

stories; his deliberately "dark" and "stark" ending was to emphasize the total failure of the disciples (a theme Perrin leaves, alas, for "discussion on another occasion") and to stress the imminent coming of the Son of God from heaven as apocalyptic judge and redeemer-king.

Matthew, on the other hand, concludes with a great vision in which the risen Lord appears from heaven to commission the disciples as the nucleus of the Church—in contradistinction (so Perrin argues) to the Jewish response to the fall of Jerusalem: namely, the establishment of what became rabbinic Judaism. Matthew's principal resurrection narrative, a sort of prophecy after the event, would thus be the "charter" of the Christian community as it severed links finally with its Jewish past—forty years after the death of Jesus. Luke, in contrast, is concerned with the shift from Jerusalem to Rome. Jerusalem, the navel of the earth, is the place where Jesus is rejected but the place also where God makes a new beginning. The resurrection appearances had to take place in Jerusalem, for Luke, because that is where the Christian movement outwards to the ends of the earth began. The resurrection narratives in Luke are thus

cast in the form of the aetiology of a quite different process, specific to Luke-Acts.

If the resurrection narratives in Matthew, Mark, and Luke may be treated in some such way—and that is a big "if"—the question naturally arises whether we have any way of knowing *what actually happened*. To that Norman Perrin answered that we can never really know. It is clear enough, so he says, from I Corinthians 15, that there were "appearances" of the risen Lord Jesus. If the resurrection narratives in the gospels are not to be counted as accounts of the original appearances we would have no information about the nature of these appearances—unless they were like the experience which Paul underwent on the road to Damascus: "Have I not seen Jesus our Lord? Am I not an apostle? Am I not free?" This was as much as Norman Perrin was prepared to say. It may sound minimalistic, unorthodox, even simply wrong. Such a short book could not be conclusive. As the last word of an adventurous spirit, abruptly silenced, it may nevertheless send many readers back, with new questions and with quickened interest, to the ancient texts.

FERGUS KERR OP

BODY AS SPIRIT: THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS FEELING, by Charles Davis.
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1976. 818 pp. £4.25.

This book attempts to reinstate *feeling* as the crucial element in genuinely Christian experience. Contrary to what is held, or implied, to be the tradition that most Christians have inherited, man is not a compound of body and soul, or body and mind: he is a unity. Hence, unlike mere reasonings (products of mind) mere volitions (products of will) or mere emotions (products of bodily reactions) *feelings* are properly unifying responses of the whole man: for they are at once visceral and intelligent, spontaneous yet freely accepted by the will. Of course, the feelings have to be educated: there is a discipline of feeling truly, that has to be learnt, a discrimination to be acquired for distinguishing appropriate from inappropriate feeling. But this should never be taken for a very different proposition, namely that the feelings are *per se* more dangerous, more suspect, of a lower order than rational

thought or the cultivation of what we have come to think of as 'spirituality'.

Of course there is nothing very new here. What is significant is that the thesis is propounded by one who has been well trained—I am tempted to say immersed—in a tradition which has tended to 'spiritualize' and to 'intellectualize' religion. There is one source of the book's eloquence: that behind the carefully qualified arguments and the academically guarded language, the reader feels the continuing pressure of a personal odyssey undergone but barely acknowledged, except in the dedication.

At the root of the argument is a distinction between sensuousness (the proper, integrated, educated expression of true feeling) and sensuality. An important part of the thesis is that sensuality is not a celebration of the body, but rather a denial of it in the interests of a dominative intellect-

ual exploitation. Sensuality is a betrayal of feeling which arises when the body is simply objectified by the isolated reason and will. The modern cult of the sensual, so far from being either integrating or liberating, is thus only a form of enslavement of the body to the old dominion of the calculating mind. But if this is so, it is a radical error to think of the true answer to the problem as consisting in any way in the repression of the feelings, or of their bodily basis: for such repression is precisely the source of the original distortion. The achievement of an integral religious awareness is not to be found in an ascesis of 'self-control', if by that is meant the supremacy of mind and will over feeling: on the contrary, what is required is a 'self-healing', which is to say a release and education of the feelings, and an acknowledgement of their rightful place in the wholeness, or holiness of man.

At this point I would have liked to see some connections made, firstly with the sort of tradition represented by, for instance, Newman, with his natural romantic acknowledgement of the place of feeling in the Christian sensibility and of its education in any Christian community; and secondly, with the modern rediscovery of healing as an essentially sacramental activity, and thus as part of what is normally to be expected in a community of faith. But the book does not move on in that direction, at least explicitly. It leads rather to chapters which deal in more general terms with the problems of evil, death and sex. Finally, the implications of the central proposition for a critique of religious experience itself are sketched out in a last

chapter.

My reservations about the book arise from its omissions rather than from its assertions. While finding it easy to accept at the level of generality it chooses to occupy, I want to know more precisely where I am being led before finally making up my mind. We are not given enough concrete examples to illuminate the route mapped out here, and so we are not enabled to decide exactly how far we want to go along with the author. Thus, to put it in one particular way, there is very little here, apart from the scholarly and Christian apparatus and tone, that was not said, in one way or another, by D.H. Lawrence. The question then arises how far the author wants to follow the Lawrentian path, with all its obvious dangers and pitfalls. But since the book makes no reference to the Lawrence case-history, or odyssey, as a whole we are not shown in what ways, if any, the Lawrentian outlook differs from, and ought to be distinguished from, the author's own. There are many other possible examples that might have been chosen to illustrate the practical implications of what may be called—without, I hope, any deprecating overtones—the advocacy of a cult of the feelings. But none of them is adequately examined: and in the absence of such further work in this field, I personally wish to reserve final judgement on the thesis as it stands, while at the same time applauding much of what is said in its defence.

BRIAN WICKER

FIVE BOOKS ON CONSIDERATION, by Bernard of Clairvaux. Trans. John D. Anderson and Elizabeth T. Kennan. *Cistercian Publications* (CF 37). 1976. 222 pp. £2.25.

THE ENIGMA OF FAITH, by William of St. Thierry. Trans. John D. Anderson. *Cistercian Publications* (CF 9). 1974. 122 pp. £5.00.

St Bernard's *de Consideratione* is not one of his most attractive works, and those looking for an account of his doctrine of meditation will be disappointed. Nevertheless it is a significant document of ecclesiology and church reform, and has enjoyed the approbation of successive generations of churchmen up to our own day.

This new translation is, on the whole,

excellently done; it makes a readable English text, and is usually sensitive and imaginative in its rendering of the latin. It is marred, however, by the occasional serious blunder. A difficult passage in IV 9 has gone astray, though without serious consequences for the section as a whole; more surprisingly and more unfortunately there are at least two occasions on which negatives are omitted, with predictably