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## International Organization

**Michael J. Hiscox**

Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade

**Frank Schimmelfennig**

Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Enlargement of the EU

**Andrew MacIntyre**

The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia

**Arthur A. Goldsmith**

Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa

**Mark Peceny and William Stanley**

The Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America

**Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild**

Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War

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Address for submissions:  
 Lynne Bush  
 Managing Editor  
 International Organization  
 IR/PS  
 University of California, San Diego  
 9500 Gilman Drive  
 La Jolla, CA 92093-0519

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## Contributors

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**Arthur A. Goldsmith** is Professor of Management at the University of Massachusetts, Boston. He can be reached at [arthur.goldsmith@umb.edu](mailto:arthur.goldsmith@umb.edu).

**Caroline Hartzell** is Associate Professor of Political Science at Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. She can be reached at [chartzel@gettysburg.edu](mailto:chartzel@gettysburg.edu).

**Michael J. Hiscox** is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego. He can be reached at [mhiscox@weber.ucsd.edu](mailto:mhiscox@weber.ucsd.edu).

**Matthew Hoddie** has recently completed his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of California, Davis. He can be reached at [mshoddie@ucdavis.edu](mailto:mshoddie@ucdavis.edu).

**Andrew MacIntyre** is Associate Professor of International Affairs at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego. He can be reached at [amacintyre@ucsd.edu](mailto:amacintyre@ucsd.edu).

**Mark Peceny** is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. He can be reached at [markpec@unm.edu](mailto:markpec@unm.edu).

**Donald Rothchild** is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis. He can be reached at [dsrothchild@ucdavis.edu](mailto:dsrothchild@ucdavis.edu).

**Frank Schimmelfennig** is Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Darmstadt University of Technology (Germany). He can be reached at [fs@pg.tu-darmstadt.de](mailto:fs@pg.tu-darmstadt.de).

**William Stanley** is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. He can be reached at [wstanley@unm.edu](mailto:wstanley@unm.edu).

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# Abstracts

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## **Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade**

by Michael J. Hiscox

Domestic political conflict has been a constant companion to international trade, but the nature of that conflict has varied greatly in Western democracies over the last two centuries. Political battles over trade policy appear to have sometimes divided societies along broad class lines and at other times split them into narrow industry-based coalitions. I argue that this diversity stems from historical and cross-national variation in inter-industry factor mobility. Class coalitions are more likely where factor mobility is high, whereas narrow, industry-based coalitions are more likely where mobility is low. Evidence from six Western economies for the last two centuries indicates that levels of factor mobility have varied historically and cross-nationally in accord with industrialization and regulation. This variation corresponds broadly with observable differences in the formation of trade policy coalitions.

## **The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union**

by Frank Schimmelfennig

The decision of the European Union to expand to Central and Eastern Europe is a puzzle for rationalist intergovernmentalism. This approach to the study of European integration accounts for most of the preferences of the state actors and many characteristics of the intergovernmental bargaining process but fails to explain why it resulted in the opening of accession negotiations. I introduce the mechanism of rhetorical action in order to show how the supporters of enlargement succeeded in overcoming the superior material bargaining power of their opponents. Through the strategic use of arguments based on the liberal norms of the European international community, the “drivers” caught the “brakemen” in the community trap and, step by step, shamed them into acquiescing in Eastern enlargement.

## **Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia**

by Andrew MacIntyre

I develop a systematic argument about the politics of the 1997–98 Asian economic crisis. I focus on institutions—specifically, the connection linking the institutional framework of

national politics, the policy environment, and investment. I seek to resolve the tension between the literatures on credible policy commitment and policy flexibility, arguing that if either is severely undersupplied, the risk associated with the policy environment rises rapidly for investors. Building on a veto player framework, I develop a simple model of a U-shaped relationship between the number of veto players in a political system and policy risk to investors. Institutional vetoes on executive authority lower policy risk for investors but only up to a point, after which additional veto players promote unwelcome policy rigidity. I illustrate this using four cases: Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, the four main Southeast Asian countries involved in the financial crisis. I argue that the institutional framework of national politics had a powerful and predictable influence on policy responses and investor reactions.

### **Foreign Aid and Statehood in Africa**

by Arthur A. Goldsmith

Has foreign aid destroyed state institutions in Africa? African states depend on development assistance to conduct basic government operations, yet few of these states are well governed or effective at providing public goods. The two trends, mounting foreign aid and static or diminishing state performance, raise an obvious question: Is aid dependency contributing to misrule and state failure in Africa? Many critics argue the two phenomena are related. I find they are not. My analysis fails to show a negative association between aid receipts and two measures of democracy and economic freedom. Instead, the evidence is consistent with a small, positive relationship between aid and these indicators of state performance. Since the international community seems bent on reducing foreign aid, an important issue is how African states can maintain and improve their performance with less foreign assistance.

### **Liberal Social Reconstruction and the Resolution of Civil Wars in Central America**

by Mark Peceny and William Stanley

The international community, in its efforts to overcome the security dilemmas that inhibit conflict resolution, need not always offer forceful security guarantees to combatants in civil wars. We argue that noncoercive, liberal international intervention can end civil wars. As suggested by a constructivist perspective and the insights of the democratic peace, the promotion of liberal democracy can successfully resolve civil wars by transforming the identities and institutions of the combatants. We develop this argument by examining the resolution of civil wars in Central America during the 1990s. Of the Central American cases, Nicaragua, the country subject to the strongest security guarantees, has been the least stable of the three. El Salvador and Guatemala, in contrast, have experienced more successful conflict resolution despite the lack of any forceful security guarantees by the international community. The termination of these civil wars can be best explained by the adherence of local actors to liberal democratic norms and institutions in response to a variety of international pressures and opportunities.

### **Stabilizing the Peace After Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables**

by Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild

In the wake of negotiated settlements to civil wars, one critical problem involves reassuring people who have been killing one another that conflict is not about to break out again, endangering people's lives. Those concerned with the success of negotiated settlements have

debated how best to enhance the prospects of a stable peace. We address this question by exploring variables that may explain the longevity of negotiated peace settlements. These variables are divided into two categories—one tapping into the potential effects of the environment in which settlements are negotiated and another focusing on the impact of settlement arrangements. On the basis of our analysis of thirty-eight civil war settlements negotiated between 1945 and 1998 we identify the environmental factors and institutional choices that affect the short-term stability of the peace following civil war.