

equatorial island also associated with the earthly Paradise). He has some fascinating suggestions about education, and advocates common ownership of everything, and a rigorously eugenic supervision of

people's sexual activities. Campanella certainly deserve his place among the radical social thinkers of the Renaissance period.

SIMON TUGWELL O P

COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS, VOLUME III by G E M Anscombe. *Basil Blackwell, 1981. pp ix + 161. £12.00.*

This third volume of the much to be appreciated *Collected Philosophical Papers* of Elizabeth Anscombe is devoted to writings on Ethics, Religion and Politics, though there are only two papers on religious matters properly so called: a CTS pamphlet 'On Transubstantiation' and a hitherto unpublished lecture on faith, which is primarily concerned with the question of what might be involved in believing God.

The most famous paper in the collection is probably 'Modern Moral Philosophy', a mile-stone of ethical inquiry in which Anscombe (to my mind most effectively) argued (a) 'that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy'; (b) 'that the concepts of obligation, and duty – *moral* obligation and *moral* duty, that is to say – and of what is *morally* right and wrong, and of the *moral* sense of "ought", ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible'; and (c) 'that the difference between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance' (p 26). Some moral philosophers have learned from these theses. A large number, alas, have not.

The other papers are less well known, but all of them are worth reading, especially, as it seems to me, 'On Frustration of the Majority by the Fulfilment of the Majority's Will' (pp 123-129), which is something of a *tour de force* the upshot of which should be put on the BBC News. We all believe in democracy, do we not? But what are its implications when it comes to decisions based on the expressed will of

individuals? As Anscombe shows: 'the majority may be satisfied on every issue, while nevertheless the majority is frustrated over a majority of issues' (p 129). More precisely: 'There is thus the possibility of a certain technique of tyranny whose every measure has the support and is truly in accord with the desire of the majority, those whom any given measure hurts being in the minority; or again, one by one "merely sectional interests" are damaged. Since everyone not wretchedly isolated belongs to several "sections", it will be possible for the tyrant to damage the interests of anyone or any group (that does not support him, say) while truthfully claiming "democratic" support for his measures. Or again, the process of damage to sectional interests – that is, to a majority of the population – may occur in a democracy in a haphazard fashion and without design, always in accordance with the will of the majority' (p 129). These points are obvious when one comes to think about things properly. But one needs someone like Anscombe to prod one into doing so.

It is worth pointing out that the volume contains a misleading foot-note. At the bottom of page 117 the reader is led to believe that the second volume of Anscombe's *Collected Papers* contains her essay 'What is it to believe someone?' But that is not so. The essay can, however be found in C F Delaney (ed.), *Rationality and Religious Belief* (Notre Dame and London, 1979).

BRIAN DAVIES O P