

Despite these above suggestions and criticisms, Sturch's book is a detailed defence of the Incarnation and a creative, intelligent, and enterprising endeavour to grasp, in faith, its mystery.

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**PAUL OF VENICE: LOGICA MAGNA PART I FASCICULE 8, G. ed. and trans., C.J.F. Williams, Oxford University Press, 1991. Pp xxx + 205. £20**

This is the seventh volume to appear in the edition of Paul of Venice's *Logica magna* sponsored by the British Academy, and comprises the final treatise, no. 23, of the first part of that work. The *Logica magna* was probably written around the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and is especially interesting because it provides a conspectus of the views of previous logicians, unfortunately for historians unacknowledged, across the full range of topics treated in medieval logic.

The question with which treatise 23 is concerned is 'whether some future being will come about or be produced of necessity'. 'Necessity' is ambiguous. A modern philosopher thinks first of logical necessity; in this sense, to suppose that a necessary being did not exist would be self-contradictory. Like most medieval philosophers, Paul is not concerned with this, but with the Aristotelian sense in which a being which cannot cease to exist is necessary. This is closer to the modern notion of causal necessity. Another kind of necessity which plays a part in Paul's arguments is the necessity which attaches to the past, because it is now unalterable.

The future being which Paul has in mind is the soul of Antichrist, and the reason why this is a plausible candidate is that an intelligent soul could not, in the medieval view, cease to exist. As Professor Williams points out, any intelligent soul fulfils this condition, so why choose Antichrist? The reason, he suggests, is that there is scriptural authority for the belief that Antichrist will indeed come to be, thus guaranteeing the future existence of his soul. This example does not promise much of general logical and philosophical interest, but in fact some of the thirty arguments which Paul deploys raise issues which still engage philosophers, even though others are only of historical interest today.

Professor Williams contributes a useful introduction in which he details some of the topics which are of abiding interest: scope distinctions, definite descriptions, beginning and ceasing, past and future, theological determinism. Among scope distinctions the most famous in medieval philosophy is that between a proposition taken *sensu composito* and taken *sensu diviso*, to which, indeed, Paul devotes Treatise 21. This is illustrated by the schemas 'necessarily, if  $p$  then  $q$ ' and 'if  $p$  then necessarily  $q$ ' respectively; but the latter is ambiguous because it can be taken as equivalent to the first. 'Definite description' is

Russell's term for expressions beginning with the definite article, in the sense 'the one and only', qualifying a count noun or count noun phrase, e.g. 'the creator of this soul'.

An interesting side-issue to which Professor Williams draws attention is that Paul holds *birth*, and not conception, to be the beginning of human existence, even to the extent that a man is individuated by the time at which he is born, so that a foetus born at one time would be a *different man* had it been born earlier or later. Williams speculates that this view may be due to the influence of astrology. However that may be, since Paul was writing a book on logic and not on ethics, it seems unlikely that he would have introduced, as something which might be taken for granted, a view which would have been morally controversial at the time.

The translation is, so far as I can judge, very competent, though everyone working in this field is going to have his own preferences for the translation of certain terms. I myself prefer 'was' to 'has been' for *fuit*, though the absence of a distinction between simple past and present perfective forms in Latin leaves the translation open between them, and sometimes the latter is required, as Williams points out in note 47. The end-notes help to elucidate difficult passages and Williams's recourse to modern modal and tense logic is helpful.

The production of this volume does not attain the standards which one would expect from Oxford University Press. It has been printed directly from a typescript with small type and large spaces, giving an unattractive page. There are many typing errors, though most are admittedly small and obvious. This might be excusable had the book been produced very quickly, but there is a gap of over two years between the date of the Introduction and that of publication. We cannot tell whether the blame is to be laid at the door of the publisher or of the British Academy's editor, who remains anonymous. But even in 1988 desk-top publishing facilities were available which could have produced much better copy.

It is also impossible to tell whether certain features are due to the translator's decision or to editorial policy. Thus there are constant cross-references in the notes to other volumes in the series, sometimes for information which is vital for understanding the present text, e.g. the meaning of the term 'primary signification'. Even where terms and distinctions are explained in the notes, it would be preferable, if they occur frequently, to have a glossary, which could indicate editorial policy. Is the translation of officians as 'functionalizer' an editorial matter, for example, and what is the justification for this *prima facie* anachronous choice?

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