

The Afghanistan war and the breakdown of the Soviet Union

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Abstract. The breakdown of the Soviet Union surprised most scholars of international relations, comparative politics, and Soviet politics. Existing explanations attribute the breakdown of the Soviet Union to the reformist leadership of Gorbachev, and/or to systemic factors. These explanations do not focus on the key contribution of the war in Afghanistan. This is surprising since many scholars view wars as key causal factors in empire breakdown and regime change. We argue that the war in Afghanistan was a key factor, though not the only cause, in the breakdown of the Soviet Union. The war impacted Soviet politics in four reinforcing ways: (1) *Perception effects*: it changed the perceptions of leaders about the efficacy of using the military to hold the empire together and to intervene in foreign countries; (2) *Military effects*: it discredited the Red Army, created cleavage between the party and the military, and demonstrated that the Red Army was not invincible, which emboldened the non-Russian republics to push for independence; (3) *Legitimacy effects*: it provided non-Russians with a common cause to demand independence since they viewed this war as a Russian war fought by non-Russians against Afghans; and (4) *Participation effects*: it created new forms of political participation, started to transform the press/media before *glasnost*, initiated the first shots of *glasnost*, and created a significant mass of war veterans (*Afghansti*) who formed new civil organizations weakening the political hegemony of the communist party.

Introduction

Next to the two world wars, the rise and the breakdown of the Soviet Union are probably the most important political events of this century. This breakdown is often attributed to systemic and/or leadership factors. The Afghanistan war, as a key factor for the breakdown, is not emphasized. Systemic explanations suggest that collapse was inevitable due to domestic problems (such as inefficient central planning and ethnic problems) and/or structural problems (such as the Cold War and the increasing economic gap between the Soviet Union and the West).² Leadership-based explanations emphasize the roles of political leaders (particularly Gorbachev and Shevardnadze) and the Soviet elites.³

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² Valerie Bunce, 'The Soviet Union under Gorbachev: Ending Stalinism and Ending the Cold War', *International Journal*, 46 (1991), pp. 220–41; Alec Nove, *The Soviet System in Retrospect: An Obituary Notice* (New York: Herrman Institute, Columbia University, 1993); Manuel Castells and Emma Kiselyova, *The Collapse of Soviet Communism: A View from the Information Society* (Berkeley, CA: International and Area Studies, University of California, 1995).

³ Mary McAuley, 'Soviet Political Reform in a Comparative Context', *The Harriman Institute Forum* 2 (1989), pp. 1–8; Bunce, 'The Soviet Union under Gorbachev'; S. M. Miller, 'Realizing Perestroika', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change*, 14 (1992); Sarah E. Mendelson, 'Internal Battles and External Wars', *World Politics*, 45 (April, 1993).

Yet systemic and leadership-based explanations inadequately address two key sets of questions. First, why did the physical break-up begin towards the end of the 1980s and the Soviet Union finally collapse in 1991? Why only in the mid-1980s did the Soviet leaders acknowledge the impossibility of sustaining their economic and foreign policies? Though the Soviet economy had deteriorated in the 1980s, it was not on the verge of an immediate breakdown. Moreover, in the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviets were, for the first time, on military parity with the United States.⁴

Second, why did the Soviet leaders tolerate the non-Russian secessionist movements? Why did they not employ the Soviet Army to suppress these movements as they had done in Czechoslovakia (1968), Hungary (1956), and East Germany (1953)?

Tilly attributes the breakdown of empires to major external or internal wars. He observes that between 1986 and 1992, the Soviet Union went through:

[O]ne of Europe's more peculiar revolutions: the shattering of an empire and the dismantling of its central structure *without the direct impact of a war* . . . the costly stalemate in Afghanistan, itself a product of a hugely expensive Cold War with the United States, provided the *closest equivalent* to those earlier empire-ending wars.⁵ [italics ours].

Yet, Tilly does not explain the etiology of the breakdown. We begin where Tilly left off.

Most scholars typically have viewed the Afghanistan war as a minor and containable conflict that had minimal impact on the basic institutions of the Soviet system. However, we view this war as one of the key causes, along with systemic and leadership-based factors, in the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The repeated failures in this war changed the Soviet leadership's perception of the efficacy of using force to keep non-Soviet nationalities within the Union (*perception effects*), devastated the morale and legitimacy of the army (*military effects*), disrupted domestic cohesion (*legitimacy effects*), and accelerated *glasnost* (*glasnost effects*). These effects operated synergistically. War failures weakened the military and conservative anti-reform forces and accelerated *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Importantly, these failures demonstrated that the Soviet army was not invincible, thereby encouraging non-Russian republics to push for independence with little fear of a military backlash.

This article has three parts. First, we briefly review the literature on the Soviet Union's breakdown. Next, we outline the role of the Afghanistan war in the breakdown of the Soviet Union and provide evidence in support of our contention. Finally, we present the conclusions of this essay.

Existing explanations of the Soviet Union's breakdown

According to systemic explanations, the Soviet system of the 1970s was facing a severe crisis due to inefficient central planning and principal-agent problems⁶

⁴ Though Soviet leaders did view the Star Wars programme as threatening this parity.

⁵ Charles Tilly, *European Revolutions, 1492–1992* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 231.

⁶ On principal-agent problems leading to governmental failures, see Charles Wolf, Jr., 'A Theory of Non-Market Failures', *Journal of Law and Economics*, 22 (1979).

inherent in gargantuan bureaucracies.⁷ These factors increased economic and technological gaps between the Soviet Union and the capitalist West. To bridge this gap, systemic reforms were needed. These reforms, once initiated, spun out of control and led to the breakdown of the Soviet Union.⁸

Fukuyama asserts that the collapse of the Soviet Union was inevitable given the inherent superiority of democracy over totalitarianism and of capitalism and free markets over communism and centralized planning.⁹ Others argue that in the 1980s, the Soviet economy had stopped growing almost entirely and that economic imperatives led to its collapse. Since the Soviet economy could not meet the demand for consumer goods from the rising urban middle class, it began losing their support.¹⁰ Incremental economic and political reforms were sabotaged by an alliance of corrupt central and regional leaders. *Perestroika*, a large-scale systemic reform, was initiated to overcome these obstacles. However, it turned into a Frankenstein, causing the breakdown of the Soviet Union.¹¹

Other systemic explanations emphasize the high costs that the Cold War imposed on the Soviet Union.¹² For example, Ikle argues that the 'Soviet system, in harness with communism, destroyed the Soviet economy and thus hastened the self-destruction of the Soviet empire'.¹³ Other scholars argue that the Soviet Empire was overstretched, emphasizing the large military forces required to hold it, the economic burden associated with subsidizing the Eastern European economies, the cost of curbing unrest in Eastern Europe, and the financial support provided to third world countries.¹⁴ Finally, some scholars attribute the collapse to internal ethnic tensions. Once *glasnost* permitted some freedom, secessionist voices grew stronger. Secessionists perceived Moscow's attempts to accommodate their demands as a sign of Moscow's weakness, and choosing to exploit this weakness, they demanded independence.¹⁵

⁷ For example, Dallin and Lapidus observe that 'the [Soviet] system was [already] on the threshold of major crisis.' See, A. Dallin and G. Lapidus, 'The Roots of Perestroika', in A. Dallin and G. Lapidus (eds.), *The Soviet System in Crisis: A Reader of Western and Soviet Views* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 9.

⁸ For the role of international factors see, Jack Snyder, 'The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?' *International Security*, 12 (Winter, 1987–8); Jack Snyder, 'International Leverage on Soviet Domestic Change', *World Politics*, 41 (October, 1989); and Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The International Sources of Soviet Change', *International Security*, 16 (Winter 1991–2). For domestic factors see, S. Bialer, 'Domestic and International Factors in the Formations on Gorbachev's Reforms,' in A. Dallin and G. Lapidus (eds.), *The Soviet System in Crisis, A Reader of Western and Soviet Views* (San Francisco, CA: Westview Press, 1991).

⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

¹⁰ M. Kort, *The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1992).

¹¹ Timothy Colton, *The Dilemma of Reform in the Soviet Union* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1986).

¹² Casper Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon* (New York: Warner, 1990); Richard K. Herrmann, 'Soviet Behavior in Regional Conflicts', *World Politics*, 44 (April, 1992).

¹³ Charles Ikle, 'Comrades in Arms: The Case for Russian–American Defense Community', *The National Interest*, 26 (Winter, 1992), p. 28.

¹⁴ Bunce, 'The Soviet Union under Gorbachev', pp. 224–5, Bialer, 'Gorbachev's Reforms', pp. 34–5, Miller, 'Realizing Perestroika', pp. 242–3, Franzke, J. 'An Empire Under the Red Banner: Considerations About the End of the USSR', *WeltTrends*, 6 (1995), pp. 55–75.

¹⁵ Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *The End of the Soviet Empire: The Triumph of the Nations* (New York: Basic Books, 1993); Miller, 'Realizing Perestroika'; Daniel Klenbort, 'On Soviet Communism', *The National Interest*, 32 (Summer, 1993), p. 107.

Leadership-based explanations focus on the roles of Gorbachev and his team in the breakdown.¹⁶ The crux of this argument is that the Soviet system was basically stable and could have lasted for a longer time, were it not for the policies of Soviet leaders. As the former US Secretary of State James Baker put it, this transformation ‘would not have begun were it not for him [Gorbachev]’.¹⁷ Some leadership-based explanations also focus on the roles of non-political elites such as Soviet epistemic communities, which, in a symbiotic relationship with political leaders, contributed to key policy changes.¹⁸ However, as suggested previously, such explanations are under-specified in that they fail to address two critical questions. First, why did the disintegration of the Soviet Union begin towards the end of the 1980s? Second, why only in the mid-1980s did the Soviet leaders acknowledge the impossibility of sustaining their economic and foreign policies?

The Afghanistan war and the Soviet collapse

Major wars critically impact domestic politics by producing durable social changes and by redistributing political power among groups.¹⁹ An established literature explains how major wars may make as well as break states.²⁰ Surprisingly, the extant explanations on the Soviet breakdown underemphasize the impact of the Afghanistan war.²¹

The Soviets intervened in Afghanistan in December 1979. In retrospect, it was unthinkable in 1979 that the Soviet empire could collapse, let alone fall apart almost within a decade. Though the Afghanistan war initially was visualized by Soviet leaders as a small-scale intervention, it grew into a decade-long war involving nearly one million Soviet soldiers, killing and injuring some tens of thousands of them.²²

¹⁶ Hannes Adomeit, ‘Gorbachev, German Unification, and the Collapse of Empire’, *Post Soviet Affairs*, 10 (1994), pp. 197–230.

¹⁷ Quoted in Charles W. Kegley Jr., ‘How did the Cold War Die? Principles for an Autopsy’, *Mershon International Studies Review*, 38 (1994), p. 23.

¹⁸ Mendelson, ‘Internal Battles and External Wars’.

¹⁹ Jack Goldstone, ‘Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation’, *World Politics*, 32 (1980), pp. 425–53; Robert Higgs, *Crisis and Leviathan: Critical Episodes in the Growth of American Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in the United States* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992); William R. Thompson, ‘The Consequences of War’, *International Interactions*, 19 (1993), pp. 125–47; Bueno De Mesquita and D. Lalman, *War and Reason* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1992).

²⁰ Bueno De Mesquita, B. R. Siverson, and G. Woller, ‘War and the Fate of Regimes: A Comparative Analysis’, *American Political Science Review*, 86, pp. 638–46. J. DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985); A. Lamborn, *The Price of Power: Risk and Foreign Policy in Britain France and Germany* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1991); Tilly, ‘European Revolutions’; Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundation of Modern Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1994).

²¹ Some scholars have compared this war to the Vietnam war. See O. L. Sarin and Lev Dvoretzky, *The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Unions’ Vietnam* (Presidio, CA: 1993). However, few, if any, have identified it as one of the key causes for the breakdown of the Soviet Union.

²² *Noorte Haal*, January 24, 1989, the newspaper of the Estonian Komsomol estimated 50,000 dead and 150,000 injured. See also V. Konovalov, ‘Legacy of the Afghan War: Some Statistics’, *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR I*, (#14, 1989), p. 3. Konovalov notes that Soviet official statistics report 15,000 dead, 37,000 wounded, and 313 missing. The number of Soviet casualties is debated. R. B. Rais, *War Without Winners: Afghanistan Uncertain Transition After the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University

During the early 1980s, the official Soviet media maintained that the Afghanistan Government had requested Soviet military assistance for humanitarian and non-combat tasks. Notwithstanding the media censorship, as the conflict escalated, and well before Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), stories about combat casualties and the problems of disabled soldiers began appearing in spite of censorship.²³

Gorbachev, as the Secretary for Ideological Affairs under General Secretary Chernenko, probably was not a participant in the decision processes leading to this intervention.²⁴ He became General Secretary of the CPSU in 1985, roughly halfway through the Afghanistan war. We identify two phases in Gorbachev's policies towards the Afghanistan war and systemic reforms. In the first phase (summer 1984 to summer 1986), Gorbachev appeared to follow the policies of his predecessors on Afghanistan. To turn the tide of the war militarily, he named General Mikhail Zaitsev, one of the most illustrious Generals, to oversee the Soviet war efforts.²⁵ At the domestic level, while Gorbachev mentioned the need for reforms, he did not champion them.

We view 1986 as the turning point in the Afghanistan war and, accordingly, as marking the second phase of Gorbachev's reform agenda. In 1986, the Mujaheddin (Afghan freedom fighters), now well armed with US-supplied surface-to-air missiles, rockets, mortars, and communication equipment, won many confrontations with the Soviet army.²⁶ As successful ambushes of Soviet convoys became a daily phenomenon, the number of Soviet casualties mounted, the number of disabled soldiers seen in Soviet cities grew substantially, and the war veterans (*Afgantsy*)²⁷ increasingly became part of the Soviet urban landscape. Since many *Afgantsy* belonged to the non-Russian nationalities, opposition to the war from citizens in non-Russian Soviet republics increased. Since their presence often was not acknowledged by the authorities, who wished to play down Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, these *Afgantsy* became bitter and openly critical of the Soviet leaders.

Press, 1994), pp. 116, lists 30,000 dead in January 1986. D. Tripathi, 'Afghanistan: the last episode?' *The World Today*, 48 (1992), pp. 10–12 lists 30,000 casualties. A. Heinamaa, L. Maija and Y. Yurchenko, *The Soldier's Story: Soviet Veterans Remember the Afghan War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, IAS, 1994), pp. ix, mention 100,000 dead. Sarin and Dvoretzky, p. 146 report 13,833 dead, 330 missing, and 49,985 wounded. T. Rogers, *The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan: Analysis and Chronology* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), p. 55, lists 15,000 dead. W. L. Grau (ed.), *The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan* (London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. xiv, lists 15,000 dead and 469,685 sick and wounded.

On Afghan casualties, see also 'Congress Discusses Afghan War', *Moscow Television Service*, June 2, 1989, translated in FBIS-SOV 89–106–s, June 5, 1989; Edward Shevardnadze, 'Statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze at the International Conference, Vladivostok, September 4, 1990', *International Affairs* (November, 1990). Kamrany and Killian report that one million Afghans were killed and refugees numbered six million, p. 146. See Nake M. Kamrany, and David T. Killian, 'Effects of Afghanistan War on Soviet Society and Policy', *International Journal of Social Economics*, 19 (1992), pp. 129–51.

²³ Stories about the war appeared in the army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* on March 12 and 23, 1983, and about war casualties on January 7 and 8, 1984. See Oliver Roy, 'The Lessons of the Soviet Afghan War', *Adelphi Papers*, 259 (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 1991).

²⁴ Cynthia Roberts, *Glasnost in Soviet Foreign Policy: Setting the Record Straight? Report on the USSR*, 1, (#50, 1989).

²⁵ *Washington Post*, April 17, 1988, p. A 30.

²⁶ Selig Harrison, 'Inside the Afghan Talks', *Foreign Policy*, 72 (Fall 1988); *Washington Post*, April 17, 1988, p. A 30; November 16, 1992, p. A1; Mendelson, fn. 26–31.

²⁷ Note that *Afganets* is singular and *Afgantsy* is plural.

By late 1986, the Afghanistan war had significantly impacted on Soviet domestic politics. Anti-militarism became strong in the non-Russian Soviet republics. For non-Russians, the war became a unifying symbol of their opposition to Moscow's rule. The decision to withdraw from Afghanistan signalled Soviet military weakness and demonstrated that the army was vulnerable. By 1988, the war had changed the perceptions of Soviet leaders regarding the efficacy of using military force to hold the disintegrating country together.

This war also discredited the Soviet army. Since the Soviet army was the glue that held the diverse Soviet Republics together, its defeat in Afghanistan had profound implications for the survivability of the Soviet Union. Corruption, looting, and plundering by Soviet soldiers destroyed the army's moral legitimacy. The ethnic split in the army was accentuated when non-Russian soldiers, particularly those from Asian regions, displayed ambivalence toward fighting Afghans, deserted, and even revolted. Drug abuse was rising and, worse still, soldiers sold equipment to the Mujaheddin to obtain drugs, food, and electronic goods.²⁸

We categorize the war's effects into four types: (1) Perception effects; (2) Military effects; (3) Legitimacy effects; and (4) *Glasnost* effects. These categories are not equally important in explaining the impact of the Afghanistan war on Soviet politics and hence on Soviet breakdown. We consider the Perception and Military effects as being most important followed by Legitimacy effects, and finally *Glasnost* effects.

The Perception and Military effects refer to the discrediting of the Soviet army, perhaps the most important institution for holding the diverse country together, and to the changed Soviet leadership's perception on the efficacy of employing the army to quell secessionist movements in non-Russian republics. In particular, the *Afgantsy* played a key role in discrediting the army. Legitimacy effects describe the weakening of the army's and the country's internal cohesion. Finally, *Glasnost* effects refer to the impact of the war on accelerating *glasnost* by emboldening the media to report non-official war stories, thereby widening cleavages among various organs of the Soviet state.

Perception effects

Soviet leaders before Gorbachev believed that they could, and should, employ the military to hold together their diverse country. In early 1983, while defending the Soviet Union's military involvement in Afghanistan, Andropov, CPSU's General Secretary, observed that: 'it took almost the entire Red Army fifteen years to subdue the rebellious khanates in the Soviet republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kirgizstan'.²⁹ The Afghanistan war changed the Soviet leadership's perception of the efficacy of holding their diverse country together by using military force.

²⁸ Daria Fane, 'After Afghanistan: The Decline of Soviet Military Prestige', *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 1990; A. Alexiev, 'Inside the Soviet Army—Afghanistan', Report No. 3627, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica (1988).

²⁹ Michael Dobbs, 'The Afghan Archive: Dramatic Politburo Meeting Led to End of War', *The Washington Post*, November 16 (1992), p. A16.

From 1979 to 1986, the war was portrayed by the Soviet media and leadership as an 'international duty', and exercise in 'good neighborliness'.³⁰ Officially, the war in Afghanistan did not exist. February 1986 marks a turning point in the official portrayal of the war. Gorbachev, in his address to the CPSU's Twenty-Seventh Congress, characterized the Afghanistan war as a 'bleeding wound'.³¹ Later that year, Shevardnadze referred to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan as a 'sin'.³²

As the full story of the war unfolded, Soviet political leaders began distancing themselves from the decision to intervene in Afghanistan. They tried scapegoating the army and 'the geriatric leadership of the previous regime'.³³ In January, 1988, Shevardnadze told *Pravda*: 'not having chosen this legacy for ourselves [but] accepting it for what it is, we are also obliged to take decisions as to how to deal with it from here on'.³⁴

In October 1989, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet, Shevardnadze, for the second time, argued that Gorbachev and he 'happened to be together' when Soviet troops went into Afghanistan and that they 'learned about it from radio and newspaper reports'.³⁵ In a significant move, in December, 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies condemned both the intervention in Afghanistan and the leaders who made that decision. In January 1990, Shevardnadze most clearly linked the withdrawal from Afghanistan (and unveiling the fallacy of using military force) to the goals of *perestroika*. He noted: 'the deliverance of our country from the oppressive moral and material burden of involvement in the Afghan war is one of the biggest international achievements of *perestroika*'.³⁶ In an interview in 1992, he most explicitly linked the start of Soviet reforms to the Afghanistan war: 'The decision to leave Afghanistan [taken on November 13, 1986] was the first and most difficult step . . . *everything else flowed from that*'³⁷ [italics ours].

The Soviet state had always brutally suppressed secessionist movements, irrespective of the material and human costs. Prior to the Afghanistan war, pro-secession leaders in the non-Russian Soviet republics perceived the Soviet leadership as having the will and the ability to employ the military to crush them.³⁸ The Afghanistan war changed this perception. Since both the will and the ability of the leadership were under a cloud, non-Russian movements were emboldened to openly preach secession. In July 1988, Bennigsen observed that:

It would be demonstrated that Soviet might was not invincible and that resistance is possible. What are the Afghans for Central Asia? It is a small, wild and poor country. So then, if the Afghans could inflict a military and political defeat, then that makes anything possible. And everyone in Central Asia knows that. I think that in Soviet Russia they know it too.³⁹

³⁰ A. Trehub, 'Soviet Press Coverage of the War in Afghanistan: From Cheerleading to Disenchantment', *Report on the USSR*, 1 (# 10, 1989), p. 2.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³² Kamrany and Killian, 'Effects of Afghanistan War', p. 129.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 129.

³⁴ T. H. Rigby, 'The Afghan Conflict and Soviet Domestic Politics', in J. W. Lamare (ed.), *International Crisis and Domestic Politics: Major Political Conflicts in the 1980s* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1991), pp. 137–149, at p. 144.

³⁵ Roberts, 'Glasnost', p. 4.

³⁶ Edward Shevardnadze, 'To *International Affairs* Readers', *International Affairs*, January 1990, p. 12.

³⁷ Dobbs, 'The Afghan Archive', 1992, p. A16.

³⁸ Zhores Medvedev, 'One More Year of Perestroika', *International Affairs* (August 1990), pp. 76–7; Fane, 'After Afghanistan', p. 9.

³⁹ Radio Liberty Research, 'Pamiati A. Bennigsen (1913–1988)', *RS* 58/88 (July 5, 1988), p. 6.

And indeed, a few weeks after the withdrawal from Afghanistan in February 1989, the Lithuanian democratic movement, Sajudis, declared that its goal was full independence from Moscow.

The Afghanistan war also accentuated ethnic unrest within the Soviet Army. Even in the early 1980s, the reliability of Central Asian soldiers was questioned and they were often removed from active combat duties in Afghanistan.⁴⁰ When they served combat duties, the Generals perceived them as being soft on Afghan civilians. For example, on September 12, 1985, following the execution of an Afghan civilian, there was an ethnic mutiny in the Dasht-I Abdan base near the city of Kunduz in the northern part of Afghanistan. The Central Asian troops fired at the Russians and 'some 450 people from both sides . . . [and] 500 military vehicles were entirely destroyed.'⁴¹

Moreover, the Soviet army was not a volunteer army, and the bulk of its soldiers were draftees. Though draft-dodging was a serious crime in the Soviet Union, war-inspired anti-militarism and draft resistance became common across the non-Russian Republics. For example, Usmankhodzhaev, the Uzbek party chief, told reporters in 1987 that hundreds of Komsomol members in Uzbekistan had been prosecuted for draft-dodging.⁴² In December 1987, Petkel, the local KGB Chief, addressing the Central Tajik Committee, labeled the Tajik radical Muslims as agents of the enemy from Afghanistan and identified them as the main cause of draft avoidance.⁴³

Other incidents of anti-militarism were reported as well. In Lithuania, many refused the autumn 1989 call-up;⁴⁴ in Georgia, the 1989 call-up resulted in mass protests;⁴⁵ and in Latvia, groups regularly staged protests outside army bases, carrying posters with slogans such as 'USSR armed forces are occupation forces', and 'Occupiers out of Latvia'.⁴⁶

To summarize, the Afghanistan war changed the Soviet leaders' perceptions about the efficacy of employing troops to suppress non-Russian secessionist movements. It accentuated ethnic strife within the army, especially the resentment of Asian nationalities towards their being used to suppress their ethnic kin in Afghanistan. As a result, Soviet leaders no longer considered their army to be reliable for suppressing secessionist movements.

Military effects

In the Soviet Union the security forces, particularly the army, were key players in domestic politics. Due to its heroic role in World War II the Soviet army was a cherished institution. It was a microcosm of the Soviet society, drawing soldiers

⁴⁰ Bohdan Nahaylo, 'When Ivan Comes Marching Home: The Domestic Impact of the War in Afghanistan', *The American Spectator*, 20 (1987), p 15.

⁴¹ T. Kuzio, 'Ethnic Problems in the Soviet Army', *Soviet Analyst*, 4 December (1985), p. 2.

⁴² Bohdan Nahaylo, 'When Ivan Comes Marching Home: The Domestic Impact of the War in Afghanistan', *The American Spectator*, 20 (1987), pp. 15–18.

⁴³ Rigby, 'The Afghan Conflict', p. 146.

⁴⁴ 'Problems of Lithuanian Conscripts', *Radio Vilnius*, November 10, 1989 (see FBIS).

⁴⁵ Fane, pp. 7–8.

⁴⁶ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, August 1989 (FBIS, September 11, 1989).

from diverse nationalities. The army was viewed as the main defender of communism, a key function in an ideologically-charged society. Importantly, it was the glue that held together diverse ethnic groups, primarily because it was perceived as being invincible. The army's poor performance in Afghanistan was therefore shocking for soldiers, generals, party cadres, and ordinary citizens. Since the military was an important pillar of the anti-*perestroika* camp, the reverses in Afghanistan weakened anti-reformists, hastened *perestroika*, and facilitated the collapse of the system.

Since a major focus of *perestroika* and *glasnost* was the demilitarization of Soviet society, the war emerged as a rallying point against the military. The poor performance of the Soviet army in Afghanistan and the large number of Soviet casualties fuelled demands to change the military's role. Responding to such pressures, some generals reluctantly accepted a part of the collective guilt. For instance, in mid-1988, Major General Tsagolov admitted that 'we became the victims of our own illusions'.⁴⁷ The March 1989 elections to the Supreme Soviet demonstrated the diminished clout of the army; some high ranking officers failed to get elected while some of their radical critics were elected. A celebrated case was that of Victor Podziruk, an anti-militarist, who defeated the Commander-in-chief of the Soviet forces in Germany.⁴⁸

In late 1989, the Congress of People's Deputies established a commission to inquire into the causes and consequences of the Afghanistan war. Thus, the hallowed institution of the army now had its performance evaluated by a civilian body.⁴⁹ The generals, reeling under criticism, joined in this debate. This was unprecedented because in the past the army had seldom felt the need to justify its policies and actions. The generals complained that the war was being used as pretext to embarrass them. General Gromov, a war veteran, and subsequently the Deputy Interior Minister, observed:

Currently a number of articles in the central press, in the magazine *Ogonek*, the weekly *Sobesednik*, *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, and the program 'Vzglyad' are in general trying to drive a wedge between the Army and society. *The sorest of sore points*—the war in Afghanistan—has been selected for this purpose [italics and quotes in original].⁵⁰

Similarly, General Varenikov, the Commander-in-Chief of the ground forces and the Deputy Minister of Defence, and Colonel General Volkogonov, the Head of the Institute of Military History, claimed that the army opposed the intervention in Afghanistan.⁵¹ General Gareyev, while defending the Soviet Army, argued:

I can say, judging by my own experience in Afghanistan in 1989–90 (after the withdrawal of our forces), that the chief military adviser's reports practically never reached the desk of the top political leaders who preferred to be satisfied with the appropriately truncated information and reports from other departments . . . The political leadership must have the courage to hold themselves responsible for their own actions, rather than pass them back to others.⁵²

⁴⁷ K. M. Tsagolov, 'Afghanistan-Predvaritel'nye Itogi', *Ogonek*, 30 (1988), p. 25.

⁴⁸ Fane, 'After Afghanistan'.

⁴⁹ *Washington Post*, 'Soviet Use of Military is Curtailed', October 28, 1989, p. A 18.

⁵⁰ 'Gromov Recalls Afghanistan Life, Career', *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 15 November 1989:4, Translated in FBIS-SOV, 89–223, (November 21, 1989), p. 103.

⁵¹ Roberts, 'Glasnost'.

⁵² Mahmut Gareyev, 'The Afghan Problem: Three Years Without Soviet Troops', *International Affairs* (March, 1992), p. 17.

These developments adversely affected the army. In late 1989, a poll conducted by the Soviet Ministry of Defence reported a crisis-like environment and unhappiness among army officers.⁵³ Importantly, as this news was leaked to civilian newspapers, the internal weakness of the army became public knowledge, thereby strengthening the public's perceptions of the army's weakness.

The Afghanistan war was very harsh for the army. Living conditions for troops were poor. Soldiers were involved in guerrilla warfare in unfamiliar and hostile terrains. They faced constant frictions with Afghan civilians who often supported the Mujaheddin. Eventually, these conditions contributed to soldiers' lost sense of purpose. Some soldiers observed:

[The] widespread corruption and smuggling of army equipment for trade in drugs and goods was permitted. And looting among the Afghan population, killing of non-combatants, punitive attacks on villages, as well as torture of prisoners of war was often permitted and even encouraged by officers.⁵⁴

And, in a typical confession which appeared in the press in 1989, one soldier noted:

There were things we're ashamed to remember. . . . I'm terrified at the thought that if we write a dishonest book about the Afghan war, reading it our children would perhaps want to fight somewhere else. . . . Who are we Afghan war vets? Internationalists or people who messed up someone else's life?⁵⁵

The army was especially brutal towards women and children. In 1987, *Helsinki Watch Reports* reported that the 'Russians systematically entered all the houses, executing the inhabitants including women and children often by shooting them in the head'.⁵⁶ With such reports of looting and brutal treatment of Afghan civilians coming in, the army began losing its moral high ground among Soviet citizens. Another soldier observed:

We were struck by our own cruelty in Afghanistan. We executed innocent peasants. If one of ours was killed or wounded we would kill women, children and old people as revenge. We killed everything, even the animals.⁵⁷

Some soldiers compared their roles in Afghanistan to that of the Nazi army in World War II. In an interview in 1990, one soldier told *Moscow News* that:

We were supposedly equated with the participants in the Great Patriotic War, but they defended their homeland, while what did we do? We played the role of the Germans.⁵⁸

Like any other war, the Afghanistan war crippled and injured soldiers who then had to be sent home. Many *Afgantsy* returned from this war desiring to actively participate in the reorganization of society.⁵⁹ By the mid-1980s, there were already

⁵³ 'Kak Zhiviotsya Ofitseram', *Izvestiya*, October 10, 1989.

⁵⁴ Quoted in Kamrany and Killian, 'Effects of Afghanistan War', p. 130.

⁵⁵ Valery Abramov, 'We Should Tell the Whole Truth about This War', *Moscow News* (weekly) 3 (1989), p. 9.

⁵⁶ Helsinki Watch, 'To Die in Afghanistan', *Helsinki Watch Reports* (New York, 1987).

⁵⁷ A. Alexiev, *Inside the Soviet Army—Afghanistan*, Report no. 3627 (The Rand Corporation, 1988), p. 58.

⁵⁸ Svetlana Aleksievich, 'Don't Say You Have Been in that War', *International Affairs* (1990), p. 133.

⁵⁹ Valerii Konovalov, 'Afghan Veterans in Siberia', *Radio Liberty Report on the USSR*, 1, (#21, 1989), p. 17.

about a million *Afgantsy* in the Soviet Union and they had emerged 'as a new social force in their own right'.⁶⁰

In the early years of the war, the Soviet leadership, wanting to play down Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, did not acknowledge the presence of the *Afgantsy*. The official media ignored them as well. The *Afgantsy* often could not find jobs. Worse still, military authorities provided them with little assistance in obtaining housing and medical care. Many Soviet citizens also had mixed emotions about them; though the *Afgantsy* had fought for the country, they had fought an unpopular war and had committed atrocities on Afghan civilians. As we have previously noted, some Asian republics (specifically, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) had ethnic and religious links with Afghans.

The *Afgantsy* felt betrayed. Many of them organized into vigilante groups determined to fight the money grubbers and 'scroungers' who had sent them to war and were ignoring their existence.⁶¹ By the late 1980s, some *Afgantsy* had begun organizing themselves politically. In June 1988, after months of lobbying, they managed to erect a small monument in the Moscow Park commemorating their fallen comrades. Such monuments eventually sprang up in other cities as well.⁶² To lobby the 1989 Congress of People Deputies for direct negotiation with the Mujaheddins on prisoners-of-war, some *Afgantsy* formed the 'Committee for the Liberation of Soviet War Prisoners'.⁶³ In 1989, to defuse the *Afgantsy's* political power and to win the hearts of newly returning war veterans, the Communist party formed official outfits under the guidance of the *Komsomols*, the youth organizations of the party. In response, the *Afgantsy* formed the organization *Dolg*, meaning duty.⁶⁴ Thus we find emerging non-party political organizations, mainly due to the initiatives of the *Afgantsy*, to fight both for the rights of the *Afgantsy* as well as to struggle for social goals.

The agonies of the *Afgantsy* also were portrayed in films. In January 1989, a film entitled 'We Paid Our Dues' was screened nation-wide on television. In this film, a group of *Afgantsy* return home to find corruption and crime. They organize, without the aid of the Communist party or any other official help, and successfully fight social ills.⁶⁵ Similarly, the songs of Vladimir Vysotskiy such as '*On ne vernilya iz Boya*' and '*Synovya ukhodyat v Boy*' ['He did not come back from the battle' and 'Sons leave for the battle'] drew official wrath.

Finally, since the *Afgantsy* had directly experienced the war, they played a major role in discrediting the military apparatus. As they also carried hostile feelings against Moscow, *Afgantsy* were recruited in the non-official militia organized by non-Russian secessionist movements.⁶⁶

To summarize: the Afghanistan war created conditions for the demilitarizing of Soviet society. It created a division between the army and the CPSU and between the army and the citizens. The atrocities committed by Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan

⁶⁰ *US News and World Report* (December 1985), p. 15.

⁶¹ Nahaylo, 'When Ivan Comes Marching Home', p. 16.

⁶² *Washington Post*, February 14, 1989, p. A1.

⁶³ Roy, 'Lessons of the Soviet Afghan War', p. 47.

⁶⁴ Michael Dobbs, 'In Service of the Motherland', *Washington Post*, September 7, 1991. However, in some regions such as Ukraine *Dolg* was viewed as a reactionary force against secession. We thank Vladimir Pigenko for this point.

⁶⁵ *Washington Post*, February 14, 1989.

⁶⁶ Roy, 'Lessons of the Soviet-Afghan War', p. 47.

undermined the legitimacy of the army as a moral institution that safeguarded the oppressed. Finally, the war created a huge mass of *Afgantsy* who returned home with accounts of cruelty and defeat. They also formed non-party organizations that challenged the legitimacy of the CPSU.

Legitimacy effects

The Soviet Union was an extremely heterogenous country encompassing diverse nationalities and religions. Many of these groups had histories of warring on each other and with Moscow/St. Petersburg. Though the Soviet system was supposed to be race-blind, it was not so. The non-Russian minorities, Asian as well as European, resented the Russian 'capture' of the system. The Afghanistan war accentuated such resentments, since the non-Russian Soviet republics perceived it as a Russian war fought by non-Russian soldiers. Moreover, they noticed the similarities between the Russian oppression of Afghanistan and of the non-Russian Soviet republics. The war therefore seriously eroded the legitimacy of the Soviet system and encouraged secession by the non-Russian republics. It alienated both elites and masses and gave the secessionist movements a popular rallying cause against Russian domination.

Afghanistan consists of three major ethnic groups: Pashtuns, Tajiks, and Uzbeks. Since Tajiks and Uzbeks were also present in the Soviet Union, there was significant unrest in the Asian Soviet republics about the war against people of the same ethnicity. Moreover, the war was perceived by these republics as a Russian war being fought by Central Asians against other Central Asians; 'our boys are dying for an alien cause.'⁶⁷ In Tajikistan, the *mullahs* publicly opposed the war, claiming that the Soviets were trying to convert the Afghans into *kafirs*.⁶⁸

As public opposition to the war increased, it began to infect the local Central Asian party cadres. This development alarmed Moscow and resulted in wide-scale political purges. Though the official media claimed that these purges reflected *perestroika* and the campaigns against corruption, the local population often interpreted them as reflecting Moscow's distrust of local party leadership. This perception was reinforced since ethnic Russians were often the new appointees to these positions. It accentuated the alienation of the Central Asian republics and resulted in riots and civil unrest.

In 1986, there was rioting in Alma Ata, the Capital of Kazakhstan, to protest against the replacement of First Secretary Kunaev, a Kazakh, by Kolbin, a Russian.⁶⁹ There were many other such incidents suggesting a growing cleavage between the Asian republics and Moscow. For example, in 1982, there were anti-war demonstrations in Tajikistan which lead to violence and arrests. In May, 1985, there were anti-war demonstrations in Armenia. And, in June, 1985, there were violent anti-war demonstrations in Astrakhan.⁷⁰

⁶⁷ Sallie Wise, 'A War Should Never Have Happened: Soviet Citizens Assess the War in Afghanistan', *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 226/88 (June 1, 1988), pp. 1–3.

⁶⁸ V. Rabiev, 'V Klass...s Koranom?', *Kommunist Tadzhikistana* (January 31, 1987).

⁶⁹ Rigby, 'The Afghan Conflict', p. 146.

⁷⁰ Nahaylo, 'When Ivan Comes Marching Home', p. 15.

The war impacted the European Soviet republics as well. Anti-war protests started in the Baltics as early as 1982. *Ausra*, the journal of the Lithuanian underground, reporting on anti-Russian demonstrations during funerals of Baltic soldiers killed in Afghanistan, noted: 'under oppression themselves, Ukrainians, Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians 'were being forced' to obey the brutal orders of the Russian officers, and shed both their own and Afghan blood'.⁷¹

And in 1985, the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church* of Ukraine depicted the war as unjust. Anti-war sentiments were so pronounced that in 1985, Catholic activists, in a letter to the defence minister, declared that 'Ukrainians do not wish to fight, nor do they want this unjust war.'⁷² By the late 1980s, the European Soviet republics had begun challenging the Soviet Defence Ministry to decide on their draftees' place of service. Instead of being sent to serve in Afghanistan, they demanded that their draftees serve within their home republic.⁷³

To summarize: the Afghanistan war accentuated the cleavages between the non-Russian republics and the Soviet state. It provided a common rallying banner for the secessionist movements and led to many anti-war demonstrations. In effect, it severely eroded the legitimacy of the Soviet system in the eyes of the non-Russian nationalities.

Glasnost effects

The impact of the Afghanistan war was so devastating that war reports challenging the official versions could not be suppressed. Importantly, though not surprisingly, the official media also began showing signs of independence in its war reporting, thereby transforming itself from an outlet for official stories to a barometer of public opinion. Contrary to popular perceptions, we find that *glasnost* did not mark the emergence of a relatively free press in the Soviet Union; *glasnost* only accelerated processes initiated earlier. And the Afghanistan war added new vigour to the forces unleashed by *glasnost*.

We identify four phases in the transformation of media in the Soviet Union. In phase one (1979–80), the central regime strongly censored the media. Accordingly, the media maintained that the Afghanistan war was being fought by the Afghan armed forces, and that the Soviet army was only supporting them from the rear. Soviet soldiers killed in action were brought home in unmarked coffins.⁷⁴

In phase two (1981–mid 1985), the media began publishing accounts of the army being actually involved in fighting. For example, in 1981, *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (the youth league newspaper) carried a story hinting that the army was actually fighting a full-scale war. The report, while describing how a Soviet tank fell into a pit while delivering food to an Afghan village, admitted that 'service in Afghanistan is difficult'.⁷⁵ Moreover, we find that war-related stories, opposing the formal party line

⁷¹ Nahaylo, 'When Ivan Comes Marching Home', p. 15.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁷³ Fane, 'After Afghanistan', p. 8.

⁷⁴ Dobbs, 'In Service of the Motherland'.

⁷⁵ Trehub, 'Soviet Press Coverage', p. 1.

(that a war was not going on in Afghanistan), began appearing in the army newspapers as early as 1983, for instance in *Krasnaya Zvezda*.⁷⁶

While these war reports were not openly critical of the official policy on Afghanistan, they conveyed a gloomy picture (contrary to the official pronouncements) of army units being routinely ambushed. 1984 marks the arrival of stories on the plight of the wounded *Afgantsy*. Moreover, we now find media reports on some party officials reluctantly acknowledging domestic repercussions of this war. For example, on 13 March 1984, Victor Boiko, the First Secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party, in an interview to the *Komsomol'skaya Pravda*, underlined the moral implications of ill-treating the war veterans.

As the Afghanistan crisis accentuated, even key party newspapers began publishing stories and articles on the war. For example, on 14 February 1985 (before Gorbachev came to power), *Pravda*, in a surprising shift from the Party line that the Afghanistan intervention was to defend international socialism, justified the war as defence of the southern border of the Soviet Union. In a totalitarian regime such as the Soviet Union, where every word was supposedly scrutinized for ideological purity, this was a baffling deviation from the party line.

The third phase (mid 1985–89) was heralded by *glasnost*.⁷⁷ Beginning in the late 1985, we find a flood of reports and letters to newspapers against the Afghanistan war. For instance, in the summer of 1987, Borovik, *Ogonek's* war correspondent, published a three-article series portraying gloom and war weariness in the Soviet army.⁷⁸ And, in November, 1987, *Pravda* published letters from readers complaining about draft-dodging by the children of party elites.⁷⁹

The last stage (1989 onwards) of this transformation covers the time period of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. In 1989 and the early 1990s, the press routinely carried interviews in which Army generals blamed politicians for engaging in the war in spite of the army's advice to the contrary. In effect, with the Afghanistan war having provided new fuel to *glasnost*, the media began playing an independent role as a watchdog of public interest, a barometer of public opinion, and, more importantly, an arena of contestations among the various organs of the hitherto unified state.

To summarize: the Afghanistan war provided the supporters of *glasnost* and *perestroika* with a key opportunity for redefining the relationship between the citizens and the Soviet state as well as among the various organs of the state itself. As Sergei Lukyanchikov, who directed 'Pain', a documentary on Afghanistan, put it: 'The War changed our psychology. It helped *perestroika*'.⁸⁰

Conclusions

The disintegration of the Soviet empire started toward the end of the 1980s when Eastern Europe left the Soviet bloc. The Cold War ended in 1989, and in 1991, the

⁷⁶ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 12 March 1983 and 3 November 1983.

⁷⁷ Gorbachev assumed the post of the General Secretary of the CPSU in March 1985.

⁷⁸ Artem Borovik, 'Vstretimsya u trekh zhuravlei', *Ogonek*, 28–30 (1987).

⁷⁹ Trehub, 'Soviet Press Coverage', p. 3.

⁸⁰ Dobbs, 'In Service of the Motherland'.

Soviet Union itself disintegrated. This collapse of this particular great power was unexpected in its timing, magnitude, and speed. The existing explanations attribute this collapse to leadership and/or systemic factors. The contributions of the Afghanistan war have been under-emphasized, if not altogether ignored. We have argued that the Afghanistan war was a significant factor leading to the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Further, to answer the two puzzles raised in the introduction to this article—why did the collapse take place only towards the end of the 1980s, and why did the Soviet leaders not employ the army to suppress the secessionist movements—a better appreciation of the impact of the Afghanistan war on Soviet politics is required.

That the Afghanistan war was critical in the collapse of the Soviet Union resonates well with theories emphasizing major wars as key factors in the demise of empires. Major wars among great powers reorient the domestic politics of the warring parties by weakening powerful groups and enfranchising less powerful groups. As the hitherto less powerful become more assertive, the domestic socio-political equilibrium gets disturbed, often irreversibly leading to the collapse of empires. However, are such major wars possible in a world where the great powers possess nuclear weapons? If not, then will major wars no longer remain a key cause of empire breakdowns? Or, do we have to redefine major wars in terms of their implications for domestic politics, and not in terms of the characteristics of the participating actors or the scope of the war?⁸¹ While the Afghanistan war may not be categorized as a major war involving a direct and wide-scale clash of great powers, it was certainly a major war in terms of impacting Soviet domestic politics. Hence, we interpret the key contribution of the Afghanistan war in the collapse of the Soviet Union as only an overlooked case, and not as an exception to those theories that highlight the role of major wars in the demise of empires.

Clearly, our article raises several tough questions. For instance, is a major war a necessary and/or a sufficient condition to force a regime change? Would the Soviet Union have collapsed in the absence of the Afghanistan war? How do we prioritize the contribution of systemic failures, leadership-based factors, and the Afghanistan war in the breakdown of the Soviet Union? Can we identify the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for explaining this breakdown?

Systemic factors were undoubtedly important in the decay, though not in the collapse of the Soviet system. One can speculate that had the Soviet economy been robust, the Afghanistan war would have had only a minor impact on Soviet politics. A robust Soviet economy would have satisfied the material needs of the non-Russian minorities and made them less sensitive to their harsh living conditions. As a result, the system would have relied less on the army and security forces for curbing dissension. Hence, the discrediting of the Soviet army due to its failures in Afghanistan would have been less disastrous for the stability of the Soviet regime.

Similarly, the role of Gorbachev and Shevardnadze was important in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The war changed their perceptions and those of other Soviet

⁸¹ On economic aspects of this war see Boris Pyadyshev, 'Afghanistan in the Summer of 1990 and After', *International Affairs* (November, 1990), p. 80; Dina Spechler and Martin Spechler, 'The Economic Burden of the Soviet Empire: Estimates and Re-estimates', in Rajan Menon and Daniel Nelson (eds.), *Limits to Soviet Power* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989). We, however, do not find sufficient evidence to suggest that the economic impact of this war was critical.

leaders about the efficacy of employing the army to suppress secessionist movements. One can speculate that another set of leaders may have interpreted differently the impact of this war on the ability of the Soviet regime to hold together their diverse country.⁸² Again, the impact of the Afghanistan war needs to be understood within the context of a given set of leaders. The ‘what if’ scenarios, while very interesting, are difficult to test.

Finally, should the Cold War itself be considered as the major war that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, as some American commentators in particular seem to believe? In our view—no. In many ways the Cold War is probably better viewed as a chronic problem that was troublesome rather than threatening to the integrity of the USSR. No doubt it imposed a cost on the Soviet system in the form of an ongoing arms race. Some would even argue that it was the fear of those costs rising in the 1980s that first forced the USSR to the negotiating table and then to contemplate the reforms that ultimately led to its disintegration. But showing that the Cold War was costly is one thing; demonstrating an unambiguous empirical relationship between this and the collapse of the Soviet Union is something else altogether. This might make it easier to justify the 40 year policy of military containment. But it does not necessarily make for good history. Indeed, in our view, the Soviet Union—in spite of its multiple inefficiencies—was not only able to bear the costs of the Cold War but had to a large degree internalized them. In the last analysis, it is only dramatic and significant events that cause empires to collapse, not ongoing standoffs—and the only event that fits this bill is the Afghan war, perhaps one of the most over-studied but underestimated military conflicts in the history of the twentieth century; one that analysts of the end of the Cold War continue to ignore at their peril.

⁸² Even Yelstin did not learn from the Afghanistan experience and persisted with forcing a military solution to Chechniya.