insuring their passivity when he remilitarized the Rhineland—the precondition for his intended aggressions.

The thesis is persuasively argued and heavily documented, but the study is not flawless. Convoluted sentences make for neither speedy nor joyous reading. Better portrayals of key personalities are needed in a work that assumes history to be made by men rather than by impersonal forces. In a few cases, what appear as factual generalizations might better have been presented as reasonable conjectures (e.g., on pp. 314 and 318, where it is said that Hitler cared nothing about the welfare of the Sudeten Germans; or on pp. 221–23, 311–12, and 360, where we are told that the Soviet Union sought political accommodation with Hitler in the period 1934–36). On a larger matter, the difference in emphasis between title and subtitle, the organization of the material, and the allocation of space seem to reflect a certain ambivalence of purpose. In any case, the interpretive emphasis on Hitler's will is blurred to some extent by the organizational emphasis on other countries, whose diplomatic relations with Germany are treated one by one in an overly mechanical pattern. Granting this pattern, we still need more details on Japan's actions in Asia and on British and French efforts for peaceful collective security—factors independent of Hitler's will that helped make his successes possible. Less might well have been said (though Weinberg says it well) about German relations with the United States and China, which were of minor importance in Hitler's policies.

The fact remains that Weinberg has written the most definitive account of his subject that we have or are likely to have for many years. His second volume will round out a major contribution to historical scholarship.

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AMERICAN IMAGES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY: AN INQUIRY INTO RECENT APPRAISALS FROM THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY. By *William Welch.* New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970. xiii, 316 pp. $10.00.

SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE, 1945–1970. By *Thomas W. Wolfe.* A RAND Corporation Research Study. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970. x, 534 pp. $15.00, cloth. $3.95, paper.

THE PRESS AND THE COLD WAR. By *James Aronson.* Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970. 308 pp. $8.00.

William Welch's first-rate methodological treatise on the study of Soviet foreign policy consists of three parts and an epilogue. In the first he lays the basis for his analysis; in the second he evaluates the state of the discipline; in the third he proposes ways to improve it; and in the epilogue he suggests how conflicting views may be reconciled. Of central importance to Welch's analysis is a proposed scheme for classifying images of Soviet policy according to two variables: constancy (how much does policy change?) and hardness (how hard is it?). The latter is an aggregate variable consisting of nine dimensions: (1) expansionism of ends, (2) expansiveness of means, (3) militancy, (4) militariness, (5) immorality, (6) addiction to the initiative, (7) offensiveness of motive, (8) malignancy of impact, and (9) hardness toward own. With this scheme he classifies twenty-two leading books by American academics on Soviet foreign policy as conforming to one of three major images: Ultra-Hard, Hard, or Mixed.

By these books Welch judges the state of the discipline. In particular, nine works—by Gehlen, Goodman, Halle, Kennan, Schuman, Shulman, Strausz-Hupé, Tucker, and Bertram Wolfe—are systematically criticized, and detailed attention is given to a major proposition of each. Among the tenets examined are these: the Soviet aim is to achieve a Russian-dominated world state (Goodman), totalitarianism is the key to Soviet conduct (Wolfe), the shift toward "peaceful coexistence" dates from 1949 (Shulman), and in recent years Soviet risk-taking is low (Gehlen). Welch concludes that the least satisfactory image of Soviet foreign policy is the Ultra-Hard image and that American scholarship on Soviet foreign policy is, on the whole, deficient.

Welch's proposals for improving the discipline amount to a plea for the empirical method—the rigorous definition and application of general concepts to particular data. He shows how empirical research might be carried out on the various dimensions of hardness, and he provides an example of research on the dimension of immorality (through an analysis of violations and nonviolations of Soviet pledges). In the epilogue he asserts that greater efforts to control bias in research are the best hope for fashioning a firmly grounded and widely accepted body of knowledge.

Stylistic and typographical shortcomings aside, the book is distinguished by rigorous analysis, fair evaluation, and cogent argumentation. Suitable for use in courses on Soviet and comparative foreign policy, it is obligatory reading for scholars in the field.

Thomas Wolfe's study of Soviet policy toward both halves of a divided postwar Europe is arranged chronologically in three parts: the postwar Stalin period (60 pp.), the Khrushchev era (160 pp.), and the Brezhnev-Kosygin period's first half-decade (278 pp.). Seven of the eighteen chapters describe Soviet political policy toward Europe, six concern themselves with Soviet military policy and posture, four are introductions or summations, and one speculates on future Soviet political and military policy.

Wolfe's objective—to provide a balanced appraisal of policy—is admirably fulfilled. His standpoint is that Soviet enlightened self-interest would be to favor "lasting accommodation with the ongoing world order over ambitious attempts to reconstruct it in accordance with outworn dogma." Aside from acerbic references to revisionist historians of the cold war and emotionally charged characterizations of the Soviet invasion ("rape") of Czechoslovakia, the book's overall tone is dispassionate. A main thesis is that Soviet political objectives toward Europe with respect to neutralization of Germany, blocking the further build-up of NATO defenses, and preventing potential defections from the Soviet bloc remain basically unchanged since Stalin's time. This "Hard" image of Soviet policy is amply documented from primary sources through careful weighing of alternative interpretations and contrary evidence.

The book's distinctive contribution is to emphasize the interplay between political and military aspects of Soviet policy. Despite its occasional digression from the European focus and despite its excessive minimization of factionalism and group decision-making under Khrushchev, the book is an impressive achievement. It should prove useful as a text in courses on Soviet foreign policy.

James Aronson's study of the American press and the cold war is seriously flawed by a one-sided presentation of evidence to substantiate propositions in need of qualification. In Aronson's view the press, rather than being a vigorous critic of government, has become a voluntary servant of established power—principally by propagating cold war anticommunism, which is a device of the master class to stifle opposition and to protect its corporate profits. Citing the Wallace campaign, the Hiss and Rosenberg cases, his own experiences as editor of the *National Guardian,* the McCarthy witch hunts, the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis, and the Korean and Vietnam wars, Aronson shows the press's involvement in the anti-Communist crusades of the cold war and demonstrates that the press is far from an unfettered governmental critic. All this, however, fails to sustain the larger point. Aronson's subject requires and deserves more careful treatment.

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OUR OWN PEOPLE: A MEMOIR OF "IGNACE REISS" AND HIS FRIENDS. By *Elisabeth K. Poretsky.* London: Oxford University Press, 1969. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970. x, 278 pp. $7.95.

THE CANARIS FILE. By *C. Amort* and *I. M. Jedlicka.* Translated from the Czech, with a preface, by *Roger Gheysens.* London and New York: Allan Wingate, 1970. 158 pp. £1.75.

The leading spokesman of the United Secretariat, Fourth International, wrote the following item: "Ignace Reiss (Ludwig), communiste polonais, héros de la guerre civile pendant la révolution russe; un des principaux dirigeants des services spéciaux de l'Union soviétique; en 1936, à la suite du premier [procès de Moscou], rompt avec le stalinisme, renvoie ses médailles en déclarant: 'Je rejoins Trotsky et la IV^e Internationale'; assassiné quelques semaines plus tard aux environs de Lausanne par le Guépéou" (Pierre Frank, *La quatrième internationale,* Paris, 1969, p. 128). This brief identification summarizes the career of a Soviet intelligence agent, born Ludwik Poretsky in a small Galician town near the Austro-Hungarian border. He joined the Polish Communist Party in 1919 but soon began operating throughout Western Europe. His widow has written the memoirs.

This is more than the life story of "Ignace Reiss," because Mrs. Poretsky herself visited Moscow during the early stages of the Great Purge. Her conversations with many friends, who expected arrest at any moment, show an empathy for the fatalism prevalent among persons who had dedicated their lives to communism only to be executed or disappear into a forced labor camp. The book is well annotated with descriptive footnotes and explanations of events that are otherwise difficult to understand.

If Poretsky-Reiss had remained in the Soviet intelligence service, he probably would have become a member of the "Red Orchestra" so well portrayed by Gilles Perrault in *L'orchestre rouge* (Paris, 1967, p. 576), which performed important espionage missions for the USSR in German-occupied Western Europe during the Second World War. Another group operated from neutral Switzerland, according to Alexander Foote (pseud.), *Handbook for Spies* (London, 1949, p. 190). And a third Soviet espionage ring existed in the Far East, headed by a German Communist (see Charles A. Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring,* New York, 1952, p. 315). Arrested by the Japanese and held more than three years in prison, Richard Sorge was executed on November 7, 1944, in Tokyo.