

Confessions of an Existentialist: Reading Augustine After Heidegger, Part II

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Reading Augustine “after Heidegger” in a two-fold sense, in Part I we considered the ek-static or transcendent character of the self in Augustine’s *Confessions*. There we argued that it is a structural characteristic of the self to seek its own happiness, but that search can take different directions, either finding its joy in the world instead of God (C 10.23.34), or the “authentic happy life” which finds its happiness in the *fruitio Dei* (10.22.32). Here in Part II we turn to an analysis of these different directions of the self: first, to the inauthentic, fallen self who enjoys the world (§§ 4–5), and then the authentic self who constitutes the world differently (§§ 6–7).

B. *Fall*: The Inauthentic Self

§ 4. Augustine’s Phenomenology of Sin: The Fall as Intentional

a) Defining Sin: The *Uti/Frui* Distinction

The inauthentic self is precisely the fallen self, the self alienated from itself by “sin”; but sin, for Augustine, is *intentional* in the sense that it is a “how”, not a “what”. It is not a question of *substantia*, but rather of the will’s *intentio*, the way in which it constitutes its “world”. “I inquired what wickedness is”, he recalls, “and I did not find a substance but a perversity of will twisted away from the highest substance, you O God, towards inferior things” (C 7.16.22). Things—the world—are not inherently evil or sinful because, as created, they must be good (Gen. 1:31); what is sinful is the self’s *relation* to the world, the way in which one directs or comports oneself toward them.¹ Sin, then, is not a matter of structure or essence, but rather of direction or aim. What Augustine offers is not an ontology but rather a phenomenology of sin.

What is the criterion, then, for determining a ‘sinful’ relation to the world? What is it that makes the self’s *intentio* inauthentic? As noted

above, the authentic self finds its meaning in the enjoyment of God (*fruitio Dei*); the inauthentic self, then, finds its happiness and enjoyment elsewhere, viz., in the world God has created. Here we hit upon a fundamental Augustinian² distinction between “enjoyment” (*frui*) and “use” (*uti*), unpacked most systematically in *De doctrina christiana*, Book I. There, Augustine provides a schematic analysis of the relationship between “things” (*res*) and “signs” (*signa*), since “all teaching is either about things or signs”: *things*, strictly speaking, “are those that are not mentioned in order to signify something”, but rather are ends in themselves (though some things also function as signs).³ *Signs*, then, are those things “which are used in order to signify something else. Thus every sign is also a thing, because if it is not a thing at all then it is simply nothing. But not every single thing is also a sign” (DC 1.2.2).⁴

Things, however, can be further distinguished, between those things “which are meant to be enjoyed [*fruendum*]” and others “which are meant to be used [*utendum*]” (DC 1.3.3). Things which are enjoyed make us happy, while things used “help us on our way to happiness.” However, the self plays a pivotal role in the determination or *constitution* of things as enjoyed or used:

We ourselves, however, both enjoy and use things, and find ourselves in the middle, in a position to *choose* which to do. So if we wish to enjoy things that are meant to be used, we are impeding our own progress, and sometimes are also deflected from our course, because we are thereby delayed in obtaining what we should be enjoying, or turned back from it altogether, blocked by our love for inferior things (DC 1.3.3, emphasis added).

While a certain ‘design’ inheres in things as the imprint of their Creator, it is fundamentally the human self which ‘constitutes’ things *as* either things to be used or enjoyed, ultimately by what we choose to *love*, since enjoyment “consists in clinging to something lovingly for its own sake” (DC 1.4.4). Thus, what we enjoy for its own sake, as an end in itself, is loved. However, there is a “right order of love” (DC 1.27.28) which ought to be observed: to enjoy things which ought to be used is to contravene this order. What, then, is to be enjoyed? “The things therefore that are to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, in fact the Trinity, one supreme thing, and one which is shared in common by all who enjoy it” (DC 1.5.5). To enjoy “the world,” then, represents a *misuse* or “abuse” (1.4.4), a substituting of the creature for the Creator (DC 1.12.12).

By describing this misuse as a substitution of the creature for the Creator, Augustine evokes a metaphor which sees enjoying the world as a kind of intentional *idolatry* (cp. Romans 1:18–20.) “Let it be clearly

understood,” Augustine earlier remarked, “that there could have been no error in religion had not the soul worshipped in place of its God either a soul or a body or some phantasm of its own” (VR 10.18). The “world,” that which is to be used, is intended to “refer” (DDC 1.4.4) or point the soul to that which is to be enjoyed, God. Thus, the world is to be constituted as a sign (both *signum* and *sacramentum*⁵) which points to the Creator as the origin of life and meaning for the self. Rather than becoming absorbed in the world and its pleasures (cp. C. 10.27.38–10.36.59), the self is to constitute the world as a sign:

When something that is loved, after all, is available to you, delight is also bound to accompany it; but if you *pass through this and refer it* to that end where you are to remain permanently, you are really using it, and are said by a figure of speech, and not in the proper sense of the word, to enjoy it. If, however, you cling to it and remain fixed in it, placing in it the end of all your joys, then you can be said really and truly to enjoy it. But this should not be done except with that Divine Trinity (DC 1.33.37, emphasis added)

The world, then, functioning as a sign, is to be constituted as an *icon* which deflects the intentional aim or “love” of the self to the Creator as that which is to be enjoyed. The fallen or sinful self, by enjoying the world rather than using it, constitutes the world as an *idol* which “absorbs” its love and concern, going against the “right order of love”.⁶ The first, authentic love is *caritas*; the second, idolatrous, inauthentic love is described as both *cupiditas* and *concupiscentia*:

What I mean by *charity* or love is any urge of the spirit to find joy in God for his own sake, and in oneself and one’s neighbour for God’s sake; by *cupidity* or greed [is intended] any impulse of the spirit to find joy in oneself and one’s neighbour, and in any kind of bodily thing at all, not for God’s sake (DC 3.10.16).

It is “not that the creature is not to be loved”, Augustine cautions, “but if that love is related to the creator it will no longer be covetousness but charity. It is only covetousness when the creature is loved on its own account. In this case it does not help you in your use of it, but corrupts you in your enjoyment of it”.⁷ To love the world is to plunge into idolatry, enjoying the world rather than using it; in contrast, to use the world as something which points beyond itself to the origin of meaning and the end of happiness, is at the same time to constitute the world as an icon which refers the intentional aim to the Creator.

In our existentialist reading of Augustine, it is important to appreciate the significance of one’s “love” in determining the meaning of

the self. For Augustine, the self is defined by the object of its love. What is at stake here is a certain ethics of self-constitution⁸: *who* I am is determined by *what* I love, how I relate myself to “the world”.

It is precisely at this distinction between *uti* and *frui* that Heidegger's *Destruktion* takes aim. Heidegger sees here an “axiology” (Ga 60 265,277), a rank ordering of values into classifications of higher and lower, based on the Neoplatonic notion of the highest good (*summum bonum*), the *beata vita*. Within this axiology, which grounds the distinction between use and enjoyment, God is perceived as *decus meum* [my glory—the concern here, following Luther, is with Augustine's *theologia gloriae*], described by Heidegger as “a Neoplatonic thought” (Ga 60 286). Indeed, the very notion of *fruitio Dei*, he argues, is the result of a “theoreticization” [*Theoretisierung*] of Christian experience in terms of a conceptual category which is “of Greek origin” going back to Plato (Ga 60 277).⁹ “Overall”, Heidegger remarks, “the explication of the experience of God in Augustine is specifically ‘Greek’ (in the sense that our philosophy is always already ‘Greek’)” (Ga 60 292).¹⁰ According to Heidegger, the adoption of this Greek axiology which privileges “rest” undermines Augustine's analysis of the struggle and trial (*tentatio*) of factual life (Ga 207–208)—a trial, Heidegger suggests, that is intrinsic to factual life itself (*ein Grundcharakter*).

While we would concede that Augustine's thought is at times entrapped by Neoplatonic categories, it seems that Heidegger's critique of the distinction between use and enjoyment is misguided here, in several respects: first, on a general level, the problem from Heidegger's standpoint is the fact that Neoplatonic categories are inadequate and inappropriate for the explication of the Christian experience of God. On this score, Augustine would be agreed; however, he would go on to point out the inadequacies of all conceptual frameworks for this task.¹¹ Augustine was simply employing the conceptual categories which were available to him at the time, explicating an experience which resisted and pushed the boundaries of those categories.¹²

Second, it must be conceded that a fundamental paradigm shift takes place in the movement from a purely Greek conception of emanation at work in Plotinus, and the radically biblical notion of *creation* which grounds Augustine's thought on this matter. The distinction between use and enjoyment is based upon the relationship between the soul and its Creator as one of “dependence”.¹³ This distinction is one of *ethical* import regarding what the self ought to be in relation to its Creator. Love of God and love of neighbour are the sum of the law; thus, the distinction between use and enjoyment grounds the obligation of the self to God and the other.

Third, and most importantly, Heidegger fails to see that it is precisely

the distinction between *uti* and *frui* which is the condition for Augustine's understanding of life as a trial (*tentatio*). In other words, rather than undermining the analysis of temptation and absorption in the world, the distinction between use and enjoyment—the “right order of love”—is the criterion for understanding the temptation of the soul. Unless the obligation to enjoy only God were in place, the world could not be understood as “tempting”, drawing the soul away from its Creator. The struggle of life is the result of the soul being pulled away from that which it *ought* to love and enjoy, in order to cling to that which it ought to use. Further, Heidegger, by suggesting that this trial and temptation is intrinsic to human factual life, fails to recognize that such is not the case for Augustine. This trial is not “natural”, but rather a result of the Fall; it is only the experience of the fallen, postlapsarian self.¹⁴ For Augustine, this is not based on a Greek idea, but the biblical notion of the goodness of creation (Gen. 1:31).

b) Distance and Dissolution: A Phenomenology of the Fallen Self

The existential import of the *uti/frui* distinction is enacted¹⁵ narratively in Augustine's recounting of his youth in the second book of the *Confessions*, which is also a re-staging of the Fall itself, the Fall which is the fall of every person. Here we see the fragmentation and dissolution of the self which has become absorbed in the world, loving and enjoying the world rather than using it. It is a re-enactment of the folly of the Prodigal Son (summarized at the conclusion of Book One), whose prodigality consisted of misusing the property (*ousia*) given by the Father (C 1.17.27), resulting in the dissipation and eventual loss of the gift (1.18.28). “My sin,” Augustine concludes, “consisted in this: that I sought pleasure, sublimity, and truth not in God but in his creatures, in myself, and other created beings” (1.20.31).

The result of the self's turning away from God to the world is, in fact, a *loss of selfhood*, a loss of identity which, in exile, is found in a “state of disintegration” and “lost in multiplicity” (C 2.1.1).¹⁶ The self which departs from its Origin is a divided self, scattered and fragmented by its own absorption in the world of multiplicity: “As an adolescent I went astray from you, my God, far from your unmoved stability. I became to myself a region of destitution [*factus sum mihi regio egestatis*]” (C 2.10.18; cp. 4.16.30). For the young Augustine, this resulted from an inability to distinguish “love's [*dilectionis*] serenity and lust's [*libidinis*] darkness” because “clouds of muddy carnal concupiscence [*concupiscentia*] filled the air” (2.2.2). The essence of concupiscence is precisely the unrestrained enjoyment of “these lowest of things” (2.2.3) to the exclusion of the higher (*viz.*, God). It was precisely such a disorder of

love which Augustine saw in his pagan father, whose “delight was that of the intoxication which makes the world oblivious of you, its Creator, and to love your creation instead of you. He was drunk with the invisible wine of his perverse will directed downwards to inferior things” (2.3.6).¹⁷ The ensuing theft of pears (taking the ‘forbidden fruit’) is a most extreme form of enjoying what ought to be used, for in the theft of pears Augustine did not enjoy the thing itself, but the mere doing of that which was forbidden: “My desire was to enjoy not what I sought by stealing but merely the excitement of thieving and the doing of what was wrong” (2.4.9). He loved the act of thieving, which was also an act of self-destruction: “I loved the self-destruction, I loved my fall, not the object for which I had fallen but my fall itself” (2.4.9). Lured and tempted by the world and its beauty, the self is enticed to choose its own downfall and destruction, to willingly dissipate itself.¹⁸

§ 5. The Lure of the Public: Inauthentic Intersubjectivity

It is in the pear theft (Book II) that we also see a glimpse of fallen self’s intersubjective relationships, which are portrayed as a critical element in the fall of the self: “Had I been alone”, Augustine recalls, “I would not have done it. [...] Alone I would never have done it” (C 2.8.16; cp. 2.9.17). It was the influence of the “gang” (2.8.16) which enticed him to do that which “I would not have done on my own” (2.9.17). Indeed, the pleasure and enjoyment was not found in the pears, but “in association with a sinful group” (2.8.16). It was “they” [*das Man?*] that enticed me to become other than myself, to fall away from myself and into the world. I am lured into the world by others who draw me away from God and hence myself. The same negative role is attributed to others later in Book VI, where it is his dear friend Alypius who is being tempted by “the ‘they’” who are always inviting him to immerse himself in public spectacles¹⁹: “the whirlpool of Carthaginian morals, with their passion for empty public shows, sucked him into the folly of the circus games” (C 6.7.11). Ensnared and embroiled by these worldly amusements, Alypius was in fact lured away from himself, losing his identity in the levelling public. And while he resisted their temptation for a time “with strict self-control” (6.7.12), upon arriving in Rome he was again drawn in by the seductive call of the “crowd”: “There,” Augustine recounts, “he had been seized by an incredible obsession for gladiatorial spectacles”, a temptation which was fuelled by the “friendly violence” of his friends and fellow-pupils who compelled him to attend the games. Wanting to resist, Alypius determined to close his eyes and not be drawn in by the ocular temptations before him; but he failed to block his ears, which led to his downfall: “A great roar from the entire crowd struck him with such vehemence that he was overcome by curiosity”

(6.8.13). Unable to resist the lure of the public, Alypius was again lost in the public games.²⁰

And by doing so, he lost himself: “He was not now the person who had come in, but just one of the crowd he had joined, and a true member of the group which had brought him” (7.8.13). The self, then, loses its identity by following the group, listening to the tempting call of the “they” by which one becomes other-than oneself. The self becomes everyone but itself, precisely in being lured by the public.²¹ In summary, for Augustine the self which has been lured by the public into an absorption in the world—who enjoys the world rather than using it—is no longer itself and therefore inauthentic.

C. Return: The Authentic Self

§ 6. The Way Home: Return as Conversion

As we begin the final section of this essay, it will be helpful to recall that it was the prodigal son who provided us, and Augustine, with its structure: origin—> exile—> return. At the end of Part Two (*Fall: The Alienated Self*), we have travelled with the Augustinian self “into a distant country” (Luke 15:13), far from home, restless and anxious, having “squandered his estate [*dieskorpisen ten ousian auton*] with “loose living” [*zoon asotos*: a kind of dissolution and dispersal, a scattering]. Far from home, he is also far from himself, is not himself, lacks a sense of selfhood or identity. The self is spent, dissolved, dissipated, scattered, pulled apart by an absorption in ‘the world.’ It has spent its *ousia*, its being. The prodigal self is less than a self, even less than human, not able to enjoy what unclean swine are fed (vv. 15–16).

However, there is a sense in which this prodigal, inauthentic self is not aware of its condition; it thinks itself to be free, to be enjoying life. Not until a moment of crisis and reflection does the self realize its destitution. That is, it is not until the prodigal “comes to himself” (lit., *eauton ... elthon*) that he then reflects on his state and realizes that he was better off at home with his father (v. 17). This *coming to oneself*, then, is that experience or crisis which precipitates a return, a conversion, a re-turning to oneself and finding meaning in relation to one’s origin/being. What we are interested in looking at in this final section is this experience of “coming to oneself”. What occasions the return for Augustine? What is the experience of the one called to authenticity? What is the catalyst that sets this in motion? What is the self called to return *to*? What makes the return possible? That is, is one even *able* to return? What would it be that would enable the self to resist temptation and repent of its inauthenticity? What role would *others* play in this conversion?

In Book VII we see the beginning²² of Augustine's conversion (or *another* conversion for those who are counting; cf. Bk III) and the experiences which precipitate his return. First, and most importantly he tells us, it is the "books of the Platonists"—despite their shortcomings²³—which *occasion* this return: "By the Platonic books I was admonished to *return into myself...my innermost citadel*" (7.10.16). So the catalyst for the return is precisely a text, a reading.²⁴ Second, we note that this was enabled by God: he "was given power to do so because you had become my helper". He seems to be incapable of this on his own and thus requires the assistance of God (i.e., grace).

What is it, then, that he (re)turns to? To himself, to his interiority. The turn is one of *reflection*, a return to consider who he is (precisely what Pascal says we run from). What becomes clear in this reflection is his status as a *creature*; by returning from the exterior world to the interior life of the soul, Augustine runs up against its derivative nature, the fact that it is created and therefore must be inferior to that which made it (7.10.16). So it is precisely in reflecting on oneself that the self is confronted by its Origin, by its maker, and is awakened to its being as *imago Dei*. Thus (as we suggested in Part A above), to raise the question of self is to raise the question of Being. Indeed, through this inward turn, by which the self is confronted simultaneously by its own nature and its Origin, what Augustine encounters is Being itself: "what I saw is Being, and that I who saw am not yet Being" (7.10.16). The creature is that being, we might suggest, for whom its creaturehood is at issue. It is *then* that he realizes 'where' he is (cp. Luke 15:17): "And I found myself far from you 'in the region of dissimilarity²⁵'" (7.10.16). The dissolution of the self is a result of its distance from the Origin (cp. Bk II). This self-realization then calls for a reconsideration and reevaluation of the world as also created and the self's relation to it (7.11.17–7.15.21).²⁶ Evil and wickedness is not a *what* but a *how*, a matter of "a perversity of will twisted away from the highest substance, you O God, towards inferior things, rejecting its own inner life and swelling with external matter" (7.16.22). Thus evil or sin is precisely a question of *how* one relates oneself to the created world. One must overcome the "weight" which would pull the soul down into the world. However, on his own, Augustine is *unable*: "I was not stable in my enjoyment of God" (7.17.23). "I did not possess the strength to keep my vision fixed," he continues. "My weakness reasserted itself, and I returned to my customary condition" (7.17.23).

Thus, "I sought a way to obtain strength to *enjoy you*; but I did not find it until I embraced 'the mediator'" (7.18.24)—the Incarnate God unthought by the Platonists. Unlike the Platonic soul, the Augustinian self lacks the resources for its redemption; whereas the release of the Platonic

soul is effected by activating a “power” always already latent within the soul (cp. *Republic*, VII, 518b–d), the Augustinian self here encounters its own inability, its lack of power, and its dependency upon grace.²⁷ Contenance is a gift.

§ 7. Conversions: Authentic Intersubjectivity

While there is a fundamental inability of the Augustinian self to restore its authenticity, we must not fall into a rather Jansenistic over-reading of Augustine on this point either. In other words, we ought not naively think that there was such a chasm of difference between Augustine and Pelagius on this point.²⁸ The self does play a decisive role in conversion; in the account of the several conversions which take place in Book VIII, we can see this role of the will in the way in which the self is “motivated” by *friends* and the *examples* of others. It is also here that we see a glimpse of authentic intersubjective relations²⁹: these friends are “true” friends, not leading one away into public follies, but exhorting one to self-reflection and conversion. In order to do so, the friends point to examples, models of authenticity and self-knowledge, whose activities do not prescribe a determinate formula for regaining oneself, but nevertheless become “occasions”³⁰ for one’s own conversion. As such, we see a pattern of friends exhorting one to follow the example of another, where the example operates as a motivator for the self’s conversion.

As we find Augustine at the beginning of Book VIII, he is “attracted to the way” but nevertheless remains “reluctant” (8.1.1). However, by providence, Augustine travels to visit his *friend*, Simplicianus, “so that he could propose a method fitted for someone in my disturbed condition, whereby I could learn to walk in your way” (8.1.1). Simplicianus, however, does not offer a method or formula, but rather recounts the story of the conversion of the rhetor, Victorinus, to Christianity (8.2.3) in order to “exhort” the trouble Augustine. Upon hearing the story of the Neoplatonist’s conversion, Augustine was “ardent to follow his *example*” (8.5.10), but was unable to do so, not because of lack of intellectual conviction, but because of lack of power (will) attributed to habit (8.5.10–12).³¹ The desire is present, but the power is absent; the “‘At once, at once’ never came to the point of decision” (8.5.12).

Later, another *friend* appears at the home of Alypius and Augustine: their fellow African, and a Christian, Ponticianus. Upon seeing the epistles of Paul on the gaming table, Ponticianus took the opportunity to recount the conversion narrative of two of his own friends who had been in the employ of the emperor. One afternoon in Trier, “when the emperor was detained by a circus spectacle” (8.6.15), the unnamed pair went for a walk in the garden (*sic*) where they happened upon a house of Christian

servants, in which they found a book, *The Life of Antony*. “One of them began to read it. He was amazed and set on fire, and during his reading began to think of taking up this way of life and of leaving his secular post in the civil service to be your servant” (8.6.15). The exemplary life of Antony moved the first to conversion, making a “decision to follow the better course”. After making this choice, he turned to his companion: “‘If it costs you too much to follow my *example*, do not turn against me’”. His friend replied that he would join him and be associated with him” (8.6.15). The friend followed the example of his friend and pursued his course as chosen.

At this juncture we have an intricate nexus of friends and examples: Ponticianus, the friend of Augustine, has pointed to the unnamed pair as examples, the first of which was motivated by the example of Antony, and the second by the example of his friend. Antony and the unnamed compatriots now function as examples for Augustine who, upon hearing the stories of both, was moved to reflection and introspection, the crisis of “coming to oneself” (Luke 15:17)—a necessary condition for conversion (authenticity). The example of others, provided by friends, become occasions to return to the self’s interiority, the battleground of authenticity.

But while he was speaking, Lord, you turned my attention back to myself. You took me up from behind my own back where I had placed myself because I did not wish to observe myself, and you set me before my face so that I should see how vile I was, how twisted and filthy, covered in sores and ulcers. And I looked and was appalled, but there was no way of escaping from myself (C 8.7.16).

Upon Ponticianus’ departure, and in the midst of this intense inner crisis, Augustine turns to Alypius and cries out: “What is wrong with us?” (8.8.19) Why do they linger in indecision? Driven to the garden by the struggle within himself, his friend Alypius nevertheless accompanied, for “how could he abandon me in such a state?” However, “although he was present, I felt no intrusion on my solitude” (8.8.19). True friends don’t meddle with the private, interior struggles of others (in other words, Alypius does not “leap in” at this point) but neither do they abandon the “one struggling against himself” (8.11.27): “Alypius stood quite still at my side, and waited in silence for the outcome of my unprecedented state of agitation”. Moving still further away, “to ensure that even his presence put no inhibition upon me”—for “solitude seemed to me more appropriate for the business of weeping” (8.12.28)—the voice of another interrupts Augustine’s solitude, exhorting him, “*Tolle, lege! Tolle, lege!*” Upon reading the words of Paul, “a light of relief from all anxiety flooded into my heart” (8.12.29). The exiled soul had come home.

What is important for our reading of Augustine is an appreciation of the authentic role of others as friends and examples who exhort the self to be itself, as opposed to the temptations and seductions of the crowd in Books II and VI, which draw the self away from itself and from its Origin. Authentic friends are those who do not alleviate my responsibility, but heighten it by admonishing me to confront and reflect upon myself, and by doing so to be confronted by my Creator. It is friends and examples who occasion the return of the exiled self living in a distant country, encouraging him to return home, to his Father and to himself.

In the course of our reading Augustine “after” Heidegger, we have seen key anticipations of structures and themes in Heidegger’s analysis of *Dasein* in *Sein und Zeit*: the priority of the self in the question of being, fallenness and the temptation of being-in-the-world, the levelling character of intersubjective relations in the “public”, the return of the self to authenticity, and the role that others play in authentic intersubjectivity. Taking the *Daseinsanalytik* as the hermeneutical situation for our reading of Augustine, we have suggested that in the *Confessions* we find the confessions of an existentialist. What remains to be asked is whether in *Sein und Zeit* we find the confessions of an Augustinian.

- 1 Cp. also *De vera religione* 1.20.38–39: “The sin is evil, not the substance that is sinfully loved. [...] Vice arises in the soul from its own doing.” (We follow the edition of *De vera religione* in CCSL XXXII, ed. K.-D. Daur (Turnholt: Brepols, 1962), and will generally employ the translation of J.H.S. Burleigh in *Augustine: Earlier Writings* [though here modified]. Henceforth abbreviated in the text as VR.)
- 2 Heidegger takes this to be not an Augustinian or Christian framework, but rather something appropriated from Plotinus and the Neoplatonic tradition—indeed, an appropriation which is incongruous with the originary Christian elements of Augustine’s thought and thus subject to *Destruction*, a Neoplatonic layer to be stripped away in order to retrieve Augustine’s analysis of the factual Christian “struggle” and “trial” (*tentatio*) of being-in-the-world. What Heidegger misses is that the *utifru* distinction is the condition for understanding life as *tentatio*, the temptation of ‘enjoying’ the world. Without this distinction, life would not be a struggle. We will return to a closer critique of Heidegger on this point below.
- 3 *De doctrina christiana*, 1.2.2. We follow the edition of CCSL XXXII, ed. Joseph Martin (Turnholt: Brepols, 1962) and will employ the translation *Teaching Christianity*, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P., *The Works of Saint Augustine, I/11* (New York: New City Press, 1996). Henceforth abbreviated in the text as DC.
- 4 Book I takes up an exposition of things, and Books II–III provide an analysis of signs. All of this falls within the larger project of instructor pastors on *how* to teach their congregations (that is, it is a book on *method* not “doctrine,” as older English translations suggested). The first three books are concerned with the “way of discovery” or biblical interpretation, while the fourth book takes up the “way of putting things across,” viz. preaching or ‘rhetoric.
- 5 For a discussion of the relationship between *signum*, *sacramentum*, and *mysterium* in Augustine, see Robert Dodaro, OSA, “*Sacramentum Christi*: Augustine on the Christology of Pelagius,” *Studia Patristica* XXVII, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone (Leuven: Peeters, 1993), pp. 274–280.
- 6 We are creatively appropriating here, not without parallel, Jean-Luc Marion’s distinction between the “idol” and the “icon” in his *L’idole et le distance* and *God Without Being*.
- 7 *De Trinitate* 9.13, trans. Edmund Hill, O.P., *The Works of Saint Augustine I/5* (New York: New City Press, 1991).

- 8 This in an *almost* “Foucauldian” sense, as suggested by Brian Stock in *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 14 and *passim*.
- 9 The problem here is the adoption of categories which are not suitable or appropriate for the “phenomena” which they are attempting to describe (Ga 277, 280–281). What is required, then, are new categories or concepts—formal indications.
- 10 Heidegger observes that already by the time of Augustine and “patristic ‘philosophy’”, which attempted to develop Christian doctrine in the context of Greek philosophy, Platonism had become deeply installed in Christian thought. Thus, “one cannot simply strip away the Platonism in Augustine; and it is a misunderstanding to believe that authentic Christianity [*eigentlich Christliche*] can be reached through Augustine” (Ga 60 281).
- 11 Augustine sees here a “battle of words”: “We are involved in heaven knows what kind of battle of words, since on the one hand what cannot be said is inexpressible, and on the other what can even be called inexpressible is thereby shown to be not inexpressible. This battle of words should be avoided by keeping silent, rather than resolved by the use of speech. And yet, while nothing really worthy of God can be said about him, he has accepted the homage of human voices, and has wished us to rejoice in praising him with our words” (DC 1.6.6). See my “Between Predication and Silence: Augustine on How (Not) to Speak of God” for further discussion of this theme.
- 12 Cp. here the old and analogous question of Aquinas as an “Aristotelian”, which, as Gilson was at pains to point out, he was *not*. For a helpful analysis, see Mark D. Jordan, *The Alleged Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas*, EGS 15 (Toronto: PIMS, 1992).
- 13 On this point, see Arendt, *Love and Saint Augustine*, p. 49.
- 14 Elsewhere I have argued that Heidegger in fact “ontologizes” the Fall such that the structure of temptation is constitutive of human being. See my *The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational Hermeneutic* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), pp. 87–113.
- 15 What the young Heidegger would refer to as the *Vollzugsinn*, the enactment-sense, the fulfilment of a meaning in action.
- 16 To *return* is to be “gathered together,” a restoration of the self by continence (C 2.10.18; 10.19.40; 10.37.60). We will return to a more detailed discussion of this below in § 6.
- 17 In contrast, during Augustine’s exile away from God, though God appeared to be silent (2.2.2; 2.3.7), he in fact spoke through Monica, his mother (and picture of the Church). Thus Augustine is constantly ‘haunted’ by this voice—God/Monica—working in his “conscience” (2.3.7), calling him back from dissipation in the world, to a life of regathering, continence. One might hear structural echoes here of the call of conscience in Heidegger’s *Sein und Zeit* (§§54–60).
- 18 Augustine’s systematic account of these narrative temptations is unfolded in Book X, which analyzes the ways in which the self is tempted by the world. The fallen self is absorbed by things and the world, rather than pointed to enjoyment in God by creation. As a result, “I plunged into those lovely created things which you had made” (C 10.27.38). The result is a “burden” and “trial” for the self “without respite”(10.28.39). *Onus mihi sum*, Augustine concludes: “I am a burden to myself”. Indeed, “is not human life on earth a trial in which there is no respite?” (10.28.39). Pulled apart by the temptation of worldly distractions and lust (*cupiditate*), the self is “disintegrated into multiplicity” and dispersed in the world, losing its identity. According to Augustine (following 1 John 2:15–16), there are three fundamental forms of temptation: the lust of the flesh (*concupiscentia carnis*), the lust of the eyes (*concupiscentia oculorum*) or *curiositas*, and worldly ambition (*ambitio saeculi*, following the Vulgate). Due to limitations in space, and our desire to offer a productive reading which does not simply repeat Heidegger, we will not undertake further analysis of this here. For Heidegger’s analysis, see GA 60, §§13–15.
- 19 On Augustine’s account of public games and “spectacles” as inauthentic, see also C 3.2.2.
- 20 We see glimpses of an authentic, intersubjective community in a ‘commune proposal’ that Augustine and his compatriots had considered (6.14.24). However, this possibility was destroyed by another distracting relationship: to their wives: “On this [the wives’ opposition], the entire project which we had so well planned collapsed in our hands; it was broken up and abandoned” (6.14.24).
- 21 Cp. *Being and Time*, § 27, where Heidegger also points to the “publicness” of the “they” as

- that which “levels” the self to a public, everyday (inauthentic?) self which is “dispersed” and must therefore find itself.
- 22 Unlike, for instance, St. Paul, Augustine’s conversion is not constituted by a single, cataclysmic event, but rather involves a process: a conversion to the search Wisdom through reading Cicero’s *Hortensius* (Bk II); a conversion to Neoplatonism through the “platonic books” (Bk VII), and finally the “climax,” according to his account, in the garden in Milan, through the reading of Paul (which he had also begun earlier) which effect his conversion to Christian faith.
 - 23 In 7.9.13, Augustine recounts his reading of these Neoplatonist texts, noting both what he found there, but also what was missing, signalling their insufficiencies. We might suggest that Neoplatonism would still be a mode of *theologia gloriae*; what was missing was a *theologia crucis*—the story of embodiment, suffering, humiliation and death. “That these books do not have.” On the Incarnation, see 7.18.24ff. (Cf. Heidegger’s critique of Augustine discussed above.) For a related discussion, see John D. Caputo, “Toward a Postmodern Theology of the Cross: Augustine, Heidegger, Derrida,” in *Postmodern Philosophy and Christian Thought*, ed. Merold Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), pp. 202–225.
 - 24 For an analysis of the pivotal role of texts in all of the conversions in the *Confessions*, see Brian Stock, *Augustine the Reader: Meditation, Self-Knowledge, and the Ethics of Interpretation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University press, 1996), ch. 3, “Reading and Conversion”.
 - 25 *In regione dissimilitudinis*, trans. by Boulding as the “region of unlikeness.” Should we perhaps here in this an echo and antithesis of the *imago Dei* as being in the ‘likeness’ of God.
 - 26 This is one site where Augustine’s proto-existentialism is in tension with his Platonism, particularly in his dealing with the question of evil by means of a theory of privation (7.11.17–7.12.18) and a greater good defence (7.13.19). Because of his Christian commitments, he is also committed to the goodness of creation, but at the same time must provide an account of the inferiority of creation (otherwise creation would be God). Unfortunately (but perhaps inevitably) he attempts to solve this problem on a Platonic register of ‘non-being’; that is, creation is a ‘mixture’ of being and non-being or privation. However, this solution in the end denies the commitment to the goodness of creation: if evil is privation, then creation, insofar as it is not God, always already lacks something. (Here we would prefer the way in which Aquinas side-steps the Platonic notion of a ‘lack’ of creation, which haunts Augustine’s account. For Aquinas, it is not because created things lack something that they are inferior; rather, it is simply because their being (*esse*) is something *given* to them. They are not self-subsistent; in other words, there is a distinction between their essence (*essentia*) and their existence or act of existing (*esse*). Only in God do these coincide. See Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*.)
 - 27 Is this not also the difference between the Augustinian self and *Dasein*? For Augustine, resolution is not enough; or rather, resolution is not possible without the assistance of grace. While “continenence” and “resoluteness” play analogous roles within the two accounts, there is also a fundamental *disanalogy*.
 - 28 It has been established that Augustine was guilty of an over-reading of Pelagius on the basis of some of the excesses of his disciples. We would further suggest that the Port-Royal tradition (including Pascal) also over-read Augustine. (As John Burnaby suggested many years ago, “The system which generally goes by the name of Augustinianism is in great part a cruel travesty of Augustine’s deepest and most vital thought.” See Burnaby, *Amor Dei* [London, 1938], p. 231.) The result is a misleading notion of radical difference. For a discussion, see Gerald Bonner, *Augustine and Modern Research on Pelagianism* (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1972)
 - 29 The relations between these friends is one of “leaping ahead” rather than “leaping in” (see *Being and Time*, pp. 122–123/114–115.
 - 30 “Occasions” in the sense of the human teacher in Kierkegaard’s *Philosophical Fragments*.
 - 31 For Augustine, such “habit” is a kind of self-chosen bondage, a “necessity” which is the result of a distorted will enslaved by passion, which produces habit (8.5.10). Thus, he can speak of habit without resistance as a “necessity”, yet also concede that “I was responsible for the fact that habit had become so embattled against me; for it was with my consent that I came to the place in which I did not wish to be” (8.5.11). What is required is precisely a “new will” (8.5.10; 8.8.19).