

The Utterly Absolute and the Totally Related: Change in God

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According to Malachi 3, v. 6 God declares that 'I the Lord do not change.' Citing this text and presenting arguments which conclude that God is 'the unchanging first cause of change,'¹ Aquinas maintains that God, as the 'first existent' which is 'sheerly actual and unalloyed with potentiality', evidently 'cannot change in any way.'² This doctrine, whether assumed as axiomatic or defended by reasoning,³ has been widely accepted throughout the history of Western theism. Reflection, though, suggests that it is also a doctrine which, while supposedly expressing the faithful's belief, in effect creates a considerable tension between the faith which in practice governs the lives of many such people and the understanding which in theory identifies its basic character. Although, for example, the faithful may consider God to become compassionately aware of their needs as they arise, may look to God for intervening grace, and may pray for divine action to produce changes in their situation, rational reflection on theism apparently requires that God be held to be immutably and timelessly the same in every respect. Consequently some have considered that there is a fundamental discrepancy between the God in whom believers actually put their trust and the deity described in reputedly 'correct' theological understanding.⁴

One of the major contributions of the work of Charles Hartshorne—and one which is the subject of this article—is to have indicated how this disharmony between the actuality and the rational self-understanding of faith in God may be reconciled. In several books and many articles spanning half a century⁵ he has combined his extensive knowledge of past philosophical thought, and especially of the ideas of Peirce and Whitehead, with his own insights to suggest how a self-consistent concept of God may be developed which adequately recognizes both the intrinsic ultimacy properly demanded by thought about the divine and the personal agency required by theistic faith, at least in the Judaeo-Christian-Islamic tradition. According to his understanding of the notions involved, it is possible—and indeed necessary for any adequate theism—to conceive coherently of God as *both* utterly absolute *and* totally related, as *both* unchanging *and* changing, in appropriate aspects of the divine reality. Indeed, far from

being a threat to the perfection and ultimacy of God, changeability in certain aspects is held to be a necessary quality of the essential perfection of the divine. The justification of Hartshorne's position involves four factors: an adequate analysis of the concepts involved, a metaphysical determination of what it is to be actual, a proper definition of 'God', and a 'dipolar' understanding of the divine nature. We shall look at each in turn.

Analysing the concepts

Hartshorne opens his Preface to *Man's Vision of God* by defending his right to add to the mass of writings on philosophical theology on the grounds that, for one reason or another, there is a need for 'exactitude, logical rigor'.⁶ In many cases attempts to reach understanding have led to puzzles, disharmonies, paradoxes and contradictions because the concepts employed have been insufficiently or inappropriately analysed.⁷ Further consideration may indicate, for example, that what has seemed to be self-evidently and unrestrictedly valid has only limited and qualified application. Problems may thus arise not because a quality is improperly attributed to an object but because its application is unwarrantably generalized. In other cases the character of an attribute may be misunderstood because what it connotes in certain cases is unjustifiably assumed to apply to all its legitimate applications.

Consider, for example, the attribution of perfection. In the first place it is important to recognize that in all cases except the unique one of the divine (where the description of God as 'the perfect being' expresses the unsurpassable supremacy of the divine as the proper object of unreserved adoration), 'perfection' does not express a material quality: it is a qualifying term which ascribes the highest possible state of some quality to something in being what it is or what it is for. Being 'perfect', that is, is not ascribable to an object in the same way that being 'red' or 'oval' or 'loving' may be ascribed to it. Something is not deemed to be perfect as such but in respect of how it is being considered—as a perfect argument or a perfect friend or a perfect lock, for example. The qualities which might be held to be indicated if an argument is held to be 'perfect' (self-evident premises and deductive reasoning from them, for instance) are not the same as those which are likely to be regarded as appropriate in the case of a lock (material strength, smoothness of operation and unpickability, for instance), and neither of those sets of qualities are relevant in the case of a friend. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that, in order for something to be perfect as what it is, it may be necessary for it to have a particular quality in certain respects and not in others. It is arguable, for example, that a perfect friend needs to be reliable in certain respects, so as to be properly trustworthy, and yet

unpredictable in others if the friendship is to be a personally enriching relationship.

It also needs to be appreciated that in the case of such a quality as a person's awareness of the contingent events in a temporally-ordered world, *perfect* awareness would involve both the unchanging existence of total awareness in that person in principle (i.e., each moment that person would always know exactly what has happened and is happening in that world, *whatever* those events might happen to be), and changing actual awareness correlative to the changes in events in practice (i.e., the contents of that person's awareness of what has become past and of what is now present would alter as previously present events perish into pastness and novel events are actualized). Whereas, for example, perfection as a counsellor or as a checker of finished goods would on the one hand require a person to be in principle unchanging, as having a completely adequate awareness of each client or product as it comes before him or her, on the other hand the instantiation of that awareness would require in practice different appraisals of and appropriately changing responses to the different individuals being considered in accordance with their actual states.

What it is to be actual

A second factor in Hartshorne's understanding of the place of change in the divine is his metaphysical perception of the fundamental character of what it is to be actual. In this respect he shares with Whitehead the view that for something to be actual is for it to determine itself by responding to its incorporation ('prehension' is the Whiteheadian term) of the previous actualities which constitute its environment (especially and massively of that actuality which was its own immediate predecessor) and of the possibilities which are open to it. To be actual, that is, is to be a momentary occasion of creative synthesis in a process; to be an enduring object is to have an identity abstracted from a temporally-ordered series of successive events whose constituent actualities change, though minutely, from momentary occasion to momentary occasion.⁸ Hence, although change has long been considered to pose a fundamental threat to human beings,⁹ it is a condition of being real: 'the subject of the change is not at all the unchanging, but the changing; it is that which alters, and in altering remains itself.'¹⁰ Furthermore, when correctly analysed, the aim of metaphysics is found to be not that of discovering 'a true reality' which 'is immune to change' in every respect but that of identifying the ground of 'the universal principle of relativity whose validity is absolute'¹¹ and which ensures that there is for all reality an unchanging rule that 'there shall be change in the form of enrichment'¹² as each successive actualization contains and adds to its predecessor.¹³

The claim that there is, in principle at least, a conceivable exception to this rule in that the perfect is to be defined as what is already complete and so could only change for the worse is rejected on the grounds that this presupposes an incoherent notion. Because there are 'incompatible possibilities,' no reality whatsoever 'can contain all possible actuality or value, all actualized.' There must be unrealized potentialities for any actual entity.¹⁴ One implication of this to which Hartshorne draws attention on several occasions elucidates what it is to have perfect knowledge. Since at no particular moment all possibilities can be actualized, there must always be future moments when what is possible and so not yet determinate may become determinate as an actuality and hence then, and only then, become knowable as such. Granted that the temporal ordering of reality is not an illusion,¹⁵ a being with perfect knowledge would, accordingly, always have 'cognitive potentialities.'¹⁶ As having perfect knowledge, at any particular time it would know everything that has been actualized up to that time as such and all potentialities as such at that time, but at a later time it would know as determinate actualities not only all that had been actualized at the previous time but additionally all that had been actualized in the intervening time.

Sharing Whitehead's insight that 'God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse,' but as 'their chief exemplification,'¹⁷ Hartshorne considers that this analysis of the essential characteristics of what it is to be actual must, appropriately interpreted, apply to the divine reality as well as to all else. This follows from his view that metaphysics attempts, among other things, to determine the 'unconditionally necessary or eternal truths about existence' which therefore apply a priori to all possible (and hence to all actual) modes of existence.¹⁸ If, then, to be real is necessarily to be constituted by a temporally-ordered process, this must be true of the divine reality.

Such views clearly challenge fundamental convictions of much theistic understanding and raise in an acute way, as Hartshorne recognizes, basic questions about the proper definition of 'God' and the relation of God to the world. In his 1976 Aquinas Lecture, for example, he argues that if it be accepted that 'the world is mutable and contingent', it is not coherent to maintain *both* that 'the ground of its possibility is a being unconditionally and in all respects necessary and immutable' *and* that this necessary being, i.e. God, 'has ideally complete knowledge of the world.' On the assumption that the world contains contingent actualities, the incoherence is held to lie in the inconsistency of holding that 'a wholly non-contingent being has contingent knowledge (since its object might not have existed).' Hartshorne's solution is, in essence, to qualify the assertion of 'the immutability and sheer necessity

of deity.’¹⁹ How, then, does he understand what is to be meant by ‘God’? This brings us to the third factor in his understanding of the place of change in God, namely, his definition of God.

What is meant by ‘God’

Although Hartshorne approaches the problem of the definition of what is meant by ‘God’ in several ways, they are complementary. Basically he identifies God in terms of being the proper object of worship.²⁰ In *Anselm’s Discovery*, for example, he shows that he is persuaded of the rational correctness of Anselm’s definition of God as ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived.’ Although he has some important criticisms of the way in which Anselm elucidates what is meant by ‘greater,’²¹ he endorses the conviction that ‘by “God” is meant the universal object of worship.’ Since, though, God is the one who is ‘rightly’ to be loved in ‘the unstinted way which is worship,’²² it follows both that there can be nothing superior to God either in reality or in possibility, and that God’s nature must be such as to attract and justify the total devotion of unreserved love.²³

On one hand this leads to what may be regarded as formal, metaphysical definitions of God as the ultimate reality, such as that ‘God is the *X* who is not conceivably surpassed, in any categorial way, by another’²⁴ and that God is the being which is ‘modally coincident with actuality and possibility in general’ in that the divine potentiality is co-extensive with possibility as such and the divine actuality with actuality as such.²⁵ On the other hand Hartshorne is concerned throughout his works to emphasise that for theistic religions ‘God’ is primarily to be regarded as ‘the One Who is Worshipped’²⁶ and may properly be worshipped ‘without incongruity by every individual no matter how exalted.’²⁷ Since, however, worship is most adequately understood as ‘a consciously unitary response to life’²⁸ in which the individual finds wholeness, God is consequently to be identified as ‘the all-inclusive reality’ which ‘cherishes all creatures’ and desires for them good ‘not yet attained.’ Furthermore, since in Hartshorne’s view ‘only supreme love can be supremely lovable,’ he maintains that an all-embracingly loving God—‘a cosmic love’ (or perhaps, better, a cosmic lover)—alone is worthy of unreserved ‘love with the whole of one’s being’.²⁹ Both these approaches, the primarily metaphysical and the primarily religious, are summarized in the claim that reference to God is to that which is essentially and necessarily ‘perfect’ in all its material qualities.³⁰

Apart from the suggestion that there may be potentiality in the divine reality, these attempts to identify what is meant by God are unlikely to be a cause of major unhappiness while they are confined to largely formal remarks. Nor, in spite of some modern reductionist

theories, are theists likely to be troubled by Hartshorne's rejection of the view that 'God' is a symbol for an abstract idea of supreme value. Although such an interpretation of talk about God might satisfy certain religious desires in that it denotes what may be regarded as totally unchanging as well as supreme, Hartshorne is fully committed to the theistic understanding that 'God' denotes a reality—although he is also concerned to point out that it denotes an ontologically unique reality whose mode of existence is 'necessary'. He thus implicitly regards as basically inadequate models of the divine perfection which present it as something wholly a priori and abstract—as if its status were similar to that of multiplication tables and logical truth-tables.

Where serious theistic controversy may arise is over the models of perfection which Hartshorne considers to be required for an adequate (so far as any human apprehension of the divine may be held to be adequate) and appropriate understanding of the divine. As 'the all-inclusive reality' which is the totally adequate object of worship, God's perfection is held to involve expression in primarily personal models. Although impersonal models like those of an ideally perfect data-recorder which notes every change in the environment or of an ideally perfect ball-bearing which never deforms whatever forces are applied to it or of a standard which never changes or of a marker-post which never shifts its position might be used with some justification to express characteristics of the divine awareness, strength, constancy and reliability, they are seriously deficient as descriptions of the divine reality unless they are augmented by models taken from personal modes of being which allow for conscious intention, awareness and response to be significantly predicable of the divine.

In *Philosophers Speak of God*, for example, Hartshorne and Reese analyse and classify the ways in which a large number of philosophers have treated the divine nature. The most adequate form of theism is held to be what is technically called 'panentheism'. This concept regards God as eternal in certain respects, temporal in others, consciously self-aware, knowing the world, and including the world as a constituent part of the divine being. The absence of any one of these characteristics is held to result in the concept of a being which fails to exemplify 'categorically supreme excellence.'³¹ Such a being cannot (both rationally and religiously cannot) serve as a proper object of unconditional worship because something higher than it can be envisaged. In the next section we will indicate how Hartshorne considers that these attributes may be coherently affirmed of one (the divine) reality. For the present, though, it is important to note that the panentheistic concept of God is incompatible with notions of God as a wholly impersonal locus of universal reactions or as a non-conscious instantiation of supreme value (whatever be the form in which the Good might be thus realized). The

five factors, when correctly interrelated, constitute a concept of the deity whose self-aware consciousness of self and of all others entails that 'will, freedom, personality, power' and 'goodness' are properly to be ascribed to the divine.³²

Hartshorne's God, that is, is not a totally blind and unfeeling Ground and Goal of reality that affects (or effects) all without the internal relationships of conscious intention and experience of the consequences. In *Man's Vision of God* he holds that the only metaphysical idea which provides a finally satisfying understanding of the cosmos is that of God as perfect love³³, while in *A Natural Theology for Our Time* he concludes that both metaphysical and theological quests find their ultimate solution in the discernment of God as the 'unsurpassably interacting, loving, presiding genius and companion of all existence' that is the one 'absolutely universal' individual who interacts with all others.³⁴ It is a concept of God which agrees with the Biblical witness to a deity of whom verbs of intention, activity, feeling and response are predicated and with believers' faith that the God whom they worship, trust and serve is one who has purposes which give ultimate meaning to life, is intimately aware of all that occurs, and exerts some influence on what happens. To sum all this in the statement 'God is love' is not to make an abstract remark about the supremacy of love as a quality but to describe the positive character of the agency which grounds the existence, stirs the process and cherishes the result of each and every occasion of being. The final issue that remains to be discussed is how Hartshorne develops on this basis a concept of God which does not undermine the proper deity of the divine and which not only allows but requires the recognition of change in certain aspects of the divine reality.

Dipolar panentheism

The concept of God which Hartshorne develops is an attempt to take account of the insights of the previous three factors in a rationally coherent and religiously satisfying manner. The result is what is sometimes called 'dipolar panentheism'. According to this position it is possible to affirm without being internally contradictory that the divine is necessary, absolute, unchanging and eternal in certain respects and is contingent, relative, changing and temporal in other respects.

The key to this insight is summed up in the statement that '“existence” is merely a relation of exemplification which actuality (any suitable actuality) has to essence.'³⁵ In recognizing, that is, the significance of the distinction between what may be called 'existence' and 'actuality', Hartshorne thus points out that an 'essence' may be said to *exist* if it is instantiated in *some* reality in *some* appropriate form but that

its *actuality* is the *particular, specific* form in which that essence is concretely realized.³⁶ What this means may be illustrated by considering the statement 'There is a desk in the next room.' So far as this statement is true, it reports that there exists something in the next room which meets the specification for what it is to be a 'desk'. The knowledge that this is so, however, does not tell us the precise character of that particular desk—what, for example, it is made of (wood or metal?), what condition it is in (worn or unused?), what are its dimensions, how many drawers it has, and so on. Nevertheless, for the desk to 'exist' at all, it must be real in one particular—i.e. 'actual'—way which will determine the correct answers to these questions. While, then, to state that an object 'exists' is to affirm that there is a reality whose characteristics lie within certain ranges of variables, it only exists as a particular actuality which is a combination of totally determinate points within that range.

In the case of all realities except the divine, their existence as well as their actuality is contingent, relative, changing and temporal. There is, for example, no necessity that a desk exists in the next room; if one does exist there its existence is not absolute, for its presence there is relative to earlier decisions to make it and to place it there—and it may be removed or destroyed; any desk that is there is not changeless—its very existence (as well as its actuality at any time) is subject to natural processes of decay and to the effects of its environment, and it will eventually be broken up to be discarded as rubbish or used as materials in the construction of something else; no desk there is eternal for it has once been made and at some future time will not be there or anywhere else as an existing entity.

God, in contrast, is the unique individual whose existence is necessary (nothing or no-one other than God causes God to be), absolute (nothing can prevent or bring an end to God's reality), unchanging (God is never anything other than fully divine) and eternal (there was no beginning and will be no end to the divine). These qualities distinguish the divine existence from that of all else. At the same time, this recognition of the uniqueness of the divine existence does not entail that the divine *actuality* must be similarly described. On the contrary, for God to exist as God in a way that is appropriate to being an actual object of worship that is self-aware, conscious, purposive and agential (i.e., as 'personal' and not simply as a cipher for supreme value), the particular form of the concretion of that existence (i.e., the divine actuality) must be *contingent* (e.g., God's actuality as the creator is contingent upon God's choice to be the creator of this particular cosmos rather than of some other possible cosmos), *relative* (e.g., the actual scope of God's gracious relationship to the creation is relative to what it contains to be related to—God cannot be gracious to what is not there to be an object of divine grace), *changing* (e.g., the form of God's grace in practice

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alters as the situations to which it is addressed change—the precise form of the divine attitude to Saul was presumably not the same as that to Paul), and *temporal* (e.g., God’s response to Paul as a follower of Jesus was not possible until after the Damascus Road incident).

How Hartshorne’s concept of God as a personal, self-conscious agent results in an understanding which both does justice to the deity of the divine and allows for appropriate modes of change in the divine reality can be illustrated by brief analyses of the ascription of knowledge and love to God. In the case of knowledge, it would be correct to say that *in principle* God’s knowledge is necessary (for a ‘God’ who is to be regarded as in any way ignorant would be inferior to ‘that than which a greater cannot be conceived’ and so would not be an adequate object of worship), absolute (for God cannot be thought of as unaware of anything that is knowable—and so reality may be defined as what God knows as such³⁷), unchanging (for each moment God knows all that is then knowable) and eternal (for God never forgets anything). Granted, however, that to be actual is to be in process, *in practice* the concrete actualization of the divine knowledge of the world is contingent (for God can only know what happens to be knowable—God cannot know as actual now what is not now the case), relative (for what God actually knows is what is the case), changing (for as novel events occur they add to the sum of what God knows to have happened) and temporal (for God does not know events as determinate until they have become determinate by happening). Similarly the divine love is *in principle* necessary (for God could not be other than loving), absolute (for God’s concern for the well-being of all others is without any imperfection or reserve), unchanging (for God’s love is never adulterated by other passions) and eternal (for God never has and never will cease to relate Godself to others as pure love). As in the case of knowledge (and of all the other material attributes of God), though, *in practice* the divine love is expressed—and has to be expressed—in concrete ways which are contingent (for God can only love what is there to be loved), relative (for what love means in practice differs according to the state of its object—to love someone despairing over their job-prospects requires a different expression of caring concern to that appropriate to loving someone euphoric in being pregnant), changing (for the form love for a person takes will vary according to the changing states of that person), and temporal (for again what is there to be loved and the most appropriate expression of love will alter as novel situations arise.)

What such an analysis of the character of the material attributes of God shows is that different sets of formal ‘qualifiers’ (to use I.T. Ramsey’s notion) are required properly to describe those attributes as they determine the divine existence in principle and as they portray the divine actuality in practice. Furthermore, if such material attributes are

to be significantly applied to the divine as a personal reality, then both forms of description are necessary.

Although it is not possible in an article to outline all the ways in which Hartshorne has developed his understanding of the nature of God, it is perhaps important not to end without indicating how he understands the relation of God to the world and the character of the divine perfection. As his description of his position as 'panentheist' suggests, Hartshorne rejects both the 'theism' which so divorces God (regarded—erroneously—as being in all respects necessary) and the world (as contingent) that it denies the possibility of any significant relationships between them, and the 'pantheism' which so identifies them that it fails to recognize the relative independence of the Creator and the creature. What he affirms is an understanding according to which all that happens in the world is experienced by God—and God is thus said to be 'the subject of all change'³⁸; but in affirming this he does not deny the respective autonomy of the creatures as contributing to the divine experience and of the Creator as aware of and responsive to the creatures in that they are relatively independent centres of consciousness. So far as the divine reality is concerned, this means that God is in actuality the opposite of an impassible deity whose awareness is completely untouched by whatever may happen in the contingent world—a deity whose bliss is timelessly to contemplate an unchanging divine essence. The divine relationship to the world does not find its perfection in sharing none of the creatures' experiences, nor is it deficient in experiencing only some of those experiences (e.g. the 'good' ones). The perfection of the divine, so far as relationship to the world is concerned, is partly constituted by embracing all that happens in the world within the divine experience. God may thus be said 'to participate without reserve in every last fragment of feeling and thought anywhere' and, 'because his sensitive sympathy is absolute in flexibility,' satisfies the religious idea of being the one 'to whom all hearts are completely open.'³⁹ On this basis Hartshorne maintains, on the one hand, that God participates in our sufferings as well as in our joys, since one cannot be concretely aware of such feelings without sharing in them,⁴⁰ and, on the other, that the point of our existence is

to enhance, not simply to admire or enjoy, the divine glory. Ultimately we are contributors to the ever-growing divine treasury of values. We serve God, God is not finally means to our ends. Our final and conclusive end is to contribute to the divine life.⁴¹

In terms of the divine relationship to the world, then, God is 'the imperishable and all appreciating Eminent Being' whose goal as all-inclusive good coincides with 'the good of all'.⁴²

As for the nature of the divine perfection, i.e., of the 'perfect'

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nature of the material qualities of the divine being, Hartshorne argues that the unsurpassability of the divine must be understood according to 'the principle of dual transcendence'.⁴³ What this means, in brief, is that while no other other being can ever surpass the divine (no one, for example, can know more comprehensively or love more purely than God does), nevertheless later states of the divine being may surpass earlier states in their incremental value. This does not imply that God is at any time imperfect. At t_1 God will know and, in love, totally appreciate all (absolutely all) that has been and is the case at that time. At, though, a later time, t_2 , God will know, love and appreciate not only all that the divine embraced at t_1 , but also all that has come to be between then and t_2 . Consequently God at each moment is unsurpassably 'perfect' in all the divine qualities but the personal activity and the relationship of God to the world mean that the divine perfection is misunderstood when it is analysed as a state of being 'completely made,' as 'that which in no respect could conceivably be greater, and hence is incapable of increase.' Instead, God is more adequately conceived as 'the self-surpassing surpasser of all' who 'has the power of unflinchingly enjoying as its own constituents ... all the values which the imperfect things severally and separately achieve' and therefore must, 'in any conceivable state of existence, be the "most excellent being"'.⁴⁴

Judging Hartshorne's analysis

Judgements on the validity of Hartshorne's analysis of the concept of God can be made in two ways. There is, first, the judgement as to whether the logical analysis of the terms is correct. Basically it is a question of whether the distinction between 'existence' and 'actuality' and the consequent dipolar exposition of the material qualities of the divine are to be accepted. Secondly, there is the judgement as to whether Hartshorne has correctly identified and expounded the nature of the divine. Here the question is fundamentally that of whether the ultimate in being, value and rationality is also to be regarded as significantly personal, self-aware, conscious of others and agential. On both counts the justification of Hartshorne's position is that it makes it possible to think in a rationally coherent manner of the 'God' of the biblical witness and of the practice of theistic belief. This is the God who, as Hartshorne himself writes, is

infinitely passive, the endurer of all change, the adventurer through all novelty, the companion through all vicissitudes. He is the auditor of all speech who should be heard because he has heard, and who should change our hearts because in every iota of our history we have changed his. Unchangeably right and adequate is his manner of changing in and with all

things, and unchangeably immortal are all changes, once they have occurred, in the never darkened expanse of his memory, the treasure house of all fact and attained value.⁴⁵

A major contribution of Hartshorne to understanding theism is to have indicated how it is coherent in thought as well as required by religious faith and adoration to conceive of God as the utterly absolute and the totally related—as the one whose unchanging existence is expressed in an appropriately changing actuality. At the same time it must be recognized that those who, as upholders of a medieval tradition, see the divine from a wholly ‘Appollonian’ perspective will be unconvinced by this introduction of ‘Dionysian’ elements into the divine reality.⁴⁶ In the end the question is that of the identification of what is to be meant by ‘God’.

- 1 Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, 1a, 3, 1.
- 2 *ibid.*, 1a, 9, 1.
- 3 One such argument maintains that change in what is perfect can only be towards relative degrees of imperfection and hence is inappropriately ascribed to the divine; cf. Charles Hartshorne, *Omnipotence and other Theological Mistakes*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984, p. 2.
- 4 cf. Charles Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism*, Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1964, pp. 3ff; *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1967, pp. 1ff.
- 5 For bibliographical details of Hartshorne's publications, cf. *Process Studies*, 6/1, Spring 1976 pp. 73—93 and 11/2, Summer 1981, pp. 108—112. Age (he was born in 1897) has not stopped him writing and he has continued to produce further material since then, including three books, *Omnipotence and other Theological Mistakes; Insights and Oversights of Great Thinkers: an Evaluation of Western Philosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983; and *Creativity in American Philosophy*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1984.
- 6 Hartshorne's *Man's Vision of God*, p. vii.
- 7 cf. Charles Hartshorne, *Reality as Social Process*, Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press and Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1953, p. 110; *Man's Vision of God*, pp. 6ff.
- 8 cf. Charles Hartshorne, *Whitehead's Philosophy: Selected Essays, 1935—1970*, Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1972, p. 162.
- 9 cf. Charles Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, London: SCM Press, 1970, p. 44.
- 10 Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, p. 256.
- 11 Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, pp. 44, 46.
- 12 Hartshorne, *Whitehead's Philosophy*, p. 76.
- 13 cf. *ibid.*, pp. 84ff.
- 14 Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection and Other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics*, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962, pp. 42f.
- 15 As for the argument that temporal successiveness is not appropriately to be applied to the divine reality, David Hume makes what is still a valid point, namely, that it is nonsense to speak of the Deity as having an ‘intelligent nature’ while having a ‘mind, whose acts and sentiments and ideas are not distinct and successive.’ A mind which is ‘totally immutable’ (which it would be if it were timeless) is a mind that has ‘no thought, no will, no sentiment ... or in a word, is no mind at all’—*Dialogues concerning Natural Religion*, Part IV.
- 16 Hartshorne, *Logic of Perfection*, p. 43.

- 17 Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, edited by D R Griffin and D W Sherburne, New York: Free Press, 1978, p. 343.
- 18 Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, p. 24; cf. pp. 19ff.
- 19 Charles Hartshorne, *Aquinas to Whitehead: Seven Centuries of Metaphysics of Religion*, Milwaukee: Marquette University Publications, 1976, pp. 15f.
- 20 cf. Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, p. 4.
- 21 cf. Charles Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery: A Re-Examination of the Ontological Proof for God's Existence*, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, pp. 26ff; *Man's Vision of God*, pp. 6ff; *Logic of Perfection*, p. 35.
- 22 Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery*, p. 26.
- 23 Although Hartshorne vigorously defends the ontological argument in the form of a modal argument about the necessity of the divine existence, I argue that it does not show that God exists but that the mode of the divine existence, if God exists, is that of necessary existence—cf. 'Some Comments on Hartshorne's Presentation of the Ontological Argument' in *Religious Studies*, October 1968, and 'An Introductory Survey of Charles Hartshorne's Work on Ontological Argument' in *Analecta Anselmiana*, Band 1, 1969. Nor, furthermore, is it the case that the greatest being in fact must be the proper object of worship and so necessarily God: the recognition, though, that the greatest actual being is not a proper definition of God is an advance in Anselm's thought from the *Monologion* to the *Prosligion*.
- 24 Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery*, p. 44.
- 25 Hartshorne, *Logic of Perfection*, p. 38.
- 26 Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, p. 3; cf. p. 17.
- 27 Hartshorne, *Logic of Perfection*, p. 40.
- 28 Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, p. 5.
- 29 *ibid.*, pp. 12ff; cf. p. 4; *Man's Vision of God*, p. 3.
- 30 cf. Hartshorne, *Logic of Perfection*, p. 40—but, as will be noted later, Hartshorne is concerned to make clear what is properly meant by 'perfection' in relation to the divine.
- 31 Charles Hartshorne and William L Reese, *Philosophers Speak of God*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 16.
- 32 *ibid.*, p. 22.
- 33 cf. Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, p. 346.
- 34 Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, pp. 136f.
- 35 Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery*, p. 131.
- 36 cf. *ibid.*, pp. xf, 38f.
- 37 cf. Hartshorne, *Creativity in American Philosophy*, p. 249.
- 38 cf. Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, pp. 251ff.
- 39 *ibid.*, p. 265.
- 40 cf. Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, p. 105; cf. *Aquinas to Whitehead*, pp. 43f.
- 41 *ibid.*, p. 43.
- 42 *ibid.*, p. 44.
- 43 cf. Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method*, pp. 227ff.
- 44 Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity: A Social Conception of God*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1948, pp. 19f.
- 45 Hartshorne, *Man's Vision of God*, p. 298.
- 46 cf. Theodore W Jennings, Jr., *Beyond Theism: A Grammar of God-Language*, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 247, n. 20.