

side by side, and examine the differences. Assuming that Matthew used Mark's account, why did he make small changes and additions? Why did he introduce the earthquake, and the resurrection of the holy dead? or explicitly identify angelic activity? Why did he tell the story about the end of Judas, or the guard at the tomb? Why did he defy Mark and add well-developed resurrection appearances? Because, says Mr Houlden, Mark's account was enigmatic, rich and subtle. Jesus in his resurrection remains awesome and elusive as in his death. But Matthew has no reticence. He ties loose ends, elucidates mysteries, gives clear instruction. He might be answering the questions of a pert, inquisitive child. So he tells what happened next, forestalls a Jewish discrediting of reports about resurrection, makes that resurrection impressive and foolproof, and shows Judas no mercy in a rather typically vindictive way.

With perpetual caution Mr Houlden tries to feel his way into the minds of the two evangelists. Not without a reluctant admiration for Matthew, he always sides with Mark—constantly realising that the need to choose has raised important questions about the very nature of faith and Christian morality. In Mark faith comes as God's gift, in Matthew by his assault upon us. Mark intimates, Matthew demonstrates. Mark handles disaster by resignation, Matthew by requital. So one should move back from Matthew to Mark, against a great deal of ecclesiastical tradition—backwards into light, in fact.

This seems to me an admirable book, not only because I often agree with the author's judgements. (Not always! Why does he call Judas' remorse sterile when it drove him to suicide. In Jewish minds was not repentance and death sufficient atonement for crime, securing a place in the world to come?) But the book is worth studying, preferably in a group, extending to other parts of the Gospels, and so enriching one's spiritual resources.

K. GRAYSTON

GOD OF OUR FATHERS, DO WE KNOW WHAT WE BELIEVE? by Peter Vardy.
Darton, Longman and Todd, London. 1967, pp. 124. £3.95.

This book satisfies a long outstanding need—a book on the Philosophy of Religion for the layman. It presents a clear, analytical and uncluttered account of four alternative ways in which it is possible to talk about God and attempts to work out the implications of and difficulties for each of these views in relation to the main areas with which religious believers are concerned, namely: miracles; prayer; eternal life; evil; religious experience; atheism; and finally, the resurrection.

The book is eminently readable though one does form the impression that the author became rather tired towards the end. The chapters on 'Religious Experience' and 'Atheism' lack the enthusiasm and acumen of the earlier chapters. This however is rectified in the final chapter on 'The Resurrection—the Final Question'. Here the crucial issue is rightly highlighted, viz., whether anyone who does *not* believe in the resurrection of Jesus as an individual with his memories can claim to be a Christian. Vardy, to my mind, is too reserved over this—he writes in his very last sentence: 'In this sense, the resurrection of Jesus and what this means may still provide the crucial test of orthodoxy and thus pose the final question'. He should come off the fence and say that the crucial test of orthodoxy *is* whether one believes in the resurrection of Jesus as an individual with his memories. Those who do not so believe, e.g., those who subscribe to the third and fourth view of God (to be expounded in my next paragraph) whilst advocating views of great depth, insight and intellectual profundity *cannot* claim to be a Christian.

The book gets off to a bad start with an unilluminating quote from Buber: it's not a question (p. 3) of where believers stand in relation to the word 'God', but in relation to different conceptions of God. However having got off to a bad start it certainly makes good progress. Chapter 2 provides a useful background chapter. Chapter 3 is central; in it Vardy presents 'four possible views of God': (1) God as personal and everlasting; (2) God as a

timeless substance; (3) the 'linguistic' view of God, i.e., God conceived of as an existing reality found within the believing community and within religious language; (4) 'Talk of God as affirming a possible way in which life can be lived'. In relation to (3) which expounds the views of D.Z. Phillips, the characterisation as 'linguistic' is unfortunate for it suggests a dichotomy linguistic/real which Phillips himself would not accept. The author makes it clear that he understands this in subsequent discussion (cf. pp. 24/5). In relation to (4), Vardy is to be congratulated on his admirably clear presentation of the 'revisionary theology' of Stewart Sutherland and on his clear delineation between this position and that advocated by Phillips.

The rest of the book, as I have said, deals with the implications of these views for miracles, prayer, etc. Space does not permit me to comment in detail on Vardy's subsequent discussions but the reader may well form the impression—certainly in regard to Chapters 3 and 4—that he is not even-handed in his treatment of the four views. One forms the view that he is prepared (rightly) to present every known objection to the more 'traditional' views, i.e., (1) and (2) and not give them a *full run* for their money, whereas the more 'sophisticated' views, i.e., (3) and (4) are treated far more gently. It is not clear, e.g., how views (3) and (4) can cope with the 'paradigm' of a miracle as presented by his own example of the John Traynor case. This is not discussed at the crucial point (Ch. 4, sections 3 and 4). This seeming lack of balance is to some degree rectified in the chapter on 'Prayer' but even here it could be argued that very clear objections to Phillips and Sutherland are not pressed hard enough. How does either view explain the prayer of consecration? In fairness to Vardy the prayer of consecration is explicitly alluded to in the chapter on 'Religious Experience' but the account of the religious experience at the heart of the Mass by view (3), as presented by Vardy, is surely *quite* unacceptable. We have an account of the 'real presence' in terms of the believers being united in their wills in dedication and obedience to God (p. 102). Since believers are so united in other services, e.g., Christening, Confirmation, this account does not explain the doctrine of the 'real presence'.

In spite of this general worry concerning lack of balance and certain specific worries of both a philosophical and scholarly nature (e.g., the doctrine of the soul as the 'form' of the body, cf. p. 71) there is no doubt that this book is one which should be read by 'the ordinary reader' and Vardy is to be thanked for presenting this opportunity.

MICHAEL DURRANT

SPIRITUAL DEVELOPMENT: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDY, by Daniel A. Helminiak, *Loyola University Press, 1987, P. 252. No price given.*

The present volume is yet another addition to the ever-increasing number of studies on the correlation between psychology and the theology of spiritual development. The author is well qualified to write on this subject, since he has already taught and written in both fields of psychology and systematic theology. For several years (1974—1977) he was a teaching assistant to Bernard Lonergan, S.J., and the influence of Lonergan is readily perceived throughout this work.

Starting with the purely human level in Part One, the author discusses the stages of human development according to contemporary developmental psychologists (e.g., Piaget, Erikson, Kohlberg, Gilligan, Fowler and Loevinger). He then offers his definition of spiritual development: 'the ongoing integration that results in the self-responsible subject from openness to an intrinsic principle of authentic self-transcendence' (p. 41). Previously the author had stated, and quite rightly, that when discussing the practical issues of spiritual development, 'adequate psychological treatment retains the priority, and it defines