

respectively, with the analogies between relation and imagination, and with some historical aspects of the problem of imagination. Perhaps the most valuable suggestion here is the idea of the closeness that both imaginary and revelatory rhetoric have, or attempt to have, to that which they carry: *intensive* closeness, which emphasizes the particular and emotional valence, as opposed to rational/critical discourse which attempts a distance from that which it discusses, and hence a more universal and non-emotional nature. Tillich once called revelation 'reason in ecstasy', and this seems to be what Hart is suggesting. For Hart, the 'hermeneutic spiral' that is theology must attempt both possibilities: it must not forget the immediate, gripping character of the revelatory data which excite the process, nor must it forget the critical distance that is necessary for thought to have any integrity. 'It is the inverse relation between extension and intension that makes the spiral move. What this means is that the more we have of a datum's immediate presence (its internal unity) the less we have of its character ('whatness') in relation to the field in which it is presented (its external range), while the more we have of its character in relation to the field in which it is presented the less we have of its immediate presence' (p. 62).

Hart borrows his ontology of revelation from Husserl and other phenomenologists, and his rhetoric of revelation from a detailed and penetrating study of imaginative discourse. The book ends with a summons to first a phenomenology of the symbolic tradition (undertaken

in part by Tillich and outlined by Hart): an assessment of the way in which tradition (Scripture, cultic acts, theological reflections) possess potency for 'revelatory intentionality'. There follows a second call to a 'systematic theological symbolics', which would be concerned with the cognitive value of tradition, and its power to illuminate our existence in the present. It is a challenge which we can only hope Professor Hart himself will more fully answer.

It is difficult to evaluate a book as complex as Hart's without considerable reference to the mass of detailed thought that lies behind it. At the base of the entire enterprise, however, lies a sense of the wonder of Being, the backbone of any attempt at ontology. If Heidegger had not already proved that ontology need not be a static discipline, Hart certainly accomplishes this much in his book. Whether he is also convincing about the compelling need for ontological understanding as the primal avenue to man's selfhood must remain an open question. Certainly this would be denied by many 'secular' theologians who are more interested in pragmatic than in ultimate questions. Yet it is difficult to see what meaning art might possibly have without an openness to wonder; not as a sentimental or vague emotion, but as a readiness to allow that reality may hold more than the common senses tell. Hart is surely right to link the future of theology, and of religion, with the rhetoric of imaginative discourse, which may, after all, turn out to be 'a repetition on the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM'. DAVID FISHER

THE LABYRINTH OF LANGUAGE, by M. Black, *Pall Mall Press*, 30s.

The purpose of this book, writes the author (pp. 18-19), is 'to extract, from what is already known and what can plausibly be guessed about language, some productive *concepts* and controversial *issues*. In short, to develop a tentative linguistic perspective, a way of looking at men, their activities, and their relations to each other and to the universe as they perceive it, *sub specie linguae*.' Professor Black gets his perspective by blending certain of the principles and procedures of modern Linguistics with various ideas extracted from the philosophical literature about language. As far as I am aware, this is the first time the disciplines of Linguistics and Philosophy have been brought face to face in an introductory way; and the result here is an extremely illu-

minating book. The linguist will benefit from the concise introduction to philosophers' views about language, and will surely become more aware of the broader implications of his subject; the philosopher will benefit from the terminological precision and awareness of language complexity, which is the keynote of modern linguistics; and the general reader, who knows little of linguistic philosophy, and less of linguistics, will find in this book an extremely lucid exposition of the tangled issues underlying the field as a whole. The relevance of the book to religious studies should be obvious from the topics covered in the various chapters. There is an introductory chapter dealing with such general characteristics of human language as its perception, acquisition, and transmission,

and the central distinctions between language and speech, and between historical and non-historical study. The second chapter, 'language as a patterned system', provides a very clear explanation of the linguistically central (for most scholars) concepts of phonemes, morphemes, and grammar. Further chapters cover the philosophy of grammar, language and thought (where there is a particularly fruitful blend of philosophical, linguistic, and logical ideas), the uses of language, linguistic abuse (e.g. ambiguity, vagueness) and reform, and the meanings of meaning. There is a helpful bibliography.

As one might expect from Professor Black's earlier work, the exposition is characterized by some nicely clarifying analogies and models, which are much needed as far as the presentation of the more abstract linguistic concepts is concerned. Also, language is viewed, as it ought to be, within the context of communication as a whole. The few linguistic criticisms which I have are relatively unimportant in terms of the book's overall aim, but they might be worth mentioning, particularly if someone begins to read more widely in linguistics after this book. For example, in the discussion on phonemes, it is not the case that linguists (with no qualification) recognise four pitch phonemes (p. 25 and fn.): this is a theoretical position, held by a diminishing number of American scholars, which is in fact highly suspect. Also, in the general discussion of views about the phoneme (pp. 27-8), some reference should have been made to current views in generative grammar, where the concept of the phoneme is completely scrapped. Similarly, Chomsky's position ought to have been mentioned, in the discussion of deep and surface grammar on page 35; and indeed, I had expected more attention generally to be paid to the rationalist/

empiricist debate in contemporary linguistics, apart from the rather brief mention on pages 50-1. It is frequently assumed that it is in this area that linguistics has most to say of relevance to the philosopher (cf. the radio discussion between Chomsky and Hampshire a few months ago, reprinted in *The Listener*, 30th May, 1968), though I do not myself agree with this: I would like to have seen Black's views on the matter.

The only important issue in linguistics which Black misrepresents is in his discussion of morphology, which he defines (over-generally) as 'the classification of words (and other linguistic elements) into form-classes' (p. 34), whereas a more usual definition would be 'the study of the elements of word-structure (i.e. morphemes) and their combinatorial properties'—in other words, subsuming the study of affixation, which he takes separately. The only omission of any seriousness (as far as reflecting current trends in linguistics is concerned) is that the sub-fields of psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics should have received separate mention somewhere—not for their own sake, but because their fields of study are highly relevant for many of the points which Black wishes to make, e.g. in the chapter on language and thought it would have been useful to see some reference to the evidence provided by language disorders such as aphasia.

Much of this, however, is a question of emphasis, and would hardly affect the newcomer to this subject. By showing clearly how language relates to other fields of inquiry, and by emphasizing the need to avoid constructing a simplistic model of language, Professor Black places the reader on a firm footing throughout and produces a book which will provide an admirable basis for further study.

DAVID CRYSTAL

THE LISTENING HEART: A Book on Prayer, by Sister Jeanne d'Arc, O.P. *Geoffrey Chapman*, London, 1968. 140 pp. 35s.

This is a very good book, the simple reading of which feeds the desire to pray. It touches the heart, and at the same time satisfies the mind by the strength and holy sanity of its thought and the manner of its expression. The reader is aware at once and throughout the book that the author speaks with authority, authority founded upon the Bible (texts and images wherefrom reinforce all her arguments) and the practice of what she preaches.

The book is divided into five parts, and the author states in the foreword that so inter-

woven are the strands of her thought that 'any chapter that takes the reader's fancy will do to begin with'. This is her only statement that this reviewer would disagree with, for it is in the first two sections that the nature of and the conditions for prayer are established which are the taken-for-granted background to all that follows. The reader is made to face the realities of his physical circumstances and human condition and called upon to do something physical, definite, temporal, in order to embark upon the spiritual unpredictable work of