

and Wallis, and shows how, for the first time, a Western power “appreciated the potential of Russia as a decisive influence in European affairs.”

The book appears to be a (revised?) doctoral dissertation and might serve as a model for others in this respect. The author organizes his material well. His prose is lean and clean. Campaign details are judiciously and even interestingly presented. Roider reveals a thorough knowledge of the basic, traditional type of German and French secondary literature and has carefully exploited certain Viennese archival sources. Altogether his work is a respectable example of the older school of historiography.

The major weakness is the one that is inherent in a strictly objective approach to the past. Mere compilation of data—however skillfully accomplished—and analysis solely on the superficial plane of human experience leave too many questions unanswered. *Why* was the Austrian army weak at this time? *Why* did the top echelons of government often function inefficiently? What was the relation between military-political problems on the one hand and the socioeconomic structure on the other? Some interesting work of this nature has been done recently, but Roider does not refer to it. One might mention in particular J. C. Allmayer-Beck, Austria’s distinguished military historian, and Fritz Redlich, the German-American who formulated the concept of the “military enterpriser.” Some source material (the *Feldakten* of the Kriegsarchiv) and at least several important Viennese dissertations (on Seckendorff and Doxat) have likewise either been overlooked or discounted. Yet another fault is the almost complete absence of titles—two Russian studies are listed—in East European languages. Even the scholar who does not know Serbo-Croatian can find ways around the problem: Though the topic is by definition Austria’s policy, it might also have been helpful to check on the possible existence of Turkish materials, at least within a bibliographic framework. The crudely drawn maps between pages 97 and 98 should never have been accepted by a reputable university press. Finally, there are a few typographical errors, something which seems unnecessary in a book of such short length.

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AUSTRIA, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE CRIMEAN WAR: THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONCERT. By *Paul W. Schroeder*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972. xxii, 544 pp. \$19.50.

Professor Schroeder’s title is accurate. His main subject is Austrian policy under Buol, foreign minister in the Crimean War period. His second subject is British policy and Anglo-Austrian relations. His third subject is the diplomacy of the Concert of Europe concerning the war and the Eastern Question, from 1853 to 1856. French and Russian policies per se get briefer treatment, Prussia and Piedmont appear in relation to Austrian concerns, and the Ottoman Empire is virtually ignored.

The scholarship is impressive. Schroeder has relied primarily on Austrian and British archives, and to a much lesser extent on French ones. He has used other depositories, including the papers of individuals. For Russian documents he has been limited chiefly to Zaionchkovsky’s collection and to later Russian historians. He has redone research that Harold Temperley, Gavin Henderson, and recently Bernhard Unckel had done, and challenges or corrects them on occasion. He also

breaks a lance or two with A. J. P. Taylor; in a footnote in Schroeder's last chapter Taylor is neatly hoist by one of his own aphorisms.

Because Schroeder stays close to his subject, some scholars will be disappointed. He does not investigate thoroughly the origins of the Crimean War, which was in its beginnings a Russo-Turkish war. Tsar Nicholas's diplomatic and military aggression is acknowledged, but seems to be peripheral, while the Ottoman reactions and maneuvers are given short shrift. By contrast, Schroeder shows carefully how Britain, France, and especially Austria became enmeshed in the Russo-Turkish war. The war itself is barely mentioned; the silence of the guns is eerie. By contrast, the Austrian quest for a negotiated peace is better told than ever before. The Paris peace congress, at the end, is again slighted, with vital aspects of its arguments and decisions largely ignored. Fortunately Winfried Baumgart, as Schroeder himself notes, has just published a good study of the peacemaking. All these omissions are evidently intentional, given the Austrian focus.

The book has a thesis, as well as a focus. Schroeder argues that Austria sought peace within the Concert, and aided the Western powers to curb Russia while trying to moderate demands by the West. He argues further that Britain wanted the prestige of victorious war, blocked any negotiated peace till the end, and so disrupted the Concert. He piles up evidence that Palmerston, Clarendon, and Russell in the ministry and Cowley, ambassador to Napoleon III, worked hard for war. Clarendon, often devious, emerges smelling like a skunk. Buol smells like a rose.

Some of the book is hard slogging. The author follows negotiations in detail, but sometimes omits the terms of crucial documents: thus the Vienna Note, the Turkish amendments to it, Russia's "violent interpretation," and others are not adequately set forth. Sometimes there are not enough dates in the text, so that the exact time sequence eludes the reader. There are dates in many notes, but this involves flipping to the back. The writing is clear, sometimes good, but relentlessly the same. Great concentration is needed to absorb name-packed sentences. There are two helpful maps, one marred by the mislocation of Besika Bay.

The concluding chapter is a ringing condemnation of British policy because it destroyed the Concert, and a powerful sermon defending Concert rules, the Metternichian ideal, the settling of crises among the Pentarchy before they became confrontations—the apotheosis of the Austrian viewpoint. Schroeder has poured his soul into this, he expresses himself well, and he says many wise things (along with some quite debatable ones). He asks "iffy" questions, poses hypotheses, projects consequences, sets standards. And so, after careful research, should a good historian do. Amen.

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OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY IN HUNGARY: LETTERS FROM THE PASHAS OF BUDA, 1590–1593. By *Gustav Bayerle*. Uralic and Altaic Series, vol. 101. Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, 1972. vii, 204 pp. \$6.00, paper.

The military and civil administrator of the parts of Hungary under Turkish occupation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was the pasha of Buda. The pashas maintained a frequent correspondence with the Viennese organs of government of the Habsburg monarchy, with the military commandants of the fortresses