represented within it. While abundant evidence is presented to prove that political expediency governed Lenin's approach to the soviets, it is interesting that Anweiler's own description of Menshevik leadership of the soviets suggests a kind of "agonized" expediency in their attitudes and behavior as well. Menshevik principles did not preclude attempts to influence and lead the soviets; and the Bolsheviks, although they were more enthusiastic, did not generally treat the soviet as the answer to a revolutionary's prayer.

Anweiler does not explore the origin and development of soviets in relation to the old commune assemblies (*skhody*), although he does note that after 1917, soviets were often slow to take root in the countryside because they so resembled these assemblies (p. 236). His focus is on Russian Marxism and the triumph of a Bolshevik state, which destroyed the democratic aspects of the soviet movement. Unfortunately, in this account, the soviets never really emerge as popular democratic institutions; they seem to take on substance only as they are observed and organized by various left-wing political parties. Such an approach is especially problematic in dealing with the soviets of 1905 (which were not generally dominated by political parties), and it does not clearly illuminate the problems of policy and administration confronted by the inexperienced soldier and peasant delegates to the soviets in 1917 or afterward. On the other hand, Anweiler's approach becomes increasingly useful when he describes the Bolsheviks' growing monopolization of political power. The author's description of the connection between Lenin's unsuccessful efforts to check the bureaucratization of the soviets and Lenin's own models for political organization is particularly interesting. Concentration on Bolshevik attitudes and behavior provides a solid, if partial, explanation of the soviets' fate after 1917.

It is a pity that this study has not been revised to take account of recent scholarship. While the author claims that the book's overall conception, conclusions, and framework remain valid, reference to other studies could have added depth to his inadequate treatment of the soviet as an aspect of Russian—and not only Marxist—social and political history. Some of these studies include: Von Laue and Zelnik's work on the *artel'* and peasant traditions of Russian proletarians; the investigations of the Socialist Revolutionaries and anarchists carried out by Radkey, Pershin, and Avrich; and Moiseeva's work on peasant soviets.

All in all, the strength of Anweiler's work lies in his perceptive analysis of Marxist leaders in relation to the soviet; a study of the role of soldiers, peasants, or workers in soviets remains to be written.

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THE SEALED TRAIN. By *Michael Pearson*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1975. x, 320 pp. + 8 pp. photographs. $8.95.

The author, a British journalist, has attempted to write a popular history of the Russian Revolution, focusing on Lenin's role in the Bolshevik seizure of power. More than one-third of the volume is devoted to the "sealed" train episode—the trip which brought the Bolsheviks from Switzerland to Petrograd in April 1917—because Pearson's main point is the crucial role of the German government and German money in Lenin's rise to power. Commendably, the author, with the aid

of translators, has consulted a wide range of Russian sources, especially memoirs of people who either accompanied Lenin on the train or who surrounded him after his return to Russia.

While the book will suffice as a popular introduction to 1917, and while it does relate incidents and details previously unavailable in English, from a scholarly perspective it adds little to our understanding of the Russian Revolution. The author provides few notes to indicate sources of specific information; his use of memoirs is often uncritical and questionable; interpretations, especially those relating to the impact of German money on Lenin, are dubious and overdrawn; and his account of the October Revolution completely ignores Professor Robert V. Daniels's *Red October*, preferring, instead, Trotsky's self-serving assessment. Pearson shows little understanding of why the Bolsheviks—regardless of the support they may have received from Germany—could so successfully exploit their resources. These and other problems significantly attenuate the value of this work for the reader seriously interested in the Russian Revolution.

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THE 'RED YEARS': EUROPEAN SOCIALISM VERSUS BOLSHEVISM, 1919–1921. By *Albert S. Lindemann*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974. xviii, 349 pp. $15.75.

Albert S. Lindemann's study deals with an important period in our recent history, the encounter between Western European Socialist parties and the October 1917 Revolution in Russia. The book is an objective, scholarly inquiry into a highly controversial subject—the conditions prevailing in the years immediately following World War I. Lindemann sees the development of the internal conflicts within Western European Socialist parties—and later between the proletarian parties in Germany, Italy, and France—essentially in the context of local conditions, which determined the splits and the ensuing fratricide. This approach follows, in a way, the ideas of the late Russian Menshevik Julius Martov, one of the most brilliant exponents of Russian socialism of the pre-October era. In his book, *Mirovoi Bol'shevizm* (Berlin, 1924), Martov analyzes the genesis of the Bolshevik ideology and psychology that emerged in Europe as a result of the horrors of World War I, and the ensuing social crisis that dislocated the very structure of European society.

Lindemann devotes much of his study to an analysis of the situation in the Socialist parties of Germany, Italy, and France, and the interrelationships between the leaders of various factions. He concludes that the failures of Western socialism were caused not only by local conditions, but also by differences dividing the various factions of the Socialist movement and the inability of these factions to establish mutual confidence and a disciplined basis for collaborative efforts directed toward their goals. The Comintern, of course, did what it could to use local conditions to suit its own purposes. Nevertheless, the splits within the Western Socialist parties were primarily a result of social trends existing before the Bolsheviks took power in Russia.

In his discussion of militants in the workers' movements in the West, Lindemann points to some similarities in the reaction of the Socialists of various Western countries to the emergence of bolshevism, and he groups these militants