

Professor Hosoya Chihiro is quite right when, in the third essay, he points to the differences between German and Japanese expectations about the alliance. Hitler wanted the Japanese to irritate the United States yet avoid an open conflict; the Tokyo government hoped that the Tripartite Pact would deter Washington from interfering with Japanese plans for southeast Asia. Both parties underestimated America's determination that was to wreck the tripartite treaty by December 1941.

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THE MARSHALL PLAN SUMMER: AN EYEWITNESS REPORT ON EUROPE AND THE RUSSIANS IN 1947. By *Thomas A. Bailey*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1977. viii, 246 pp. \$10.95.

Thomas A. Bailey, whose *Diplomatic History of the American People* has been a basic college textbook for more than thirty years has added another volume to his twenty-odd books. *The Marshall Plan Summer* is based on the author's diary maintained while he surveyed conditions in war-torn Europe. Bailey traveled under the auspices of the National War College whose staff provided the initial briefings. In Europe most of his information also came from official or semiofficial American sources. In spite of this handicap, Bailey strives to maintain scholarly objectivity, but he succeeds only in part. Although many observations show his perspicience, he is not quite able to evade the clichés of a biased environment: thus the Soviet Union "did not want a reunited Germany"; "Stalin connived with Hitler to start the war"; and the Kremlin used the Western currency reform as "a pretext for inaugurating the Berlin blockade." In a similar vein, important details which could provide balance remain unreported. There is no reference to Truman's neglect when he relinquished the German assets in Austria as reparations; nor is the reader informed that a unanimous control council vote in Vienna was actually needed to reverse the decisions of Austria's independent government.

Bailey acknowledges that "the 'party line' at the War College was that the Soviet Union by its aggressive post-war designs and acts had forced the cold war on the Western democracies." And he admits that "I myself came to accept it, especially after numerous and extended talks with American officers in Europe who had experienced close contacts with the Russians."

Despite these limitations, *The Marshall Plan Summer* deserves a wide readership. It is well written, quite entertaining, and clearly reflects the spirit of the late 1940s, which tended to promote the confrontations of the Cold War.

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SOVIET IMAGES OF AMERICA. By *Stephen P. Gibert*, with contributions by *Arthur A. Zuehkle, Jr.*, *Richard Soll*, and *Michael J. Deane*. Stanford Research Institute, Strategic Studies Center. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1977. xiv, 167 pp. \$12.50, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

In his opening sentence, the author declares: "Faulty perceptions of the policies of other nations or of the motives, beliefs and actions of their leaders and people can and do lead to disastrous mistakes." And his initial position, as well as that of his colleagues at the Strategic Studies Center of the Stanford Research Institute which published this volume, seems to be that Soviet perceptions of the United States have indeed been faulty, and dangerously so. Gibert appears to be convinced that Moscow now holds an

image of a weakening America, one whose leadership has lost its political nerve. He maintains that "the present Soviet perception is that America's will to resist what the Soviets see as an ongoing shift in power and influence in their favor is eroding" (pp. 47–48). Given their image of an increasingly flaccid United States, Soviet planners have been emboldened to undertake ever more aggressive political and military policies.

Though there is an argument to be made—recent events in Angola and in the Horn of Africa do indicate a more militant Soviet stance in the Third World, a posture in some measure predicated upon a less than vigorous American response—the evidence presented here is unconvincing. First of all, the author seems very much at sea in dealing with his sources. He seems unaware (explicit disclaimers to the contrary notwithstanding) that much of the material he uses to elucidate "Soviet thinking" on the United States more accurately reflects Soviet domestic propaganda. For example, Gibert notes that in recent years "Moscow has portrayed the West as being mired in a deepening economic, political and social crisis, 'unprecedented in the history of postwar capitalism,' leading to a 'crumbling' of the capitalist system of controls and the 'disintegration of the political machinery of capitalist rule'" (p. 29). True enough, but Soviet sources have been saying much the same thing since 1917. The prime function of these ominous sounding pronouncements is to reinforce Soviet citizens' belief in the virtues of their own system. They have little, if any, demonstrable foreign-policy implications.

More important, however, is the fact that Gibert reads Soviet sources poorly. For example, he asserts, without persuasive argument or evidence, that "definite military superiority" is the goal of the Soviet leadership (pp. 126 and 127). Furthermore, in his zeal to make a "worst-case" analysis, he focuses on the most menacing Soviet arguments, totally ignoring contrary assessments. Thus, although Soviet observers have indeed written fulsomely about inflation, unemployment, student unrest, racial tension, and political instability in the United States, what is most striking is the considerable respect which many analysts, especially from Moscow's Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, have shown for the economic productivity and technological superiority of the United States, as well as for the resilience and adaptability of its sociopolitical system. In addition, Gibert misreads what he describes as an "anti-militaristic trend" in Soviet analyses of American public opinion (pp. 100–101): although the anti-Vietnam War movement in the United States has been carefully dissected in the Soviet Union, in 1976 ranking Soviet Americanists observed that the average American is still "intoxicated with strength," "jingoism," and feelings of "national superiority," and tends to support the claims and policies of the Pentagon.

Gibert and his SRI colleagues are clearly concerned that the Kremlin will come to believe that the United States has become what Richard Nixon feared—"a pitiful, helpless giant." Frightened that such perceptions could have dire implications for American national security—which they would—Gibert, ironically, seems to believe not that Soviet images of the "changing correlation of forces," the "crises of capitalism," and the "loss of faith of American ruling circles" are faulty, but that they are correct! The evidence is compelling, however, that Soviet analysts themselves do not accept the exaggerated boasts and claims of their propaganda specialists. They have not portrayed the United States as enfeebled or its leadership as paralyzed by internal conflict. While Kremlin leaders now appear to have acquired military capabilities to support their Great-Power aspirations—and are behaving accordingly (thereby complicating life for Washington policymakers)—they do not anticipate, pace Gibert et al., an imminent, early, or easy decline of the West.

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