

If violence neither works to mobilize or persuade, why do candidates believe it does? Rosenzweig's answer rests in politicians' cognitive biases. Using experimental treatments with actual Kenyan politicians, he shows that they underestimate how much voters reject violence and ethnized appeals. Even when given information about the potential for voter backlash, politicians' perceptual lenses still prevent them from internalizing the costs of employing violence.

The last empirical chapter offers one explanation for the stickiness of these misperceptions. It broadens the scope of investigation beyond Kenya by using time-series cross-national data and short case studies in Indonesia, Pakistan, Ghana, Nigeria, and Brazil. Rosenzweig shows that violent founding elections will increase the likelihood of future election violence because of persistent misperceptions on the part of politicians about its efficacy.

Rosenzweig's contribution to theory is novel and important by allowing for rational calculations on the part of politicians and voters at the same time as explaining why violence ultimately does not form a winning strategy. If politicians' cognitive biases remain, we should expect election violence to continue, and Rosenzweig calls for more work to understand the sources and resilience of these biases.

His empirical strategy is rich, detailed, and multifaceted, demonstrating the best of contemporary comparative politics that combines deep case knowledge, microlevel data collection, and careful attention to inference with clearly delimited scope conditions and attention to broader implications. With its careful attention to detailed technical matters while achieving readability and clarity, *Voter Backlash and Elite Misperception* is also a masterclass for PhD students wanting to learn how to successfully turn dissertations into first books.

I highly recommend this book to students and scholars of contemporary democratic politics and wish to outline two wider contributions of interest. First, many of Rosenzweig's results demonstrate that ethnicity is not the sole or even an especially relevant factor that explains electoral behavior in diverse societies. He is careful to demonstrate this empirically because he admits it will be surprising to many observers of Kenya. But whether looking at the tendency to choose nonviolent non-coethnics over violent coethnics, or the rejection of violent coethnic appeals, he joins a growing literature in African politics that underscores the limits of ethnic theories.

Second, the mismatches between what politicians believe voters want and what they actually want are striking. In his concluding chapter, Rosenzweig draws the importance of his study to understanding the types of policy interventions to overcome this gulf. Rather than relying on normative pleas, he suggests "*appealing to*, rather than *competing against*, political elites' electoral incentives ... correcting those misperceptions can

effectively reduce the incidence of violence associated with electoral competition" (161–62). But what then causes politicians to update their priors? Although his experimental results suggest that entrenched elites' cognitive biases may be too powerful to change, his policy prescriptions posit the importance of providing resources to new entrants to the political scene who abjure violence.

The mismatch no doubt has important implications for democratic consolidation. It first suggests that politicians' blinders are a more powerful source of undermining democratic institutions than voters' behavior. Given growing concerns over backsliding that focus on the public's attraction to chauvinistic or authoritarian messaging, this points back to the leaders pushing that messaging as the problem. It also highlights the role that voters play in holding politicians accountable. Previously violent candidates may succeed in evading prosecution for alleged crimes, as in Kenya, but they are unlikely to succeed in evading a voting base willing to punish them at the ballot box.

Breaking Ground: From Extraction Booms to Mining Bans in Latin America. By Rose J. Spalding. New York: Oxford

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Breaking Ground: From Extraction Booms to Mining Bans in Latin America analyzes mining policies in Central America during the 2000s and 2010s mining boom, with a focus on the gold sector. The book forges new paths for scholarship on extractive conflict by shifting our attention from explaining conflict toward tracing its policy impacts. As a comparative study of *national* mining policy, *Breaking Ground* pushes us beyond project-level dynamics on which the literature has centered. Rose Spalding's rigorous qualitative empirical analysis draws on data she collected through her extensive fieldwork that included more than 250 interviews.

The book leverages most-similar and most-different systems designs to explain mining-friendly policies in Nicaragua, intermittent mining restrictions in Guatemala, and Costa Rican and Salvadoran mining bans. Cross-national variation in policy emerged even though all four countries had histories of mining and of government encouragement of large-scale mining in the 1980s–90s, as part of the region's turn toward economic liberalization. Mining was banned both in Costa Rica and El Salvador, though these two countries vary in state capacity, internal security, and economic growth. During the period of interest, both El Salvador and Nicaragua were governed by political parties that had emerged from a revolutionary leftist movement, and yet the cases differ starkly with respect to mining policy.

Spalding's causal framework, which borrows insights from political economy, comparative politics, and social movement theories, emphasizes the power balance between anti-mining and pro-mining actors. One variable is the degree of elite unity, expressed in terms of political and business elite views on mining and, organizationally, whether national business associations incorporate foreign mining.

Countering elite unity is the strength of the anti-mining movement. Spalding considers whether that movement displays a coherent set of goals, extends to the national level, and incorporates multiple sectors, such as Indigenous rights activists, Catholic Church leaders, and environmental organizations. Successful movements built on preexisting civil-society organizations and networks—be they environmentally oriented as in Costa Rica or structures developed by resilient communities during and following civil war in El Salvador. By attending to movements' goal coherence, *Breaking Ground* underscores variation and tensions among three kinds of mining conflict that traditionally have not been examined in single studies: environmental conflict, conflict over compensation or other material benefits brought by mining, and conflict in which artisanal miners resist relocation caused by large-scale mining development.

The book's third and final variable is the presence of "institutional locations within the state where engaged citizens can introduce initiatives and maneuver public officials to advance toward their preferred policy response" (38). Although the research is concerned mainly with social movement actors' use of these "docking points," it also reveals how elites depend on them. For instance, both activists and elites in Costa Rica turned to the judiciary in their struggles.

Docking points operate independently in Guatemala where, despite a unified, pro-mining elite and the lack of a national mining movement, groups that organized against individual mining projects gained traction using the courts. Yet in other cases, docking points result partly from the actions of powerful anti-mining movements, unified elites, or both, demonstrating how Spalding's independent variables interact. In Costa Rica, organizers opposed to the major Crucitas mine project gained success through the court that oversaw administrative law. Previously, social movements had relied exclusively on a different court that handled constitutional claims. Thus, the movement against Crucitas established a new docking point. For their part, powerful elites could block a movement's access to institutions. In Nicaragua, "mining advocacy penetrated deeply into the state apparatus, precluding the development of opposition enclaves within executive agencies, legislative commissions, municipal governments, or the courts" (65).

Following the book's close empirical analysis of mining policy in the four countries, a concluding chapter

examines several cases in which foreign mining firms initiated international investor–state dispute-settlement processes against Central American governments. The analysis reveals how this strategy has pressured governments to adopt and retain mining-friendly policies and suggests that it constitutes a serious impediment to movements that strive to limit large-scale mining.

Breaking Ground stands out for its conceptual rigor. The study's innovative, detailed typology of mining activists' demands is noteworthy. At a broad level, the book distinguishes between demands for "restrictive regulation" and "prohibition." Subcategories highlight variation in the *type* and *degree* of constraints on mining. Restrictive regulations include environmental restrictions, compensation requirements, and mandates for community consultation. Within each of these three types of restrictions, Spalding sorts policies according to the level of constraints on firms. "Prohibition" can be temporal, geographic, or national, with each prohibition type varying in its reach; for example, temporally defined prohibitions range from project-level delays to national moratoria. Future research might productively employ this useful typology, including by exploring potential patterns in how regulations and prohibitions interact. For example, the temporary ban of a project pending citizen review—a "prohibition"—can exist only where community consultations, a kind of "restrictive regulation," are required.

The book also raises interesting questions about levels of analysis. Spalding deliberately focuses on national mining policy and not on individual project outcomes. However, in the book national policy seems fused to projects in important ways. First, organizing around a single mine project can lead directly to discussions and change in the national policy realm. In El Salvador, activism against the El Dorado mine project led the environment ministry to assess critically not only El Dorado but also the ministry's practices for reviewing (all) proposed mining development. Second, at times the study only arrives at a national assessment by aggregating project-level events. Most obviously, Spalding characterizes Guatemala as a case of "intermittent" mining based on the suspension or temporary closure of three large-scale mines (135).

Certain connections between project and national policy outcomes might be caused by how different docking points operate. Anti-mine groups accessed the courts in Costa Rica and Guatemala and the state bureaucracy in El Salvador through *mine-specific* filings. These docking points helped bring about *national* mining policy change but only, it appears, because organizers also could use docking points in political parties and the legislature, which ultimately passed laws banning mining in Costa Rica and El Salvador. In contrast, struggles necessarily remained at the project level in Guatemala, where activists lacked connections to parties and lawmakers.


Spalding's mastery of national political dynamics and rich descriptions of mine conflicts in her country cases are what enable us to contemplate such potential connections between project trajectories and national policies. Hers is a highly informative, rigorous, and convincing study. *Breaking Ground* is a major contribution to our understanding of social organizing, elite power, and political institutions in the realm of resource extraction.

Patchwork States: The Historical Roots of Subnational Conflict and Competition in South Asia. By

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What explains variation in political conflict and competition in South Asia? In his compelling book, *Patchwork States: The Historical Roots of Subnational Conflict and Competition in South Asia*, Adnan Naseemullah addresses this complex and critical question through comparative historical case studies of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, relying on both archival research and contemporary data to support his theory. Naseemullah argues that the patterns of violence and political contestation that we have seen—and continue to see today—are a consequence of the diverse historic authority of the state and how it governed. Examining a dizzying array of governance arrangements during the colonial era and since independence, the book traces how distinct governing structures led to differences in state capacity and state–society relations. He shows that “the state is powerful and autonomous in some places, weak and captured in others” (22). This, in turn, has important downstream consequences for distinct patterns of political violence and related outcomes of development and political competition.

Patchwork States makes a number of important theoretical claims, which it unveils over the course of the first five chapters, before turning systematic attention to its three outcome variables. It begins by providing distinct motivations for colonial conquest and argues that these mandates varied subnationally within the colony. Colonizers were motivated by *greed* (satisfied by trade or taxation), by *fear* of rebellion and the resultant “existential insecurity” (29), and by the need for *frugality* to limit the costs involved in the colonial project. The spatial distribution of these mandates, coupled with the responses of the colonized—who Naseemullah rightly points out were not merely passive actors—shaped governance arrangements during the last century of British rule in India. Naseemullah's typology of governance categories allows for significantly more nuance than the often-cited “direct vs. indirect rule” dichotomy and is based

on important differences in practices of land tenure in rural parts of the colony. These categories range from “exceptional” governance arrangements that involved fully indirect rule for parts of today's former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan and the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh to “metropolitan” structures that include Bombay and Calcutta.

These colonial governance structures, in turn, led to four distinct orders in the postcolonial patchwork states, orders that reflect both colonial legacies and the postcolonial states' efforts either to integrate or revise these legacies. Of course, as Naseemullah demonstrates, the newly independent states of India and Pakistan in 1947 had varying success in extending their own administrative control over a sometimes resistant citizenry and elite. India was able to dismantle entrenched social structures and extend administrative control through both land and agriculture reforms and the “deployment of blunt, coercive force” (193), but even so, the effect was uneven across the state. Neighboring Pakistan, meanwhile, faced myriad challenges after independence, chose to privilege stability early on, and accordingly saw a greater persistence of colonial traditions and governance structures, particularly in its northwestern and western regions. In contrast to both India and Pakistan, Bangladesh arose, Naseemullah argues, not from disparate patchworks but rather from “whole cloth” (205) in 1971 through secession from Pakistan and has tended to see patterns of politics and of violence that are “national in scope and centrifugal in character” (174).

Although the book's theory accounts for variations in development trajectories and electoral politics at the district level, it shines most in its exploration of political violence as a central outcome of interest. All three countries of the subcontinent have seen numerous manifestations of violence across various political, ethnic, sectarian, or religious cleavages, and the book nicely weaves evocative examples of such violence throughout its narrative. This violence has taken not only the form of larger spectacles such as deadly ethnic riots, terror attacks, and armed clashes between insurgents and the state but has also been a part of everyday life and quotidian politics in the region. It has varied in intensity not only across time but also spatially within the countries.

The book is primarily concerned with the distinction between sovereignty-contesting and sovereignty-neutral violence, a cleavage that is useful for understanding overall patterns of violence across the states. Nonetheless, a singular focus on it means that we lose some of the complexity and nuance inherent to the different types and repertoires of violence that mark the region. As Naseemullah himself acknowledges, his theory cannot adequately account for some important instances or episodes of violence, such as long-standing party and ethnic violence in Karachi, and it may not be the most informative typology in the case of the more homogeneous