

# The Gulag Archipelago: History Betrayed I

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In plotting the artistic course of Alexander Solzhenitsyn the two texts which may be taken as datum points of particular importance are the first short novel *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* and *The Gulag Archipelago*.<sup>1</sup> Writing previously on *Ivan Denisovich*<sup>2</sup> I proposed an interpretative model which saw the book's empirical and 'valueless' character as having twofold importance: it represented a clean break with previous official 'illustrating literature' and simultaneously reflected central characteristics of Soviet society atomised and depoliticised by the rule of the Stalinist bureaucracy. This duality I saw as a threshold which could pave the way for a new and radical, analytic, Soviet literature and yet could also remain tied to an empirical and static reportage of phenomena subsumed under a structure of concepts constituted of abstract, superhistorical, and in the end desperately reactionary values. It is this latter possibility, the rehearsal of the terrible facts of Soviet history organised in the service of a retrogressive ideology, that is realised in *The Gulag Archipelago*.

The book appears to be a *history* of the repressive apparatus and of 'that amazing country of Gulag', but most editions of it (although not the English language version) are subtitled 'An experiment in artistic investigation' which has, as I shall show, a quite different and less authoritative epistemological status. It extensively and repetitively catalogues the entire repertoire of the Stalinist atrocities from the moment of arbitrary arrest, through the process of interrogation, mental and physical torture, to trial or extra-judicial sentencing; it recounts the intermediate stays in the transit prisons, the MVD internal prisons and the 'boxes' in which prisoners *en route* were kept at railway stations. Solzhenitsyn writes of the journeys made by prisoners in the red cattle trucks in which entire nations were deported, in the ships and barges crossing the White Sea to the notorious Solovetsky Island camps, and in the prison vans variously camouflaged from the rest of the population under the brightly-painted labels MEAT, BREAD or DRINK SOVIET CHAMPAGNE, and arrives finally at the labour camps, sometimes no more than a sign nailed to

<sup>1</sup>*The Gulag Archipelago Parts I and II*, trans. Thomas P. Whitney, 1974, from which I have taken all quotations, is slightly altered from the Russian edition (YMCA Press, Paris, 1973) due to the author's and other corrections. There are altogether seven parts in three volumes, of which the second volume has been published but not yet translated into English.

GULAG is an acronym for the Chief Administration of Corrective Labour Camps.

<sup>2</sup>See Francis Barker, *Ivan Denisovich: Towards the Repossession of History*, *New Blackfriars*, April 1974.

a fir tree where the prisoners had first to erect the barbed wire and watchtowers that contained them.

Solzhenitsyn records the many 'waves' of mass arrests and deportations that punctuated the Stalinist period and shows that there were many more of these than the officially acknowledged 'excesses' of 1936-8. He details the political articles of the Soviet penal code, their subsections and the 'dialectical' extensions which transformed them from instruments of Soviet law into the formal rationale for repression: Solzhenitsyn himself was arrested under Article 58-11 which provides for anti-Soviet organisation—the 'organisation' in this case consisting of Solzhenitsyn and the friend to whom he wrote letters critical of Stalin. He writes poignantly on one of his favourite themes of Gulag as a secret country within, but distant from, the rest of society, and portrays with psychological acuteness officials of the 'security' services whose motivations and conscious desires he exposes in a series of vignettes, caricatures and anecdotes. There is much in *The Gulag Archipelago* that is new. Roy Medvedev the dissident Russian historian, who writes from a position critical of Solzhenitsyn and from prolonged study of Stalinism, remarks that 'Soviet readers—even those who well remember the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the Party—know hardly one tenth of the facts recounted by Solzhenitsyn: Our youth, indeed, does not know even a one hundredth of them'. (*On Gulag Archipelago*, trans. Tamara Deutscher, *New Left Review* 85, 1974.)

Some of Solzhenitsyn's facts are wrong. Medvedev points out a number of errors—the deportations from Leningrad in 1934-5 after the murder of Kirov were numbered in tens of thousands and not the half-million that Solzhenitsyn proposes; similarly the number of peasants arrested during the forced collectivisation is exaggerated; and after Stalin's death it was not ten officials of the MVD-MGB who were imprisoned or shot but nearer a hundred (although this is still a minute figure compared with the many criminals who retain positions of prestige and power in the state bureaucracy or, like Molotov, enjoy a comfortable retirement). But it is not the facts that Solzhenitsyn brings to light which reveal the writer, for this information—if it were ever widely disseminated in the Soviet Union—could only speed the rebirth of political opposition among the mass of the people and aid the completion of the 'unfinished revolution'. In order to know Solzhenitsyn and his importance for the development of Soviet society it is necessary to dissect not only *what* he tells us but *how* and *why* he does so, to separate the content from the form. To exchange facts with Solzhenitsyn, welcome his revelations and regret his ideological backwardness is, at this stage in his career, after exile to the west, politically inadequate and critically superficial. To do this is to fall into the trap of 'moralistic politics' as Ernest Mandel, faltering on the edge of it himself, characterises the problematic of Solzhenitsyn's book'. (*Solzhenitsyn, Stalinism and the October Revolution*, *New Left Review* 86, 1974.) It is of course true that, as Medvedev says, Solzhenitsyn's account is 'one-sided'—from an examination of one aspect of

Soviet history he draws conclusions designed to describe its totality—and it is equally the case that his version of what he does undertake to describe is partial and distorted—his treatment, for example, of the foreign intervention and White Terror which provoked Bolshevik repression is cursory (Mandel), but the shape and intentions of *The Gulag Archipelago* are determined by forces which have their roots deep in Soviet society and to chide Solzhenitsyn in hurt tones for not having told us a truth that resides outside the ideological area that his work defines is to succumb to an emotional liberalism that abdicates from the task of explanation which precedes and conditions judgement.

To go deeply into that collective history of which *The Gulag Archipelago* is a refracted product is clearly beyond the scope of this article, but even a schematic account of the nature of the Soviet intelligentsia will gather important clues to an understanding of Solzhenitsyn's work. His ideology is composed of two main structural elements: I have termed these the 'technocratic' and the 'organic', and each is based in a different phase of the history of the intelligentsia—the former representing the current material relationships of this group 'in ideal form' and the latter a conservative retrieval of older values.

#### *The Technocratic element*

The contemporary intelligentsia is dominated by its technical and scientific layer. This domination dates from the early thirties when the persecution of the old technical intelligentsia—amongst whom the engineers, singled out as scapegoats for certain weaknesses of the economy and branded 'wreckers', received special attention—was reversed. As Mary McAuley points out (*Political Change Since Stalin, Critique No. 2*), initially necessary and temporary measures hardened under Stalin into economic principles, two of which were the emphases, largely unchanged to the present day, on the expansion of heavy industry and the production of arms. To facilitate this development a layer of scientific and technical experts was needed, prompting Stalin to decree in 1931 as the fifth of his 'Six Conditions' for construction that 'we must move from a policy of destruction of the old technical intelligentsia to a policy of concern for it, of making use of it'. (Quoted in *The Gulag Archipelago*, p. 48). From this point stems the modern intelligentsia playing a part of paramount importance both in the real economy and in official ideology. This intelligentsia has increasingly overlapped with other sections of the ruling elite, participating in the running of state political, economic and police institutions. The subjective demands of this group are various; Hillel Ticktin argues in an important article (*Political Economy of the Soviet Intellectual, Critique No. 2*) that there can be few members of the ruling elite, apart from professional policemen and the utterly cynical, who do not share to some degree the desires of the intelligentsia for democratisation. Wider discussion on, for example, economic and social matters, articulated by the *dissident* intelligentsia as a political principle, for the incorporated intelligentsia is a way of enhancing their own position and also of finding solutions to the pressing prob-

lems in these fields at a time of increasing awareness of the failure of traditional dogmatism. Those members of the lower intelligentsia, not directly part of the ruling group although aspiring to its privileges, are restrained from open dissent by their dependence on that group for employment and wait for a cue from above. And those within the governing group fear that 'liberalisation' for the intellectuals might lead to political opposition among the working classes which would fundamentally challenge their position as an elite. Instead, 'private freedoms' are instituted: already, prohibited books circulate freely among the elite and otherwise banned films may be seen at special cinemas. This is underpinned by the envelope system of unofficial payments that supplement official salaries. The objective, material interests of the intelligentsia *as a group* are tied to those of the ruling group and support individualistic ideologies of self-advancement.

The political positions taken up by the dissident intelligentsia, as evidenced by the samizdat *Chronicle of Current Events*, vary from marxist to 'slav fascism' but centre on the advocacy of technocratic and frequently pro-capitalist reforms, often coupled, as in Sakharov's early statements with a compassion for the 'common man'. The technocratic ideology in Solzhenitsyn's work derives from this intelligentsia of which he is a part and is homologous with the material relations of this group with the rest of society and with the ruling elite; these relations lend themselves, particularly in the present conjuncture of emerging 'managerial' solutions, to the advocacy of technocratic leadership which feeds on the depoliticisation of society that Stalinism has already effected.

### *The Organic element*

The organic, peasant, element of Solzhenitsyn's ideology represents an historical nostalgia for a lost wholeness, a reaction from the atomisation of Soviet society which seeks in an ideal, undifferentiated peasantry imbued with a stylised moral simplicity, an alternative to the spiritual vacuum of bureaucratic rule. This ideology bases itself on the peasant orientated intelligentsia of the revolutionary and immediately post-revolutionary period. During the revolution the intelligentsia fragmented. The forces of liberal democracy who had with the socialists opposed Tzarism were divided by October when the constitutional reforms based on a desired form of bourgeois parliamentarianism were outstripped by the socialist measures of the Bolsheviks supported by the mass of the people. Trotsky, writing in 1924, describes the variety of currents that existed even within the literary intelligentsia basically sympathetic to the revolution, and also points the peasant connection: 'The non-communist intelligentsia which has not thrown in its lot unreservedly with the proletariat, and this comprises the overwhelming majority of the intelligentsia, seeks support in the peasantry because of the absence, or rather, the extreme weakness of bourgeois support. For the time being, this process has a purely preparatory and symbolic character, and expresses itself (with hindsight) in the idealisation of the peasant element of the Revolution.'

This peculiar neo-populism is characteristic of all the fellow-travellers. Later on, with the growth of the number of schools in the villages and of those who can read, the bond between this art and the peasantry may become more organic. At the same time, the peasantry will develop a creative intelligentsia of its own. The peasant point of view in economics, in politics, and in art, is more primitive, more limited, more egotistic, than that of the proletariat. But this peasant point of view exists and will continue to exist for a long time and very earnestly'. (Leon Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution* trans. Rose Strunsky, 1960. See especially Chap. 2.) To this must be added the various elements of the intelligentsia who either sided with the White Forces in the name of a return to Tzarism or continued to agitate for an intermediate bourgeois period. These groups largely lost their bases during the Civil War and their members were either killed, imprisoned, or exiled forming the basis of the White emigre tradition which Solzhenitsyn, for all the liberal populism of this zone of his ideology, can at times invoke as an alternative to Stalinism: the White emigration was, he says, 'the outflow from Russia of a significant part of her spiritual forces . . . a great and important stream of Russian culture' (*G. A.*, p. 269).

The intelligentsia of the twenties, then, apart from those among the Bolsheviks, consisted largely of subscribers to an ideology of 'peasant liberalism' derived from the populist agitation of the preceding century which had varied in form from the anarchism of *Narodnaya Volya*, steeped in a mystic self-immersion in an idea of the peasantry, to the more collectivist revolutionary positions of the Social Revolutionaries who, contemporary with the Bolsheviks, were also peasant-based.<sup>3</sup> Solzhenitsyn invests in the peasantry long-suffering endurance (an oblique function of his own authoritarianism) and the nostalgically simple morality of old Holy Russia 'when the distinction between good and evil was simply perceived by the heart' (*G. A.*, p. 161). Upon the basis of this idea are founded Solzhenitsyn's explicitly religious positions which range from high moral didacticism to a mystic inwardness. And his peasantry is supplemented by his idea of the political prisoners as a nation, the inhabitants of the 'country' of Gulag. (In a passage in *The First Circle*, trans. Michael Guybon, 1970, which is clearly autobiographical, Nerzhin, Solzhenitsyn's representative, describes the evolution of his own ideas from 19th century populism, through technocratic elitism, to a new populism in which 'the People' is the prison population. See pp. 466-70.)

#### *From populism to technocratic elitism*

The early years of the revolution were a period of considerable freedom and creativity for the intelligentsia, and also saw the emergence and ratification of a scientific and technical layer. The engineers and other technical experts based on the expansion of Russian

<sup>3</sup>*Narodnaya Volya*—The People's Will, a terrorist group which broke away in 1879 from the more genuinely narodnik *Zemlaya 1 Volya*—Land and Freedom. See Leon Trotsky, *The Young Lenin*, trans. Max Eastman, 1974, esp. Chap. 3 and Christopher Hill, *Lenin and the Russian Revolution*, 1971.

industry in the pre-revolutionary period<sup>4</sup> had opposed Tzarism as a hindrance to the development of the productive forces and, more or less grudgingly, acquiesced in the revolution as technologically and economically progressive. It is to this group that Solzhenitsyn turns for one of the rare, imagined, fusions of the two poles of his own ideology. The following portrayal of the engineers of the twenties seeks to combine the spiritualising idealism of the peasant orientated, non-marxist progressive intelligentsia with the technologistic modernism of the technical layers: 'I had grown up among engineers, and I could remember the engineers of the twenties very well indeed: their open, shining intellects, their free and gentle humour, their agility and breadth of thought, the ease with which they shifted from one engineering field to another, and, for that matter, from technology to social concerns and art. Then, too, they personified good manners and delicacy of taste; well-bred speech that flowed evenly and was free of uncultured words; one of them might play a musical instrument, another dabble in paintings; and their faces always bore a spiritual imprint' (*G. A.*, p. 197). This image, which reads like one of Trotsky's more lyrical visions of future, Communist, man, is Solzhenitsyn's remembered and proposed technocratic elite.

To identify these two determinate *poles* of Solzhenitsyn's ideology is to run the risk of essentialising his work, of identifying an essence of which everything else is merely epiphenomenal. It must be acknowledged that *The Gulag Archipelago*, while representing in the most developed and extreme form this dual ideological structure (which was latent in Solzhenitsyn's earlier work but crystallises in the present book), has an immediate complexity which appears at times as personal confusion on the author's part. Admiring evocations of the society of Holy Russia jostle with liberal-democratic proposals, universal human compassion with extreme Russian chauvinism. All should be given their due within the basic ideological structure which is *disrupted* by these contradictory positions rather than reflected in them. This complexity in part derives from the fact *The Gulag Archipelago* is an archeology of the author's previous positions, which are not necessarily identical with the ideological parameters of the book itself. Indeed, within Solzhenitsyn's work as a whole there is a chronological shift between the two main elements: while both are present in *The Gulag Archipelago*, Solzhenitsyn's populism tends to predominate in the earlier work and the technocratic elitism emerges in the development of his work reaching clarity in this book, and the organic element itself undergoes internal mutation, the later religiosity displacing the previous 'peasantism'.

### *Memory and Divination*

This bifurcated ideology can be seen at work most clearly in Sol-

<sup>4</sup>Because the bourgeoisie was small and weak—the means of production were largely owned by foreign capitalists—the bearers of bourgeois ideology in Russia tended to be those petit-bourgeois elements directly connected with the development of capitalism. See, for example, the ideology of the engineer Obodovsky in Solzhenitsyn's *August 1914*.



zhenitsyn's understanding of history, but this must first be situated within the epistemology and methodological form of the book. Solzhenitsyn announces in the Dedication the partial nature of his account of Soviet history :

I dedicate this book to all who did not live to tell it. And may they please forgive me for not having seen it all nor remembered it all, for not having divined all of it.

His relationship to the object of 'artistic investigation' is one of memory and divination—a curiously, but as we shall see appropriately, arcane expression—and this double process of, on the one hand seeing, the sensuous apprehension of phenomena, and memory, the personal retention of sensuous fact, and on the other a mysterious reading of facts, is a version of Solzhenitsyn's general epistemology. It mixes a scientific regard for sources, information, itemisation, with the organic irrationality by which Solzhenitsyn leaps from collected fact to historical generalisation. He sees himself not as one who has *knowledge* of history, but as one who has experienced it 'on the skin of my back, and with my eyes and ears' (*G. A.*, p. xi), and as one who must speak out. From the start his project is one of exposure, which is, to the extent that what is concealed is not the whole, a project of distortion. Not only intention but also opportunity conspire in this partiality: when introducing a chronological list of the 'waves' of mass arrests Solzhenitsyn regrets its incompleteness, 'limited by my own capacity to penetrate the past' (*G. A.*, p. 26). 'Penetrate', as 'divined', suggests a privileged, esoteric relationship with history. Side by side with intuitive perception is a painstaking empiricism—Solzhenitsyn carefully thanks the 227 'witnesses' who supplied him with reports and letters and the researchers who found 'supporting bibliographical material'.

Within personal relationships also Solzhenitsyn vaunts an irrational epistemology :

I had not yet had time *to think things over* and conclude that I did not like this fellow Georgi Kramarenko. But a spiritual relay, a sensor relay, had clicked inside me, and it had closed him off from me for good and all . . . I became aware of the work of this internal sensor relay as a constant, inborn trait . . . always that secret sensor relay, for whose creation I deserved not the least bit of credit, worked even before I remembered it was there, worked at the first sight of a human face and eyes, at the first sound of a voice—so that I opened my heart to that person either fully or just the width of a crack, or else shut myself off from him completely (*G. A.*, pp. 185-6. My italics).

In a strange mixture of the technological and the intuitive this inner sense, both 'spiritual', 'secret' and yet also a 'sensor relay' provides instant, automatic judgements before and without analytic thought. The relationship between the empirical and the intuitive remains secret; Solzhenitsyn offers us no theoretical link between them and so the foundations of his judgements are left unclear. Was, for example, Solzhenitsyn's belief that 'Russia, due to the makeup of its

population was obviously not suited for any sort of socialism whatsoever. . . . It was totally polluted' (*G. A.*, p. 26. As Mandel appositely asks, was it suited to Tzarist barbarism?), gathered from letters and memoirs, or was it an intuitive leap? The reader is suspicious because he knows that Solzhenitsyn will guess when he doesn't know:

Knowing the *sense and spirit* of the Revolution, it is easy to *guess* that during these months (October and November, 1917) such central prisons as Kresty in Petrograd and the Butyrki in Moscow, and many provincial prisons like them, were filled . . . (*G. A.*, p. 26. My italics).

Unable to produce even many facts of Bolshevik repression, particularly not during the first months of the revolution before the intervention and the White Terror, Solzhenitsyn has to guess or, perhaps, rely on his 'spiritual relay'. And although Solzhenitsyn's epistemological method is an unreconciled concatenation of bare fact and supposition, Solzhenitsyn frequently shows little regard even for the empirical basis of his judgements:

There were many tiny ups and downs in this period which only a historian pursuing all the details of those years would be able to trace (*G. A.*, p. 302).

On a scale larger than that of particular statement the general polarity of the epistemology is repeated in the form of the book which is predominantly anecdotal. Solzhenitsyn introduces with glee, sometimes ironic, each new story: of a prisoner Koverchenko he writes 'such stories as his are a treasure. . . . They are meant to be heard' (*G. A.*, p. 518). The anecdote, usually vivid, sometimes hilarious, and always moving, is the basic unit of Solzhenitsyn's narrative and is given a precise function; it forms the basis of, and helps to obscure the assertive status of, general observations on Soviet history.

Solzhenitsyn's account of the process of arrest (*G. A.*, pp. 8-11) illustrates his general method. An initial statement—'arrests vary widely in form'—is followed by a series of anecdotes including an ironic compliment to the secret police for their virtuosity 'in an age when public speeches, the plays in our theatres, women's fashions seem all to have come off an assembly line'; and this preludes a generalised 'historical' statement—'For several decades political arrests were distinguished in our country precisely by the fact that people were arrested who were guilty of nothing'. The progression is from uncontentious statement, through distracting anecdote, to historical conclusions which are far from the realm of absolute truth that Solzhenitsyn insists that the rest of men should inhabit. It is true that many were arrested who were guilty of nothing but this is far from saying that this was the defining characteristic of all political arrests, and it is far from the last word on Soviet society. Solzhenitsyn indulges in silent exaggeration under the cover of anecdotal 'evidence'.

Similarly deceptive is the repetitiveness of the catalogue of crimes. The events which form the basis for Solzhenitsyn's chapter on the chronology of repression are also cited when he itemises the articles



of the penal code. He seems to flinch as if overwhelmed by a mass of information, and then acknowledges the recurrence of material he has already used: "But here I note that I am beginning to repeat myself. And this will be boring to write, and boring to read, because the reader already knows everything that is going to happen ahead of time" (*G. A.*, pp. 582-3). The verb, however, is 'will' and Solzhenitsyn repeats himself in any case, creating the impression of more information than he actually displays.

### *History as machine and as natural process*

If the two elements of the technocratic and the organic exist in the epistemology and anecdotal form of *The Gulag Archipelago* this is no less true of its wider categorial resources. The very process of history is imagined by Solzhenitsyn within these ideological poles. His idea of history resides in two major groups of organising images—technological images which see history as a process imaginable in terms of machine-like mechanisms which may be understood to have certain definable structures and (perhaps) to develop in accordance with historical laws; and organic images which feed a view of history as a natural process, given and detached from human volition and responsibility.

The first of these groups predominates in the book. The repressive apparatus is described as 'our Sewage Disposal system' (*G. A.* Title, Part 1, Chap. 2) and as a 'meat grinder' (*G. A.*, p. 90); it is a 'Great Machine' (*G. A.*, p. 478) whose 'engine room' (*G. A.* Title, Part 1, Chap. 7) is the special courts where 'the machine stamped out the sentences' (*G. A.*, p. 291). Solzhenitsyn speaks of the process of interrogation as 'the grinding of our souls in the gears of the great Nighttime Institution' (*G. A.*, p. 144). Associated with these images are those which record the dehumanisation of the people involved. The interrogator is 'an anonymous cog in the whole machine' (*G. A.*, p. 295) as is the lieutenant who asks the prisoners in the central Moscow prison for complaints about their treatment: 'The whole strength of the Lubyanka showed itself in a totally machine-like manner: no expression on the face, no inflection, not a superfluous word' (*G. A.*, p. 201). The personnel of the *apparatus* do their work of imprisonment and interrogation in accordances with 'schedules' (*G. A.*, p. 481) and 'the real law underlying the arrests . . . was the assignment of quotas, the norms set, the planned allocations' (*G. A.*, p. 71). The view which inheres in these images is one which sees Stalinist repression as a vast anonymous mechanism which processes prisoners like a packing factory; but it is a machine without an operator, it has lost any rationale that it might once have had; torture, for example, was rarely used to elicit the truth but was 'simply an exercise in an inevitably filthy procedure' (*G. A.*, p. 94). This technological imagery of the state as a machine supports the technocratic ideology that it could be best run by trained mechanics.

Side by side with the mechanical are Solzhenitsyn's organic images of history. In a telling mixture of magic and nature he refers to the

prison camps, amplifying the natural image of the book's title, as the 'spellbound archipelago' (*G. A.*, p. 489). The various mass arrests he imagines as 'waves' which, combining with technological imagery, rush through the pipes of the sewage disposal system. Waves of sufficient dimension become rivers—'the wave of 1929 and 1930, the size of a good River Ob' and the history of Stalinist repression is: 'the history of an endless swallow and flow; flood alternating with ebb and ebb again with flood; waves pouring in, some big, some small; brooks and rivulets flowing in from all sides; trickles oozing in through gutters; and then just plain individually scooped-up droplets' (*G. A.*, p. 25). The meaning of this natural imagery becomes clearer when Solzhenitsyn describes one of the waves in which the personnel of the apparatus themselves suffered: '. . . those gaybisty—the State Security officers—who got caught in a *wave* were in serious danger. (They had their own *waves*!) A wave is a natural catastrophe and even more powerful than the *Organs* themselves' (*G. A.*, p. 156). A natural catastrophe: that is how Solzhenitsyn sees what is for his technocratic ideology the Great Machine. It is an elemental force stronger than the most powerful human institutions. The idea is reinforced by a cluster of supplementary images which stress the 'naturalness' of Stalinism: mass arrests were 'epidemics' (*G. A.*, p. 75), and the repressive apparatus is imagined as a 'dragon' (*G. A.*, pp. 335, 464), 'monster' (*G. A.*, p. 369), a 'tapeworm' (*G. A.*, p. 149) and as the circulatory system of the human body:

And just as, in a course of physiology, after a detailed description of the circulation of the blood, one could begin over again and describe in detail the lymphatic system, one could begin again and describe the waves of non-political offenders and habitual criminals from 1918 to 1953' (*G. A.*, p. 86).

And the victims of the waves form 'vast dense gray shoals like ocean herring' (*G. A.*, p. 237).

*(The second part of this study appears in our next issue.)*