

THE MIGRATION OF WORKERS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY by W. R. Bohning (Institute of Race Relations & OUP). £3.00.

IMMIGRANT WORKERS AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE by Godula Korsache and Stephen Castles (Institute of Race Relations & OUP). £5.50.

Ever since the dawn of the Industrial Revolution the surging, throbbing capitalist economic engine has been sucking in labour—and it never had much compunction about the way it did it. First, it sucked its own people off the land. The enclosure movement often forced poor peasants off their farms and into the arms of the Industrial Revolution. Herded into overcrowded conditions, they were forced to work long hours for little pay. Merely to subsist, wives, and children had to do the same. A brilliantly argued article by Brian Inglis in a recent issue of *Encounter* argues that the Industrial Revolution, contrary to the accepted doctrine that it provided wealth for all, actually forced down the standard of living of the first proletarians.

Although the drift from the land has continued right up to modern times, and indeed in parts of Europe is still continuing apace, it was not sufficient. It soon became necessary for the industrialising countries to reach out to the more backward parts of Europe.

Britain's principal source of labour was Ireland. The times of the major migrations coincided with the great famines of 1822 and 1846. Even so, British policies in Ireland helped the process along. In particular, the Act of Union in 1800 led to the ruin of domestic industry in Ireland.

In France, as far back as 1886 there were a million foreign workers. Between 1891 and 1901 they provided almost 60 per cent of the French population increase. By 1913, it was estimated that 40 per cent of Germany's Ruhr miners were Poles. Indeed, so worried were the German authorities by the size of the immigrant work force that in 1908 a law was passed outlawing the speaking of Polish in public places. This led to a form of political agitation known as the dumb assemblies—at which nobody spoke but leaflets printed in Polish were passed around the eager gathering.

The First World War played havoc with Europe's manpower requirements. Many of the foreign workers felt compelled to return home. The French Ministry of Re-Armaments was so short of manpower that it recruited over one million workers from Southern Europe, North Africa, and Indo-China. Britain, too, recruited coloured workers from her colonies. However, at the end of the war Britain repatriated them all.

The process continued after the War. France, for example, recruited labour from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Italy. Special trains were

laid on and brought in a thousand at a time. When the economy slumped in the thirties they went back in the same way—train loads of a thousand.

The Second World War led to unforeseen new demands. By 1944 Germany had seven million foreign workers. Every fourth German tank, lorry, and field gun was made by a foreigner. Much of this, of course, was forced labour.

But at the end of the war, in 1945, the consensus of expert opinion was that most European countries would not be able to provide enough employment for their own citizens. The big worry was Western Germany which had received eight million refugees from the East. But in fact the reverse happened. The expanding economies of the West European countries soon took up the slack and before long attention was swivelling outwards to foreign sources of labour. In Britain it began with the *Emperor Windrush* in May 1948—the first ship to dock with a cargo of West Indian immigrants. They were closely followed by Indians and Pakistanis. The numbers of immigrants increased year by year until, in the late fifties and early sixties, Britain's economy went into the permanent doldrums. Ironically at this time racism and xenophobia pushed anxious governments into building high walls of protection to limit the immigrants who no longer wanted to come. No one in public life—apart from George Brown in one prophetic outburst—asked the question: how will Britain get future supplies of raw labour assuming the British economy one day regains its form and begins to grow again? All in all, in this time of immigration Britain absorbed 800,000 workers and their families—small fry compared with what was going on in some other European countries. Germany has 2½ million foreign workers, France 3½ million, and Belgium has almost the same number as Britain although it is a much smaller country.

Twenty per cent of France's manual working class are now foreigners. For a time they were principally Algerians. But rising hostility to the 'Arab influx' after the end of the Algerian War forced France to limit their number to 35,000 a year. About a million North Africans are now living in France but the main immigrant groups are Spanish and Portuguese. Many are not simply economic emigres—although Portugal is poorer than Trinidad and Tobago—but political ones, fleeing the possibility of becoming cannon fodder in Portugal's colonial wars in Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique.

The British have long deceived themselves into thinking that immigration is a purely British phenomenon—a legacy of Empire. The virtue of these two books is that they quickly, but not painlessly, jack us out of this narrow assumption. Immigration is seen by all three authors as primarily related to Europe's state of economic growth. Europe dictates and the rest follow.

The whole process has at least two rather terrifying implications. The first is—what is it doing to us, the users of this labour? Our economic escalator and its twin, our raised expectations, have taken us to the point where we do not want to do menial jobs, but where there are more menial jobs constantly being created. Affluence breeds the need to service it. There is more garbage to be disposed; more dirty dishes in the restaurants to be washed; more bolts to be screwed in on endless assembly lines. But do we want to become the employers, directly (or indirectly through the services we use) of a clearly defined and recognizable helot class? What does it do to our own psychological make-up to be evolving a two-tier society? Oppression dehumanises the exploiter as well as the exploited. That is the first implication, but the second is perhaps even more worrying—and Korsache and Castle's book brings this out sharply—what does it do for the developing countries themselves?

We know for example that Turkey receives

\$300 million from Turkish workers in Germany alone. That amount in effect covers Turkey's key imports. But set against that is the break-up in family life—most European countries make it very difficult for families to join their migrating husbands. There is the decline in agricultural activity as villages are denuded of their most youthful and hardworking members. Villages can be found as far afield as Portugal, Turkey and Senegal where the only inhabitants are small children, women, the old and a handful of returned migrants on holiday. And then there is the evidence presented in a recent study by the French Trade Union, the CFTD, which reveals that the "skills" learnt in Europe are rarely applicable back home. Given all this it is not surprising that Godula and Castles conclude that immigration into Europe is a "form of development aid given by the poor countries to the rich countries".

It is time that the liberal race relations lobby in this country stopped worrying so much about police/immigrant relations, anti-discriminatory legislation and so on which although extremely important are after all only the surface manifestations of the problem not the root cause of it. Rather they should begin—and it really is begin—to think about the long-term implications of the use of immigrant labour in Europe. An honest think could produce quite devastating conclusions.

JONATHAN POWER

**THE NEW FAMILIES.** Youth, Communes, and the Politics of Drugs, by Ross V. Speck. Tavistock Publications, London, 1972. 190 pp. £2.50.

**YOUNG OUTSIDERS.** A study of alternative communities, by Richard Mills. Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1973. 208 pp. £3.00.

**KEEP THE FAITH BABY.** A close-up of London's drop-outs, by Kenneth Leech. S.P.C.K., London, 1973. 110 pp. £1.90.

**A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE DRUG SCENE** by Kenneth Leech. S.P.C.K., London, 1973. 165 pp. 75p.

The authentic hippy is now almost an extinct species, and all these books are based on studies of the youth counter-culture of London or Philadelphia conducted three or more years ago. If they can claim the interest of any intelligent reader it is primarily because here we see three very different men wrestle with an ancient problem, one which concerns us all whether or not people called hippies still exist: namely, how far can an investigator belonging to the dominant society comprehend the world of a cultural minority which has deliberately rejected the dominant society's values and aims? It is an important question if (as these writers believe) the prominent feature of future society is going to be increasing diversity of life-styles—a diversity manifested particularly in a growth

of age-segregated peer-networks and an increasing willingness to experiment in various kinds of community living.

The three authors approach in different ways different aspects of the hippy phenomenon. Because of his remarkable pastoral experience, acquired when he was curate of St Anne's, Soho, Kenneth Leech clearly has a more intimate understanding of the kids who make up the 'phenomenon' than we find in either sociologist Richard Mills or psychiatrist Ross V. Speck. Unfortunately Leech is not a man with a reflective turn of mind. His interest in the hippy phenomenon originated in his interest in the 'drug problem' and *A Practical Guide to the Drug Scene* is a straight reprint in paperback of his *Pastoral Care and the Drug Scene*. When