

influenced by the idea of linkage, provides evidence of haste and superficiality in negotiations on the part of Nixon and Kissinger and asserts that "they lacked the technical competence to comprehend the issues fully" (p. 569).

The presentation of Vietnam policy is, of course, a central concern of the book. Szulc feels that the administration repeatedly misled the public about both the motives and the content of its policy, and that it eventually negotiated terms which made the military position of the Saigon government untenable. His criticisms of Vietnam policy are sharp, as are his criticisms of policies for other world areas. But they are well-documented and the book provides important insights into both the essentially ephemeral features of the Nixon administration and the ways in which its legacy in foreign policy remains influential today.

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U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT. By *Lawrence Freedman*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. xvi, 235 pp. Tables. Figures. \$22.50.

Are the Russians coming? This remarkable book does not attempt to answer the question, but it helps us understand why honest, hard-working analysts give conflicting appraisals of Soviet strategic might. It is not just that the actual Soviet threat (capability multiplied by intentions) may differ from its perception in the West, but that both real and perceived threats depend upon Western capabilities, vulnerabilities, intentions, and strategies.

To be sure, intelligence community estimates may be affected by bureaucratic infighting and partisan pressures, but intelligence predictions can deviate from actual Soviet deployments for many other reasons: the Russians may change their minds, Kremlin rationality may not conform to Washington rationality, or older weapons may be retained rather than retired, thereby inflating inventories. Indeed, U.S. forecasts underestimated actual numbers of Soviet long-range missiles from 1963 through 1972. The miscalculation occurred in part because of the Kremlin's strong reaction to its 1962 Cuban debacle and to the impunity with which American forces attacked Vietnam in the mid-1960s, factors which led Moscow to accelerate missile deployment while keeping older missiles in service longer than Washington had expected.

The next time the Pentagon seems to cry "Wolf!" ("Bear," "Bison," or "Backfire"), this book should be consulted in order to recall past charges about whether a sheep or monster is standing in the wings. Aside from the analytical and historical merits of the book, it is written with a grace and clarity that should help even the Luddites among us to grasp the differences between an SS-11 and an SS-9, an MRV and a MIRV.

Lawrence Freedman wrote most of this book in London. Let us hope that Soviet writers on the United States will some day match his gift for empathy at a distance. And let us await even more fervently the day when Western (or Eastern) writers can accomplish a similar feat in understanding Soviet perceptions of the U.S. strategic posture.

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SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. By *Morton Schwartz*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. viii, 216 pp. \$12.50.

In this substantial, occasionally provocative, study Morton Schwartz presents an image of the United States obtainable from the publications of Soviet "Americanists." He characterizes these official researchers as Soviet "scholar-publicists of détente" (p. 161). Rewarded for their efforts by trips to the United States and opportunities to