Central America, other analysts in this group remind readers that dissent on foreign-policy issues has a long past. Prolific historian Philip Foner documents the varied currents that moderated the first foreign-policy debates within the ranks of labor from the Mexican War to 1919. *U.S. Labor and Latin America* establishes that workers opposed such policies and events as the Mexican War, continuous Central American intervention, post-1898 expansionism, and the occupation of Cuba. Labor also became involved during the Wilson administration’s strange dance with the Mexican Revolution, which eventually resulted in violations of Mexican sovereignty by U.S. troops, first at Veracruz and then in Pershing’s 1916 “punitive expedition.”

Labor disagreements with government policy took distinct forms. Some militants argued for class solidarity above allegiance to one nation and viewed expansionist wars as capitalist ventures for which the working class provided cannon fodder. Others objected to U.S. attempts to impose its will upon sovereign peoples like those in Cuba, Panama, and Nicaragua. In the Mexican War, Irish working-class Catholics (many of whom joined the U.S. Army because they could find no work) sympathized nonetheless with Catholic Mexico. A number actually fought with the Mexican Army. The center of opposition, however, came from those opposing slavery (many from the working class), who saw the war as an attempt to extend slavery to the south and west.

But not all workers or their organizations disapproved of U.S. actions. Unions justified Manifest Destiny abroad as good for workers because increased trade created jobs at home. After the Spanish-Cuban-American War, the AFL and the Railroad Brotherhoods came to support U.S. expansionism as represented by the Open Door policy. Although the AFL at times questioned the wisdom of annexing Cuba or the Philippines, once Puerto Rico became (sort of) a part of the United States, the AFL proceeded to organize there along narrow craft lines just as it had in the United States. In the case of Puerto Rico, Foner points out that U.S. unions like the masons tried to exclude their darker brothers from the Caribbean. He also produces more evidence that Santiago Iglesias did not single-handedly organize Puerto Rican (or Caribbean)

labor during these years. Many U.S. unions backed the new imperialism for selfish reasons: typographers reasoned that Filipino and Puerto Rican children would need English textbooks in the process of assimilating; railroad unions demanded that U.S. workers build any Central American canal; and many craft unions believed that the "Big Navy" translated into more employment for their members.

Disagreements between government and labor clearly existed, however. Even Samuel Gompers, the conservative head of the AFL, protested the use of force against strikes in occupied Cuba and the jailing of his organizers in Puerto Rico (although he did not object to jailing organizers of the International Workers of the World at home). By the early 1900s, a clear understanding had emerged between the labor bureaucracy and business that was symbolized by the National Civic Foundation, which was designed to ameliorate conflict between employers and workers within the existing capitalist economy. During the presidency of Teddy Roosevelt, Gompers first gained access to the White House, and subsequent administrations viewed the AFL as a real or potential asset in executing U.S. foreign policy. In return, AFL leaders pushed the idea that capitalist expansion benefited U.S. workers and therefore deserved their support. A corollary view held that all radical organizations in general, and the IWW in particular, were to be combated at home and abroad. *

Professor Foner carries on a lively debate with traditional historiography in his copious citations and endnotes. He repeatedly demonstrates that mainstream historians have virtually ignored labor history and working-class struggles. Others have fostered the national myth by assuming unanimous support for foreign policies that were actually challenged by important segments of the working class through representative organizations.

U.S. Labor and Latin America is based on extensive research in the United States and abroad. It neglects a couple of episodes, however. For example, a U.S. railroad worker helped found the first railroad unions in Chile and Argentina. The Argentine union, La Fraternidad, even took its name from a U.S. counterpart. Foner's study does display a measure of objectivity. For example, he defends Gompers's actions in specific instances and openly disagrees with those who would characterize his role as totally negative. Yet despite Foner's caveats, the reader cannot help wondering how effective or widespread the working-class anti-imperialist movement really was. Evidence plainly exists in the form of petitions and newspaper articles, rallies, and demonstrations, but how many people actually participated in protests? Were editorials the work of one writer, or did they represent the dominant voice in a union or trade? Despite these minor points, *U.S. Labor and Latin America* represents a valuable contribution to both U.S. and Latin American la-

bor and working-class history. Scholars should look forward to a second volume covering the period from 1919 to present.

Two works in this group analyze the ten-year struggle from 1976 to 1985 by workers at the Coca-Cola bottling plant in Guatemala City: *Refreshing Pauses: Coca-Cola and Human Rights in Guatemala* by Henry Frundt and *Hard Labour, Soft Drink: Guatemalan Workers Take on Coca-Cola* by Mike Gatehouse and Miguel Angel Reyes (writing for Latin America Books). Both studies detail workers' efforts to win recognition for their union, STEGAC (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Embotelladora Guatemalteca, Anexos y Conexos), and to obtain a fair labor contract. What makes this case so special is not only the workers' tenacious struggle against the company, security forces, a legal system designed to defend capital, and the Guatemalan government but also the fact that, despite the odds, they achieved many of their goals. One key to their success was the reluctant agreement of the Atlanta-based parent company, one of the world's largest multinationals, to become part of the ongoing conflict. Coke eventually participated because shareholders—represented by several religious groups with important support from the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR)—as well as international organizations like the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF, the international with which STEGAC affiliated) together waged a stubborn and principled global campaign against Coca-Cola.

This contest marked the first time that Coke bargained, albeit indirectly, with an international union and one of the few times that pressure orchestrated by an international-trade secretariat succeeded in obtaining redress of workers' grievances at the local level. Although Coca-Cola went to great lengths to avoid direct negotiation, it ultimately had little choice. Work stoppages and boycotts by IUF affiliates combined with embarrassing resolutions and testimony from participants at annual shareholder meetings to eventually force the company's hand.

The real heroes of the story are the STEGAC members, who stood at the barricades throughout the fray, many times literally. One cannot help but admire the way they steadfastly clung together through threats and repression. As Gatehouse, Reyes, and Frundt detail (sometimes graphically), three general secretaries of the union were assassinated, and so were other union members. Moreover, union members and their families were threatened, arrested, kidnapped, beaten, tortured, "disappeared," shot, or forced into exile. These events actually formed only a part of the larger picture in which successive military governments declared open war on unions and organizers via security forces (nearly all U.S.-trained and U.S.-armed) and death squads. The latter usually traveled in unmarked cars but sometimes rode openly in

government vehicles. Coke workers suffered, but so did workers from other urban and rural unions in this all-out attempt to crush organized resistance.

In addition to their heroism, the Guatemalan workers showed a remarkable ability to learn from experience and to develop new tactics when faced with changing circumstances. They decentralized the union when repression threatened and twice mounted lengthy factory occupations that ultimately succeeded. Even so, the workers' actions in response to company and government duplicity might not have succeeded without the international support network that formed to bolster their cause. The direct and indirect pressure mounted by shareholders, Amnesty International, and the IUF on Coca-Cola Atlanta proved decisive in stimulating negotiations and in inducing the company to pressure its Guatemalan bottler or the government. Further, the eighty thousand dollars provided from abroad gave Guatemalan workers vital funds after their own resources ran out.

How did this pressure work against a multinational giant that, during most of the period, was enjoying intimate connections at the Carter White House? The answer at the crudest level is that such pressure threatened the bottom line. As a seller in a highly competitive market, Coca-Cola proved vulnerable when its image could be publicly questioned or tarnished. A strike at a far-off bottling plant did not ordinarily worry management, but a Guatemalan employee announcing on the floor of the company's annual meeting that in his country "murder is called Coca-Cola" proved quite another matter. Protests by IUF members in Europe, Australia, and the United States could be ignored, but product boycotts, refusal to deliver or sell Coke, prohibitions against vending machines in company cafeterias, and (perhaps worst of all) alterations of advertising to show red blood running out of Coke bottles called for countermeasures. In all, about half of the IUF's affiliates responded favorably to its appeals, while locals in more than twenty countries either took action or threatened to do so before Coke helped resolve the matter by pressuring for union recognition and a negotiated contract.

Coca-Cola always moved slowly. At first, it stonewalled the matter by claiming that it had no jurisdiction over local bottlers, a line it maintained to the very end. The company slowly acknowledged that a problem might exist but did its utmost to play the situation down. Throughout negotiations with the IUF or with shareholders, the company systematically denied proven facts and carried out an extensive global disinformation campaign. In this effort, Coke's ability to disseminate information quickly gave the company an advantage over the IUF, which could not react as quickly.

Fruendt's *Refreshing Pauses* reveals the clout that Coca-Cola could

muster at the local level with both the U.S. embassy and the Guatemalan government, although Coke clearly could not control either one. In fact, Coke's identity as a foreign corporation aroused nationalist suspicions. Determined opposition by local bottlers, one an American citizen and another a Mexican, gave the company considerable pause, particularly when bottlers had important connections inside the local government or institutions like the army. But when push came to shove, Coke obviously maintained a greater degree of control over its bottlers than it admitted in public. The huge size of the company evidently prevented swifter action, as did the failure to have or develop a comprehensive policy on labor relations in contracts with bottlers. Finally, although certain Coke executives demonstrated humanitarian concerns, company policy did not.

The actors who played the major role in prodding the parent company and keeping the issue alive were U.S. shareholders and a U.S. religious organization, the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR). Delegations traveled to Guatemala to verify company claims and to provide direct support for STEGAC workers. U.S. unions, in contrast, played a lesser role, although at least three of them backed the initial 1982 boycott. During the 1984 campaign, the United Food and Commercial Workers came forward with support. Surprisingly (or perhaps not), the AFL-CIO did little more than proclaim its solidarity, and AIFLD, despite an extensive Guatemalan program, seems to have done nothing.

Professor Frundt served as agribusiness consultant for the ICCR and thus gained access to prime materials. In addition, he conducted extensive interviews with STEGAC members, the lawyers involved, Guatemalan government officials, and representatives of Coca-Cola, the IUF, and shareholder groups. Although Frundt clearly sympathizes with the workers, he goes beyond defending their actions to present the perspectives of the company and local franchisees. Frequent use of anecdotal material gives the reader the sense of following an enthralling serial movie. Will the army or security forces crush the movement? Will the Guatemalan courts rule for or against the union? Will the death squads find a certain union leader, or will he continue to elude them? Will Coke relent and push local management to bargain before the strikers starve?

Frundt narrates the story from the first strike and occupation of 1976 to the settlement of 1980 through the second occupation of 1984 and the plant's reopening in March 1985. Gatehouse and Reyes's short study, *Hard Labour, Soft Drink*, includes some material not found in Frundt's account and concentrates more on the solidarity aspects of the struggle than on its Guatemalan components. The study is nevertheless a concise summary that takes the story up through 1987. Indications at

that time and subsequent reports tend to concur that the agreements are holding and that the union (now called the Sindicato de Trabajadores de Embotelladora Central, S.A., or STECSA) is flourishing despite continued general repression against trade-union and peasant activists. *Hard Labour, Soft Drink* was also coauthored by a participant. Miguel Angel Reyes served as a legal advisor for the Confederación Nacional de Trabajadores (CNT), to which STEGAC belonged, and this version is based largely on his earlier study circulated in Spanish.⁸

These two works show how a new sense of international solidarity influenced the outcome of what began as a small strike by a group of workers in a Guatemalan Coca-Cola bottling plant. The authors document the vulnerability of companies like Coca-Cola to the power of an international campaign. Coke's traditional relationship with the churches (particularly the Methodist Church) no doubt enhanced the ability of religious groups to gain a hearing from a company interested in maintaining friendly relations and a good image. Frundt suggests that STEGAC's ability to survive and triumph resulted from its diffused leadership, democratic decision-making process, and ability to connect with a network of international solidarity. He also notes that support came from specific groups inside the churches, not from any church hierarchy as institutional policy. Also, the IUF's previous experiences in taking on Nestlé, W. R. Grace, and Unilever greatly aided the campaign. While these "unusual" factors may have brought victory, STEGAC's triumph undoubtedly represents a milestone in international labor solidarity, and perhaps a glimpse of a future when corporations will be held responsible for basic labor and human rights wherever their corporate logo appears. Frundt speculates on the possibilities for developing a multilayered coalition comprised of Latin American workers, U.S. and European unions, churches, and human-rights group. Such a coalition could work to curb the currently almost-unchecked corporate power in the area of human rights, including basic labor freedoms like the right to organize and to bargain collectively.

Together all these books represent a trend in labor studies that will undoubtedly grow. As the global economy expands, so will international labor solidarity.⁹ Further, this solidarity has a long history that needs to be told. We will see more writings of the kind reviewed here.

NOTES

1. See, for example, the path-breaking book by then liberal (but now Contra apologist) Ronald Radosh, *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1969); and Henry W. Berger, "Union Diplomacy: America's Labor Foreign Policy in Latin America, 1932-1955," Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966. Both of the foregoing works were completed under the direction of William Appleman Williams. Early empire studies would include Susanne Bodenheimer, "The AFL-CIO in Latin America: The Dominican Republic, A Case Study," *Viet Report*, no.

- 19 (Sept.–Oct. 1967):17–28; and Sidney Lens, “Labor and the CIA,” *The Progressive* 31, no. 4 (April 1969). Outstanding work among research groups is that of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) in its *Latin America and Empire Report*. An exception from the “old left” is George Morris, *CIA and American Labor: The Subversion of the AFL-CIO’s Foreign Policy* (New York: International Publishers, 1967).
2. Examples of more scholarly works include Jeffrey Harrod, *Trade Union Foreign Policy: A Study in British and American Trade Union Activities in Jamaica* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor-Doubleday, 1972); and Hobart A. Spalding, Jr., *Organized Labor in Latin America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), esp. chap. 6. On the more popular level, see Fred Hirsch, *An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO Role in Latin America* (San Jose, Calif.: Steamfitters, 1974), perhaps the first study made by a labor person; Philip Agee, *Inside the Company: CIA Diary* (Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1975); NACLA, “AIFLD Losing Its Grip” in *Argentina in the Hour of the Furnaces* (New York: NACLA, 1975), 56–76; or these articles from *Counterspy*: “CIA Target: Labor,” vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 1974):26–47; and “CIA Labor Operations in Latin America,” vol. 2, no. 2 (Winter 1975):30–59.
 3. For more on AIFLD, see Hobart A. Spalding, Jr., “U.S. Labour Intervention in Latin America: The Case of the American Institute for Free Labor Development,” in *Trade Unions and the New Industrialization of the Third World*, edited by Roger Southall (London, Ottawa, and Pittsburgh: Zed Press, Ottawa University Press, and University of Pittsburgh Press, 1988), 259–86. For very recent material, see “Unions Look South,” “AIFLD in Action,” and “AIFLD Amok,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 22, no. 3 (May–June 1988):14–27, 37–39.
 4. See Jack Haberle, “New Attack on AIFLD Rebutted,” *AIFLD Briefs*, 8 Oct. 1987.
 5. A sampling of publications would include National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, “El Salvador: Labor, Terror, and Peace” (New York: National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, 1983); William C. Doherty, Jr., “Nicaragua, A Revolution Betrayed: Free Labor Persecuted,” *Free Trade Union News* 39 (Mar. 1984):1–3, 8; “The Sandinistas and the Workers: The Betrayal Continues,” in *Sandinista Repression of Nicaraguan Trade Unions* (Washington, D.C.: AIFLD, 1985), 1–10; U.S. Labor Lawyers’ Delegation to Nicaragua, *Are Nicaragua’s Trade Unions Free?: A Response to the American Institute for Free Labor Development (AFL-CIO) Report, “Nicaragua, A Revolution Betrayed: Free Labor Persecuted”* (New York: National Lawyers Guild, 1985); AIFLD, *U.S. Labor’s Single Standard on Dictatorships* (Washington, D.C.: AIFLD, 1985); AIFLD, *Sandinista Deception Reaffirmed: Nicaragua Coverup on Trade Union Repression* (Washington, D.C.: AIFLD, 1985); James McCargar, *El Salvador and Nicaragua: The AFL-CIO View on the Controversy* (Washington, D.C.: AFL-CIO, 1985); and National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, *The Search for Peace in Central America* (New York: National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El Salvador, 1985). The latest pamphlets in the war include these items: Americas Watch, *Labor Rights in El Salvador* (New York: Americas Watch, 1988); the AFL-CIO and AIFLD response of 10 June 1988 entitled “A Critique of the Americas Watch Report on Labor Rights in El Salvador,” mimeo; and finally, the Americas Watch response, “Americas Watch Critique of AIFLD Critique on ‘Labor Rights in El Salvador,’” mimeo, 1988.
 6. For a good summary and update of the contemporary debate within the labor movement, see David Slaney, “Solidarity and Self-Interest,” *NACLA Report on the Americas* 22, no. 3 (May–June 1988):28–36, 39–40.
 7. See the unsigned review entitled “Foreign Policy: Differences or Distortions,” *The Bulletin of the Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO* 3, no. 4 (Apr. 1988):6–7.
 8. Miguel Angel Reyes, “La derrota de una transnacional: STECSA contra Coca Cola,” mimeo, Guatemala City, 1986.
 9. See, for example, Jane Slaughter, “Auto Workers Find Companies’ Drive for ‘Flexibility’ and ‘Teamwork’ Is International,” *Labor Notes*, no. 109 (Apr. 1988):7, 11. This article discusses a conference partly sponsored by Brazilian unions that brought together autoworkers from eleven countries. It notes that Brazilian autoworkers are linked to British unions by computer, making possible “instant” solidarity actions or communications. This network was used in a recent strike against British Ford.