

NOTES AND DISCUSSION

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THE MONEY GAME:

NOTES ON FANTASIES OF TEMPORAL

RECOVERY AND PREKNOWLEDGE ¹

Temporal recovery and prescience or preknowledge clearly belong to the realm of imagined time, for they brazenly threaten to disobey the unidirectional structure of successive or linear time. It goes without saying that the acts of fantasizing recovery or preknowledge belong to what becomes an expanded sense of nowness. Fantasizing transcends mere temporal imagining, for the processes of recall and expectation are transformed and accelerated into momentary wish fulfillment.

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Figuratively speaking, fantasizing and imagining may be thought of as running in opposite directions along the same spatial plane.² Apparently restrained by the objective mold of chronological succession, imagining in the form of recall returns the experience to the present while fantasy of recovery “succeeds” in “transporting” us to the “time” of the original experience. Expectation on the other hand, “projects” outward our feelings, hopes, and dreams as bolts of content to fill the emptiness of future while fantasies of preknowledge barely “succeed” in bringing to us, through subjective prematurity, an elaborated interpretation of a now replete future.

Fantasy and what we have termed imagining become differentiated by the oppositional nature of their intrinsic temporalized emotional components. They are as different as recall, return or re-do on the one hand and plan, hope, or prescience on the other.

The vividness of temporal fantasization is spoken of by Herbert Fingarette whose references are to what he calls the “sense of presence”:

“The sense of ‘presence,’ of nearness in subjective time, is generated then, when any object or situation is cathected by the currently mobilized drives and when it plays a significant role in the dominant drive-fantasy complex. Such a ‘dynamic theme,’ or ‘unifying theme,’ once mobilized in waking life or in the dream, is like a magnet... The current perceptions incorporated are then perceived as ‘real’; the memories, though perhaps locatable in long past (calendar) time, are, in subjective time, ‘as if it happened yesterday’; the hopes are vividly present: ‘I can see it already!’”³

Fantasization connotes a certain anthropomorphic unboundedness that imagining in the present usage does not permit itself: “...Fantasy in story telling derives from the less conscious and less structured aspects of the individual’s personality. To these areas of personality the rules of logic and propriety do not

² Cf. Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1910); *Duration and Simultaneity with Reference to Einstein’s Theory*, translated by Leon Jacobson (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

³ Herbert Fingarette, *The Self in Transformation* (New York, Basic Books, 1963), p. 207.

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apply.”⁴ Just as fantasy need not be limited by the direction of its temporality, so might it be free to scale the boundaries of one’s finitude. It need not be restricted to experiential realms for we may “place” ourselves in Periclean Greece, or on the moon, by predicating fantasies on reports and conjectures of others. This means of course, that fantasy itself may be differentiated into authentic and inauthentic conditions (after Husserl).⁵ The former would refer to fantasy developed as actualized fulfillment from revived or expected experience, while the latter would include fantasies evolving from secondary or “intellectual” sources. Authentic fantasy also could be defined as the re- or pre-experiencing of original time of life space time, leaving inauthentic fantasy to encompass imagined but indirectly encountered history: Original time is no external framework consisting of an endless sequence of “nows” on which man can eventually hang up and put into proper order his experiences and the events of his life... Man’s original temporality always refers to his disclosing and taking care of something. Such original temporality is dated at all times by his meaningful interactions with, his relating to, that which he encounters. Every “now” is primarily a “now as the door bangs,” a “now as the book is missing,” or a “now when this or that has to be done.” The same holds true for every “then.” Originally, a “then” is a “then when I met my friend sometime in the past” or a “then when I shall go to the university again.”⁶

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Fantasy need not be contained within experiential parameters. Indeed, Fingarette’s allusions to the “as if it happened yesterday” and “I can already see it” phenomena demonstrate the caprice

⁴ William Henry, *The Analysis of Fantasy* (New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1956), p. 1.

⁵ On this point, see Philip Merlan, “Time Consciousness in Husserl and Heidegger,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Sept. 1947, 3, No. 1, pp. 23-53.

⁶ Merdard Boss, *Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis*, translated by Ludwig B. LeFedre (New York, Basic Books, 1963), p. 45.

of temporal fantasies. Recognizing its characteristic qualities, our task becomes one of asking people to comment on or react to the transparent veils of fantasy which drape their more substantial orientations in time. Precisely, the problem is how to stimulate these qualities of fantasy, making certain that respondents will contemplate all four zones of the horizon: historical past (past prior to birth), personal past, personal future and historical future (time following death). We could of course, inquire of respondents, "Using a scale of 1 to 5, with 5 being the highest, how much would you like to live your life over again or know the future, etc.?" Something along these lines was in fact attempted in a pretest using university students but found to be inexact and diffuse. What was lacking, among other things, was the foundation of fantasy provocation. A second method proved more successful and ultimately became what henceforth will be called the Money Game.

The strategy of the Money Game developed from two rather independent sources. The first was a study performed by Leonard Doob⁷ in which the experimenter asked subjects if they would rather have x dollars now or more than x dollars at a specified future time. Dealing somewhat with risktaking behavior Doob's investigation represented an almost classical paradigm in gratification delay. The experiment demonstrated incidentally, that subjects of higher intelligence tended to wait longer for greater sums of money while lower intelligence groups settled at once for the lesser amounts. The experiment suggested moreover, the use of money as a standard against which time might be measured. At the very least, it was reasoned that some scale of temporal worth or value could be constructed.

The introduction of money made relevant a second source of ideas namely, the laws of diminishing utility. If the value of (fantasy) time emerges as the essential focus, will it not develop as a function of the original allotment? Is there not an obvious difference between asking people for the financial worth of their life and assessments of hours, days and years?

The purpose of the Money Game was not merely to measure

⁷ Leonard Doob, *Becoming More Civilized. A Psychological Exploration* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1960).

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the extent to which people are attracted by the four time periods but rather to provide them with a standard for assaying the “worth” of various chronological allotments in the periods as well. The whole idea is so unabashedly fantastic in nature that no attempt was made to disguise this quality. Surely the very first word of the instructions communicated to respondents that they were about to play a game in imagination:

“Pretend that you had a lot of money, more money than you could possibly use. Pretend also that someone had the power to sell you time, any time that you would want, and you would have this time given to you right now, knowing what you now know. And, once you had this time, you could do whatever you wanted with it. Now look at the following amounts of money: a) \$ 0.00, b) \$ 10.00, c) \$ 100.00, d) \$ 1000.00, e) \$ 10,000.00. For each of the questions below, circle the letter that represents the amount of money that you would pay. Make certain that you answer all twelve questions.”

How much would you pay to right now bring back:

- | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 hour of your own past? | a | b | c | d | e |
| 1 day of your own past? | a | b | c | d | e |
| 1 year of your own past? | a | b | c | d | e |

How much would you pay to right now know all about and do whatever you wanted with:

- | | | | | | |
|----------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 hour of your own future? | a | b | c | d | e |
| 1 day of your own future? | a | b | c | d | e |
| 1 year of your own future? | a | b | c | d | e |

How much would you pay to bring back right now any:

- | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 hour before you were born? | a | b | c | d | e |
| 1 day before you were born? | a | b | c | d | e |
| 1 year before you were born? | a | b | c | d | e |

How much would you pay right now to know all about and do whatever you wanted with any:

- | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 hour that will occur after your death? | a | b | c | d | e |
| 1 day that will occur after your death? | a | b | c | d | e |
| 1 year that will occur after your death? | a | b | c | d | e |

Notice that the monetary values become the components of an interval scale; hence scoring is accomplished merely by transposing the letters a through e into the corresponding numbers 1 through 5.

It should be noted that a task of this design although contaminated by the various meanings of money and reactions to pretend situations, may be moderately threatening for some people. The fantasy of temporal recovery for example, as prevalent as it is, may just be one of those thoughts about which we keep silent. Yet Meerloo writes about temporal recovery in a way that makes it sound as though the fantasy lingers in the psychological processes of most persons:

“Here it may be noted that in all inner disturbances, the time factor is a cardinal point. There is always primarily a search for past time, for the obscure and forgotten crisis or the might-have-been; it is an attempt at recapturing it and working it out differently, usually more happily, or for simply dwelling on it. We are most of us amateur time detectives, groping blindly for the clues to our own mishaps and errandries.”⁸

“It may be, in some cases, that he sees the past as having been altogether happy, and he wishes to repeat it in the future, minus the errors that brought that happy past to an end—and of course, the whole thing will be larger and more significant. Or, on the other hand, the past may have been miserable to him, and he wishes to turn it inside out and make a happy future of it—constituting a triumph, a vindication, and also a kind of satisfactory revenge on life.”⁹

Preknowledge on the other hand, may be both the innocuous wish for arrival of events encouched in the pedestrian phrase “I can hardly wait,” or a plea for the postponement of death, or simply, immortality. Having now even an hour of one’s own future should offer powerful evidence (in fantasy of course) of whether goals, dreams, hopes, etc. are attained, a fact which if available, could instantaneously determine the worth of personal

⁸ Joost A. M. Meerloo, *The Two Faces of Man: Two Studies on the Sense of Time and on Ambivalence* (New York, International Universities Press, 1954), p. 45.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

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effort. Having an hour after death implies that one has “successfully” tampered with the inevitable and has achieved therefore, a level of immortality; for what is immortality if it is not the living beyond one’s prescribed (or self-allotted) time? Preknowledge is hardly a neutral stimulus. Indeed, in his introduction to *Timelessness and Precognition*, Meerloo builds the fantasy into the very core of the disturbed personality:

“A note on the problem of precognition is needed in a study of subjective time because in every neurosis the craving for timelessness and foreknowledge of future occurrences plays a role. We may explain this as an unconscious wish for immortality and eternity. It is, at the same time, a reaction against dissatisfying reality, because perceptions of time in an adult, in contrast with the magic infantile omnipotence which ignores time and schedule, means a necessary confrontation with actual reality and its limitations. Often, when a person announces his foreknowledge, his vision of the future, one can explain this vision as wishful thinking, as illusion caused by the patient’s unconscious need to put himself beyond time, to evade the pains and stresses of waiting and uncertain anticipations.”¹⁰

Two conspicuous inadequacies of the Money Game require brief comment. The task pivots first on an individual’s reaction to money and the meanings he imputes to the various amounts. It is entirely possible that, given the instructions, responses are made primarily to monetary values rather than temporal divisions (personal past, historical future, etc.) or allotments (hour, day and year). It might be expected that certain people will express feelings of potency or inadequacy through their payments. Furthermore, it seems obvious that irrespective of the attitudes one holds about time or money, the strength of payments should follow the degree of allotment.

Second, tasks of fantasy may exclude some respondents before the variable of time even comes into awareness. It is likely that while some will be scared off by the word “pretend,” others will be intimidated by or mock the routine. Either reaction could produce results which may or may not adequately reflect sentiments about the time of fantasies. In a slightly different

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

vein, one young social scientist, upon reading through the instructions, laughingly scorned its utility on the grounds that everyone would spend all his money for time as unlimited funds had been provided. The game therefore, is potentially contaminated by both its operational variables, time and money, and by any one of several different reactions to the fantasies suggested.

SUBJECTS AND PROCEDURE

Subjects were 426 men and 100 women in a midwest Naval Training Station. At the time of testing they were engaged in a voluntary medical corpsman program lasting fourteen weeks. Their backgrounds as judged by parental occupations and levels of education, may be classified as lower middle class. All had completed four years of high school but less than ten percent had done college work. They ranged in age from 17-22 and very few were married. For the most part all were either Protestant or Catholic.

Intelligence levels of these young men and women should be considered "normal." Indeed, many presumably, will attend college following their Navy obligation.

Testing, administered by non-military people, was done in group paper and pencil fashion during regularly scheduled class periods. Respondents were advised that results were confidential and would not be entered on their official records. The Money Game normally was completed in less than five minutes.

RESULTS

I. Temporal Recovery

The frequency distribution of payments for the personal past is shown in Table 1.

The dates make several issues quite clear, and importantly, tend to diminish the relevance of the following objections: 1) There are large groups of men and women who demonstrate a capacity to fantasize about the recoverability of personal time (67% of the men and 46% of the women for a year). 2) In response to

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the doubting social scientist, not everyone plays, however, nor do they offer their "unlimited" resources without apparent deliberation. 3) Concerning the utility prediction, a slightly positive relationship is obtained between allotment and sum: the more time proposed, the more money offered.

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS FOR PERSONAL PAST

| Money Value | Time Allotment | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|-----|---------|----|-------|-----|---------|----|-------|-----|---------|----|
| | Hour | | | | Day | | | | Year | | | |
| | Males | | Females | | Males | | Females | | Males | | Females | |
| | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N |
| \$ 0 | 44.4 | 189 | 49.5 | 49 | 38.8 | 144 | 43.4 | 43 | 32.7 | 140 | 54.0 | 54 |
| \$ 10 | 16.2 | 69 | 13.1 | 13 | 11.0 | 47 | 11.1 | 11 | 5.4 | 23 | 5.0 | 5 |
| \$ 100 | 13.6 | 58 | 13.1 | 13 | 15.5 | 66 | 16.2 | 16 | 9.1 | 39 | 9.0 | 9 |
| \$ 1,000 | 7.3 | 31 | 9.1 | 9 | 16.9 | 72 | 12.1 | 12 | 12.8 | 55 | 10.0 | 10 |
| \$ 10,000 | 18.5 | 79 | 15.2 | 15 | 22.8 | 97 | 17.2 | 17 | 40.0 | 171 | 22.0 | 22 |
| Percentage | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | |
| N | 426 | | 99 | | 426 | | 99 | | 428 | | 100 | |

At this point anyway, it would seem that manipulating temporal allotments was a superfluous operation, yet note that among non-playing men, while there is a decrease of about 12% between an hour and a year, lesser increases are shown among women in the high payment categories and an overall increase of 4% occurs within the non-playing row as well. Whereas the most striking fact of the table is men's greater interest generally in recovering time—an interest which grows as a function of allotment—something happens, too, among non-playing women to suggest that allotment is not directly associated with recovery fantasies. Precisely, it is in the suggestion of reviving a year that men increase payments, thereby making the difference in mean scores between the sexes significant.

A clue to men's proclivity for recovery is found in their somewhat consensual belief that retrieved time may be reworked. In post-test interviewing woman generally reported that imagined

revival permitted a reexperiencing of time; hence it was bought essentially to recapture prior excitement or, surprisingly, sadness. Men, however, expressing less interest in reliving, were more inclined to experiment with different forms of "life arrangements" now that they had witnessed the outcome of earlier anticipations and planning. It is as though an overriding doing or activity orientation encouraged a susceptibility to this sort of fantasy.¹¹ Perhaps because of the overdetermined orientation toward action, this particular fantasy aroused possibilities for life changes or modifications which could then ramify in the structure of their "realistic" futures as well.

Change or alteration in the perceived or proposed course of existence has not the same motivating enticement for women. Desired instead was a magical return to pastness which now might be relived in such a fashion as to not interfere with life's expected eventualities. The interviews revealed that while women longed perhaps for the "good old days," thereby honoring fantasy dimensions and limitations, men actively attempted to build the fantasy of revival into the actualities of contemporary exigencies and comprehensive life plans.¹²

II. Preknowledge

Unlike recoverability, the prospect of preknowledge does not tantalize men more than women. Whereas a difference of about twenty-two percent points separated men and women in their purchasing of a past year, virtually the same amount now refuse to play for a future year (41% of the men; 47% of the women). Combining the results of Table 1 with Table 2 over, points to a rather firm core (about 40%) who remain unwilling to enter a game which offers the possibility of procuring the gratifications of so-called temporally authentic fantasies, recovery and preknowledge. For the most part, men and women do not alter their game performance in the two major zones of imagined time.

¹¹ These terms are suggested by the writings of Florence R. Kluckhohn. See her "Dominant and Variant Value Orientations," in Florence R. Kluckhohn and Fred L. Strodtbeck, *Variations in Value Orientations* (Evanston, Row Peterson, 1961), Chapter 1.

¹² There is a serious and unexplored implication to this divergency in *function* of fantasies among men and women.

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TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS FOR PERSONAL FUTURE

| Money Value | Time Allotment | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|-----|---------|----|-------|-----|---------|----|-------|-----|---------|----|
| | Hour | | | | Day | | | | Year | | | |
| | Males | | Females | | Males | | Females | | Males | | Females | |
| | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N |
| \$ 0 | 46.6 | 198 | 56.0 | 56 | 42.4 | 180 | 46.0 | 46 | 41.5 | 177 | 47.5 | 48 |
| \$ 10 | 15.3 | 65 | 17.0 | 17 | 6.6 | 28 | 11.0 | 11 | 2.6 | 11 | 2.9 | 3 |
| \$ 100 | 14.1 | 60 | 10.0 | 10 | 14.9 | 63 | 23.0 | 23 | 5.6 | 24 | 8.9 | 9 |
| \$ 1,000 | 5.6 | 24 | 8.0 | 8 | 13.2 | 56 | 9.0 | 9 | 6.8 | 29 | 11.9 | 12 |
| \$ 10,000 | 17.9 | 76 | 8.0 | 8 | 22.4 | 95 | 10.0 | 10 | 43.2 | 184 | 28.8 | 29 |
| Percentage | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | |
| N | 425 | | 100 | | 424 | | 100 | | 426 | | 101 | |

Both sexes are visibly attracted by the allotments, but men evidence a somewhat greater representation in the extravagant payment categories.

Up to now, we have failed to speak much of men's and women's varying styles of money expenditure. It might have been predicted that men would be more willing to part with money especially for an "absurd" commodity like time, for presumably money stimulates a power urge in men which should reflect in their treatment of the time variables. This prediction is only partially supported in the data, as in the low payment row there are several instances of women displaying higher percentage scores than men. It is perhaps only at the extreme expenditure limits that men will demonstrate a greater predisposition to invest in time. Thus, the significance of allotments and ideas connected with recovery or preknowledge may be contaminated or concealed by the competing stimulus, money. We must contend therefore, with complications imposed by the meaning of investment and the likelihood of men's characteristic attraction to extreme response options.

III. Historical Recoverability

The introduction of historical retrieval commences a pursuit of the so-called (temporally) inauthentic fantasy. People cannot actually recover their past or know their future in advance but at least they have experienced that past time which the Money Game asks them to consider and in all probability they will someday realize that futuristic period of which they now seek early knowledge. Foreknowing, an almost ludicrous topic for a discourse on reality, arouses exciting fantasies and compels us, moreover, to consider the effect on present activity of future ambiguities.

When attention is turned to historical time, however, the reference is to a fantasy mechanism purely, for the historical past cannot be genuinely regained through the act of recall. Complicating the meaning of these four temporal compartments is the fact that unlike the historical past, the historical future by definition cannot ever be made known to us through report.¹³ We can guess at it or extrapolate from present developments but we cannot approach it as one does through historical investigations. So once again we are confronted with two dimensions of time: first, the past-present distinction and the generalized set of meanings attributed to these positions on a temporal horizon; and second, the differentiation once made by Russell between *personal* and *historical* time.¹⁴ These two dimensions then yield four relevant spheres of temporality, each with attending fantasy identities:

1. The Personal Past: experienced in actuality and therefore able to be "directly" re-captured by memory or recollection.

2. The Personal Future: existent always in an anticipated unrealized state and therefore unknowable through or by intellectual or emotional properties and operations.

¹³ Many of these notions come from the writing of Martin Heidegger. See especially his *Being and Time*, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, Harper and Row, 1962). See also Magda King, *Heidegger's Philosophy* (New York, Dell Publishing Company, 1964).

¹⁴ See Bertrand Russell, "On the Experience of Time," *Monist*, 1915, 25, pp. 212-233; and *The Problems of Philosophy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1959).

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3. The Historical Past: known to us “indirectly” by reports of others¹⁵ and for the most part, probably made intriguing by intellectual rather than purely emotional fascinations.

4. The Historical Future: remaining forever unknown to us either directly through intellectual experience or indirectly through other’s accounts.

The various meanings given to the historical past also may reflect interests ranging from the abstract or intellectual to the egocentric. Many of us, for example, might like to take a magic carpet ride in time to the days of Ancient Rome or Periclean Greece. Yet an interest in the historical may be oriented more to tracing our personal evolutions. The intellectual would necessarily argue for an evolutionary thesis. Karl Mannheim’s position, for example, essentially rests on the notion that contemporary existentiality develops from and within a greater past selectively shared by prior societies:

“This idea of ‘the past which lies behind’ can thus be interpreted in two ways: as a temporal past or as an antecedent evolutionary phase which can account for any particular detail of the actual. Looked at from the former point of view, everything has meaning because it has arisen out of a temporal process of development; from the latter point of view everything that exists historically has meaning because it exhibits the same fundamental drive, the same basic trend of mental and spiritual growth.”¹⁶

In Mannheim’s terms, the historical past provides development, growth and evolution.

One’s inextricable immersion in such evolutionary flow need not, however, be recognized or acknowledged much less operationalized, as the degree to which one seeks a forbidden re-entrance into the womb of humanity. Historical pastness is probably to be viewed less as a model of abstract contributions to the evolution of social and psychological processes than in terms of personal and generational links to earlier chronological periods, or

¹⁵ Cf. Heidegger, *op. cit.*

¹⁶ Karl Mannheim, *Essays on Sociology and Social Psychology* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 111.

antecedent social and spiritual forms. In Mannheim's coinciding of socio-political ideologies (which emerge incidentally, almost as political cognitive styles or fundamental propensities for ordering one's being-in-the-world) with temporal orientations, one gets a taste of the force of history on present exigencies and, more precisely, the impact of a generic priorness not limited to directly experienced activity on the most contemporary of decisions leading to social and psychological complexities of linear and spatialized time: "... the progressive experiences the present as the beginning of the future, while the conservative regards it simply as the latest point reached by the past... Primarily the conservative experiences the past as being one with the present; hence, his concept of history tends to be spatial rather than temporal; it stresses coexistence rather than succession."¹⁷

Perhaps a more personalized statement of man's inevitable predicament vis-à-vis history, is contained in a passage written by Edward Tirayakian. An added dividend of these words is the inclusion of historical futureness in the space of existential involvement and committedness:

"Another aspect of the openness of the self lies in its historical grounding; being-in-the-world means to participate in social time and thus in history. I am today what I am in part because of my historical past and in part because of what I anticipate to be my historical future. I am also historical in a collective or social sense, that is, I am open to and take as mine the history of my people and this leads me to realize that I am not contained in my finite and solid appearance but that my being goes out spatially and temporally."¹⁸

Tirayakian's sentiments probably cannot represent the world outlook of these normal adults referred to by Einstein who rarely contemplate temporal matters:

"The normal adult never bothers his head about space-time problems. Everything there is to be thought about, in his opinion, has already been done in early childhood. I, on the contrary,

¹⁷ Mannheim, *ibid.*, pp. 111-112.

¹⁸ Edward Tirayakian, "The Existential Self and the Person," in Chad Gordon and Kenneth J. Gergen (Editors), *The Self in Social Interaction* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 175.

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developed so slowly that I only began to wonder about space and time when I was already grown up. In consequence, I probed deeper into the problem than an ordinary child would have done.”¹⁹

It is doubtful if a concern with private or public evolution permeates the boundaries of pedestrian confrontations and experiences. An adolescent’s encounters with religious teachings and ceremonies for example, may supply him with the barest curiosity for history, but it is again doubtful if these curiosities would erupt into any significant passion for historical revivals, even in a context of effortless imagining and limitless wealth.

The distribution of payments for the historical past shown in Table 3 corroborates this premonition. The non-experienced past, contraining the precursors of one’s most immediate reality, appear (economically) tantalizing for less than 30% of these young people.

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS FOR HISTORICAL PAST

| Money Value | Time Allotment | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| | Hour | | | | Day | | | | Year | | | |
| | Males % | Females N | Females % | Males N | Males % | Females N | Females % | Males N | Males % | Females N | Females % | Males N |
| \$ 0 | 73.7 | 314 | 81.0 | 81 | 70.7 | 301 | 78.0 | 78 | 70.2 | 299 | 72.3 | 73 |
| \$ 10 | 7.0 | 30 | 6.0 | 6 | 6.8 | 29 | 5.0 | 5 | 4.2 | 18 | 4.9 | 5 |
| \$ 100 | 5.4 | 23 | 5.0 | 5 | 7.0 | 30 | 8.0 | 8 | 6.1 | 26 | 0.99 | 1 |
| \$ 1,000 | 2.4 | 10 | 2.0 | 2 | 4.9 | 21 | 6.0 | 6 | 3.9 | 17 | 5.9 | 6 |
| \$ 10,000 | 11.5 | 49 | 6.0 | 6 | 10.6 | 45 | 3.0 | 3 | 15.6 | 66 | 15.8 | 16 |
| Percentage | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | |
| N | 426 | | 100 | | 426 | | 100 | | 426 | | 101 | |

The results should seem remarkable to that social scientist who predicted indiscriminate spending. More importantly, the reticence demonstrated here makes unequivocal the notion that

¹⁹ Quoted in Arthur Koestler, *The Act of Creation* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1964), p. 175.

time's significance supersedes the meaning of money and furthermore, that discrete allotments are overshadowed by the more primitive definitions of epochs.

One obvious interpretation of such results is that the lack of interest in the historical past occurs because people feel detached from the events of this realm. They are unable therefore, to propel themselves backward in fantasy or utilize such fantasies in the contexts and atmospheres of their own immediate environments. Even the provisionary freedom accompanying wealth cannot assuage this predominant disinterest and apparent lack of engagement in evolution.

The prospect of historical recoveries need not be limited, of course, to lofty conceptualizations, for one might wish to purchase sufficient time "merely" to see one's parents as children or, an even more frequently expressed fantasy, for the opportunity to observe one's family prior to one's own arrival. Despite Mannheim's and Tirayakian's elegant proposals, the task must not be explained only in terms of conservative-progressive or open selves existence in broad spatial and temporal fields. The fact remains that for these respondents an interest in time diminished markedly with the stipulation that fantasies trespass upon the space of pre-existence.

One should not leave the topic of temporal recovery without some reference to the notion that historical pastness contains all that (temporally) belongs to the realm of the sacred. On the level of spiritual contemplations, a refusal of history is an ignorance of creation and a denial of origins. The time out of which each of us derives and which through our own subjectivities and cognizance seems to undergo temporary cessation during the period of our lives, then to resume in magical duration upon death, is in one dramatic sense, sacred time.²⁰ It need not exist as religious mysticism or vessels of imponderables, yet it contains no less than the primitive generation of spirituality ultimately offering to man the privileged sense of consuming responsibility.

Each of us, necessarily occupying his own special and finite time, delineates the commencement and completion of *profane*

²⁰ In the same mood, Tillich advised that upon death, we are returned to time.

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time, thereby rendering the measure of eternity to the prior and eventual times bordering the "geography" of the profane. Now in an almost ironical sense, *sacred time*, as elucidated by Mircea Eliade, while uncovered by unreligious man, in fact is attainable through the time of festivals.²¹ It possesses in other words, the capacity for revival and the feasibility of return.

In the temporal freedoms of purposeful fantasy and the institutionalization of recovery through ceremony, the realm of sacred time remains untrampled upon, even ignored or rebuked. In a most complex way therefore, a third realm of time appears to intervene between the corridors of fantasy and reality. This third time, the sacred, encompasses epochs requiring only symbolic restoration, as for many of us they exist already as the time of permanence. The distinction between sacred and profane time made by Eliade, is contained in this unusually profound paragraph:

The (religious man) experiences intervals of time that are "sacred," that have no part in the temporal duration that precedes and follows them, that have a wholly different structure and origin, for they are of a primordial time, sanctified by the gods and capable of being made present by the festival. This trans-human quality of liturgical time is inaccessible to a non-religious man. This is as much as to say that, for him, time can present neither break nor mystery; for him, time constitutes man's deepest existential dimension; it is linked to his own life, hence it has a beginning and an end, which is death, the annihilation of his life. However many the temporal rhythms that he experiences, however great their difference in intensity, non-religious man knows that they always represent a human experience, in which there is not room for any divine presence.²²

IV. Historical Preknowledge

In some respects, futureness is futureness regardless of the tentative chronological boundaries established by death. Whereas the

²¹ Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History, The Myth of the Eternal Return* (New York, Harper and Row, 1959).

²² Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane* (New York, Harper and Row, 1961), p. 71.

knowledge of pastness may be the information of reports or experiences, the future in the most expansive sense, cannot be known until its arrival. As Merleau-Ponty wrote, we leave only imaginings to fill the void of future:

“Reproduction presupposes re-cognition, and cannot be understood as such unless I have in the first place a sort of direct contact with the past in its own domain. Nor can one, *a fortiori*, construct the future out of contents of consciousness: no actual content can be taken, even equivocally, as evidence concerning the future, since the future has not even been in existence and cannot, like the past, set its mark upon us.”²³

The thought that our envisioned and immanent future turns in upon us has been discussed by Heidegger and Whitehead. What has not been fully explicated however, is the supposed distinction between personal and historical futures, the latter to be distinguished by its identity of insuperable aloneness. Although free to fill its caverns with the most eloquent of imaginings, we are forever refused even the slightest glimpse of its light. To seek a forbidden entrance into the realm of the historical future is to gain a perspective from which to judge the worth of existence and the progress of cultures as well as acquire the dubious right to inspect immortality. To “live beyond death” is not only to read one’s obituary along with other anthropological progress reports, it is, in the ingenious substance of fantasy, a method of eliminating death altogether. Pursuing Eliade’s thesis, the historical future becomes the simultaneous origin and resumption of the sacred, the point of termination for the profane.

The following citation from Cournot, selected by Miguel de Unamuno, introduces the concept of destiny to the existing structure of the future. The passages adjoining it from Unamuno’s own work, depict the religious grandiosity necessarily born and nurtured in prospective sacredness:

Religious manifestations are the necessary consequences of man’s predisposition to believe in the existence of an invisible, supernatural and miraculous world, a predisposition which it has been possible to consider sometimes as a reminiscence of an

²³ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception* (New York, Humanities Press, 1962), p. 413.

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anterior state, sometimes as an intimation of a future destiny.²⁴

And it is this problem of human destiny, of eternal life, or of the human finality of the Universe or of God, that we have now reached. All the highways of religion lead up to this, for it is the very essence of all religion.²⁵

Once again I must repeat that the longing for the immortality of the soul, for the permanence, in some form or another, of our personal and individual consciousness, is as much of the essence of religion as is the longing that there may be a God.²⁶

And nevertheless men have not ceased endeavoring to imagine to themselves what this eternal life may be, nor will they cease their endeavors so long as they are men and not merely thinking machines... Man will never willingly abandon his attempt to form a concrete representation of the other life.²⁷

It was noted that one of the difficulties reported by men and women alike, was that purchasing time of their own pasts on first glance loomed as a genuinely appetizing prospect. On later consideration however, retrieving became an obstruction to personal evolution. Thus, the idea of recovering a year discouraged many who wanted instead to get on with "real living." All the same, about 50% of the students bought in time at some amount for each allotment. To see how life works out stimulated an investment of comparable value, for destroying future surprises did not stall the enterprise. Prices dipped only slightly here.

Up to this point, baiting people with time had proved moderately successful. Whether it was detachment, disinterest, disengagement, or boredom that made respondents shy away from the third epoch remains unexplained. Whatever the reasons, historical pastness produced consistent and overriding stinginess. Now appealing to one's definitions of postponement, destiny,

²⁴ Cournot, from *Traité de l'enchaînement des idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire*. Quoted in Miguel de Unamuno, *Tragic Sense of Life*, translated by J. E. Crawford Fritch (New York, Dover Publications, 1954), pp. 217-218.

²⁵ Unamuno, *ibid.*, p. 218.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 211.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

immortality and sacredness, the Money Game concluded offerings with its final bargain, the rights to the historical future.

As was true with personal past and future investing, the historical future appealed more to men than women. Furthermore, the purchasing distributions shown in Table 4 echo the earlier findings that epoch more than allotment, tends to determine the amount of the pledge.

TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS FOR HISTORICAL FUTURE

| Money Value | Time Allotment | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------|-----|---------|----|-------|-----|---------|----|-------|-----|---------|----|
| | Hour | | | | Day | | | | Year | | | |
| | Males | | Females | | Males | | Females | | Males | | Females | |
| | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N | % | N |
| \$ 0 | 55.8 | 237 | 67.5 | 68 | 54.1 | 230 | 64.0 | 64 | 55.0 | 235 | 71.0 | 71 |
| \$ 10 | 5.6 | 24 | 4.9 | 5 | 1.66 | 7 | 4.0 | 4 | 4.4 | 19 | 0.0 | 0 |
| \$ 100 | 7.5 | 32 | 5.9 | 6 | 8.3 | 35 | 13.0 | 13 | 3.4 | 14 | 6.0 | 6 |
| \$ 1,000 | 6.6 | 28 | 5.9 | 6 | 11.1 | 47 | 8.0 | 8 | 3.5 | 15 | 6.0 | 6 |
| \$ 10,000 | 24.5 | 104 | 15.8 | 16 | 24.9 | 106 | 11.0 | 11 | 33.7 | 144 | 17.0 | 17 |
| Percentage | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | | 100 | |
| N | 425 | | 101 | | 425 | | 100 | | 427 | | 100 | |

That men generally promise higher payments nullifies any peculiar predisposition on their part to purchase special allotments from favored epochs. It may be that they are in fact more tolerant or needing of fantasy, hence more easily swayed by the suggestibility of the Money Game. Or, if fantasies are seen to obstruct life goals and in so doing become annoyances rather than media for playing with time, men may be more compelled to sift out the playful qualities and prevent them from interfering with public realities and especially destiny. However, their constant display of larger sums confuses these issues and points to an intervening and deceptive factor, money. Nothing conclusive about fantasy may be advanced therefore, in a comparison of male-female performances in the differentiating epochs, but frequent refusals to bid do suggest that men's unabridged accounts

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are abated by the meaning and relative worth imputed to these fundamental divisions of the horizon.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

A summary of expenditures reflects in the means of all categories (Table 5). Evidently, men not only pay more at each of the twelve options, they obey as well, and with consistency, the relationship between temporal unit and financial value.

TABLE 5
MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR THE MONEY GAME

| Epoch | Allotment | Males | | Females | |
|-------------------|-----------|-------|------|---------|------|
| | | Mean | S.D. | Mean | S.D. |
| Personal Past | Hour | 2.43 | 1.55 | 2.29 | 1.51 |
| Personal Past | Day | 2.88 | 1.58 | 2.47 | 1.55 |
| Personal Past | Year | 3.31 | 1.73 | 2.38 | 1.67 |
| Personal Future | Hour | 2.37 | 1.56 | 1.93 | 1.32 |
| Personal Future | Day | 2.72 | 1.67 | 2.23 | 1.40 |
| Personal Future | Year | 3.14 | 1.88 | 2.70 | 1.77 |
| Historical Past | Hour | 1.73 | 1.37 | 1.46 | 1.09 |
| Historical Past | Day | 1.80 | 1.39 | 1.51 | 1.07 |
| Historical Past | Year | 1.92 | 1.53 | 1.89 | 1.55 |
| Historical Future | Hour | 2.43 | 1.72 | 1.99 | 1.55 |
| Historical Future | Day | 2.57 | 1.76 | 1.99 | 1.45 |
| Historical Future | Year | 2.62 | 1.87 | 1.99 | 1.60 |

The means indicate that the four epochs are accorded worth in the following ranking: personal past > personal future > historical future > historical past. Extrapersonal time, therefore, is seen to lose considerable value, and while authentic fantasies tend to drift backward chronologically, unauthentic ones prefer a forward direction.

The one minor deviation in the table deserves brief mention because it documents, however meekly, a somewhat recurring phrase in the interviews. In discussing their desire to recover personal time, many women admitted that while the idea appealed to them, a year seemed to be too much to reposses. The slight

drop from a day ($\bar{X}=2.47$) to a year ($\bar{X}=2.38$) may be explained by the aforementioned notion that many simply wanted to "get on with it," and this fantasy, albeit unrealizable, perpetrated a sense of a temporary halt.

This fact should point again to the power of a domineering reality principle, for all fantasies are quelled in part by reality considerations. Psychically, action probably derives from the "mathematics" of a fantasy numerator and denominator of reality?. When the "fraction" generated is too low, reality somehow has squelched the impetus for wild abandonment and the corresponding value attributed to time dips. The components of the fraction are seen to be embedded in the instructions, for while fantasy naturally is prompted by the suggestion of "pretend," reality, in a most subtle and unintended role, is introduced in the suggestion that one may do whatever he wishes with the time he chooses to purchase.

There is then, an implicit but forceful transformation in the task, as respondents must exchange the freedom of fantasy for the utility of "unreal" time. Their reluctance to play, indeed their manifest stinginess may be a result not of an inability to fantasize but of an incapacity to reconcile the demands that reality (unfortunately) makes on the eventual use of this achieved time. Hence they may very well desire and cherish recovered or prematurely attained moments only to discover that reality fails to provide vessels for storing these now burdensome luxuries.

THE TIME OF "REFRACTION"

It may be argued that so-called future-directed people, displaying heightened involvement with their own anticipations, are led to contemplate death more intensely than those who report that life's dominant experiences have already been encountered.²⁸ In a word, holding chronology aside, the expecting person, by nature

²⁸ Experiential orientations in time have been well studied by social scientists. See for example, Morris Eson and Norman Greenfield. "Life Space: Its Content and Temporal Dimension," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 1962, 100, pp. 113-128; M. Wallace, "Future Time Perspective in Schizophrenia," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1956, 52, pp. 240-245; and Thomas J. Cottle, "The Experiential Inventory: A Manifest Time Orientation," unpublished manuscript, Department of Social Relations, Harvard University, 1966.

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of his stance vis-à-vis the temporal horizon “stands to lose more” by death. By committing himself most zealously to the rewards of the future, to the rewards of the not yet accomplished, the “expector” necessarily places a greater premium on this period. The premium carries with it, obviously, the contingency and yet the hope that one lives sufficiently long to receive these planned-for rewards. One must not die prematurely, therefore, because everything would be spoiled, everything being all that has been expected. Yet, if one continuously carries a future experiential perspective, the threat of death spoiling everything would seem to be a permanent fixture attending this orientation of expectation and hope.

The argument could also be read the other way round: those fearing death the most are those orienting themselves toward the unmodifiable safety and sanctity of completedness. In either case, the future orienter, concerned with processing experiences until their conclusion, may be eager to vault ahead into sacred futurity for purposes of postponing his demise as well as assessing his limited accomplishments and industry.²⁹

An hypothesis that fundamentally expecting or planning people will characteristically seek models of preknowledge is weak if the differentiations between personal and historical, and the profane and sacred, have merit. It may be central in the Calvinist tradition to work hard now for greater rewards later on, but it is equally justifiable in a tradition of secular achievement, to reconcile aspirations with an appreciation of human finitude. Moreover, the distinctions between allotments and epochs should carry over to those whose basic stance toward experience is one of reflection, for profane reflections need not be paralleled in the realm of the sacred.

We might ask, if experiential reflection, here broadened to include both experienced and inexperienced events, retrieves for the present both sacred and profane pasts, what is the (analogous) operation active in preknowing or “pre-experiencing” the future. Asked in a different way, how do I treat a sense of imagined pre-

²⁹ Many of these ideas have come from Erik H. Erikson. See his *Childhood and Society* (New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1950); and “Identity and Uprootedness in Our Time,” in *Insight and Responsibility* (New York, W. W. Norton and Company, 1964), pp. 83-107.

knowledge so that I might derive some benefit from this newly-willed perspective?

Preknowledge may be said to differ from expectation and anticipation in the inference that we know, with assuredness, a prescribed set of outcomes or eventualities. Preknowledge is not something like the awareness of death, however, for at least two reasons. First, we rationally know that death will come so there is nothing “pre” about it. Life, however, can be thought of as existing in a temporary “pre” state. Second, we cannot experience now the feeling of “deathness.” Preknowledge implies, in the most crude terms, that I know how and when death will come. This alleviates the first objection but the second remains, for I still cannot experience death authentically.³⁰

The closest we may come to a rational acceptance of fantasized preknowledge occurs in what might be called the “time of refraction” in which “presentness” is experienced or responded to, not through the reflection of a prior response state, but through the prism of future. Here the time of the now is refracted through some future period and in fact perceived from this advanced station. Thus, if I feel that my work is not going as well as it did a year ago “at this time,” my perception of the now occurs through reflection, literally a past-present comparison. If, however, I say that I am *already* knowing the guilt that I will *soon* feel at the conclusion of my work when I will look *back* and say, “Why didn’t I do this better?,” I am in effect using discrete future moments for a perception of this now and the corresponding feeling which is uniquely different from the mood of my previous reflection. In the literal sense, I have succeeded in first thinking along the expected direction of chronology but then have deflected this line of thought back again to a most novel form of the now, the so-called front view.

Although precarious terms because of their customary scientific usage, reflection and refraction may very well capture some of the reality and fantasy components intrinsic in the Money Game. At very last they begin to describe the genuine moods we all experience as the “there and then’s” of the horizon seem to softly turn in on the moment of the here and now.

³⁰ Heidegger, *op. cit.*

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CONCLUSION

Despite its fantasy nature, the Money Game permits us to explore an added level of temporal thought. It is neither a mood that the Money Game stimulates nor an irrelevant or bizarre manipulation of time. It is rather, the probably too superficial commencement of an exploration into those “inner” make-believe states about time which ultimately turn out to be as important as the more substantial instruments measuring temporal perspectives and attitudes. The Money Game provides a peek at two defining columns of temporality: The first is the column of experiential location, or what might even be referred to as the space of experiences in time. And then the column which probably forever coexists with the first, the column of hope and wish, or, simply, the counterforce of experiential location.