

demonstrate how faith is exercised by powerless people in the face of human helplessness. In an interesting discussion of discipleship Dr Marshall agrees that, while at first discipleship depends upon the prior call of Jesus, by the time we get to Bartimaeus the call has been universalised so that discipleship now depends not on personal selection by Jesus but on voluntary acceptance of his demands. A distinction can be drawn between faith as acceptance of the message and petitionary faith which is concerned with experiencing the power of the kingdom. Unbelief emerges as the one power which is able to resist the kingdom. Throughout the Gospel the narrative material is aimed at the readers and they are drawn into the process of determining where they stand in relation to Jesus.

It emerges that Mark has a rich conception of faith and that, consciously and unconsciously, he uses a whole variety of literary techniques which bring it to expression. Thus this book has value both as an exposition of how Mark presents his narrative and as a depiction of his concept of faith. Although the broad conclusions regarding faith may not appear to be especially novel, the book abounds in shrewd insights about what is going on in detail in the Gospel. I could wish that the author had discussed further, if it were possible, how faith originates as a 'gift', why some believe and others do not, and I could wish also for more discussion of the relation between Mark's concept and that of his sources and ultimately that of Jesus himself. But this book is clearly and compellingly written, it commends new ways of understanding the Gospels without resorting to fancifulness, and it presents a thesis which (despite differences on points of detail) commends itself as thoroughly persuasive. Although it deals with a limited area, Dr Marshall's book could well become an introduction for students into how to understand the Gospels. This is an excellent contribution to a generally first-class series.

I. HOWARD MARSHALL

PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION by Sybil Wolfram, *Routledge and Kegan Paul, London & New York, 1989. Pp. xiv + 290. £30.00. Pb. £8.99*

In a Pickwickian sense this is a valuable book. By adopting in the first few pages an unqualified commitment to the Strawsonian understanding of 'statement', and drawing out the consequences of this for various topics in philosophical logic, it constitutes a thorough *reductio ad absurdum* of Strawson's theory. For many of the consequences are indeed wildly absurd.

There is an argument (strangely attributed to Quine) that there are no necessary truths because the same type-statement that is stated by '9 is greater than 7' can also be stated by 'The number which happens to be the current number of planets is greater than 7'. It could also, we are told, be stated by '9 has the relation to 7 I just spoke of'. It is taken to be Strawson's view that any proposition in which the same predicate is attached to a 'referring expression' referring to the same subject expresses the same type-statement. Statements, however, are what are true or false; so it will be statements, if anything, which will be describable as necessarily true or not necessarily true. The Conventionalist view, to which Mrs Wolfram is sympathetic, is that a truth is necessary if and only if it requires an analytic

proposition for its expression. Her way of allowing us to retain necessary truths, keeping, as she wishes to, the 'Conventionalist' connection between necessity and analyticity, is to redefine 'necessary truth' as a truth which can, though it need not, be expressed by an analytic proposition. This has the remarkable consequence that 'The number which happens to be the current number of the planets is greater than 7' is a necessary truth.

Much of the discussion of truth itself is given over to the theory that ' p is true' (*sic*) says no more than ' p '. What are we to make of ' p is true' here? The lack of inverted commas suggests that she is talking about sentences like 'Snow is white is true'. Not very promising for a discussion of the so-called 'disquotational theory of truth'! But worse is to come. A proposition like 'What the policeman says is true' is treated as a possible substitution instance of ' p is true', and it is regarded as an objection to the theory that it is obviously false that 'What the policeman says is true' says no more than 'What the policeman says'.

We come on to existence. Reasons are advanced for denying that existence is a predicate. No mention of levels of predicates. No mention of the idea that 'So-and-sos exist' is an answer to the question 'How many so-and-sos are there?'. No reference to Russell's comparison with 'So-and-sos are numerous'. But there is some sympathy for the notion that a distinction needs to be drawn between existential statements and others. The trouble is that 'others' turn out to be 'subject-predicate' statements or—what are supposed to be something else—relational statements. A protracted struggle ensues to find a sense of 'subject' which will yield the supposedly desirable result that no subject-predicate statement is also existential. As if there was any difficulty about 'There is someone who will give John a job' being at once existential and a statement about John! Mrs Wolfram seems to have overlooked the possibility that a formula in which one variable is bound by a quantifier may yet have another variable free.

Next, identity. In this section a most remarkable doctrine is attributed to Kripke (p. 211). He is said to have 'singled out statements of identity, or at least affirmative ones, as "if the subjects mentioned therein exist" necessarily true, or, if true, necessarily true'. The first disjunct here might be supposed to be due simply to careless writing, were it not that the same claim is alluded to two pages later: 'far from (affirmative) propositions of numerical identity (or difference) having to express truths so long as 'the objects mentioned therein exist' ...'. So Kripke is supposed to hold that 'The author of *Naming and Necessity* is the same person as the author of *Individuals*', or at least 'Kripke is the same person as Strawson', has to express a truth! At least we can reject this attribution to Kripke of an absurd thesis as straightforwardly false. More irritating is the vague and sloppy remark about his views on proper names: 'The idea, incorporated in the notion that proper names are "rigid designators", that proper names are a superior, foolproof mode of reference to particulars seems misleading' (p. 250). You do not know, when faced with a sentence like this, what it is that needs refuting. Mrs Wolfram's ideas about proper names are distinctly odd: 'Mary Jones becomes Mary Smith at marriage. It is not correct to say that Mary Smith was born in August without the qualification "as she became later".' As though there were anything improper about inquiring after the date of Augustus's birth!

The blurb, as is usual with blurbs, calls the book lucid. I have probably quoted enough already to indicate the amount of trust to be placed in this case in the publishers' claim. Possibly they thought the system of sections, sub-sections, sub-sub-sections, etc., an aid to understanding. To my mind it is anything but helpful, apart from the fact that it is not always easy to locate '5.2.2.(iii)B'. The practice of placing conclusions, or supposed conclusions, of sections in ugly boxes does little to improve intelligibility. Does the momentous dictum 'Whether proper names are to be said to have a "meaning" seems a matter of choice' gain much by being placed in a box?

It is hard to interest students in philosophical logic. If they are allowed to waste their time on this book it will be harder than ever to persuade them that the subject is worth their attention. If it does fall into their hands the best hope is that they will find it so boring that they will quickly lay it aside. The danger is that some of them will persevere with it and be seriously misled.

C.J.F WILLIAMS

RELIGION, REASON AND THE SELF. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HYWEL D. LEWIS. Ed. by Stewart R. Sutherland and T.A. Roberts. *University of Wales Press, 1989. Pp. xvi + 173. £20.*

This is an interesting collection of essays. Each of the authors is distinguished in his own field, so the essays merit attention individually on that account. But they are also of value as a collection, in disclosing something of the variety of ways in which philosophy of religion is presently being conducted.

D.Z. Phillips offers a piece on 'William James and the Notion of Two Worlds'. Characteristically, he is out to repudiate the notion that religious beliefs may be construed as hypotheses concerning metaphysical realities. Here the problem has to do with the idea of communication from the dead: 'What is at issue is the grammar or logic of "from the dead"'. What I am suggesting is that the grammar involved is such that any notion of "tracing the message" distorts and misunderstands it' (p. 137). The examples Phillips submits seem enough to establish that 'communication from the dead' need not be understood in other-worldly terms, but I am left unconvinced that as a matter of principle (of 'logic') it must not be so understood.

In 'The Concept of Revelation', Stewart Sutherland also raises the matter of the other-worldliness of religion. He distinguishes picture (a), 'in which behind the empirical world of phenomena there lies a second world of ultimate or spiritual reality', (p. 36) and picture (b), where 'one is depicted as trying to perceive the structures or substructures of this world, rather than trying to understand this world better by gaining knowledge of another ultimate reality' (pp. 36–7). Sutherland's sympathies would lie, I think, with picture (b), as do Phillips's. But here he focuses upon the question of what must in general be true of any example of revelation.

In 'Meaning in the Bible', Richard Swinburne investigates what it would be like for one particular (supposed) revelation to be true, examining how assumptions about the Bible's author, intended audience and structure have a bearing on this matter. His willingness to admit the possibility that God might have dictated the Bible marks out his position on the general