

campaign of that year, the new party had very little in the way of a coherent program, few candidates of any stature, and almost no local organization. Ineptness also characterized the few deputies who won seats in parliament—seventeen instead of the seventy predicted by Istóczy—and by the end of the decade, the party had disintegrated and anti-Semitism had receded into the political background.

This book is certainly a useful introduction to an important problem, but much remains to be done. For example, we need to know more about the anti-Jewish sentiments of the various social classes, particularly the urban workers and the peasantry, the connection between anti-Semitism and nationalism, and the extent of anti-Semitism among the non-Magyar population of Hungary. The author's succinct account of the Tisza government's opposition to anti-Semitism is of particular interest; she emphasizes the fact that anti-Semitism did not become a decisive factor in Hungarian political life as it did in neighboring countries, precisely because it lacked official support. Yet, her explanation is limited to political tactics of the moment. A more thorough investigation of the nature of Hungarian liberalism would suggest more profound reasons for the course anti-Semitism took in Hungary.

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COMPARATIVE PATTERNS OF FOREIGN POLICY AND TRADE: THE COMMUNIST BALKANS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. By *Cal Clark* and *Robert L. Farlow*. Studies in East European Planning, Development, and Trade, no. 23 (July 1976). Bloomington: International Development Research Center, Indiana University, 1976. xii, 152 pp. \$6.00, paper.

Foreign trade may be conducted to obtain goods from abroad which are unavailable in the domestic market, to benefit from comparative exchange advantage, or to promote political objectives. The interrelatedness of these goals often makes it difficult to sort out the structure of cause and effect, especially when a large variety of goods are traded and political motives are complex. Cal Clark and Robert Farlow, though aware of these complicating factors, nonetheless try to show that the foreign trade pattern of the Communist Balkans can be understood in terms of shifting political policies and fluctuations in the relative priority accorded to political and economic objectives.

The first chapter provides an overview of postwar developments in the foreign policies of Yugoslavia, Rumania, Albania, and Bulgaria; and the second outlines how foreign trade is institutionally determined. The narrative is documentary in style and makes no attempt to discriminate interpretation from fact. The rest of the book is articulated in the same way. Changing patterns of interbloc and intrabloc foreign-trade volumes and structures are described and imputed to diverse causes—sometimes political, sometimes economic, sometimes both.

Because the basis for the authors' causal attributions are never rigorously elaborated, it is difficult to appraise their inferences. They "eyeball" the time trend of various trade flows, and from an infinity of possible causal explanations, manage to find political and/or economic reasons for every squiggle in the trend line. Although the reasons they provide are often "reasonable," the real burden of analysis falls upon the reader, who must continually try to imagine alternative interpretations of the squiggles, fill in the logical substructure of Clark and Farlow's assertions, and then evaluate their comparative merit. Burdening the reader in this manner, of course, is unworkable, and in the end one is faced with the choice of trusting the authors' subconscious judgmental faculties or discarding their analysis entirely.

Given the current state of the art and the limited availability of high quality work in Balkan studies, one is disinclined to be overly critical of Clark and Farlow's exploratory effort. It seems clear, however, that if the authors had been more conscious that their descriptions are theory-laden and controversial, that inferences drawn from open models require elaborate justification, and that statistical tests are essential for inductive analysis, they would have written a very different book. The theories of causal explanation developed by contemporary philosophers of science—Harré, Secord, Bhaskar, Scriven, Hansen, and Hesse—might in the future assist Clark and Farlow in establishing a more effective analytic framework from which to extend their potentially important research.

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IZ ISTORIJE SRBIJE I VOJVODINE, 1834–1914. By *Andrija Radenić*. Novi Sad and Belgrade: Matica srpska and Istorijski institut, 1973. 556 pp.

DNEVNIK BENJAMINA KALAJA, 1868–1875. Edited and annotated by *Andrija Radenić*. Belgrade and Novi Sad: Istorijski institut and Institut za istoriju Vojvodine, 1976. xxxiv, 887 pp.

"I do not know how to love," wrote Benjamin Kallay in his diary at the age of 29, "I can, therefore, only take for a wife someone who can help me in my ambitious plans. I have no other goal, no other thought, and cannot have, than to satisfy my ambitions, and if that is not possible, at least to struggle. But I do not abandon hope that I will one day yet rule over some nation." Well, as Will Cuppy once said about Catherine the Great, if Kallay did not know how to love, at least he was in there trying. His problem was whether to marry the Budapest opera star who was the mother of his natural child, or to seek a more socially and financially advantageous match. A member of one of Hungary's oldest but not wealthiest families, Kallay was a prolific writer, a charming companion, an accomplished sportsman, a superb diplomat; and, above all, an ambitious man. As his frank comment indicates, the advantageous match won out over the opera star, and, just as he hoped, one day he became, as the Habsburg minister of finance, the ruler of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Kallay began his career in Belgrade, where he became Austrian consul two months before the assassination of Prince Michael Obrenović in 1868. He remained in this position until just before the uprising in Herzegovina in 1875. During these seven years he kept a meticulous political diary. Kallay had excellent contacts in both Budapest and Belgrade, and was a man of enormous energy. Almost every figure of any importance to Serbian politics is not only mentioned in his diary, but analyzed in day-to-day detail.

As a young man, Kallay was pro-Serbian. Shortly after his arrival in Belgrade, he began enticing the Serbian government with hints that Hungary might be able to convince the sultan to allow Serbian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina. By this suggestion he hoped to attract Serbia to Hungary in order to hinder Russian penetration of the Balkans, induce the Serbs to stop supporting their brethren under Hungarian rule in the Vojvodina, and stifle Croatian ambitions in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Julius Andrassy, who, as president of Hungary, suggested Kallay's appointment, was less forthright in this policy, and, of course, Count Beust, the Habsburg foreign minister, opposed it, but Kallay continued his efforts to secure Serbia's friendship for Hungary until 1871, and did not turn against the Serbs until Prince Milan's trip to Livadia in 1873.