

seeking God, even if in the wrong way. Seeking God means seeking Love. Dr Pittenger's view is that "the genuinely integrating factor in human experience is the capacity to give love and to be loved. But as lovers we are frustrated, because we are liable to the distortion of sin. So what is sin? As the author says, it is not simply the transgression of law, but rather "our refusal to move on in becoming truly human"—which can also be seen as our refusal to follow natural law. Natural law, says Dr Pittenger, can and should be understood as that which tells us to avoid the evil and do the good. It is not something revealed to men *in spite* of their humanity, "as if such a law cut across all human insight and experience." For a homosexual, it is not natural to seek fulfilment in heterosexual love; on the contrary, he is committing an outrage against his own instincts.

But this does not entail moral anarchy. As well as having the right to fulfil themselves as human beings through their sexuality, homosexuals, like everybody else, have responsibilities. The last sections suggest an ethic for homosexuals. Dr Pittenger concludes that when homosexuals have recognised their sexuality as an integral and natural element in themselves, they should accept it and rejoice in it; that one's sexual behaviour should involve a considered and serious attitude towards

the other person; namely, that all sexual acts be subjected to "the control of love."

This is a thoughtful and humane book. Who is meant to read it? I think it is largely directed at heterosexual Christians who honestly want to understand the nature of homosexuality and of homosexual people. Most importantly, this must include all those who are called on to be counsellors, and more specifically, confessors. Then there are those who have "achieved gay consciousness", which properly means the shedding of guilt through awareness of the potential creative value of homosexuality, but is often bound up with a rejection of the need for any regulating force on human behaviour. People who in this way reject any "control of love" will dismiss the book as "liberal", irrelevant, etc, but it was not written for them. More to the point, it will incur great hostility among those who, under the impression that they are upholding Christian principles, deliver facile and self-righteous judgements on a subject they know nothing about. Dr Pittenger is well aware that from their point of view his book is highly controversial, even shocking. he says he has been "driven" to his conclusions, through blood, sweat and tears. I wonder how many of his opponents will feel able to claim the same.

MARTIN McQUIGG

ORIGIN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL: A MARXIST PERSPECTIVE by Phil Slater. *Routledge and Kegan Paul*, £5.95

Bertolt Brecht once thought of writing a novel about a rich old man who set up an institute to enquire into the sources of evil and suffering in the world. The institute duly pursued its research, and reported back to its benefactor that the source of evil and suffering was himself. Brecht's story was intended to be a parable of the fate of what has become widely known, within Western Marxism, as the Frankfurt School. The term 'Frankfurt School' designates that small group of Marxist intellectuals who constituted the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, established in 1923 and directed from 1930 onwards by the philosopher Max Horkheimer. Herbert Marcuse, Theodor

Adorno, Eric Fromm, Franz Neumann, Leo Lowenthal, Friedrich Pollock: what united these thinkers was a common antagonism to that species of positivism which passed as 'orthodox Marxist-Leninism', and a determination to oust it with a truly critical, dialectical theory of society by a return to Hegelian Marxism. Influenced by Lukacs and Korsch, hostile to Stalinism and Engelsian 'dialectical materialism', the Frankfurt School chalked up some major theoretical achievements—Neumann and Pollock's pioneering work on the political economy of fascism, Horkheimer's meditations on Marxist philosophy, the aesthetics of Adorno and Marcuse, Fromm's attempts

to synthesise Marxism and Freudianism. They were concerned, in effect, to elaborate that 'theory of superstructures' largely missing within classical Marxism; and it was for this reason that their collective enterprise centred on philosophy, psychology, culture and aesthetics, concerned with problems of 'social manipulation' (both in the fascist era, and later with the American 'culture industry') rather than with the more traditional Marxist preoccupations—economic exploitation, class-struggle, revolutionary organisation.

With the crushing of the German workers' revolution, the Frankfurt school was left marooned between the betrayals of the German Social Democratic Party on the one hand, and the Stalinism of the German Communist Party on the other. In 1933, as German fascism gathered force, the Institute (most of whose members were Jews) moved to New York, to become the last, lonely outpost of Weimar culture in an alien land. From then on, the rot set well and truly in. Perry Anderson, in his recent *Considerations on Western Marxism*, has noted the deep-seated pessimism which has uniformly marked the Western Marxist lineage; and the exiled Frankfurters were certainly nothing if not gloomy. Adorno's *Minima Moralia* is a bizarre *melange* of cryptic metaphysical insight and patrician grousing; his joint work with Horkheimer (*Dialectic of Enlightenment*) reveals, in the manner of Marcuse's *One-dimensional Man*, the grim vision of a monopoly capitalism wholly saturated with an instrumentalist rationality, capable of containing and defusing its contradictions, almost completely impermeable to Hegelian-Marxist 'Reason'. Horkheimer ended up as a craven apologist for liberal capitalism, a supporter of both Adenauer and the anti-contraception encyclical; Lowenthal became research director of Voice of America; Adorno collapsed into private *Angst* and received some rough treatment at the hands of rebellious German students in the late 1960s. The Institute in exile, funded by American grants (hence the point of Brecht's parable), became notably cautious about treading on even the tiniest toes; its research in America, such as the studies in anti-semitism conducted in the 1940s, employed the very empiricist methods its earlier 'critical theory of society' had so soundly berated. Only Herbert Marcuse, despite his characteristic Frankfurt brand of utopian idealism, was to survive the rot

to become prophet of the late 1960s students' movement; and Marcuse, despite popular myths to the contrary, never abandoned his belief that only the working class could provide the agency of revolutionary change in advanced capitalist society.

Phil Slater has written a valuable, compact history of the whole sad tale, tracing the early years of the School in its relation to contemporary German history, and providing informative chapters on its philosophical, psychological and aesthetic theses. As a Marxist himself, Slater puts an accurate finger on the central, devastating disability of the whole School: its chronic inability to bring its theorising into any productive relationship with political practice. (Actually he says 'praxis', and writes of the need for a 'theory-praxis nexus'; he seems not to know that, in neo-Hegelian Marxist parlance, the term 'praxis' means a unity of theory and practice). Slater, rightly doesn't regard this failing as an unfortunate oversight, a mere historical accident: he sees it instead as the logical outcome of the 'critical theory of society' as a whole. So it was; but it is hard to see quite how Slater can argue this, when his own brand of historical materialism seems heavily influenced by precisely those strains of 'historicism', 'humanism' and neo-Hegelianism which the Frankfurt School most graphically exemplifies. To pose the issue somewhat crudely: if from the outset the proletariat figures within your 'Marxist' theory are little more than a 'materialist' stand-in for the Hegelian concepts of 'negation' and 'World-Spirit', then, its fairly predictable that, once the class-struggle temporarily freezes over, you are going to find yourself proclaiming the death of the working-class, the hopelessness of revolution and the attractiveness of American research funds. Slater's book seems at one level aware of this; but it doesn't draw the obvious conclusion (indeed there isn't, frustratingly, a Conclusion at all) that so-called 'neo-Hegelian' Marxism is merely a variant of petty bourgeois humanism and needs as such to be smashed rather than 'sublated'. This work won't replace the fullest study of the Frankfurt School we have to date, Martin Jay's *The Dialectical Imagination*. But if it falls short of that book in theoretical exposition, it has the edge over it in its alertness to the historical context surrounding the School, as well as its political seriousness and commitment.

TERRY EAGLETON.