

This book, then, cannot be too highly recommended to all who are affected by the Mass, that is, the Catholic public in general. Hence the publishers and translators are to be thanked for making it available to the English-speaking section of that public, even if one cannot at the same time refrain from suggesting that certain blemishes of language and punctuation should be removed from subsequent editions.

R.T.

A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. Volume III, Ockham to Suarez. By Frederick Copleston, S.J. (Burns Oates; 30s.)

THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS. By Leslie Paul. (Faber and Faber; 25s.)

Two ways seem to be open to historians of philosophy; they can be scholarly and objective, producing the sort of book that everyone consults; or by paying attention to what should have been, rather than to what really was said, they can be philosophically stimulating, like Whitehead or Collingwood. To be able to combine both ways, as M. Gilson can, is rare.

Fr Copleston is providing English readers with what is obviously to be the standard history of philosophy for many years to come. His third volume deals with a period particularly suited to such treatment. Ockham and Suarez abide Fr Copleston's question, where Plato somehow escaped. Suarez is the source of much familiar modern scholasticism, Ockham of even wider preoccupations, though we are here warned that he was 'a Franciscan and a theologian: he should not be interpreted as though he were a modern radical empiricist'. Both are important, but in bulk unreadable; gifts for the historian. The real interest of the period lies in following the gradual transition to an outlook recognisably our own. The startling clarity of thirteenth-century vision falls outside our sympathy; how could men have been so sure? But though the next two centuries are still dominated by speculation, the heart has gone out of it; metaphysical explanation is gradually giving way to the logical analysis and physical theories with which we feel at home.

Fr Copleston brings to his complex task the exact scholarship and sober judgment we have come to expect. The proportions of his work are admirable, but we cannot help thinking that if he had been somewhat less repetitive, and less concerned always to explain what he was about to do before doing it, his book could have been considerably and advantageously reduced in size. The bibliography and index are excellent.

Mr Paul's is stimulating history. Through skilfully chosen extracts he manages to give convincing accounts of a surprisingly large number of English philosophers; and his comments, if sometimes misguided, are never trivial. There are things he was unwise to attempt—the early writers, for whom he uses secondary and rather dubious sources (the bibliography

recommends C. R. Harris and E. A. Moody), or the idealists, who are made quite remarkably baffling—but on his own ground, on Locke or Hume or Russell, he is very well worth reading.

LAURENCE BRIGHT, O.P.

THE RANGE OF REASON. By Jacques Maritain. (Geoffrey Bles; 15s.)

This book is made up of ten essays which formed the bulk of the author's *Raison et Raisons* published in 1947, supplemented by seven others. By this manipulation of his material M. Maritain hopes that the present book forms a more satisfactory unity than the French book, which bore the sub-title of *Essais détachés*.

In what this unity consists is perhaps sufficiently indicated by the title. The book is divided into two parts entitled 'Human Knowledge and Metaphysics', and 'Faith and the Human Community'. The first begins with an essay on our human rational knowledge, especially the supreme science of metaphysics and its relation to the modern empirical sciences. But although man is a rational animal, he has other ways of knowing than the strictly rational one. The various forms of knowledge by connaturality are accordingly next dealt with. Then again, human knowing has its implications, its degrees of self-awareness, its history. Several essays on these aspects conclude this section, among them one entitled 'The immanent Dialectic of the first act of Freedom' being the most closely knit and the most thoroughly metaphysical in method.

The title of the second part is more explanatory of its contents than the first. This part still comes under the range of reason, firstly because the realm of politics, as part of ethics, necessarily involves the use of the practical intellect and depends upon the givings of the speculative intellect; and secondly, because we are here concerned with faith, not strictly as such, but as healing and enlightening reason, and especially the practical reason, in the exercise of its (reason's) own functions. The non-Christian reader may demur to this last, and maintain that the author is undoubtedly talking theology, and therefore something irrelevant to him. But the opposition which the Church has met with throughout her history is there to prove that her theology (the thinking that guides her action) can no more be ignored by anyone concerned with human reason, than can the fact of her existence by the historian. Moreover, this problem of the relationship between the Church and the temporal human community with which M. Maritain is here preoccupied, is one perhaps which within the Church is reaching a decisive stage, comparable to that of the problem of the relationship between speculative human reason and faith which was reached in the age of Aquinas. If that latter crisis was resolved in a sense which safeguarded the autonomy of reason in its own sphere in contradistinction to the previous somewhat fideist compromise, the question whether the