age-long struggle for the supremacy of the Spiritual over the Temporal, it is almost unbelievable that a great Liberal like Acton, who lived and was ready to die for "Truth" and "Liberty," should have said of Gregory VII, that the dying Pope's words at Salerno ("Dilexi justitiam et odivi iniquitatem: propterea morior in exsilio") represent "the last cry of a disappointed and despairing fanatic."

Though it may indeed seem almost unkind to dig up these things, dead and buried long ago, it does perhaps serve some good purpose, if only to make us realize, how things look in historical perspective, and how quickly the cocksureness of to-day may turn into the pitiful absurdity of to-morrow.

Herr Noack's book is based entirely on Acton's writings and letters and is done with meticulous care. Perhaps here and there his rendering of shades of meaning from English into German is not very happy: "evidence," for instance, is not "Beweiskraft der Zeugenaussage," but "Beweismaterial"; "a crooked canon" is not "Krummes Gesetz," but "verkrümmte Richtlinie"; and "the vacant record of incoherent error" is not a "luftleerer," but a gedankenleerer, "Bericht unzusammenhängenden Irrtums."

H. C. E. ZACHARIAS.

THE MODERN MIND. By Michael Roberts. (Faber, pp. 277; 8/6.)

MEN AND TENDENCIES. By E. I. Watkin. (Sheed & Ward, pp. 316; 10/6.)

"In our own age," writes Mr. Roberts, "many people have tried to live without religion and without poetry . . . Leaving one part of their nature uncultivated, and having no language in which to speak of that part, many of them fall victims to sentimentality, and quack religions," (p. 261). It is the thesis of his book that irreligion has been brought about by this lack of language which, in its turn, is caused by an unfortunate turn of events in the sphere of philosophy: the triumph of realism over nominalism. And the first thing that strikes one in the author's elaboration of his thesis is precisely the oddity of his judgments in regard to the history of philosophy. For St. Thomas, for example, "only deductive logic was valid . . . it was a position which could not be held against the discovery of new facts"; he postulated a God "to help him to tidy up his thought"; Thomism (the author is careful to speak of it always in the past tense) was concerned with a "passive intellectual satisfaction." What is more important in this context, there is no recognition of the fact, cardinal to the author's thesis, that Thomist realism is as unlike the absolute realism with which he is in fact concerned as it is unlike nominalism; and that it does precisely avoid rendering

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science impossible, like the former, or invalid, like the latter. Further, there is no recognition of the importance of the different degrees of abstraction in guaranteeing the independence of metaphysic in face of a changing physical science; nor of the importance of intuition (again cardinal to the thesis of the book) in the Thomist epistemology. Lastly, the author distinguishes, not between science on the one hand and poetry and mysticism on the other, but between science and religion simply, as demanding two different languages: he has thus no use for rational theology, and makes no allowance whatsoever for the place of reason, beside and necessary to intuition, in the whole complexus of religious knowledge. In this context, as Professor de Burgh has put it, logic alone is empty, but intuition is blind . . .

The positive part of the author's thesis, that the fall of poetry to the level of a toy and the consequent impoverishment of religion, must be remedied by a recognition that different types of thought demand different kinds of language, is valuable indeed, and needs to be forcibly stated if religion is generally to regain its profundity. But it would seem truer to restrict the issue to *prayer and poetry* as against science and metaphysic; and the value of the book as it stands is likely to be lost in the unfortunate historical setting and the imprecisions with which it is associated.

Mr. Watkin, also concerned with modern intellectual tendencies, presents a complete contrast. Indeed, in so far as he is mainly concerned with different forms of anti-intellectualism, he would no doubt have found Mr. Roberts an interesting subject. The principles elaborated in A Philosophy of Form are here applied, in a number of essays on modern writers, and in two important essays, Nationalism, Energeticism and the Totalitarian State, and The Philosophy of Marxism. The smaller essays strike one as uneven: that on Bertrand Russell, for example, (religion without reason), a brilliant piece of criticism; that on Peter Wust, a most helpful introduction to that writer's thought; that on the influence of Plotinus on Christian thought, again, an illuminating study. On the other hand, Mr. Watkin hardly does justice to Mr. Aldous Huxley, though the essay on Do What You Will is full of good things; and in the essay on Havelock Ellis, the Studies are dismissed in a cavalier fashion which one cannot but regret.

But the core of the book is in the two longer essays already mentioned. The author treats Marxist Communism and Fascism together under their common aspect of energeticism: the attitude of mind which exalts action for its own sake against contemplation, form. It is in so far as they display some aspect or another of this anti-intellectualist worship of force that the particular writers are discussed; but here the principles themselves in their commonest form are examined and criticized. The criticism is brilliant and profound; and the truth is stressed as

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well as the falsehood, the good as well as the bad. The author suggests that the dialectic of history may bring about the synthesis (the Christian ideal) from the contemporary antithesis and part thesis: from liberalism and its antithesis fascism, order; from the materialist antithesis of communism, the ideal-realist synthesis which will give to the body constructed by its predecessor the soul it lacks.

This is a profound and stimulating book, in spite of unevenness, and a very definite help towards the clarification of the tendencies of our times. The author concludes with a reasoned statement of his views on *Peace and War*.

GERALD VANN, O.P.

## SOCIOLOGY

GERMANY'S NEW RELIGION. By Wilhelm Hauer, Karl Heim, and Karl Adam. (Allen & Unwin; 5/-.)

The situation of the Church, both Catholic and Protestant, in Germany to-day, is a desperate one. Dangers and difficulties beset them at every step. It is hard for us to understand the crisis, and to grasp what lies behind this attack, carried on with violence and persistency. This book dealing with Germany's "new religion" comes opportunely, for part of it is from the hand of one of its chief founders and supporters.

The book consists of several essays, by three professors in the university of Tübingen. In the first, Wilhelm Hauer, who is the prophet of the new Paganism, gives an account of the German Faith movement, which began in 1933, soon after Hitler came into power. The second, by Karl Heim, one of Germany's leading Protestant theologians, is confined to a discussion on responsibility and destiny, and is a refutation of Hauer's attack and distortion of the Christian teaching on this subject. The third is by Karl Adam, well known to Catholic readers. He, in his fine essay on *Jesus Christ, and the Spirit of the Age*, answers Hauer's protest against Jesus Christ "being imposed on us as a leader and pattern."

Hauer studied at Oxford, and later became a Protestant pastor in Germany. After he had practically abandoned Christianity, he became professor in the university of Tübingen, where he lectures on Race and Religion, and kindred subjects. He is less fantastic in many ways than Rosenberg or Ludendorf in his exposition of the "new religion," which he has had so great a share in formulating.

He claims that the German Faith movement must be understood in close relation with the national movement, which led to the formation of the Third Empire. In the programme of the National-Social Party there is a statement that the