
REVIEW ESSAYS

BEYOND HEGEMONY: U.S.-Latin American Relations in a "New World Order"?

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THE AMERICAS IN A NEW WORLD: THE 1990 REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE. By Inter-American Dialogue. (Washington, D.C., and Queenstown, Md.: Aspen Institute and University Press of America, 1990. Pp. 88. \$8.00.)

U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS. By Michael J. Kryzanek. Second edition. (New York: Praeger, 1990. Pp. 259. \$47.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.)

THE DANGEROUS DOCTRINE: NATIONAL SECURITY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. By Saul Landau. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1988. Pp. 201. \$24.95 cloth, \$9.95 paper.)

PARTNERS IN CONFLICT: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA IN THE 1990s. By Abraham F. Lowenthal. Revised edition. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990. Pp. 263. \$35.00 cloth, \$12.95 paper.)

EXPORTING DEMOCRACY: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal. (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991. Pp. 422. \$55.00 cloth.)¹

THE ORDEAL OF HEGEMONY: THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA. By Guy Poitras. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990. Pp. 214. \$34.95.)

LATIN AMERICA AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: OPPOSING VIEWPOINTS. Edited

1. The paperback edition is available in two volumes subtitled *Themes and Issues* and *Case Studies*, at \$12.95 each.

by Bonnie Szumski. (St. Paul, Minn.: Greenhaven Press, 1988. Pp. 239. \$7.95.)

FINDING OUR WAY? TOWARD MATURITY IN U.S.-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS. By Howard J. Wiarda. (Washington, D.C., and Lanham, Md.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, distributed by University Press of America, 1987. Pp. 286. \$27.50 cloth, \$16.75 paper.)

As the field of international relations faces the unprecedented changes in polarity, transnational activity, and the role of international actors that are said to constitute a "New World Order," scholars focusing on Latin America must struggle to register these changes in a regional context. Is there a "New World Order," either in the sense proclaimed by U.S. President George Bush or as a broader trend toward transnational interpenetration and the replacement of superpower conflict with regional concerns? How enduring are the new trends, and what do they mean for Latin America? Although the works under review differ over the extent and implications of these developments, all of them recognize a fundamental shift in the ability of the United States to control events in Latin America. Each of these treatments also considers the effects of inter-American relations on the welfare and options of Latin American states. From distinct perspectives, all argue for a pragmatic reassessment of U.S. policy toward Latin America according to new global interests and respect for Latin needs.

Although the works under review all offer analyses of these central issues in inter-American relations, they do not address each other directly and to a certain extent are aimed at different audiences. In part, this diversity reflects the threefold nature of inter-American relations as a subfield of Latin American studies: it is simultaneously an arena for testing theoretical propositions derived from international relations, a necessary supplement to area studies, and a source of policy guidance. Accordingly, while Howard Wiarda presents a collection of freestanding policy-oriented essays, the studies by Michael Kryzaneck and Abraham Lowenthal and the anthology edited by Bonnie Szumski are all intended to serve as texts. The Szumski anthology consists of excerpts from popular and scholarly works by activists as well as analysts, organized around five thematic questions concerning inter-American relations. The study by Saul Landau and the report of the Inter-American Dialogue (a group of some ninety Latin and North American scholars, former policymakers, and "leading citizens") have a clear policy focus. Only Guy Poitras's volume and the collection edited by Lowenthal, *Exporting Democracy*, make sustained theoretical arguments that are primarily oriented toward a scholarly (rather than classroom or policy) audience. *Exporting Democracy* comprises historical treatments of U.S. attempts to export democracy to Latin America by Paul Drake, Leslie Bethell, Tony Smith, and Thomas Carothers; country

case studies by Carlos Escudé, Heraldo Muñoz, Jonathan Hartlyn, Lorenzo Meyer, Joseph Tulchin, and Knut Walter; thematic analyses of the role of certain types of actors or policy processes by Elizabeth Cobbs, Paul Buchanan, John Sheahan, and Laurence Whitehead; and a concluding summary and extraction of policy prescriptions by Abraham Lowenthal. The theoretical and policy implications of these works will be discussed in this review, followed by a brief evaluation of the pedagogic value of the texts.

From "Special Relationship" to "New World Order"

The panoply of changes affecting inter-American relations are treated most systematically in the report of the Inter-American Dialogue and in Lowenthal's *Partners in Conflict*. At the international level, the most significant development is the effective end of bipolar competition in the Third World. Regardless of the outcome of domestic turmoil in what was the Soviet Union, Soviet influence and interest in Latin America have substantially diminished for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Landau, Poitras, and Lowenthal all argue that U.S. policymakers have traditionally over-emphasized the Soviet role in Latin conflict, especially in the upheaval in Central America.² Only Kryzanek (and Wiarda at times) continue to find "further penetration of the sphere [of U.S. influence] by the communist world" (p. 213), and Kryzanek's last three chapters reveal a progressive recognition of the emergence of economic and social concerns over strategic competition.

In a broader sense, both Latin America and the United States have become more open to a greater variety of international influences. As Poitras observes, "The Western Hemisphere idea—which holds to the tradition that the Americas is a special and unique sanctuary insulated from world politics—is dying as an economic reality . . ." (p. 33). Lowenthal and the Inter-American Dialogue report note rising Latin influence on the United States via transnational issues like debt, the environment, and migration, as well as growing Latin relations with Europe and Japan (although the Dialogue report introduces cautionary notes about the long-term viability of Latin diversification). Kryzanek and many of the contributors to *Exporting Democracy* (especially Cobbs and Buchanan) trace the influence of transnational actors such as business, labor, and ideological lobbyists. Finally, most of the authors note an increase in multilateral Latin activities and initiatives, from Cartagena to Esquipulas.

These changes in international relations establish key elements of

2. In order to avoid confusion, references to Lowenthal will pertain to the work he authored, *Partners In Conflict*, while the collection edited by Lowenthal will be cited by its title, *Exporting Democracy*.

the “New World Order” framework. Analysts diverge, however, in assessing the evolution, causes, and consequences of U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. The historical and case studies in *Exporting Democracy* argue that U.S. ability to pursue ideological goals and shape domestic institutions in Latin America has always been much more limited than is commonly assumed. Ongoing limitations in exporting democracy are traced to the predominance of local actors (Smith), inconsistency in bureaucratic or interest-based policy (Escudé), inherent contradictions in the U.S. concept or process of imposing democracy (Carothers, Hartlyn, Whitehead), or all of the above (Drake). Landau depicts a consistent contrasting tradition of ideologically legitimated U.S. dominance of the Third World, rooted in economic exploitation and (U.S.) domestic power elites.

In contrast, Poitras, Lowenthal, Kryzanek, and Wiarda all perceive reductions in the level of U.S. control over Latin America. Poitras examines bilateral measures of power and depicts an uneven area- and issue-specific decline in U.S. preponderance resulting in a condition of “asymmetric interdependence.” Lowenthal focuses on the diversification of Latin America’s power relationships, which has produced a retreat from the postwar peak of the “special relationship” (see especially pp. 36–39). Kryzanek laments “a slow but steady decline in this country’s ability to control events in our sphere of influence . . . , now in the throes of foreign competition, budding nationalism, and communist penetration” (p. 214). All agree that rising costs—domestic and diplomatic—governing the exercise of power exacerbate this decline.

Poitras’s overview identifies a variety of dynamics that are reducing hegemony, including power diffusion, strategic intrusion, Latin defection, the rise of the state in Latin America, and the lack of “political will” of U.S. policymakers (p. 31). While Poitras chronicles a blend of these international and domestic determinants, Wiarda and Kryzanek emphasize intrusion, defection, and loss of will (a strategic perspective). In a more classically liberal argument, Lowenthal stresses the “secular” factors of diffusion and (Latin) development while emphasizing the growth of new common interests in the Americas.

Each of these interpretations of the state of hegemony has different implications for the management of U.S. relations with Latin America. Although several of these arguments point to structural factors as determinants of the shifting balance of power, they also prescribe policies to adjust to it or even arrest it. Wiarda favors “updated containment,” Lowenthal and Poitras urge cooperation, and Landau lobbies for nonintervention. Each of these prescriptions contains assumptions about and reassessments of the national interest.

Defining the National Interest

Wiarda's call for "maturity" in inter-American relations entails a broader and more sophisticated version of fundamentally traditional U.S. concerns. In his *Finding Our Way*, the national interest is based on security, informed by a long-term vision of Latin development along indigenous but incremental lines that do not contradict U.S. economic and social goals. Wiarda explains, "Ultimately, U.S. policy in the Caribbean and Central America must be judged by its influence on Cuba and the Soviet Union" (p. 265). For Wiarda, change mandates different means rather than different ends: more sustained and professional attention to Latin America; appropriate and coordinated military, economic, and educational exchange; and a respect for Latin "local models." But the real question is, whose local models? On this last point, Wiarda conflates the divergent interests within Latin societies creating the social conflict that is perceived by conservatives as a threat to U.S. security. Similarly, Poitras and Kryzanek tend to report rather than analyze policymakers' claims about the national interest, formulated in terms of the traditional bipartisan consensus.

Lowenthal and Landau are the ones who, from different perspectives, explicitly challenge traditional notions of U.S. interests in Latin America (this point is also addressed by Mark Hendrickson and Rafael Hernández in the Szumski volume). Lowenthal systematically reexamines and demotes U.S. security interests in favor of a focus on U.S. values and resource flows (of finance, trade, migration, drugs, and pollution). Modern military technologies make tight regional control increasingly irrelevant, and the United States has lived with an established, Soviet-allied Communist regime in Cuba for more than thirty years. According to this view, inter-American conflict is based on misperception regarding the national interest. Enlightened self-interest will lead to an investment in issue-based partnership and retreat from the security-based obsession with Central America. Landau directly attacks the definition of national interest as national security that has rationalized U.S. intervention throughout the Third World. He counterposes the hegemonic influence (in the Gramscian sense) of a "national security elite" to a national interest legitimately based on national values—democracy at home and nonintervention abroad. Landau's analysis in *The Dangerous Doctrine* brings out a critical issue ignored or slighted by most: the detrimental effects of national security policy on democracy within the United States. Although many of the works under review discuss the impact of domestic politics on foreign policy (Kryzanek, Wiarda, *Exporting Democracy*), only Landau explores the impact of foreign policy on U.S. domestic politics. In Landau's view, misspecification of the national interest is neither inappropriate political technology (in the style of Wiarda) nor misperception (as Lowenthal

would assert) but a manipulation of the U.S. public and U.S. policymakers by a national security apparatus seeking power and defending profit.

This important and historically rich challenge nevertheless leaves some analytic and prescriptive issues unresolved. First, the idea of a national security elite is a slippery concept. At times, Landau depicts the apparatus as a collective defender of corporate interests, while at others, the state is characterized as being relatively autonomous (for example, his account of U.S. intervention in Chile stresses security interests over corporate involvement).³ Although Landau's historical cases reveal the bureaucratic politics of national security policy, the national security elite is not always institutionally located. The general argument pits the executive branch against more representative institutions, but according to Landau, under President John Kennedy "the elite turned on the rhetoric of democracy and let it flow from the mouths of the President and his key associates and allies" (pp. 77–78).

An unfortunate corollary of Landau's lack of clarity in defining the problem is the sketchiness in the solution he offers. Greater public awareness of and participation in the policy-making process (democracy at home) is assumed to favor nonintervention and to allow possibilities for self-determination (one interpretation of democracy abroad). Although Landau introduces a new argument for nonintervention as enlightened self-interest (the defense of democracy at home), U.S. anti-interventionism has more often been based on isolationism than on domestic or international principle. His normatively laudable faith in popular will is being tested by post-cold war popular support for military adventures in Panama and the Persian Gulf. Around the world, nationalism seems a more resilient force even than empire.

The Role of Ideology

The struggle between power and principle is an enduring theme in international relations. One of the critical questions about the possibility of a New World Order is whether it represents a new set of power relations, a new dedication to principle, or a new relation between power and principle. Ideology plays a variety of roles in defining hegemony and national interest. Ideology is at the same time a dimension of hegemony, a component of national interest, and a filter for defining both. Events such as the Nicaraguan elections of 1990 demonstrate a complex interplay of

3. The leading role of strategic concerns in U.S. intervention in the Third World is supported by several recent analyses: Stephen D. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); Harold Molineu, *U. S. Policy toward Latin America: From Regionalism to Globalism* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990); and Elizabeth Cobbs's study of the role of U.S. business in *Exporting Democracy*, 264–95.

power and ideology at many levels: the Sandinistas' ideological support in resisting U.S. pressure for so long, the Contras' ideological appeal for U.S. aid, the Reagan administration's shift from power- to principle-based arguments to gain domestic backing, and the independent influence of a new international ideology of electoral democracy in producing and enforcing the victory of Violeta Chamorro.

In *The Ordeal of Hegemony*, Poitras treats ideology as a subjective dimension of hegemony in the dual sense of U.S. political will to deploy power resources and Latin adoption of U.S. perspectives and internalized habits of conformity along with them. He locates this loss of credibility and consensus as the fastest-slipping aspect of U.S. hegemony. But Poitras also underlines the circular nature of subjective hegemony: overcommitment in response to subjective challenge accelerates the crisis of confidence of U.S. power and attitudes toward it. This formulation is a useful corrective to the cruder concept of political will employed by analysts such as Kryzaneck, in which recalcitrant publics and paralyzed bureaucracies undercut the symbolic assertion of dominance necessary for deterrence in the U.S. sphere of influence (pp. 229–30).

As a component of the national interest served by hegemony, ideology can be viewed as a goal rather than as a mechanism of U.S. policy in Latin America. The missionary impulse in U.S. foreign policy has distinguished U.S. hegemony from other great power experiences, and nowhere more so than in its special relationship with Latin America. From Manifest Destiny to the War on Drugs, the United States has attempted to export its values and project domestic social problems onto its weaker neighbors. The promotion of democracy has drawn on and even forged a wide political consensus. Until recently, however, U.S. promotion of democracy was criticized only for ineffectiveness or insincerity in specific cases. It is an ironic measure of hegemonic reassessment that U.S. attempts to export democracy are now being subjected to scrutiny as such by a wide spectrum of analysts.

The essays in *Exporting Democracy* take up the gauntlet laid down by Wiarda in his provocative essay, "Can Democracy Be Exported?" in *Finding Our Way*. Wiarda questions the effectiveness and appropriateness of U.S. promotion of democracy in Latin America, concluding that U.S. attempts to export democracy have served neither U.S. nor Latin interests. Paralleling the contributors to Lowenthal's *Exporting Democracy*, Wiarda criticizes U.S. use of democratic ideology to promote hegemonic interests (Hartlyn), failure to reconcile ideological and material components of national interest (Escudé and Meyer), overestimation of international influence on domestic political processes, and insensitivity to Latin sovereignty and concerns (Whitehead and Lowenthal).

But Wiarda's most controversial claim—that Latin America does not necessarily want to be democratic—is challenged by several of the case

studies in *Exporting Democracy* and by the direct appeal by Latin policy-makers and scholars found in the report of the Inter-American Dialogue. Some of Wiarda's criticisms of Latin democracy may be (unintentionally) useful in expanding understanding of democracy, while others verge on the ethnocentrism he so ably attacks in other contexts. Wiarda's contention that Latin Americans often value the common good, popular will, democratic social forms, and national self-determination more than they value electoral and institutional mechanisms should broaden but also toughen scholarly assessment of Latin democracy while checking the U.S. tendency towards "electoralism." But Wiarda's attempt to draw conclusions about Latin attitudes toward democracy from Latin American history and constitutional traditions is complicated by the very U.S. role and ideology that he critiques. In this sense, "indigenous Latin forms of democracy" call to mind the comment attributed to Gandhi about "Western Civilization": "What an interesting idea that would be."

Furthermore, some of the aspersions that Wiarda casts on Latin paths toward democracy lack comparative context. He questions the legitimacy of Latin democratization because it is elite-generated, yet comparative studies ranging from Robert Dahl's *Polyarchy* to Philippe Schmitter's and Guillermo O'Donnell's *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* have shown that most democracies throughout the world have been initiated by elites.⁴ Nor is Latin commitment to democracy impugned by attributing transitions to the exhaustion of alternative models. Few have criticized Eastern Europeans similarly disillusioned with economic failures and state brutality for their lack of Jeffersonian vision.

The foregoing argument illustrates the final potential role of ideology in inter-American relations: before it becomes a goal or mechanism of foreign policy, ideology may first serve as a filter for assessing national interest. The appeals by Lowenthal and the Inter-American Dialogue report for rational cooperation in order to reap mutual benefit from global changes thus may founder on incommensurable worldviews within and between the Americas. Groups within the United States and in Latin American nations hold competing beliefs about development strategies and distribution that result in socially desired but economically suboptimal resource flows (especially in trade and migration). Countries measure national interest in terms of relative and short-run gains rather than absolute, long-term gains. This distinction can be perceived in the inter-American debate on environmental issues: countries like Brazil reject a disproportionate sacrifice of immediate development that would ulti-

4. Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971); and *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

mately and “rationally” benefit their own overall condition. The hand of history lies heavy on a region where the United States has intervened directly almost forty times in the twentieth century. This overwhelming legacy has perpetuated reflexive U.S. views of Latin autonomy as intrinsically threatening and has given a reactive character to Latin nationalism.

International Forces and Latin National Interests

If changes in hegemony lead to a reassessment of U.S. national interest and ideology, what do they mean for Latin America? First, how much has hegemony changed for Latin America? The issue- and country-specific disparities in hegemonic decline noted by Poitras and Lowenthal are much more significant for Latin America than they are for the United States. For U.S. citizens, debt is only one issue among many (and a countervailing area of renewed dominance); for Latins, it is a crushing and omnipresent burden that is destroying their societies and undermining their options. Yet despite the crisis, regional powers like Brazil assert their interests and diversify their foreign relations, while client-states like Panama live in a world little changed from the era of the Big Stick.

Nevertheless, a curious convergence has occurred within extremely diverse Latin American states on electoral democracy and internationally oriented market economies (see the Inter-American Dialogue report, pp. 7–8). On the one hand, this nearly universal domestic realignment in accordance with U.S. models may be viewed as a continuation or ideological internalization of hegemony—Bush’s version of the New World Order as Pax Americana and end of history. On the other hand, this Latin trend draws as much on global events as on regional developments, and in this sense it bolsters the normalizing of Latin America’s international relations and further deterioration of the special relationship.

A century of U.S. hegemony shaped a nationalist view that set the parameters of Latin discourse, in which all international influences were viewed as prejudicial to sovereignty and self-determination, and thus to national interest. That view is now being reexamined from several different angles. In the areas of continued hegemony, Latin internationalists may fit the old *vendepatria* model—sacrificing national interest to personal gain. But as U.S. investment in Latin America wanes and Central American dissidents seek refuge in the United States while drug traffickers fight extradition, the United States is playing a reduced and more ambiguous role in shaping Latin American affairs. Many pragmatic Latin Americans sincerely seek to use foreign involvement to serve a revised concept of national interest. For example, the Mexican debate on the North American Free Trade Zone cuts across historic lines in defining the national interest for Mexican leaders, workers, capital, consumers, and dissidents.

Even more important, transnational and nonstate actors are play-

ing a growing and increasingly progressive role in inter-American relations, as is reflected in *Exporting Democracy*, the Inter-American Dialogue report, and the Kryzanek monograph. These actors include economically based transnational forces, ideologically oriented social movements, and traditional international organizations. The negative transnational influence of multinational corporations has been amply explored, but two of the essays in *Exporting Democracy* question this conventional wisdom. Elizabeth Cobbs shows that U.S. business can often live with (stable) reform in Latin America better than U.S. policymakers can—and may even try to moderate security-inspired destabilization policies in the interests of “business as usual.” A more subtle challenge to the view that the internationalization of capital is inherently exploitative and must be combated by greater labor organization is Paul Buchanan’s study of the “contradictory nature of U.S. labor’s Latin America policy” (p. 323). Surprisingly, none of the works considered provide a systematic treatment of the role of international organizations, although the Inter-American Dialogue report, *Exporting Democracy*, and Poitras’s study (pp. 184–85) make specific policy recommendations that involve international lending organizations, the Organization of American States, and multilateral Latin groups.

Perhaps the most intriguing development is the emergence of value-based nongovernmental organizations acting in transnational coalitions. Kryzanek considers the U.S. human rights lobby, while Muñoz discusses (in *Exporting Democracy*) the importance of Chilean church and human rights groups in democratization. But the importance of international human rights groups, journalists, and solidarity networks is strangely absent from Escudé’s study of Argentina and from Tulchin and Walter’s work on Nicaragua. Grass-roots movements for social change in Latin America, from ecology to feminism to Indian rights, turn increasingly to the international system for resources and countervailing power within their own societies. This important and burgeoning area of transnational influence deserves greater scholarly attention. Taken together, the spectrum of transnational trends indicate that Latin national interests may come to be defined by filtering and balancing rather than by simply rejecting international influences.

Pedagogy and Policy

As noted earlier, this group of works serves a variety of purposes in providing scholarly, pedagogical, and policy guidance. It is thus only fair to round out the theoretical discussion by evaluating the texts and advocacy pieces on their own terms.

Among the textbooks, Kryzanek’s study provides the most comprehensive history and a good account of the U.S. foreign-policy process,

although his work is uncritical of U.S. policy and relies on dated figures and assumptions. Lowenthal's *Partners in Conflict* provides students with a thoughtful and accessible start that also acquaints them with developments in Latin America. His text will work best when supplemented with more detailed historical and institutional background. It also offers an excellent and well-organized bibliography. *Latin America and U.S. Foreign Policy*, the anthology edited by Bonnie Szumski, addresses well-chosen issues and includes some good readings (such as *Americas Watch* and Ted Galen Carpenter on human rights, and Fidel Castro on the debt), while introducing critical thinking activities that are evidently new to many students. The human rights section is dated, however, while the issue of "what form of government" is framed in such narrow terms as to limit its relevance, and the section introductions and overall sense of how the individual issues fit together are underdeveloped.

Nearly all the authors offer some policy prescriptions, but this section will concentrate on those framed predominantly as advocacy. The more targeted of Wiarda's essays in *Finding Our Way* present a defense of Reagan administration policy in Latin America and the Kissinger Commission report (in which Wiarda participated). He rejects Ronald Reagan's reassertionist rhetoric. But he depicts and endorses a model in which the moderating tendencies of U.S. politics produce a compromise policy of pragmatically preserving basic U.S. strategic hegemony, with increased respect for Latin autonomy in areas not essential to this goal.

The Inter-American Dialogue report, *The Americas in a New World*, advocates a multilateral, issue-oriented approach toward common problems (although dissenting members point out that the definition of common problems may incorporate bias). A distinguishing feature of this report is its emphasis on mutual adjustment and the need for change in North as well as South America.

Landau's *Dangerous Doctrine* seeks to reorient U.S. foreign policy fundamentally throughout the world (Chapters 6 through 13 focus most heavily on Latin America). His extensive citations of U.S. policymakers seek to expose hypocrisy and illegitimate motives in their activities in the Third World. Landau advocates changes in U.S. ideology and power structure as the key to international peace. These disparate policy analysts—Landau, Wiarda, and the authors of the Inter-American Dialogue report along with Poitras and Lowenthal in his summary of *Exporting Democracy*—all find common ground in advocating a sharply reduced and reoriented U.S. involvement in Latin America.

Beyond Hegemony?

The works under review address major changes taking place in the Americas and the world. Collectively, they set out the critical questions in

inter-American relations. Will Latin America be the last bastion of an uneven and fading U.S. hegemony? Will it find new patrons among the rising powers, or will the southern part of America finally achieve autonomy? As U.S. influence wanes and material, institutional, and political resources diminish, who will bear the burden of adjustment? Can increasing attempts at intra-Latin American regional cooperation bridge the gap?

A final possibility is the emergence of a new world disorder, with diverse and even contradictory trends in inter-American relations. In a world where Europe is unifying as Yugoslavia collapses, U.S. relations with Latin America may become more hemispheric (via a strengthened Organization of American States and a free-trade zone) and yet more bilaterally differentiated. In relations beyond ongoing issue-based partners like Mexico, U.S. policy may well revert to the prehegemonic norm of episodic and unpredictable involvement. Even the fixed framework of the relationship—geographic proximity—will have different implications at specific times and places, reflecting changes in military, industrial, and information technologies. This possibility is unsettling, especially to scholars trained to search for patterns and paradigms. But it could provide new options for all of the Americas, and it could become an unfolding test of the relationship between history, structure, and ideology.