

States and China, and by the Soviet Union's reservations about all these alternatives. In Laos the likelihood is that the longer the war continues the less there will be left, as China, Thailand, and North Vietnam compete for influence. The Pathet Lao would be left as a rump in the middle.

"Thailand is the most secure State in the area. While Laos and Cambodia wait on events, Thailand is in a position to decide for itself. How its policies evolve will depend on its assessment of China's and North Vietnam's intentions. . . .

"Of the outer ring of countries—Burma, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines—only the first could

claim that its insurgency problem could be directly affected by events in Vietnam. A victory to Hanoi and the bonus of an American humiliation would boost the morale of rebel groups in these countries. But the longer term effect of a settlement might well be debilitating to the rebels and governments alike. President Park of South Korea (although with North Korea, Taiwan, and Japan in a related but separate web of political relations) reacted last year to Sino-American detente with a state of emergency. The countries of South-east Asia will find the atmosphere of post-Vietnam as hard to live with as the period of the war."

PAMPHILUS

## Correspondence

[from p. 2]

Consider Holden's apologetic for the colonels' "wholesale removal of judges who delivered judgments they did not like . . . political censorship even of . . . classical Greek dramas . . . immediate imprisonment of Andreas Papandreou with threat of bringing him to book for the Aspida affair . . ." and other "detentions" of dissidents. Holden attributes these misdemeanors to the junta's "impressive inability to understand the first principles of either diplomacy or public relations!"

Flesch would comment on the 69-word sentence which included these charges. A functional-fog index would catch the queasiness in the reference to Papandreou: The colonels threaten to "bring him to book for the Aspida affair on charges of conspiracy to overthrow the government. . . ." Why, since they had summarily disposed of cases far less grave, did they release him untried? Holden implies that he avoided prosecution—and, as a matter of course, execution—because he had "gained . . . widespread sympathy as a noble martyr. . . ."

Certainly there was "widespread" mobilization of the intellectual community on his behalf. Marquis Childs reported LBJ's instructions to the State Department, after receiving voluminous appeals from American academicians—"Tell those Greek bastards to let that son-of-a-bitch what's-his-name go." Elsewhere, however, Holden pictures the junta as being impervious to such pressures.

To refute "the theory of a CIA conspiracy," he finds in the colonels

"men of great determination and independence of mind," whose rejection of attempted pressure by "America's partial suspension of military aid" argues against "the view that they had been Washington's chosen instrument" for a *coup d'état*. It seems to argue equally against their yielding to moral duress and releasing an inveterate enemy, against whom, Holden infers, they had valid proofs of treason.

I have been led to believe that the regime's case rested on two affidavits testifying to overheard remarks by Papandreou in favor of the Aspida conspiracy of leftist army officers. And that it was only after the two affiants had fled to America and had publicly repudiated their affidavits, claiming coercion, that the junta found "bringing him to book" inadvisable. If this version is false, Holden should plainly say so instead of befogging the issues—as he also does that of systematic torture.

Holden correctly warns against simplistic moralizing over a very tangled can of worms indeed. However, simplistic value judgments concealed in functional fog don't aid in the untangling. Peyton Bryan *Smithville, Tex.*

## In General

To the Editors: I came across my first copy of *Worldview* on a newsstand, and bought it to read what György Lukács had to say about Marxist theory ("The Failure of Marxist Theory," May). Perhaps you will allow a comment on that article and on that issue of your magazine.

Lukács was, as you note, one of the, if not the, leading Marxist theorists

of our century. In the light of the whole issue it is appallingly clear why you chose to publish this interview. It is Lukács as an old man, clearly discouraged and, in a moment of weakness, inclined to disparage contemporary socialism. It is hardly representative of Lukács's thought. The advantage of that kind of article to the editors of *Worldview* is obvious when one looks at the other articles in the same issue, almost all consistently reactionary: McNerny talks about "original sin" in order to undermine whatever democratic impulses there might be in American political history; Shirley Garrett, in "Those Ungrateful Chinese," almost completely whitewashes the imperialistic history of missionaries in China; Ashok Kapur discusses India's foreign policy in a way that completely agrees with the discredited notions of balance of power; surely no one not in the pay of the Greek colonels will doubt that Holden's piece on the Greek junta is little more than propaganda; and Neuhaus, while he used to be known as a radical, can hardly be taken seriously when he talks about U.S. "responsibility" in the Third World. As for the lead article by John Bennett, such theological meanderings only serve an obscurantist purpose, distracting from the revolutionary struggle. . . .

Somewhere I heard that *Worldview* was a journal with no political or ideological line. After the May issue, I've filed that little piece of information along with other myths and fairy tales about Establishment journalism.

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