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International Organization

Barry Buzan

Economic Structure and International Security

Bruce W. Jentleson

East-West Energy Trade and Domestic Politics

Joanne Gowa

Hegemons, IOs, and Markets

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The Force of Prescriptions

Vincent A. Mahler

The International Sugar Agreement

Robert L. Rothstein

Consensual Knowledge and International Collaboration

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Abstracts

Economic structure and international security: the limits of the liberal case by Barry Buzan

The theory that a liberal international economic structure is associated positively, and a mercantilist structure negatively, with international security is widespread. But the case in favor of liberalism, and the case against mercantilism, are both one-sided, and the whole attempt to link economic structure to international security anyway overestimates the influence that economic structure has on the use of force. Political and military factors provide explanations more convincing than economic ones for the propensity of states to resort to, or refrain from, the use of force. Liberal and mercantilist structures each have both positive and negative impacts on the use of force, but these impacts become important only when they are complemented by noneconomic factors governing the use of force. Hence security grounds cannot be used convincingly either as a reason for maintaining the current liberal system or as a reason for opposing a shift toward a more mercantilist structure of international economic relations.

From consensus to conflict: the domestic political economy of East-West energy trade policy by Bruce W. Jentleson

Changes in the domestic politics of East-West energy trade policy indicate a more general transformation of the domestic politics of American foreign policy. In the postwar period the basic, consensual pattern of congressional bipartisanship, executive-branch unity, interest-group collaboration, and a supportive public has been replaced by the conflictual pattern of an assertive Congress, a fragmented executive branch, antagonistic interest groups, and a divided public. These contrasting patterns are manifestations of structural changes in the domestic political economy. Along both political and economic dimensions, and differentiated according to whether the locus of pressure was group-specific or more general, what had been basic foundations of consensus became by the early 1970s fissures of conflict. Of particular significance were the weakening of the macropolitical foundations (the basic accord on foreign-policy objectives and strategies) in the wake of both Vietnam and détente and the increased marginal value of the economic costs, both diffuse (macroeconomic) and particularistic (microeconomic), to be paid for economic coercion. In this transformed

context, the state's support-building instruments of ideology and economic compensation were insufficient to build consensus. As a result, in this issue area and perhaps more generally, high levels of domestic constraints on the conduct of American foreign policy have become the rule rather than the exception.

Hegemons, IOs, and markets: the case of the substitution account by Joanne Gowa

For eighteen months between 1978 and 1980, the International Monetary Fund and IMF members attempted to reform the international monetary system by establishing a substitution account. Designed to enhance the stability of the monetary system, the proposed substitution account would have accepted dollar deposits from foreign central banks, in return issuing certificates denominated in special drawing rights. The collapse of negotiations about the account in early 1980 confirms the hypothesis of hegemonic stability theorists that the distribution of systemic costs is problematic in the absence of a hegemonic power. The case thereby qualifies recent assertions that a small group of nations can supply stability to the international economy. However, two factors outside the realm of hegemonic theory also helped produce the outcome of the negotiations: the division of power within the United States between Congress and the Executive, and changes in international market conditions during 1979 and early 1980.

The force of prescriptions by Friedrich Kratochwil

How do norms influence choices in social life? Conceptual distinctions among types of norms and suggestions in the work of Hobbes, Hume, and Durkheim help us investigate in greater detail the "woolly" concept of regimes in international relations. When we disaggregate the "set of explicit and implicit norms, rules, and decision-making procedures" in a given issue area and focus on the conceptual links between rules, principles (norms), and actions, we gain an understanding of the role of norms in social life that is more comprehensive than the understanding provided by traditional accounts. Furthermore, placing the present regime discussion within wider philosophical traditions enables us to develop a more critical approach to the building of theory in the social sciences, since the use of norms as explanatory devices challenges the predominant positivist outlook in several important respects.

The political economy of North-South commodity bargaining: the case of the International Sugar Agreement by Vincent A. Mahler

The historically unstable world trade in sugar has long stimulated multilateral efforts to stabilize sugar prices. In the negotiations leading to the International Sugar Agreement (ISA) of 1977, both producers and consumers were willing to make short-term concessions in the interest of reaching an accord that would benefit all in the long run—a pattern that has hardly been typical of North-South bargaining in general. But the ISA has failed to achieve its goal of more stable sugar prices in the years since its enactment. This failure is primarily due not to shortcomings in the agreement

itself but rather to a major expansion of production in the only important sugar exporter that failed to ratify the ISA, the European Community. The ISA is important not only in its own right but also because it offers a good example of the promise—and the problems—of international commodity agreements in bringing about more stable and equitable relations between North and South.

Consensual knowledge and international collaboration: some lessons from the commodity negotiations

by Robert L. Rothstein

Consensual knowledge can produce widely varying levels of impact on different international negotiations. In the case of negotiations over UNCTAD's Integrated Program for Commodities, consensual knowledge developed among the experts involved. This consensus tended to support the position taken by the developed countries, thus pointing in a direction already taken for other reasons. Consensus in this case facilitated an agreement, but empirical and theoretical analysis both suggest it may prove to be an incorrect or unstable agreement. The outcome of the commodity negotiations implies that the interaction of key variables, such as uncertainty and the degree of acceptance of the knowledge, might yield different results in other cases. Various specific means might be used more effectively to diffuse expert knowledge among policy makers.