# REVIEW ESSAYS

## THE LEVIATHAN ON THE ZOCALO: Recent Historiography of the Postrevolutionary Mexican State

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*THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION.* By ADOLFO GILLY. Translated by Patrick Camiller. (London: Verso Editions and New Left Books, 1983. Pp. 407. Cloth $25.00, paper $11.50.)

*LA CRISIS OBREGON-CALLES Y EL ESTADO MEXICANO.* By RAFAEL LOYOLA DIAZ. (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980. Pp. 169.)

*EN UNA EPOCA DE CRISIS (1928–1934): LA CLASE OBRERA EN LA HISTORIA DE MEXICO. Vol. 9.* By ARNALDO CORDOVA. (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1980. Pp. 240.)

*LOS INICIOS DE LA INSTITUCIONALIZACION: LA POLITICA DEL MAXIMATO. Volume 12 of HISTORIA DE LA REVOLUCION MEXICANA.* By LORENZO MEYER, RAFAEL SEGOVIA, and ALEJANDRA LAJOUS. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978. Pp. 314.)

*LOS ORIGENES DEL PARTIDO UNICO EN MEXICO.* By ALEJANDRA LAJOUS. (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1979, 1981. Pp. 268.)

*EL MINIMATO PRESIDENCIAL: HISTORIA POLITICA DEL MAXIMATO, 1928–1935.* By TZVI MEDIN. (Mexico City: Era, 1982. Pp. 170.)

*IDEOLOGIA Y PRAXIS POLITICA DE LAZARO CARDENAS.* By TZVI MEDIN. (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1972, 1976. Pp. 237.)



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*LA MECANICA CARDENISTA. Volume l6 of HISTORIA DE LA REVOLUCION MEXICANA.* By ALICIA HERNANDEZ CHAVEZ. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979. Pp. 236.)

*MEXICO 1940, INDUSTRIALIZACION Y CRISIS POLITICA: ESTADO Y SOCIEDAD CIVIL EN LAS ELECCIONES RESIDENCIALES.* By ARIEL JOSE CONTRERAS. (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977, 1980. Pp. 219.)

*DEL CARDENISMO AL AVILACAMACHISMO. Volume l8 of HISTORIA DE LA REVOLUCION MEXICANA.* By LUIS MEDINA. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1978. Pp. 410.)

*CIVILISMO Y MODERNIZACION DEL AUTORITARISMO. Volume 20 of HISTORIA DE LA REVOLUCION MEXICANA.* By LUIS MEDINA. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1979. Pp. 205.)

*EL ESTADO Y LOS PARTIDOS POLITICOS EN MEXICO (ENSAYOS).* By PABLO GONZALEZ CASANOVA. (Mexico City: Era, 1981, 1982. Pp. 178.)

*EL PARTIDO DE LA REVOLUCION INSTITUCIONALIZADA (MEDIO SIGLO DE PODER POLITICO EN MEXICO): LA FORMACION DEL NUEVO ESTADO (1928–1945).* By LUIS JAVIER GARRIDO. (Mexico City: Siglo Veintiuno, 1982. Pp. 380.)

*SU MAJESTAD EL PRI.* By RUIS [EDUARDO DEL RIO]. (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1982. Pp. 117.)

All revolutions degenerate into governments.
An anonymous Mexican *guerrillero*,
early 1970s[1]

On the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the ruling political party in Mexico in 1979, *Proceso* (a weekly magazine of news and analysis) published a telling cover illustration. It showed a couple celebrating their *bodas de oro* or golden wedding anniversary. La Señora appeared as a plump, rather gaudy thing wearing a too-tight red, white, and green dress and jewelry inscribed with the letters PRI. El Señor, in contrast, had clearly been dead for some time, a skeleton in tattered clothing with two bandoleers. The unmistakable message expressed a simple, yet sarcastic, truth: the government party has become a nouveau riche while her "partner," the Mexican Revolution, has been dead for decades, although not yet buried. In that year of commemoration, it was obvious that the Revolution's most important and lasting legacy was a powerful, corrupt, and bureaucratic party and state.[2]

This leviathan on the Zócalo, the postrevolutionary Mexican state, was constitutionally framed in 1917, consolidated after 1920, and institutionalized during the period demarcated by the assassination of President-elect Alvaro Obregón in 1928 and the formation of the Partido Revolucionario Institutional, the PRI, in 1946. The meaning of this po-



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litical development, particularly the events after 1928, has long been disguised for political ends. What took place was not the institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution, despite the PRIistas's reiteration ad infinitum to the contrary. That overused phrase is logically incongruous: power can be institutionalized but revolution cannot. Nor can this development be correctly or usefully characterized as counterrevolutionary, Thermidorean, or Bonapartist, as some Marxist scholars today claim. Rather, what took place between 1928 and 1946 was the institutionalization of the new political order, populist in appearance and structure but essentially dedicated to the preservation of the power and privileges of the postrevolutionary political elite, the "Revolutionary Family."[3]

This conclusion is by no means a new or particularly challenging one. Francisco Bulnes in *Los grandes problemas de México* (1926) denounced the emerging "burguesía burocrática." Diego Rivera in the mid-1930s created scathing visual representations of the new class in his frescoes in the Palacio Nacional and the Del Prado Hotel. Federico Robles, Carlos Fuentes's fictional revolutionary in *La región más transparente* (1958), cynically justified his wealth and status by saying, "every revolution ends with the creation of a new privileged class." This reality has not always been so clear to historians, however. Beginning in the late 1920s and early 1930s, the new political class dissimulated the meaning of the process of political consolidation, centralization, and institutionalization by means of the so-called ideology of the Mexican Revolution, the "mask of the Revolution" in the words of Octavio Paz. The Revolution was transformed and enlarged from the ambiguous historical struggle of the second decade of the twentieth century into a never-ending process of reform and economic development directed by, indeed embodied in, the "Revolutionary Family," the Revolutionary party, and all subsequent Mexican governments.[4] "La Revolución no ha terminado," declared former President Plutarco Elías Calles in 1934. "Es necesario que entremos en un nuevo período, que yo llamaría el período revolucionario psicológico."[5] Until recently, historical writing on postrevolutionary Mexican state formation by both Mexican and North American historians has been largely shaped by the official, almost mythical version of Mexico's recent political past, by the seductive mask of the Revolution. Theirs was an optimism born of faith in the many promises of the Revolution and hope for a better future for all Mexicans.

Since 1968 at least, however, when revolutionary legitimacy was stripped away by the massacre of several hundred peaceful demonstrators to reveal the rigid, authoritarian, and brutal face of the Mexican state, a new historiography has appeared. It is a historiography imbued with few illusions about the Mexican Revolution and the state it engen-



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dered. The new historiography's many voices, grounded either in the holistic Marxism of political sociology or the cautious empiricism of political history, agree on little except rejection of the official mythology. Contemporary Mexico is perhaps unique among all postrevolutionary societies of this century in its intellectual confrontation of its modern self-definition, of its only immediate historical frame of reference—the Revolution itself. Mexican historians, conscious of their own historicity, are engaged in a fascinating dialogue with and exorcism of their Revolutionary heritage, history, and historiography. At the center of this dialogue or exorcism is the problem of power, "the basic question of every revolution," according to Lenin.[6]

*Political Reconstruction*

The Revolution of 1910–17 all but destroyed the existing Mexican state. The insurrectionary movement of Francisco Madero in 1911 decapitated the centralized, personalistic, and geriatric political machine of dictator-President Porfirio Díaz; but most local bosses, governors, the bureaucracy, and the army of the ancien régime survived until the beginning of a series of civil wars in 1913–14. For a time, anarchy reigned. Mexico was contested by several so-called governments, warlord-caudillos, and revolutionary and counterrevolutionary movements. By mid-1916 the Constitutionalist armies of Primer Jefe Venustiano Carranza emerged triumphant on the battlefields of north central Mexico. From November 1916 to January 1917, Carrancistas (or rather the left wing of the Carrancista faction) wrote a reform constitution ordaining a strong chief executive, and a constitutional government was installed. The Revolution was over, and the time for economic, and particularly for political, reconstruction had begun.

The Carranza government (1917–20) faced enormous difficulties in restoring national governmental authority. Armed resistance persisted in Morelos, Chihuahua, Chiapas, and elsewhere in remote pockets throughout Mexico. The Constitutionalist army numbered over two hundred thousand soldiers led by five hundred generals of questionable loyalty and considerable ambition. Many regional bosses and military chieftains governed their territories with little regard for the government in Mexico City. Moreover, due to the nationalist reforms in the constitution affecting foreign properties, pressure for intervention was building within the United States. "Carranza's approach to state-making was basically the same as Porfirio Díaz's," writes Richard Tardanco. "Instead of working toward the institutionalization of state power, Carranza, like Díaz, relied on patronage and repression in an attempt to maximize his personal capacity to maneuver among conflicting intra- and interclass forces."[7] It did not work. Carranza's policies only alien-



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ated the new bourgeoisie, urban workers, landless *campesinos*, certain military chiefs, and the United States (which withheld post-Revolution reconstruction loans). When Carranza attempted to impose a nobody as his successor in 1920 (the ambassador to the United States whom Mexicans disparagingly called "Mr. Bonillas"), Carranza was easily overthrown and then assassinated. When General Obregón marched into Mexico City in 1920 leading a rebel army, "it marked the sixth time in nine years that the central government had been overturned by force."[8] It was also the last time.

Political consolidation proceeded during the 1920s partly because the squabbling children of the Revolution began to be brought into line by Obregón. For those who would not be bought off, there was assassination, execution, or exile. The Obregón government (1920–24) also furthered the process of political consolidation by pursuing conciliatory foreign and domestic policies. Although the rapprochement engineered by Obregón with the United States broke down during the following presidential period (concord between the two countries was not firmly established until World War II), U.S. moral and material aid proved crucial in the Mexican government's suppression of the de la Huerta rebellion of 1923–24. Obregón also formed a loose political coalition that included military chiefs, regional caudillos, worker and campesino organizations, and the bureaucracy. The government of Plutarco Elías Calles (1924–28) inherited the Obregonista coalition. But whereas Obregón had developed close ties with certain agrarian groups (and administered the land reform program so as to increase political support for the government), Calles strengthened his political ties with urban workers and their leaders. Calles and his War Minister, General Joaquín Amaro, also made some progress in the difficult task of reducing and professionalizing the army. Still, Calles governed Mexico only with the consent of Alvaro Obregón, the Caudillo of the Revolution, the new indispensable man.[9]

The reelection of Obregón to the presidency ("Obregón o el caos," warned Ezequiel Padillo in 1927) and his assassination immediately following in 1928 exposed the fragility of Mexico's postrevolutionary political consolidation. The tensions within the political coalition, between Obregonistas and Callistas, between agraristas and laboristas, and between the central government and the revolutionary generals, threatened to undo the modest measure of political solidification of the previous decade. Calles thereupon skillfully navigated the fractious group in power through the crisis and toward the promised land, "a la nación de instituciones y leyes."[10] Together with some suspicious Obregonistas, Calles established the Partido Revolucionario Nacional to preserve what little unity remained within the political elite, to solve the difficult problem of presidential succession, and to maintain



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and advance his own power and influence in national politics. This process Calles defined as the institutionalization of the Revolution.

What would be the nature of this new institutionalized order? To answer that question, two generations of Mexican politicians, historians, and intellectuals have looked to the past—to the Revolution itself—for guidance and justifications. "The final outcome of the revolution," writes Adolfo Gilly, "was expressed above all at the level of the state" (p. 354). But what was the Revolution?

*Orthodoxy and Revisionism*

"All political activity is intrinsically a process of historical argument and definition . . . , all political programmes involve some construction of the past as well as the future," states the Popular Memory Group at the University of Birmingham in England. "Political domination involves historical definition."[11] The validity of this supposition can be confirmed in the Mexican case by studying postrevolutionary history and historiography.[12] The evolution of the orthodox interpretation of the Mexican Revolution during the 1930s and beyond certainly served to legitimate the postrevolutionary state. According to friendly polemics, memoirs, and histories, the Revolution, and therefore the postrevolutionary state, was populist, nationalist, and (at least in aspiration) democratic. The hopes of the people were crystallized in the Constitution of 1917; and subsequent governments have struggled to implement its revolutionary reforms, to defend the sovereignty of the nation, to raise the standard of living for all Mexicans, and to uphold civil liberties and democratic practices—in short, to propel and finally institutionalize the Revolution.[13] As late as 1953, Howard F. Cline, one of the most respected North American *mexicanólogos* of his generation, noted that "there is a widely shared belief in Mexico that the earlier aggressive and combative phases [of the Revolution] provided that nation with appropriate revolutionary institutions. Now the problem is merely to operate them more effectively."[14] Even for critics of the post–World War II Mexican government, the epic Revolution of 1910–17 remained the source of revolutionary inspiration and guidance. In their eyes, the new political conservativism of the 1940s and 1950s constituted a betrayal, a corruption, or at least an abatement of the Revolution.[15] Yet despite the reservations of intellectuals like Daniel Cosío Villegas and Jesús Silva Herzog, the historical orthodoxy of the Revolution long remained the dominant historical memory of the political elite, the middle class, and the working masses.

A fundamentally different Mexican Revolution emerged in the revisionist historiography of the late 1960s and 1970s. "The bitter central truth of the Mexican Revolution for the revisionists," writes Gilbert



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Joseph, "is that more often than not, the revolution constituted an aggression against the great majority of the Mexican people. . . . [The] revisionists argue that the epic revolution would ultimately have the effect of creating a 'modern leviathan,' of consolidating the increasingly centralized, increasingly capitalistic modern state which had already been emerging during the Díaz period."[16] What was once celebrated as the first social revolution of the twentieth century is now widely characterized as an incomplete and "frozen" revolution, "la revolución desequilibrada," "la revolución domesticada," or simply as "a middle class insurgency."[17] This collective devaluation of the Mexican Revolution has important political implications and is, at least in part, the result of reading history backward. The origins of the capitalistic, dependent, corrupt, and authoritarian postrevolutionary state (as it is now characterized) are traced back to 1910–17 and even to the Porfiriato. Lorenzo Meyer, for example, writes that the "Mexican Revolution is not a negation of the political past but rather an impressive step forward in the modernization of the Mexican authoritarian state."[18] Although some revisionists have overdrawn their arguments and have concluded that the Mexican Revolution was not a revolution at all, most revisionist historians advance a more complex and subtle interpretation.

One of the most important contributions to the recent revisionism of the Revolution appeared in 1971, Adolfo Gilly's *La revolución interrumpida: México (1910–1920), una guerra campesina por la tierra y el poder*, and it has finally been translated into English as *The Mexican Revolution*. Gilly forcefully and persuasively argues that the Revolution was not simply a great rebellion, full of sound and fury signifying only jobs, politics, and graft, but an "interrupted" social revolution, a peasant war for land and power that irreversibly influenced the triumphant bourgeois revolution. The Constitution of 1917, part of the framework of the new state, was a bourgeois document. But it was also "an indirect, remote—in short, consititutional—testimony to the conquests of the mass struggle, and to the relative weakness vis-à-vis the masses that the Mexican bourgeoisie has never been able to overcome" (p. 234). The Zapatista and Villista peasant war, the workers' strikes and unionization, the social reforms in various states all forced the bourgeois Carrancista movement "to integrate deep political and social reforms into the juridical structure of the country" (p. 229). The Revolution also unleashed the Mexican masses from traditional restraints, and they continued to defend their revolutionary conquests, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. Beginning in 1920, the vague outline of the postrevolutionary Mexican state became visible. As Gilly describes this process, "Obregón created the model to which all subsequent Mexican governments have clung. They have not been able to crush or disorganize the masses, but have had to lean upon them in order to control



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them. No government has been able to free itself of the revolution, of the need to speak in its name" (p. 323).

*Political Sociology*

Gilly's study is part of a larger, sociologically fertilized historiography of considerable appeal and influence in Mexican studies today. Within the historiography of the Mexican state are a number of ambitious works of political sociology written by scholars who employ structural, or macro, analysis of political change on a high level of generality.[19] Along with Gilly, Arnaldo Córdova, Juan Felipe Leal, Octavio Ianni, Arturo Anguiano, and Roger Bartra pioneered the study of the socioeconomic structures—those complex patterns of relationships among groups and societies (according to Theda Skocpol's definition) sometimes called "impersonal and inexorable forces"—that conditioned the construction and functioning of the postrevolutionary Mexican state.[20] The Revolution destroyed the liberal oligarchical state and replaced it, according to Leal, with "a coalition of forces, precarious and contradictory because of its multi-class structure, but under the relatively firm leadership of a political-military bureaucracy, whose plan of action pointed toward the implementation of reforms within the framework of capitalism." [21] The key to any understanding of postrevolutionary state formation, Córdova maintains, lies in the national state's pursuance of *"la política de masas"*: the organization of workers and campesinos into isolated corporate groups designed (originally) to influence policy but also to be dependent upon the paternalistic national state. The coopting of the working masses by the national state enhanced the ability of the political bureaucracy to consolidate its power, to become semiautonomous within Mexican society, and to promote reformed capitalism while maintaining the political support of the proletariat. This thesis has considerable merit as an explanation of one of the central contradictions of the modern Mexican state, which Octavio Paz describes as "the fact that the state must alternatively depend upon the masses and control them."[22] As some critics have pointed out, however, this interpretation assumes that state formation during the critical period of the 1920s and 1930s was not ultimately subject to the messy give-and-take of actual politics involving personal, institutional, regional, and class rivalries and struggles. State formation was instead conditioned by the structural constraints fashioned during the Porfiriato (dependent capitalist development) and during the Revolution (the ascendancy of the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie and the politicization of the proletariat). State formation was also guided and propelled by statesmen of considerable prescience who understood the structural realities of modern Mexican history and who manipulated workers and



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campesinos and their leaders, the traditional landowning class, military chiefs, regional bosses, and others who (apparently) lacked such suprahistorical intelligence and vision.[23]

Recent studies of the postrevolutionary state forming part of the structuralist historiographical vein constitute an uneven lot; some retrace old footsteps while others break out in new directions. Rafael Loyola Díaz in *La crisis Obregón-Calles y el estado mexicano* analyzes the political crisis of 1928–29 that was precipitated by the assassination of Obregón. Loyola Díaz sees this period as a *coyuntura*, a critical historical juncture. The crisis was a confrontation not just of two political factions, the Obregonistas and the Callistas, but of two alternative forms of government: *caudillesca* and *institucional*. The fundamental source of Obregón's power resided in his capacity to negotiate alliances to preserve the power and unity of the emerging "Revolutionary Family" and to preserve class peace. Calles, who lacked this talent as well as Obregón's stature, established the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) in order to increase his power and authority, to institutionalize the unity of the political elite, and to organize and control the working masses. The PNR, Calles's principal legacy to the Mexican bourgeoisie, possessed a long-term historical commitment: the capitalist development of Mexico based on the consent of the working masses, who would underwrite the cost, or part of it, through stable or declining wages. Loyola Díaz's *La crisis Obregón-Calles* is an interesting book on a most important period in Mexican history, but I think the author exaggerates the distinction between Obregonista caudillismo and Callista institucionalismo. Linda Hall convincingly shows that Obregón favored the formation of a national party to unify revolutionary elements and keep their disputes within the family.[24] More importantly, however, Loyola Díaz simply applies the thesis of "la política de masas" in his analysis of this period, offering little that is new.

In contrast, Arnaldo Córdova in *En una época de crisis (1928–1934)* argues that both Obregón and Calles pursued to some extent "la política de masas" during their presidencies but that during the period from 1928 to 1934, the revolutionary establishment abandoned that strategy. The government's attempt to dominate and control worker and campesino organizations (without granting them political influence within the PNR and the state in return) in conjunction with the economic crisis of the early 1930s gave rise to a popular movement of workers and campesinos from below. This movement increased the power of the left wing of the PNR, a trend that in turn brought Lázaro Cárdenas to the presidency in 1934. This thesis, which was originally advanced by Cardenistas (particularly labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano) at the time to lend authority to their cause, has come under detailed criticism in recent years.[25] It is no longer accepted by historians



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as gospel. Once Cárdenas was in power, however, he pursued and in fact institutionalized "la política de masas," a topic discussed in Córdova's more innovative book, *La política de masas del cardenismo* (1974).

Pablo González Casanova's *El estado y los partidos políticos en México* is an extended discussion of the nature of political power in Mexico since the Porfiriato. It isolates three political techniques: *"la política de poder"* (meaning repression), *"la política de masas"* (meaning popular coalition), and *"la política de persuación y mitos"* (meaning ideological hegemony). González Casanova states that "the history of their combination is the history of the State and political parties in Mexico" (p. 32). He then reconstructs this history, explaining how the postrevolutionary state and party employed these techniques with increasing sophistication and balance—until recently. This book is a good synthesis and primer (it also contains two very good essays on the history of the revolutionary party that were originally published in *Nexos*[26]); however, I doubt that it would add much to the subject for those with specialized knowledge of modern Mexican politics.

Of all the recent studies, Nora Hamilton's *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico* (1982) is the most challenging because she carries the discussion and debate on postrevolutionary state formation to a more sophisticated and complex plane. She rejects the rather standard Marxist-oriented thesis that Cárdenas continued, only with more vision, the orientation of his predecessors toward reformed capitalist development. "The Cárdenas government envisioned, and in conjunction with mobilized workers and peasants implemented, a much more radical restructuring of society than its predecessors or populist regimes in other Latin American countries."[27] Cárdenas forged a progressive alliance that integrated the left wing of the political bureaucracy and the mobilized sectors of workers and campesinos into the new Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM) and in support of a strong presidency. This alliance, Hamilton contends, underwrote a brief period of limited autonomy of the Mexican state in relation to the dominant, but divided, bourgeois class. During this period, the Cárdenas government was able to carry out a significant agrarian reform program, establish state control over key sectors of the economy, and expropriate the properties of foreign-owned petroleum companies. The power and autonomy of the Cardenista state were progressively limited, and its ability to effect more radical reform curtailed, by the structural limitations imposed by the combined power of national and international capitalism, by contradictions within the progressive alliance, and by the formation of a stronger conservative faction within the state during the Cárdenas presidency. The election of General Manuel Avila Camacho to the presidency in 1940 had a double significance: first, the survival of the "state-party-labor-peasant bureaucracy" against the



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threat posed by the independent rightist candidacy of General Juan Andreu Almazán; and second, the neutralization of progressive elements within the PRM and the dominance of the conservative "revolutionary capitalist" faction. "Since that time," writes Hamilton, "conservative groups within the state have become consolidated, structures uniting the state and dominant class interests at various levels have been considerably strengthened, and progressive groups and individuals brought into positions within the state apparatus have been easily isolated."[28]

Ariel José Contreras in *México 1940: industrialización y crisis política* reaches a similar conclusion by a somewhat different route. By 1940, argues Contreras, Mexico was a society in transition. The old, essentially agrarian country was giving way to a predominantly industrial country. The social forces involved in this transition came into open conflict during the election of 1940 and nearly undid a decade of "revolutionary" insititutionalization. That election, Contreras contends, almost became a dangerous confrontation between the capitalist right (which included the new industrial bourgeoisie, traditional Porfirian *latifundistas*, and part of the petty bourgeoisie) and the political bureaucratic establishment (which included the political elite, the army, and the mobilized proletariat and had the support of the "revolutionary" agrarian oligarchy). Once the conservative forces within the political bureaucracy had defeated Francisco Mújica, the candidate of the Cardenista (left) wing of the party, and secured the PRM nomination of Manuel Avila Camacho, a more serious political threat appeared on the right. The independent candidacy of General Almazán, supported at first by the fairly unified front of the capitalist right, sought nothing less than the political defeat and dissolution of the "Revolutionary Family." Two developments saved the Revolutionary establishment. First, control of the Almazán candidacy slipped away from the Monterrey-based industrialists into the hands of the petty bourgeoisie (who then organized and controlled the Partido de Acción National, or PAN). Second, Avila Camacho's campaign manager, Miguel Alemán, successfully implemented what might be called "*la política de burguesía*" when he traded the political control of Monterrey and the state of Nuevo León to the industrialist "*burguesía regiomontana*" in exchange for its political support of the "Revolutionary Family." Thus Almazán may have "won the election" in 1940 (although the official count gave the election to Avila Camacho), but the "Revolutionary Family" won the struggle for power and thereby maintained control of Mexico.



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*Political History*

The other category of studies of postrevolutionary Mexican state formation—political history—presents cautious generalizations, offers particular findings, and relies more on primary sources. This group of historians, as David C. Bailey noted in a different context, "have settled for investigating limited problems and reporting their findings as accurately as possible."[29] In general they view state formation and institutionalization as a result of struggle among individuals, political factions, narrow interest groups, and political institutions rather than as a process involving socioeconomic structures or a struggle between classes or among class fractions.

Three monographs focus on the years 1928 through 1934 as the decisive period in the construction of postrevolutionary state power. Alejandra Lajous in *Los orígenes del partido único en México* sets the tone by contending that the PNR was created in 1929 to solve a concrete crisis, that its creation and development were improvised, and that its evolution surprised and confounded even the main political actors. President Calles, she argues, conceived the necessity and benefit of political institutionalization when his personal situation, and the country's, reached a critical state of instability as a consequence of Obregón's assassination. Calles then established a new mechanism of political cohesion and control to promote two contradictory objectives. The first, which he stated publicly, was to institutionalize the power and depersonalize the internal disagreements of the "Revolutionary Family." The second, which can be inferred from his actions, was to advance his own power and authority as Jefe Máximo of the "Revolutionary Family." Although Calles triumphed over his rivals and for a time controlled the PNR, the institutionalizing process he set in motion eventually escaped his control. Calles also lost out because he did not include the organizations of workers and campesinos in the institutionalizing process. This deficiency and the discontent it bred were exploited by Lázaro Cárdenas and the progressive wing of the party in order to capture the presidency and destroy the Maximato. The elimination of Calles, concludes Lajous, permitted the party to take its natural course in politically incorporating the organized masses and serving as the main political instrument of the presidency. Thus "Cardenismo was Callismo expanded" (p. 172).

Lorenzo Meyer, Rafael Segovia, and Alejandra Lajous in *Los inicios de la institucionalización* maintain that the key concept in understanding the politics of the Maximato (1929–35) is the *diarquía* (diarchy): the president was to be in charge of administration while the party (meaning Calles as Jefe Máximo) was to be in charge of politics and policy. Calles used the party to put his candidates into office, to promote his



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political and economic program, to impose discipline on the political bureaucracy, to undermine the power and independence of the regional bosses and constituent parties, and to transfer real power from the presidency to the Jefe Máximo. All of these goals Calles accomplished by 1931, and by 1934, he further centralized the party by abolishing the confederated regional parties and integrating their members into the national membership, thereby converting the PNR into a real political party and a powerful, centralized political machine. It was this party that brought another Callista, Lázaro Cárdenas, to the presidency in 1934. But to view his candidacy as the crest of an inexorable wave committed to renewing the Revolution, Meyer notes in the Epilogue, one must possess the perspective of hindsight because the view from 1934 was not nearly so clear.

The most solidly researched of these three studies of the Maximato is Tzvi Medin's *El minimato presidencial* (its notes are littered with references to Calles's personal archives). Medin's primary subject is not the PNR but the political intrigues within the dominant political oligarchy, the "Revolutionary Family." He makes an interesting distinction between the Jefe Máximo, meaning the personal prestige and authority of Calles, and the Maximato, meaning the Callista political machine. All contending revolutionary factions accepted the primacy of the Jefe Máximo but not that of the Callista group. As a result, although Jefe Máximo Calles and President Pascual Ortiz Rubio shared a common ideological outlook, the two "institutions" they headed were constantly in conflict. Ortiz Rubio refused to accept the political direction of the "mecanismo callista," but he possessed little authority, even as an administrator, because he lacked the fundamental political instrument in the Mexican system: the prerogative to name his successor. The resignation of Ortiz Rubio in 1932, Medin contends, signified the failure of the Maximato. The same tension existed during the first year of the Cárdenas administration; Cárdenas accepted Calles as the Jefe Máximo de la Revolución but rejected the *mecanismo político del maximato*. The difference between Cárdenas and Ortiz Rubio was that Cárdenas created his own base of political power during the electoral campaign among organized workers and campesinos. Cárdenas was also able to attract the support of several powerful politicians and military chiefs who had become disaffected after several years of Maximato politics. Medin views the Maximato, the political mechanism of Callismo, as fatally flawed in design and in practice. Because the caudillo could not be president, the president would not be the caudillo. But this scheme never really worked. By denying the Maximato, writes Medin, Cárdenas "eliminated the caudillo from the Mexican political scene, but preserved caudillismo, making it the patrimony of the president" (p. 164).

Not since the publication of John W. F. Dulles's *Yesterday in Mexico*



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in 1961 had a solid political history of the Maximato appeared until now. These three monographs differ only slightly in interpretation and approach, but they complement one another in topical emphasis. After reading all three, it is difficult to disagree with Medin's characterization of the period 1928–35 as the "historical genesis of the Mexican political regime" (p. 14).

The presidency of General Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–40) has long been perceived as crucial in the construction of the contemporary Mexican state. Cárdenas tamed the military, disciplined state and local governments, increased state intervention in the private economy, and reorganized the government party to incorporate the organized masses. According to Arnaldo Córdova, Cárdenas "left to his successors a political organization institutionally perfected."[30] Yet despite considerable scholarly interest in the Cárdenas regime in recent years, few solid empirical studies of politics and state formation in this important period have been published.[31] In fact, only the works of Tzvi Medin and Alicia Hernández Chávez can be judged to be original, comprehensive, and well-researched contributions to the political historiography of Cardenismo.

Tzvi Medin argues in *Ideología y praxis política de Lázaro Cárdenas* that the political revolution of Cardenismo was the unification of effective power and the institutional prerogatives of the presidency. Cárdenas accomplished this end by aligning himself politically and symbolically with workers, campesinos, and the middle class during and after his presidential campaign against the Callista elite of millionaires and latifundistas. This strategy gave him the leverage to break the Maximato and transform the PNR into a political instrument of the presidency. Later, in 1937 and 1938, Cárdenas restructured the party and in fact restructured national politics by integrating into the new Partido Revolucionario Mexicano (PRM) worker, campesino, military, and bureaucratic sectors (and by organizing commercial and industrial confederations outside the party structure). His goals were to institutionalize the class struggle and create a more just equilibrium between classes. According to Cárdenas's design, this political structure was to be regulated by the politically preeminent presidency and guided by a revolutionary, anti-imperialist, and proworker (but not socialist) ideology. The flaw in this design was that the political structure and the revolutionary ideology that inspired and governed its creation were not organically fused. Thus, Medin concludes, "the political structures created by Cárdenas took primacy over the spirit and the objectives which animated them at the moment of their creation . . . . The political structures survived, although subservient to [conservative] ends" (pp. 230–31). One question remains: Why did Cárdenas not anticipate this outcome and attempt to forestall it?



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A divergent and highly original revisionist interpretation is put forward by Alicia Hernández Chávez in *La mecánica cardenista*. She argues that Cárdenas did not come to the presidency and overcome Calles via worker and campesino discontent, militancy, and political incorporation, that is, via "la política de masas." Rather, in time-honored Mexican fashion, Cárdenas forged an alliance of marginalized and excluded political elements consisting of non-Callista regional caudillos, Agrarista and Sindicalista leaders, and Carrancista, Villista, Zapatista, Almazanista, Cedillista, and Veracruzano military factions. The key to the power of the "mecánica cardenista," Cárdenas's political mafia, was the support of the army. In fact, writes Hernández Chávez, "with Cárdenas, the generals remained the rectors of national politics" (p. 77). The incorporation of worker and campesino sectors into the PRM gave the national state increased leverage for intervening in and regulating the national economy and provided the "grupo gobernante" with a more effective political instrument. But power, real political power, resided not in the popular organizations, in the PRM, nor even in the presidency alone; real power remained where it had resided for two decades—with the generals, the governors, and the politicians. They chose Cárdenas's successor, General Manuel Avila Camacho, and they controlled Mexico together with the president, who acted as *primus inter pares*. "In spite of the dazzling agrarian and social policies of Cardenismo, its ultimate fate was not decided by 'the masses': it was decided by *los políticos*, the key elements of the *mecánica cardenista*" (p. 208). In sum, Hernández Chávez denies that the Revolution revolutionized or even significantly altered the nature of Mexican politics.

The year 1940 has long been considered a significant watershed dividing the "social revolution" from the subsequent "institutional revolution." Certainly the election of that year led to a political change in course, but from the perspective of the mid-eighties, it appears to have been neither abrupt nor unexpected. The year 1940 also seems to have served as a historiographical watershed dividing the Mexican past into its "historic" and "contemporaneous" epochs, inviting historians to study the former and neglect the latter. Fortunately, this trend is no longer the case now that a number of scholars have penetrated this frontier with excellent results. One of these pioneers, Luis Medina, demonstrates in two books on the 1940s that the process of political institutionalization continued beyond 1940. In *Del cardenismo al ávilacamachismo*, Medina examines the politics of the Manuel Avila Camacho presidency (1940–46), "one of the most important, but least studied, epochs of the contemporary history of our country" (p. 5). He views this *sexenio* as a period of conciliation accompanied by centralization. Within the "Revolutionary Family," two mutually antagonistic factions, the Cardenista left and the Callista right, constantly confronted one



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another, presenting the moderate Avila Camacho group with the opportunity to act as arbitrator and thus strengthening the power and prestige of the presidency. Mexico's participation in the Second World War, Medina shows, also strengthened Avila Camacho's position. The president was able to exact political and economic sacrifices from powerful interest groups in the name of "the national interest" and "war mobilization." The political importance of the 1940s is examined in more detail in *Civilismo y modernización del autoritarismo*. "By 1943," writes Medina, "the main part of the task of political institutionalization was nearly concluded. Parties, sectors, unions, agrarian leagues, commercial and industrial confederations, associations of bankers presented a complex panorama dominated by interest and pressure groups" (p. 10). The military sector of the PRM was eliminated in 1940, and the army was completely professionalized and tamed during the war. The electoral reform of 1945 transferred responsibility for the electoral process from municipal and state officials to the newly centralized power, the Comisión Federal de Vigilancia Electoral. The dissolution of the PRM in early 1946 and its reconstitution as the Partido Revolucionario Institutional "reformed" the procedure for the internal selection of candidates, which diminished the influence of the sectors (particularly that of the Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos) and increased the authority of the top leadership. Finally, argues Medina, "the first three years of the government of Miguel Alemán (1946–1952) were definitive for the construction of the political system which had been slowly forming since the end of the 1920s" (p. 93). The "modernization of authoritarianism" under President Alemán included three tasks: first, the reaffirmation of the political ascendancy of the presidency; second, the elimination of all "*ismos, personalistas como ideológicos*"; and third, the fusion of Mexican nationalism with anticommunism. The leviathan on the Zócalo was fully established and firmly in control. Later modifications and adaptations were embellishments on a remarkable political edifice.

To a considerable extent, the history of the party of the Revolution is the history of the postrevolutionary Mexican state. Yet, writes Luis Javier Garrido in *El partido de la revolución institucionalizada (1928–1945)*, "it is the most complex and least studied party of Mexico" (p. 14). Garrido has rectified this neglect in writing what will surely be recognized for years to come as the most complete, balanced, and well-researched study of the party.

Garrido begins by pointing out that the principal obstacle preventing the consolidation of the postrevolutionary state was the absence of unity within the ruling group. This problem was somewhat allayed during the 1920s by the personal authority and prestige of Obregón. But his assassination forced Calles to create the PNR, a political



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organization that would unify all revolutionaries, resolve all electoral problems, and ideologically legitimate the regime. Contrary to the current historiographical consensus, Garrido maintains that Calles originally intended to make the PNR a true organization of the masses, a goal never achieved under Calles's tutelage. During the Maximato, in fact, the party became nothing more than a party of the Callista oligarchy, "un centro de unión de los caciques callistas" (p. 177). It served as the instrument by which Calles and his allies controlled the Cámara de Diputados, the government bureaucracy, and the presidency, thus creating the key political reality of the Maximato: "una situación de doble Poder Ejecutivo" (p. 175). The PNR during its first six years did contribute significantly to the integration of the nation and the consolidation of the central state, but it was neither democratic nor popular, despite protestations to the contrary. Paralleling the development of the party during the Maximato was the consolidation of worker and campesino organizations that remained outside party control but contributed, along with the climate of popular discontent, to the designation of Cárdenas, a populist Callista, as president.

President Cárdenas took office in late 1934 with a cabinet, congress, and party beyond his control. During the first six months of his government, Garrido notes, Cárdenas successfully extended his authority over his own administration, most state governments, and the army. He gained control over the Cámara de Diputados and the party only after Calles abandoned control to go into voluntary exile in June 1935. Thereafter Cárdenas converted the PNR into an instrument of the presidency, incorporated union leaders into the "*nuevo PNR*," and transformed the presidency into the preponderant political insitution in the nation. The incorporation of syndical organization (informally from 1935 to 1937) and the armed forces into the new restructured party, the PRM, in 1938 gave the party and the government a popular force and legitimacy both had previously lacked. During the last three years of the Cárdenas administration, Garrido argues, the party was converted into a fundamental pillar of the postrevolutionary state. It subordinated worker and campesino organizations to the state and amplified the regime's institutional social base, thereby permitting a significant program of social reform. Despite its rhetoric, however, the PRM was not a party of the left, and it sustained the political and electoral functions of the party during the Calles period.

According to Garrido, the 1940 elections constituted the most serious test to date of the postrevolutionary state and party. The presidential campaign of General Almazán against PRM candidate General Avila Camacho demonstrated the considerable power of industrialists, landowners, the clergy, and the middle class and also demonstrated the popular desire for real democracy. Almazán's threat and the undoubt-



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edly "fixed" elections weakened the PRM as a front for popular worker-campesino interests, brought the prestige of the PRM to its lowest level, and led the Avila Camacho government to distance itself not only from Cardenismo but from the PRM as the state apparatus most clearly shaped by the Cardenista experience. Thus, maintains Garrido, Avila Camacho eliminated the military sector, suppressed the party's newspaper, brought conservatives to power in the labor sector, integrated the "popular" sector into the party (which further reduced the influence of the labor and campesino sectors), and reduced the PRM to being simply the electoral apparatus of the state. The presidency was strengthened at the expense of the party. In fact, when Calles returned to Mexico from his exile in 1941, writes Garrido, "su projecto político era en mucho una realidad" (p. 320). During the war years, pressure from industrial and financial groups (who sought the dissolution of the party) reduced the PRM to a secondary role. By 1945 the party served as an electoral apparatus, the formal center of the alliance between government and labor leaders, and as a legitimizer of presidential decisions. By the election of 1946, the party had become largely marginalized in the selection of the presidential candidate. It had become, as its new name suggested, definitively institutionalized; and, concludes Garrido, "the resignation of the popular masses, expressed through silence, once again became the fundamental dominant note of Mexican political life" (p. 360).

*Popular Historiography*

The above examples of academic historiography will be read in Mexico by a few professors, students, journalists, bureaucrats, and other university-educated readers. None of these monographs have been published in runs of more than five thousand copies. Collectively, and perhaps even individually in some cases, they may have some impact on Mexico's intelligentsia and opinion-shaping elite. Perhaps through the media of newspapers and magazines, some of their conclusions may be disseminated among the urban middle class. A popular historiography of much greater significance in the formation of Mexican historical memory also exists, but it is a historiography all but dismissed or ignored by academic historians. It includes films and television programs, public monuments, posters, and government ceremonies, school texts and comic books, as well as stories told by the old and jokes told by the young. It is a politicized historiography, partly conservative, partly radical, partly reverent, and partly cynical. By the standards of professional historians, it may not be very accurate or analytical, but it is history all the same, and as such, has importance.

Ruis's *Su majestad el PRI*, a cartoon history of the party, belongs to



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this popular historiography. Some professional historians might comment sadly that this book will find a greater audience than all of the above-mentioned studies together. But it belongs to this category for another, and I think more important, reason. My sense is that Ruis is a good listener. His sources include books, but I suspect they also include informal conversations and street-corner humor. He writes, for example, that Mexicans have christened the PRI with a thousand titles, including "la aplandora," "el partidazo," "los privilegiados," and (my favorite) "Puros Rateros Incapaces" (p. 45). His history of the party is actually a fairly accurate revisionist account. From its formation, Ruis maintains, the PNR was not a real political party with voluntary members, internal democracy, ideological principles, and a program of work. "Entonces que era?" asks a worker. "Una oficina burocrática de Calles," replies his companion (p. 32). Once free of Calles, President Cárdenas transformed the PNR into the PRM, which could have been a real party of the working class. Unfortunately, Ruis notes, the PRM remained the official party and became an organization for controlling the masses according to the interests of the bourgeoisie, but an organization masked by the appearance of democracy. What does PRM mean? A campesino has the answer: "Para Rezar Manuel, Para Robar Maximino" (p. 44). Finally, Mexican political evolution culminated in the PRI, which Ruis defines as "algo así como una gigantesca oficina de personal engargada de proporcionarle al país presidentes, governadores, diputados y senadores, presidentes municipales y elevadoristas" (p. 42). *Su majestad el PRI* is a delightfully cynical and very Mexican history of postrevolutionary politics. It resonates with the *quejas* heard so often in Mexico.

The idea of historical production needs to be expanded beyond the limits of the writing of academic histories. The historiography of Mexican postrevolutionary politics and state formation should also include Raymundo Gleyzer's film, *México: la revolución congelada*; Ochoa's cartoon series "Don Concho: un político a la mexicana"; the Nueva Canción movement and songs of Los Folkloristas; Editoral Nueva Imagen's "México: historia de un pueblo," a series of *historietas*; the *cartillas* for the national campaign against illiteracy during the 1940s, and similar sources. Analysis of popular historiography may enhance understanding of the nature of the state's ideological hegemony, the relationship of Mexican society to its political past, and the importance of historical understanding to class consciousness and political activism. Whether scholars like it or not, the writing of academic histories is only part of a much larger process. We may ignore the rest at the risk of our own irrelevancy.



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*Conclusions, Reflections, and Prejudices*

"Qué clase de Leviatán nos gobierna?" asks Arnaldo Córdova.[32] There are few questions of greater relevance for the Mexican people today, burdened as they are by an economic crisis that is the consequence of state actions, as they struggle for democracy in Juchitán, Oaxaca, and other localities against an authoritarian state, and as they mobilize in labor unions and agrarian leagues for rank-and-file democracy against leaders allied with the state bureaucracy. The twentieth century has witnessed a vast inflation of the Mexican state's power, size, and functions. "Seldom in history," writes Carlos Pereyra, "has a state obtained such a definitive degree of legitimacy and dominion over the economic, political, and ideological life of a country."[33]

For good reason, then, Mexicans have become more interested in the nature of their national state; and due to historical investigation of politics and state formation over the past fifteen years or so, they are now more knowledgeable about their state. Mexicans have been partially liberated by national and foreign historians from many of the myths of the Mexican Revolution, the "Institutional Revolution," and the "Revolutionary" state; and they have begun to redefine their political choices as a result. Thanks in part to the studies such as those under review here, our knowledge is more detailed and our understanding more sophisticated of the critical period from 1928 to 1946. From the complementary perspectives and methodologies of sociology and history, scholars have generally concluded that the mass-incorporating policies of postrevolutionary regimes were crucial to political consolidation and to the expansion of state power and activity. Future students of this period, however, should attempt to reconcile the postrevisionist analysis of Alicia Hernández Chávez of Cardenista politics with the "política de masas" interpretation. Hernández Chávez's work is simply too solid and too antagonistic to the prevailing historiographical consensus to be ignored.

The convergence of history and sociology in regard to the study of the Mexican state is a positive development. Sociologists (and political scientists) have analyzed and defined the state and social classes not as static social formations but as complex relationships that can only be understood historically and in historical context. Historians, to their credit, have become more conscious of the processes of social structuring. Another positive development is that all but the most vulgar Marxists have discarded the idea of the state as an "instrument" of the ruling class. Thanks to the theoretical work of Nicos Poulantzas and the comparative historical studies of Ellen Kay Trimberger and Theda Skocpol, students of politics and states have come to explore the "relative autonomy of the state."[34] This approach is evident in the recent histori-



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ography of the Mexican state. Scholars now recognize the importance of a postrevolutionary "state bourgeoisie" that has interests separate from and sometimes opposed to those of landowners, bankers, industrialists, and capitalists generally, although the terminology is not yet consistent and is therefore somewhat confusing in referring to the "Revolutionary Family," the "grupo gobernante," or the "state-party-labor-peasant bureaucracy." In short, recent scholarship has revealed much about the history of power and the social institution of the state in postrevolutionary Mexico. But there is still work to be done.

First, although all of the books under review here touch upon the problem of political centralization within localities and regions, no detailed examination exists of this complicated development, the taming of political regionalism. Such a task requires intimate familiarity with the politics of specific localities and regions, the kind of familiarity that is evident in Laurens Ballard Perry's *Juárez and Díaz: Machine Politics in Mexico* (1978). Given the proliferation of regional studies in recent years, a study of national political centralization and regional resistance and incorporation would be more manageable today.

Second, a study of the ideological legitimation of the postrevolutionary state is needed, something like a sequel to Arnaldo Córdova's *La ideología de la Revolución Mexicana: la formación del nuevo régimen* (1973) and an elaboration and chronological continuation of the work begun by Guillermo Palacios in his brilliant essay, "Calles y la idea oficial de la Revolución Mexicana," in *Historia Mexicana* (1973). As Machiavelli pointed out, to govern is to make believe. The exercise of ideological hegemony by the Mexican state for many decades is an extremely important, but poorly understood, problem.

Third, no comprehensive history of the postrevolutionary state exists that is comparable to Oscar Oszlak's *La formación del estado argentino* (1982). The absence of such a broad study is not especially surprising given the lack of well-researched biographies of many of the major political figures of postrevolutionary Mexico as well as the lack of studies of the bureaucracy and most governmental ministries, and comprehensive studies of centralization and ideological hegemony. Contributing to the situation is the fact that political history has been out of favor among professional historians for some time. Nevertheless, a monographic base is beginning to accumulate, and the study of power, politics, and the state is being rehabilitated. It is now time to put the story together again.

## NOTES

1. Octavio Paz, "Twilight of Revolution," *Dissent* 21 (Winter 1974):59.
2. *Proceso* 3, 5 March 1979.



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3. According to Frank Brandenburg, "The Revolutionary Family is composed of the men who have run Mexico for over half a century, who have laid the policy-lines of the Revolution, and who today hold effective decision-making power." See *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 3.
4. Guillermo Palacios, "Calles y la idea oficial de la Revolución Mexicana," *Historia Mexicana* 22 (Jan.–Mar. 1973):261–78.
5. This statement comes from Calles's famous "Grito de Guadalajara," quoted in *El Nacional*, 21 July 1934.
6. From Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 284.
7. Richard Tardanico, "Revolutionary Nationalism and State Building in Mexico, 1917–1924," *Politics and Society* 10 (1980):76–77. Also see his dissertation, "The Transformation of the Mexican State, 1917–1940," Johns Hopkins University, 1979.
8. Edwin Lieuwen, *Mexican Militarism: The Political Rise and Fall of the Revolutionary Army, 1910–1940* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), 57.
9. Studies on political consolidation during the Obregón-Calles period include Randall G. Hansis, "Alvaro Obregón, the Mexican Revolution, and the Politics of Consolidation, 1920–1924," Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1971; David C. Bailey, "Obregón: Mexico's Accommodating President," in *Essays on the Mexican Revolution: Revisionist Views of the Leaders*, edited by George Wolfskill and Douglas Richmond (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1979), 81–99; José Iturriaga de la Fuente, *La revolución hacendaria: la hacienda pública con el presidente Calles* (Mexico City: Sepsetentas, 1976); Jorge Alberto Lozoya, *El ejército mexicano (1911–1965)* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1970); and Guillermo Boils, *Los militares y la política en México, 1915/1974* (Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito, 1975).
10. Calles, "Informe presidencial del 1 de septiembre de 1928," in *El Universal*, 2 Sept. 1928.
11. "Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method," in *Making Histories: Studies in History Writing and Politics*, edited by Richard Johnson, Gregor McLennan, Bill Schwarz, and David Sutton (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 213.
12. See, for example, Thomas Benjamin and Marcial Ocasio-Meléndez, "Organizing the Memory of Modern Mexico: Porfirian Historiography in Perspective, 1880s–1980s," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 64, no. 2 (May 1984):323–64.
13. See, for example, José Castillo Torre, *El PNR de México: como debe entenderse la razón de su origen y su función como instituto político de la Revolución Mexicana* (Mexico City: Imprenta de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, 1933); Gilberto Bosques, *The National Revolutionary Party of Mexico and the Six-Year Plan* (Mexico City: Secretariat of Press and Propaganda, National Revolutionary Party, 1937); Vicente Fuentes Díaz, *Los partidos políticos en México (de Carranza a Ruiz Cortines)* (Mexico City: published by the author, 1956); Rafael Corrales Ayala, "Características del estado mexicano," and "Sentido y destino de la Revolución Mexicana," in *México: cincuenta años de revolución* 3 (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1963), 263–69, 360–78; and Miguel Osorio Marbán, *El partido de la Revolución Mexicana (ensayos)*, 2 vols. (Mexico City: Impresora del Centro, 1970). Also see José Luis Reyna, "Desde dentro y desde fuera: el PRI visto por los mexicanos," *Nexos* 2 (May 1979):48–51.
14. Howard F. Cline, *The United States and Mexico* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 58. Also see Cline, *Mexico: Revolution to Evolution, 1940–1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963); Robert F. Scott, *Mexican Government in Transition* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1959); Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico;* L. Vincent Padgett, *The Mexican Political System* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966); and Lorenzo Meyer, "Del optimismo a la duda: el PRI visto por los norteamericanos," *Nexos* 2 (May 1979):45–48.
15. Jesús Silva Herzog, "Rise and Fall of Mexico's Revolution," *The Nation*, 22 October 1949, 395–96; and *Is the Mexican Revolution Dead?*, edited by Stanley R. Ross (New York: Knopf, 1966).
16. Gilbert M. Joseph, "Mexico's 'Popular Revolution': Mobilization and Myth in Yucatán, 1910–1940," *Latin American Perspectives* 6 (Summer 1979):48.
17. *México: la revolución congelada* ("The Frozen Revolution") is the title of a documentary



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film released in 1971; Moisés González Navarro, "México: la revolución desequilibrada," reprinted in González Navarro, *México: el capitalismo nacionalista* (Mexico City: 1970), 227–52; and John Womack, Jr., "A Middle-Class Insurgency," a book review of Ramón Eduardo Ruiz's *The Great Rebellion: Mexico, 1905–1924* (New York: Norton, 1980), in *The New Republic* (14 February 1981):34–36.

18. Lorenzo Meyer, "Historical Roots of the Authoritarian State in Mexico," in *Authoritarianism in Mexico*, edited by José Luis Reyna and Richard S. Weinert (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1977), 19. Also see Meyer's excellent syntheses, "La etapa formativa del Estado mexicano contemporáneo (1928–1940)," *Foro Internacional* 17 (Oct.–Dec. 1977):453–76; and "El Estado mexicano contemporáneo," *Historia Mexicana* 23 (Apr.–June 1974):722–52.
19. E. P. Thompson discusses the different approaches of sociology and history in "On History, Sociology, and Historical Relevance," *British Journal of Sociology* 27 (Sept. 1976):387–402. Also see Philip Abrams, "History, Sociology, Historical Sociology," *Past and Present* 87 (May 1980):3–16.
20. Córdova, *La formación del poder político en México* (Mexico City: Serie Popular Era, 1972), and *La política de masas del cardenismo* (Mexico City: Serie Popular Era, 1974); Leal, "The Mexican State, 1915–1973: A Historical Interpretation," *Latin American Perspectives* 2 (Summer 1975):48–63; and *La burguesía y el estado mexicano* (Mexico City: Ediciones El Caballito, 1982); Anguiano, *El estado y la política obrera del cardenismo* (Mexico City: Editorial Era, 1975); Ianni, *El estado capitalista en la época de Cárdenas* (Mexico City: Serie Popular Era, 1977); and Bartra, "La revolución domesticada," in Bartra, *Campesinado y poder político en México* (Mexico City: Editorial Era, 1982), 16–41. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 18.
21. Leal, "The Mexican State: 1915–1973," 50.
22. Paz, "Letter to Adolfo Gilly," in *The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid* (New York: Grove Press, 1972), 131.
23. Paper presented at the seminar on "El movimiento obrero y la Revolución Mexicana" sponsored by the Dirección de Estudios Históricos del INAH, also published as "Del Leviatán al viejo topo: historiografía obrera en México, 1920–1930," *Historias* 1 (July–Sept. 1982):41–54.
24. Hall, "Alvaro Obregón y el partido único mexicano," *Historia Mexicana* 29 (Apr.–June 1980):602–22.
25. Romana Falcón, "El surgimiento del agrarismo cardenista: una revisión de las tesis populistas," *Historia Mexicana* 27 (Jan.–Mar. 1978):333–86.
26. González Casanova, "El partido del estado: I. Antecedentes y umbral," *Nexos* 2 (Apr. 1979):3–20; and "El partido del estado: II. Fundación, lucha electoral y crisis del sistema," *Nexos* 2 (May 1979):3–19.
27. Hamilton, *The Limits of State Autonomy: Post-Revolutionary Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982), 141.
28. Ibid., 280.
29. Bailey, "Revisionism and the Recent Historiography of the Mexican Revolution," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 58, no. 1 (Feb. 1978):79.
30. Córdova, "Regreso a la Revolución Mexicana," *Nexos* 3 (June 1980):5.
31. There are two very good dissertations on the subject, however. See Lyle C. Brown, "General Lázaro Cárdenas and Mexican Presidential Politics, 1933–1940: A Study in the Acquisition and Manipulation of Political Power," Ph.D. diss., University of Texas, 1964; and Albert L. Michaels, "Mexican Politics and Nationalism from Calles to Cárdenas," Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1966.
32. Córdova, "Regreso a la Revolución Mexicana," p. 4.
33. Pereyra, "México: los límites del reformismo," *Cuadernos Políticos* (Mexico City) 1 (July–Sept. 1974):56.
34. Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, translated by Timothy O'Hagan (London: New Left Books and Verso Editions, 1973); Trimberger, *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Modernization in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1978); and Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*.



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