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## THE CONTRIBUTORS

ALEXANDER LEE is a Ph.D candidate in the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. His dissertation focuses on the role of caste in Indian politics. He can be reached at [amlee@stanford.edu](mailto:amlee@stanford.edu).

HERBERT OBINGER is a professor of comparative public and social policy at the University of Bremen's Center for Social Policy Research. He is coeditor of the *Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State* (2010) and coauthor of *Transformations of the Welfare State: Small States, Big Lessons* (2010). He can be reached at [hobinger@zes.uni-bremen.de](mailto:hobinger@zes.uni-bremen.de).

CARINA SCHMITT is research fellow in political science at the Collaborative Research Center Transformations of the State (TranState) at the University of Bremen. Her current research focuses on comparative public policy and quantitative comparative methods. Schmitt has published on civic engagement in Latin America and on convergence of OECD welfare states. She can be reached at [carina.schmitt@sfb579.uni-bremen.de](mailto:carina.schmitt@sfb579.uni-bremen.de).

PHILIPP REHM is an assistant professor of political science at Ohio State University. His work is located at the intersection of political economy and political behavior. He explores the causes and consequences of income dynamics (such as income loss, income volatility, and risk exposure), both at the microlevel and at the macro-level. He can be reached at [philipp.rehm@gmail.com](mailto:philipp.rehm@gmail.com).

PHILIP ROESSLER is a senior research fellow in the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. He is currently finishing a book on the internal politics of civil war onset in sub-Saharan Africa. He can be reached at [philip.roessler@politics.ox.ac.uk](mailto:philip.roessler@politics.ox.ac.uk).

JILLIAN SCHWEDLER is an associate professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. She is author of *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen* (2006) and, most recently, editor (with Laleh Khalili) of *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East* (2010). Schwedler is currently finishing a book manuscript tentatively titled "Protesting Jordan: Space, Law, Dissent." She can be reached at [jschwedler@polsci.umass.edu](mailto:jschwedler@polsci.umass.edu).

## ABSTRACTS

### WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST?

POVERTY, EDUCATION, AND THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

By ALEXANDER LEE

Many studies of the social backgrounds of terrorists have found that they are wealthier and better educated than the population from which they are drawn. However, studies of political behavior have shown that *all* forms of political involvement are correlated with socioeconomic status. Among those who are politically active, opportunity costs may lead those involved in nonviolent activities to have a higher social status than violent individuals with a similar ideological orientation. This article develops a theory of participation in violence that incorporates both opportunity costs and informational barriers to participation and tests it by comparing violent and nonviolent political activists involved in the anticolonial agitation in Bengal (1906–39) using data from their police files. While the Bengali terrorists are better educated and have higher status jobs than the population average, they are less educated and less wealthy than the nonviolent activists. These results suggest that socioeconomic status may play a substantial negative role in terrorist recruitment within elites.

### GUNS AND BUTTER?

REGIME COMPETITION AND THE WELFARE STATE DURING THE COLD WAR

By HERBERT OBINGER AND CARINA SCHMITT

Scholars from a number of disciplines have argued that the massive expansion of the welfare state in the postwar period was at least in some part a byproduct of the cold war and the associated political competition between two rival regime blocs. However, the question of whether regime competition fuelled welfare-state growth has never been subject to systematic examination. Applying spatial econometrics, this article offers the first empirical test of this argument. The authors' findings support the notion that regime competition stimulated the expansion of the welfare state on both sides of the Iron Curtain in the postwar period.

### SOCIAL POLICY BY POPULAR DEMAND

By PHILIPP REHM

Why are unemployment benefits more generous in some countries? This article argues that citizens trade off the redistributive and insuring effect of social insurance. As a result, the distribution of risk in a society has important consequences via popular demand for social policy-making. At the microlevel, the article shows that, in addition to income, the risk of unemployment is a key predictor of individual-level preferences for unemployment benefits. Based on the microlevel findings, the article argues that at the macrolevel the homogeneity of the risk pool is an important determinant of benefit generosity: the more equally unemployment risk is distributed, the higher unemployment replacement rates are. Empirical testing at both levels finds support for this account of social policy by popular demand.

### THE ENEMY WITHIN

PERSONAL RULE, COUPS, AND CIVIL WAR IN AFRICA

By PHILIP ROESSLER

Why do rulers employ ethnic exclusion at the risk of civil war? Focusing on the region of sub-Saharan Africa, the author attributes this costly strategy to the commitment problem that arises in personalist regimes between elites who hold joint control of the state's coercive apparatus. As no faction can be sure that others will not exploit their violent capabilities to usurp power, elites maneuver to protect their privileged position and safeguard against others' first-a rising internal threat, rulers move to eliminate their rivals to guarantee their personal and

political survival. But the cost of such a strategy, especially when carried out along ethnic lines, is that it increases the risk of a future civil war. To test this argument, the author employs the Ethnic Power Relations data set combined with original data on the ethnicity of conspirators of coups and rebellions in Africa. He finds that in Africa ethnic exclusion substitutes civil war risk for coup risk. And rulers are significantly more likely to exclude their *coconspirators*—the very friends and allies who helped them come to power—than other included groups, but at the cost of increasing the risk of a future civil war with their former allies. In the first three years after being purged from the central government, coconspirators and their coethnics are sixteen times more likely to rebel than when they were represented at the apex of the regime.

## CAN ISLAMISTS BECOME MODERATES?

RETHINKING THE INCLUSION-MODERATION HYPOTHESIS

By JILLIAN SCHWEDLER

Recent years have seen a surge of studies that examine the inclusion-moderation hypothesis with reference to political Islam: the idea that political groups and individuals may become more moderate as a result of their inclusion in pluralist political processes. Most of these interventions adopt one of three foci: (1) the behavioral moderation of groups; (2) the ideological moderation of groups; and (3) the ideological moderation of individuals. After a discussion of various definitions of moderate and radical, the concept of moderation, and the centrality of moderation to studies of democratization, the author examines the scholarship on political Islam that falls within each approach. She then examines several studies that raise questions about sequencing: how mechanisms linking inclusion and moderation are posited and how other approaches might better explain Islamist moderation. Finally, she offers a critical analysis of the behavior-ideology binary that animates many of these models and suggests some fruitful paths for future research.