

# Index

- agent-neutrality, 2, 94–97, 142, 143  
agent-relativity, 2, 94–97, 101, 144–145, 150–151, 213, 215  
algorithms, *see* [strategies to argue for underdetermination](#)  
anti-realism  
  moral anti-realism, 10, 52–53, 185–186, 196–202, 205–211  
  scientific anti-realism, 10, 162–164, 185–190, 196, 202–204  
argument from moral underdetermination, *see* [skepticism](#)  
Audi, Robert, 47, 48, 54, 57  
  
backward-looking account of consequences, *see* [constitutive consequences](#)  
Baker, Derek, 46, 52–53, 197–198, 208–209  
Berker, Selim, 46–51, 208  
Bonk, Thomas, 27, 32, 166–167, 174  
Bortolotti, Lisa, 17, 169, 171  
Boyd, Richard N., 55, 58, 60  
Brandt, Richard B., 41, 136  
Broome, John, 94, 97, 108, 110, 122  
Brown, Campbell, 97, 108–111, 215, 221–222  
  
compelling idea, 133, 140–143, 145, 150–151, 153, 154, 177, 213  
completeness condition, 41, 89, 135–137, 172–173  
conciliationism, 179–183  
consequentialism's compelling idea, *see* [compelling idea](#)  
consequentializing, 2–5, 9, 57, 71, 89–129, 133–135, 137–148, 150, 152–155, 165–166, 168, 174, 194, 213–215, 217, 219, 221  
  recipe to consequentialize, 90–91, 121, 138, 147, 214  
constitutive understanding of consequences, 93–95, 97, 117, 118, 215  
constructive deonticism, 10, 159, 185–186, 190–211, 221  
  
constructive empiricism, 10, 185–190, 199–200, 203–204  
contractualizing, 98, 104, 105, 192  
convergence argument, 9, 71, 73, 79–80, 126, 169, 217, 219  
  conciliatory interpretation of, 73, 80–84, 221  
  Triple Theory interpretation of, 73, 82–85  
Crisp, Roger, 76, 128  
Cummiskey, David, 76, 128  
  
Dasgupta, Shamik, 50, 194–195  
deontic content, 4, 40, 60, 61, 69, 80, 99, 185  
deontic equivalence thesis, 91, 106, 166  
deontologizing, 2–3, 5, 9, 57, 71, 89–90, 98–107, 111, 113–114, 117–119, 121–126, 128–130, 133–135, 137–148, 152–155, 165, 174, 219  
  recipe to deontologize, 90, 104–105, 118, 121, 147  
Dietrich, Franz and Christian List, 4, 38–40, 61, 85, 91–112, 165, 212  
dirty hands, *see* [problem of dirty hands](#)  
doctrine of double effect, 102, 106, 139, 214  
Douven, Igor, 14, 65, 170  
Dreier, James, 90–91, 93–94, 97, 99, 105, 111–117, 121, 135, 141–142, 165–169, 195, 197  
Duhem, Pierre, 3, 16–25, 29, 33–34, 65, 130, 152, 161–162, 169  
  
epistemic peers, *see* [peer disagreement](#)  
evidence transcendence, 180–183  
expressivism, *see* [metaethical expressivism](#)  
extensional equivalence thesis, *see* [deontic equivalence thesis](#)  
extensionality thesis, 113–114, 117, 166  
  
falsificationism, 19, 152–153, 156  
fictionalism  
  moral fictionalism, 200–201  
  scientific fictionalism, 164, 199–200  
Fogal, Daniel and Risberg, Olle, 46, 50–53

- Foot, Philippa, 141, 167  
 Frankena, William, 41, 44–45
- gimmickyiness, 105, 121–126
- grounding  
   metaphysical grounding, 46–48, 50, 194–195  
   moral grounding, 46–53, 85–88, 115, 191,  
   194–195, 197–198, 200, 208
- Hare, Richard M., 50, 73, 75–77, 81, 125, 128, 215  
 Harman, Gilbert, 37, 177  
 Herman, Barbara, 80, 99–100  
 holism, *see* strategies to argue for  
   underdetermination
- Hooker, Brad, 76, 78, 82, 84, 106, 128, 203, 216,  
 217  
 Hurley, Paul, 95, 99–100, 108, 118, 124, 141, 143  
 hyperintensionality, 48, 49, 86, 88, 195  
 hypothetico-deductivism, 18–20, 175, 217
- independence from axiology, 143–146, 150, 151,  
 154, 177  
 instrumentalism, 162, 165, 186, 199
- Kantianizing, 104–105, 118  
 Kukla, André, 27–28, 121–123, 169, 170
- La Théorie Physique: Son Object, Sa Structure,  
*see* Duhem, Pierre
- Ladyman, James, 14, 15, 169, 170, 189  
 Laudan, Larry, 5, 29–30, 33, 133, 134, 174–175  
 Laudan, Larry and Jarrett Leplin, 28, 123–124  
 Leibowitz, Uri D., 13, 37, 39, 42–45  
 List, Christian, *see* Dietrich, Franz and Christian  
 List
- logical positivism, 67, 187–189, 197, 220  
 Louise, Jennie, 97, 101, 108
- Maxwell, Grover, 206–207  
 metaethical expressivism, 52–53, 197–199, 202  
 metaphor of the mountain, 73, 77, 81, 85  
 Mill, John Stuart, 73–75, 77, 81, 125, 128, 213–215  
 Moore, George Edward, 94, 213  
 moral particularism, 45–46, 106
- neutral goodness, *see* agent-neutrality
- Norton, John Daniel, 21, 27–28, 33, 126, 148, 175  
 notational variants view, 3, 15, 28, 112–118,  
 164–169, 191, 195, 220
- Okasha, Samir, 31, 162  
 On What Matters, 2, 5, 9, 58, 71, 73, 76–88,  
 125–127, 217
- parasitism, 28, 119, 123–126, 162  
 Parfit, Derek, 2, 4, 9, 41, 58, 71, 73–90, 117,  
 125–130, 132–133, 135–137, 149–151, 169, 173,  
 179, 203, 209, 217, 219, 221  
 peer disagreement, 64, 179–183  
 Peterson, Martin, 93, 97, 109, 127, 215  
 Portmore, Douglas W., 4, 15, 41, 91, 93, 97, 102,  
 104–105, 107–112, 114–116, 118, 124–125, 133,  
 138, 141–143, 152, 194, 213–215, 217  
 prima facie duties, 43–45, 102–103, 106, 139, 148,  
 214  
 problem of dirty hands, 131–132  
 Putnam, Hilary, 6, 222
- Quine, W. V. O., 3, 14, 17–18, 21–23, 25–26,  
 30–31, 33–34, 112, 130–132, 152, 161–168
- radical disagreements, 3, 15, 26, 49–51, 86–88,  
 115, 117–119, 129, 134, 164, 169, 171, 173, 219  
 Rawls, John, 55–56, 59–62, 78, 216–217
- realism  
   moral realism, 10, 51–53, 87–88, 186, 202–206  
   scientific realism, 152, 163–164, 169–171,  
   187–189, 202–204
- reason-based representation of moral theories,  
*see* Dietrich, Franz and Christian List
- reflective equilibrium, 10–56, 59, 125,  
 216–218
- relative goodness, *see* agent-relativity
- Rosen, Gideon, 46–51, 185, 186, 189,  
 199–200
- Ross W. D., 43–45, 54, 102–103, 106, 214
- Sachs, Benjamin, 100–101, 147  
 Scanlon, Thomas M., 78–80, 85, 87, 104–105,  
 136, 149, 216–217  
 Schroeder, Mark, 96, 126, 141–143, 147, 213  
 Schroeder, S. Andrew, 90, 107, 112, 114, 116, 144,  
 165, 177–178
- Sen, Amartya, 96–97, 122  
 Sidgwick, Henry, 76, 179
- skepticism  
   epistemic challenge, 10, 67, 135, 161, 165–169,  
   171–173, 196, 197, 220  
   moral skepticism, 9–10, 36, 103, 106, 122–123,  
   137, 159, 165–169, 172–185, 194–196, 198,  
   202, 204, 206–211, 220  
   scientific skepticism, 9, 134, 159–162, 170–171,  
   173, 175–178, 181, 191, 206–207  
   semantic challenge, 10, 67, 135, 161, 165–169,  
   191, 195, 197, 220
- Sklar, Lawrence, 31–32  
 Stanford, P. Kyle, 15, 17, 24–27, 32, 122, 125, 132,  
 140, 169

- strategies to argue for underdetermination  
 algorithmic, 9, 26–28, 34, 71, 89, 107, 121–126,  
 132, 141, 173, 219  
 holistic, 19, 21–22, 25–27, 34, 130–132  
 inductive, 24–26, 34, 125–127, 132, 136  
 Stratton-Lake, Philip, 44, 57, 58  
 structural analogy, 3–4, 8, 10, 35, 43, 55, 85, 166,  
 185, 202, 204, 222  
 Suikkanen, Jussi, 4, 77, 79, 82, 98, 143, 192, 194  
 superfluity, 28, 123–124, 126
- tenet of explanatory disagreement, *see* textbook  
 view of moral traditions  
 tenet of extensional disagreement, *see* textbook  
 view of moral traditions  
 test tube for theoretical virtues, 153–156  
 textbook view of moral traditions, 1–3, 5–6, 37,  
 49, 73–74, 76, 86–87, 91, 110, 220–222  
 The Scientific Image, *see* van Fraassen, Bas  
 Triple Theory, *see* convergence argument  
 trivial expedient, 164–168  
 Tulodziecki, Dana, 17, 175  
 Two Dogmas of Empiricism,  
*see* Quine, W. V. O.
- Väyrynen, Pekka, 38, 46  
 van Fraassen, Bas, 10, 62, 67, 169, 176–178,  
 185–191, 196–197, 199–200, 202–204, 208,  
 220  
 varieties of underdetermination  
 ampliative, 32–33, 107, 140–151, 155, 171,  
 173–177  
 deductive, 32–33, 140, 141, 143, 144, 151, 153,  
 171, 173–175  
 egalitarian, 30, 134–135, 151, 175  
 existence, 29, 133, 135, 151  
 global, 30–31, 130, 135–137, 151, 172–173, 177  
 local, 30–31, 130, 135–137, 151, 172, 177  
 non-uniqueness, 29–30, 123, 134, 135, 151, 175  
 permanent, 31–32, 137–140, 151, 152, 218  
 recurrent, 32, 140  
 transient, 32, 137–140, 151  
 virtue ethics, 127–128, 132
- web of beliefs, 21–23, 130–132  
 Wright, Crispin, 180–182