

innovation. Here again some qualification is in order. There were some real wars in this period that did not go well for the Qing. Emperor Qianlong's four expeditions into Burma (1765–1769) were a disaster, and his Vietnam expeditions (1788–1789) were not exactly successful. The results of the second invasion in Nepal (1791–1792) militarily speaking were also unimpressive. None of this led to any reforms. In 1809–1810, the Qing government had to ask the British and the Portuguese to help them suppress piracy in the Southern China Seas. Over the entire period from the 1760s until the 1840s, government hardly did anything to modernise their army or navy. It was not just a matter of money. Military expenditure in China over the first half of the nineteenth century *decreased* and was only a fraction, in real terms per capita and as a percentage of GDP, of that of Great Britain. Negligence, arrogance, and unwillingness also played their part.

Even the First Opium War, at least initially, failed to function as a wake-up call. By the second half of the century though, a broader movement of self-strengthening emerged. As Andrade shows, that movement was certainly not unsuccessful when it came to military hardware. The Chinese lost the war against Japan because they fought poorly and had no unified military command. Their fundamental problem was not technical or ideological but institutional. Resources often were scarce but I would want to emphasize, more than Andrade does, that this was not because China's government spent so much but because it had so little revenue, much less as a percentage of GDP than Western states or Japan. The Qing state had *always* been weak in terms of revenue, number of officials, or soldiers. As long as it had no strong opponent that was not a big problem: now it was. Andrade shows that efforts at reform became increasingly ad-hoc and de-centered, and that policies were often changed. No fundamental transformation took place. Of its army, for example, hundreds of thousands banner troops had become nearly useless but China's government kept on paying or at least supporting them. When at the end of the nineteenth century the Gunpowder Era was over, Qing China still was not reformed but had, as the New York Times claimed, become "an anachronism" (p. 296).

Andrade's book may at some instances be somewhat too revisionist in discussing China's military innovations and strength, but it will certainly and deservedly become a landmark in debates about military divergence and convergence in world history.

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*The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century.* By Richard von Glahn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016. Pp. vii, 461. \$99.99, hardcover; \$39.99, paper.  
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As Richard von Glahn points out in the "Introduction" to *The Economic History of China: From Antiquity to the Nineteenth Century*, there is currently no other comprehensive English-language survey of China's economic history. For more than 40 years, Mark Elvin's *The Pattern of the Chinese Past* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973) has effectively served as the point of entry despite never being intended to play that role (pp. 3, 7). *The Economic History of China* is intended to serve as just this type

of comprehensive survey, updating and expanding the scope of Elvin's seminal work with four decades of research in Chinese, Japanese, and Western languages. Each of the nine chronological chapters summarizes research on areas of fiscal and monetary policy, social and economic organization, demography and urbanization, technological change, and commerce and markets. Each chapter also presents case studies to give intuitive and specific pictures of local society.

Yet this is more than a work of summary and synthesis. While von Glahn is clear that he "[has] not proposed an overarching theory of the Chinese economy," he does have two theoretical perspectives to advance: a repudiation "of any linear, stadial notion of history or economic development" and a disavowal of "a fundamental tenet of neoclassical economics, namely the idea that the market is *the* driving force in economic development" (his emphasis, p. 7). This provokes two major interventions: a non-linear and non-determinist periodization and summary of Chinese history; and a specific intervention into the debates over China's development and standards of living that emerged around Kenneth Pomeranz's *The Great Divergence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Von Glahn actively disavows the Weberian and Marxist portrayals of Chinese society as largely static until the intervention of the West (p. 1), as well as work by China scholars that portrays China as "trapped in some form of structural equilibrium" outside of a few periods of revolutionary change (p. 4). Instead von Glahn offers a new periodization of Chinese history based on state attitudes and interventions into the economy. Chapter 1 describes the "patrimonial state" in the early Zhou (1045 to 707 BCE), based on loose associations of autarchic communities. He then follows the transition to "city states" (Chapter 2) and the creation of the fiscal state in the Qin and Early Han (250–281 BCE, Chapter 3). Von Glahn identifies two forms of fiscal state: a "military-physiocratic state" with a focus on agriculture and war (p. 85), and a "mercantilist fiscal state" that "manipulates the terms of exchange and the money supply" (p. 118). He uses these two types to describe state policy for the rest of premodern Chinese history: a period of division (Chapter 4); the restoration of a fiscal state by foreign dynasties (Chapter 5); the mercantilist state reemerging in the late Tang and Song (c. 780–1127, Chapter 6); the "Heyday of the Jiangnan Economy" between 1127 and 1550 under a strong money supply (Chapter 7); and finally, opposition to commerce in the Ming and Qing (1368–1911 CE) and a devolution to a "military-physiocratic" style government (Chapters 7 and 8).

This periodization provides a very useful framework for analysis, which in the Chinese context *must* address the role of the state in the economy. Terms like "patrimonial," "physiocratic," and "mercantilist" reflect Chinese economic thought far better than traditional terms like "feudal." Yet these terms are still fundamentally anachronistic, grounded in the European experience more than a millennium after the events described in China. I am also troubled by the absence of any treatment of the Liao and Jin Dynasties (916–1234), important states in North China which are addressed in existing scholarship; and by a rather one-dimensional understanding of the Ming state with minimal reference to key Chinese scholarship on Ming fiscal policy. (See, especially Liang Fangzong. *Liang Fangzhong wenji* [Collected Works of Liang Fangzhong]. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2008–2011.) More generally, von Glahn imputes that a mercantilist state offered the best governance for the Chinese economy; this is a refreshing change from the free-market zealotry of neoclassical economics, but the success of the mercantilist position is controversial in Chinese historiography.

If von Glahn's new periodization will be both useful and controversial, his treatment of the *Great Divergence* debate will likely draw the most attention. Von Glahn gives an authoritative summary of market development in China both before (Chapter 8) and after 1800 (Chapter 9). He presents new evidence showing standards of living, degree of market integration, and credit availability were all lower in China than in Western Europe around 1800. Yet von Glahn notes that Chinese institutions for credit, contract, partnership, and business organization were different from European institutions, but not necessarily inferior. Differences between Europe and China were of degree, and did not categorically preclude China from industrial development. Von Glahn also disagrees with other "California School" arguments that the divergence of Chinese and European fortunes was based in resource availability (Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence*), or the degree of urbanization (Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong, *Before and Beyond Divergence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). Instead he returns with new evidence to support an old argument: that warfare and the development of treaty ports in the nineteenth century destroyed and displaced native Chinese institutions.

As a reference work and introduction *The Economic History of China* is an astounding success. It is eminently readable, succinct but thorough; it touches upon all major areas of economic history, and most major debates in both Chinese and comparative economic history. A particular strength is the attention to language: for each key term von Glahn provides a brief institutional history; a clear, context-sensitive English translation; and the original term in Chinese. Von Glahn's original arguments on the nature of political and economic change, the periodization of Chinese history, and the divergence debate are clear and provocative, and largely persuasive. Despite minor oversights, *The Economic History of China* lives up to its promise to both summarize and frame China's economic history. It is highly recommended to both specialists on China and comparative scholars of political and economic history.

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*Trade and Technology Networks in the Chinese Textile Industry: Opening Up Before the Reform*. By Carles Brasó Broggi. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016. Pp. xiii, 221. \$120, hardcover; \$89.00, eBook.  
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When discussing China's extraordinary economic achievement after 1978, few studies connect it to the country's experience in the early twentieth century, despite clear similarities in industrial development; for example, firms in both two periods clustered in coastal areas and had a special emphasis on light industries. The dramatic changes in between make it difficult to link these two periods. After all, WWII and the civil war destroyed most of China's industries and drove entrepreneurs to Hong Kong or overseas. During the socialist transition in the 1950s, surviving firms were turned into state-owned enterprises. Most of the firms emerging in the 1970s are new and not originated from the old ones in the 1930s.

Carles Brasó Broggi shows that although firms from the 1930s were taken over by the government, their commercial networks survived and contributed to China's industrial