

EXPLAINING AND
RECONCEPTUALIZING
UNDERDEVELOPMENT:
Paraguay and Uruguay*

Paul C. Sondrol

University of Colorado at Colorado Springs

- SOCIALISM, LIBERALISM, AND DICTATORSHIP IN PARAGUAY.* By Paul H. Lewis. (New York: Praeger, 1982. Pp. 154. \$42.95.)
- THE STROESSNER ERA: AUTHORITARIAN RULE IN PARAGUAY.* By Carlos R. Miranda. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1990. Pp. 177. \$42.50.)
- PARAGUAY: THE PERSONALIST LEGACY.* By Riordan Roett and Richard S. Sacks. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991. Pp. 188. \$40.50.)
- NEGOTIATING DEMOCRACY: POLITICIANS AND GENERALS IN URUGUAY.* By Charles G. Gillespie. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991. Pp. 264. \$49.50.)
- POLITICAL STRUCTURES AND DEMOCRACY IN URUGUAY.* By Luis E. González. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991. Pp. 201. \$26.95.)
- REPRESION, EXILIO Y DEMOCRACIA: LA CULTURA URUGUAYA.* Compiled by Saúl Sosnowski. (Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1987. Pp. 363.)

As Jan Black has noted, the study of Latin America has always tended to follow a unifying theme, approaching the inquiry as a problem or set of problems such as underdevelopment, political instability, or the failure of democracy. The search for the precursors of these problems has generally led research in one of three directions: to the Iberian institutions and values brought to America; to Latin Americans themselves—their supposed passivity, corrupt leaders, or lack of entrepreneurship; or to international capitalism generally and the U.S. version specifically (J. Black 1991, 1–15).

Uruguay and Paraguay offer a comparative case study for analyzing theoretical explanations of political development. Certain characteristics, aside from similarity in name, would lead one to expect a parallel

*This essay is for Edward J. Williams, who taught me a great deal about development.

development. Uruguay and Paraguay are two of the smallest countries in South America. Both share bifurcated political party systems and traditional parties among the oldest in the world. Uruguay and Paraguay are also buffeted between the two giants of South America—Argentina and Brazil—and both have been caught up in the combined and at times conflicting ambitions of these larger neighbors.

Yet despite these resemblances, Paraguay and Uruguay have traditionally offered perhaps the greatest contrasts of any pair in Latin America in terms of social development, economic progress, and political evolution. Geographically isolated and landlocked Paraguay was settled at Asunción by the Spanish some two hundred years before the late colonization of coastal Montevideo in 1726. Although the two countries have some of the most homogenous populations in Latin America, Paraguay's is a racially mixed, mestizo society, while Uruguay's is more Europeanized. Uruguay is one of the richest countries per capita in Latin America, Paraguay one of the poorest.¹ Paraguayan politics has largely continued to be characterized by militarism, authoritarianism, and a subject or parochial population, while Uruguay's has been overwhelmingly democratic and participatory.²

The ultimate foundational myth of Uruguayan exceptionalism as a "model country" of enlightened pluralism was adorned by such old clichés as "La Suiza de América del Sur" and "Como el Uruguay no hay." This myth occasioned scholarship stressing Uruguay's distinctiveness, even when political realities began to diverge from that imagery.³ Subsequently, Uruguay's democratic decay, breakdown, descent into military rule between 1973 and 1985, and ultimate redemocratization likewise spurred analysis in the various "transitions" volumes (see Gillespie 1986a, 1986b; and Gillespie and González 1989).

Until recently, the amount of attention given to Uruguay was matched only by scholarly neglect of Paraguay, now emerging from perhaps the most profound authoritarian tradition in Latin America. Dearth of interest in Paraguay stems from several factors. It has remained a poor, remote, and rather "unimportant" country in terms of Western economic investment or cold-war strategic concerns. Also, "Paraguayan dictatorship" seemed a redundant phrase—what of value could be learned from

1. Even in the distinctive context of the subset of countries in the Southern Cone, the Uruguayan gross national product per capita was U.S. \$2,620 in 1989, exceeding that of Argentina (\$2,160), Brazil (\$2,540), and Chile (\$1,770). Paraguay's, in contrast, was less than half of Uruguay's (U.S. \$1,030 in 1989), on a par with that of Ecuador (\$1,020), El Salvador (\$1,070), and Peru (\$1,010). These figures come from *World Development Report, 1991*.

2. Johnson shows Paraguay ranking either eighteenth or nineteenth out of twenty Latin American nations in nine successive surveys of democratic development at five-year intervals (Johnson 1988, 195). Uruguay, however, consistently ranked as the most democratic nation in Latin America from 1945 through the mid-1960s. See Johnson's earlier survey (1976).

3. Early Anglo works typifying this analysis include Fitzgibbon (1956) and Taylor (1962).

such a monotonous history? Finally, the long-standing Stroessner regime (1954–1989) kept a low profile by design as well as by default. Personally, General Alfredo Stroessner Mattiauda was rather plodding and taciturn. On a more calculating level, regime elites perceived that the less attention drawn to Stroessner's police state, the better.

The six books under review here provide a fount of largely recent writings that analyze Paraguay and Uruguay from a developmental perspective. This essay will review these works to assess and contrast the ways in which three dominant developmental paradigms are utilized: corporatism and culture; development and modernization theory; and the dependency approach.

Blaming the Iberians: Corporatism and Culture

One reason long offered for political retardation in Latin America is that the culture has been damned to an Iberian ethos that lacked secular modernizing influences and was reinforced by major backward-looking social institutions—the Catholic Church, the military, and the oligarchy. The so-called Black Legend nurtured among nineteenth-century Latin American *pensadores* led to indiscriminate rejection of all the baleful influences of Spain and Spanish colonialism arising out of the Iberian authoritarian heritage.⁴

Modern Latin Americanists who adhere to this historical-cultural approach are now assuming a more dispassionate tone (Dealy 1974; Véliz 1980; Wiarda 1981). Labeling the region's five-hundred-year-old heritage as "corporatism" or "clientelism" or both, these analysts do not necessarily argue that Spanish-American values are better or worse but simply that they exist. Corporatist theories of internal governance and interest-group representation are viewed as a major authoritarian theme in civil-state relations. References are made to "enforced limited pluralism" via regulation and representation of social groups by and before a leviathan state. Corporate statism, in turn, is defined as part and parcel of the larger clientelist structure of social relationships (personal, dyadic, hierarchical, authoritarian) within Latin American culture. Proponents of the corporatist paradigm argue that political order has never been achieved by devolving power onto "the people," as in Lockean theory. Instead, solutions to political instability, underdevelopment, and even transitions to democracy have always involved the creation of some kind of political monism.

Paul Lewis's *Socialism, Liberalism, and Dictatorship in Paraguay* is a slimmer version of his seminal *Paraguay under Stroessner* (1980), the first

4. For a more detailed review, see Sondrol (1990a).

book-length treatment in English of the Stronato (the Stroessner regime). Lewis's work along with Carlos Miranda's more recent *The Stroessner Era: Authoritarian Rule in Paraguay* and Riordan Roett's and Richard Sacks's *Paraguay: The Personalist Legacy* all fit squarely into the corporatist-cultural approach.

In his preface, Lewis asserts that in order to comprehend why "dictatorship has been the unbroken rule" in Paraguay (p. ix), students must "put General Stroessner and his regime into the context of Paraguayan culture" (p. x). Miranda's theme is similar: "The stability achieved by the Stroessner regime of Paraguay can be traced to a combination of historical and cultural elements . . . , the authoritarian tradition of the nation" (p. 9). Roett and Sacks's analysis is almost identical: "the long-lived Stroessner dictatorship was no aberration, but rather a logical link in Paraguay's almost unbroken tradition of essentially authoritarian to downright despotic rulers" (p. xiii). The remaining portion of these three books present historical overviews of Paraguayan history and analyses of the Stroessner regime that utilize political culture as the conceptual schema. Key components of Paraguay's authoritarian tradition are analyzed and explicated, including the country's geopolitical isolation amid hostile neighbors, an exaggerated tradition of *caudillismo*, clientelist and corporatist political arrangements, and militarism.

Roett and Sacks stress early colonialism, poverty, racial miscegenation, and hostile geopolitics as factors that have informed and distorted Paraguay's authoritarian and personalist tradition (p. 18). Miranda even posits the impact of the Jesuit *reducciones* on the native Guaraní Indians: "prompting them to submit unquestioningly to strong forms of authority . . . may have conditioned Paraguay to certain forms of authoritarian leadership" (p. 13). Given the fact that most of the missions were not even located within what is now modern Paraguay, that influence is probably exaggerated, yet the unholy "theocracy" of these priests has long constituted a strawman that some analysts are loath to relinquish.

The despotisms of three successive caudillos who ruled Paraguay for almost sixty years following independence had even more to do with an authoritarian tradition. As precursors to Stroessner, Dr. José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia (1814–1840), Carlos Antonio López (1841–1862), and Francisco Solano López (1862–1870) ruled during the formative years of national life and set a symbolic early tone. While the militarized closed Paraguay of Francia gave way to a more international posture under his successors, an extreme proto-totalitarian brand of tyranny remained the constant feature, in contrast to equally brutal but more chaotic caudillo governments elsewhere (Lewis, p. 23).

Yet as unbridled as these three early autocrats were, they brought Paraguay independence, autonomy, stability, and development during the formative first six decades of national life. This experience contrasted with

the dozens of petty dictators and would-be democrats who dotted the next three generations of the so-called "Liberal Republic" (1870–1936). This period witnessed the reverberations of military defeat in the disastrous War of the Triple Alliance (1865–1870); foreign occupation (by Brazil); an alien constitution imposed in 1870 that was not geared to Paraguayan realities; loss of much of the national patrimony; denationalization of the economy (via the land sales laws of 1883 and 1885); and chronic political instability.⁵

Another authoritarian precursor was Paraguay's participation in two of the three great wars in Latin American history, fighting in the Triple Alliance against Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay between 1865 and 1870 and in the Gran Chaco War against Bolivia from 1932 to 1935. This heavy involvement also enhanced the position of the armed forces as national saviors, fostering the meta-ethos that justified an amplified role for the military in things political and conditioned Paraguayans to accept and equate militarism with independence and national pride. Praetorian intervention in politics became the norm in the 1930s, as military leaders replete with fascist overtones ruled with monotonous impunity, paving the way for Stroessner's *golpe* in 1954.⁶

The potted historical overviews, up to Stroessner's seizure of power, will please generalists more than the fairly small fraternity of Paraguayan specialists.⁷ But the common denominator in the works by Lewis, Roett and Sacks, and Miranda is their shared insistence on a persistent pattern of authoritarian modes of discourse at both societal levels (interpersonal and patron-client relationships) and state levels (*caudillismo*) of interaction that habituated a politically inexperienced public to personalist dictatorship.⁸ Never having known competitive polyarchy, Paraguayans have had no basis for comparison, only a historical record showing that whenever politics opened up even slightly (as in the Liberal era), governmental ineffectiveness, confusion, and anarchy resulted. An exhausted nation thus accepted more or less willingly the seizure and consolidation of power

5. After 1870, the next eighty years brought dozens of *cuartelazos* (barracks revolts), overt threats of *golpes*, and eight actual coup attempts, seven of which succeeded. Between 1870 and the 1930s, when the modern Paraguayan military began to rule intermittently, Paraguay had thirty-two presidents. During these years, two presidents were assassinated and three were overthrown. In the decade between 1901 and 1911, Paraguay had ten presidents, including four in 1911. Not until 1912 did a Paraguayan president serve out his full constitutional term.

6. Various factions of the military seized power in 1936, 1937, 1948, three times in 1949, and once more in 1954, when General Stroessner assumed power. For a history and current analysis of the Paraguayan armed forces, see Sondrol (1992a).

7. The best introduction to the history of Paraguay remains Warren (1949). On the early, nationalist period, see White (1978) and Williams (1979). The most scholarly account of the Liberal Republic is Warren (1978) and (1985).

8. The classic article that first linked state and societal "dyadic contracts" in Paraguay is Hicks (1971).

by Stroessner (known as El Continuator) soon after the 1947 civil war in a Faustian bargain for peace and stability that fit Paraguay's sociopolitical history.

Of the three books, Lewis's *Socialism, Liberalism, and Dictatorship in Paraguay* and Miranda's *The Stroessner Era* offer much stronger analyses of the interminable Stroessner regime. Lewis details Stroessner's rise to power and his pillars of regime support, policies, and opponents. The excellent theoretical final chapter situates the Stroessner regime along the continuum of non-democracies in a position approximating Juan Linz's model of an "authoritarian regime" that nonetheless possesses certain organizational resemblances (particularly a mass-based official party) found in more advanced mobilizing systems (pp. 127–29).⁹

Miranda's sophisticated discussion of the Paraguayan political system provides a more current description of the machinery of the Stroessner regime, one that should demolish ill-informed generalizations dismissing Stroessner as a Neanderthal. Stroessner's dictatorship was personalistic, not military. He was not simply *primus inter pares* in a contemporary junta but the classic caudillo who dominated the entire regime, including the army and the single official party. Although not charismatic, Stroessner secured a popular base for his regime by bringing the century-old Asociación Nacional Republicana (the Colorado party) under his formal control, buckling it to the state, and penetrating society through a national network of *seccionales* and *subseccionales* (branches and block wards) in totalitarian fashion. This structure distinguished the Stroessner regime from the more bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in the Southern Cone.

The conclusions drawn by these three studies regarding the prospects for democracy in Paraguay after Stroessner are not sanguine. Lewis sketches several possible scenarios but predicts that "Paraguayans, never having known democracy, [may] revert under the stress of change to the familiar authoritarian traditions of the past" (p. 130). Miranda argues that "a process of socialization will have to be initiated if a more democratic political culture is to emerge" (p. 144). Roett and Sacks correctly view current General-President Andrés Rodríguez as a rational, calculating reformist and a wealthy beneficiary after three decades of collaborating with Stroessner's kleptocracy—certainly not an altruistic visionary committed to reinventing the democratic wheel. Roett and Sacks perceptively sum up Paraguay's classical bind: "The essence of personalism in politics is that [Paraguay's] fate should depend so completely on the will and action of a single man" (p. 133).

The corporatist-cultural variable evokes almost violent debate in academic circles. Corporatism's association with fascism has caused both disclaimers by proponents and rejection by opponents. Culture stresses

9. For a comparative theoretical analysis, see Sondrol (1991).

the uniqueness of each nation, thus limiting generalizability across cases. Moreover, nations are not monolithic—different political subcultures may characterize different societal groups (and even different factions of those subgroups, as evidenced among various service branches of the military). Corporatism is more a model that cautions sensitivity to culture and less a full-blown theoretical prescription for change. Perhaps most damning, corporatism cum culture becomes an easy residual tautological category when no other seems convenient, implying a certain fatalism regarding change: “Paraguayans are just authoritarian.” Recent research, however, has challenged the notion of a fundamentally authoritarian political culture in nondemocratic regimes as “natural” to the milieu (see Booth and Seligson 1984; Tiano 1986).

Nevertheless, Paraguay’s sustained legacy of extreme tyranny obviates any deep cultural commitment to democracy and dictates circumspection regarding the short-term habituation of newer democratic norms in the face of long-standing authoritarian routines and structures. Democracy has never proved to be the norm in Paraguay, nor even the clear-cut preference. The country’s tentative liberalization (as opposed to full-blown democratization) by no means suggests a definitive triumph of consolidative polyarchy (see Sondrol 1992b).

Blaming the Latin Americans: Modernization and Development

Whereas the cultural approach remains more a descriptive and static “model of limitations” urging sensitivity to historical contexts, modernization theory is intrinsically prescriptive, dynamic, and negative regarding Latin values. Moreover, a central theme of many of the early modernizationists was the effort to link the stability of democratic institutions to patterns and levels of economic development (see Lipset 1959; Rostow 1960; Almond and Coleman 1960).

In contrast to Paraguayan scholarship emphasizing Hispanic cultural characteristics as an ultimate cause of that nation’s authoritarian condition, analyses of Uruguay have explicitly rejected such explanations. To do otherwise would deny certain twentieth-century realities as well as the ritualistic social imagery of Uruguay’s supposed uniqueness and superiority.¹⁰ In fact, few specialists seem able to begin and end sentences laud-

10. In studies of Uruguay, one finds a tendency to assume that a modern period of development constitutes the whole of the nation’s history. Uruguay’s “polyarchy of exception” actually started only about 1903 and was attributable in large measure to the contributions of one caudillo: President José Batlle y Ordóñez (1903–1907 and 1911–1915). Thus to one degree or another, an underlying current of authoritarianism and *personalismo* may be found throughout Latin America, but its incidence and permanence depends largely on geography, personalities, historical experiences, and ethnic relations. Viewed in this light, Uruguay and Paraguay are not particularly different.

ing Uruguay's preeminence without taking a few concomitant whacks at the neighborhood. The late Charles Gillespie captured this mood in *Negotiating Democracy: Politicians and Generals in Uruguay*:

Pessimistic cultural determinism is . . . inapplicable to Uruguay, Latin America's most homogenous, most Europeanized, and best educated nation. The fact that the country was scarcely settled beyond a thin coastal strip during the colonial period makes arguments focusing on colonial heritage irrelevant. Uruguayan society and culture exhibit profoundly democratic structures and values, in marked contrast with neighboring Argentina's militarist, elitist, antidemocratic, and clerical traditions. (P. 18)

If Uruguay's polyarchy was exceptional and thus not to be compared with the more Spanish, Indian, authoritarian, or "backward" cultures throughout the rest of Latin America, what then led to the 1973 democratic breakdown? Gillespie's *Negotiating Democracy* and Luis González's *Political Structures and Democracy in Uruguay* revive the explanatory power of "revisionist" modernizationists (C. Black 1966; Huntington 1968) to remind students that although certain aspects of modernization may be irreversible (such as urbanization and mobilization), there is nothing linear about political development. The Uruguayan case illustrates that a crucial factor in the developmental process remains a system's response capability in relation to demands.

Gillespie's key contribution lies in redressing a gap in the debate on regime change in Latin America: an understanding of democratic breakdowns, as well as the chances for overcoming authoritarianism, must center on analysis of the behavior of political parties. Gillespie utilized opinion data of Uruguayan political elites to explore their values, orientations, strategies, and choices in order to explain the crisis and survival of Uruguay's parties under authoritarianism.

The result is a tightly organized and lucid work that begins by reviewing Uruguay's traditional patronage parties (the Colorados and Blancos), which proved unwilling or unable to resist escalating sectoral and class demands for services and subsidies as the economy deteriorated during the 1950s. Economic decline, the absence of cohesive and adaptable programmatic parties, the creation of a strong presidency in 1967, mounting guerrilla violence, and intransigent elite response all coalesced to create a political stalemate that resulted in military role expansion, decline in respect for civil liberties, and finally military rule. Gillespie highlights the particular importance of institutions and elites in reacting to Uruguay's generalized systemic crisis and how these actors proved tragically unable or unwilling to contain the mounting conflict:

By the early 1970s the behavior of at least some sectors of all major Uruguayan parties were semiloyal (or even disloyal) to democracy. Abdication of responsibility by politicians eventually occurred in the form of refusal to form coalitions as well as failure to come to the aid of [President Juan María Bordaberry] when he

was faced by a military rebellion. Indeed, most political sectors at one time or another encouraged military role expansion, hoping it would work to their advantage. (P. 239)

But if Uruguay's party leaders were partly to blame for the democratic decay, they deserve some credit for their crucial organization of popular protest, opposition to the military, and ultimate demands for a return to full democracy. The middle chapters of *Negotiating Democracy* unfold the story of the authoritarian crisis in Uruguay (particularly the military's failure to create an official party or personalist leader and business-sector alienation despite the officers' neoliberal vision) as well as the delicate dialectic of societal conquest and military contestation regarding the officers' vision of "a new Uruguay" and their place in the transition. Sparkling anecdotes reinforce Gillespie's analysis of party and military strategies in controlling the terms of their "dialogue," beginning with the 1980 defeat of the military's continuist referendum, on through the collapse of the Parque Hotel talks in 1983, to the Naval Club pact in 1984.

Chapter 9 assesses the extent to which Uruguayan parties have adapted and renovated themselves. Gillespie argues that Uruguay's transition led to restoration of the status quo ante in most respects. A major finding is that a common commitment now exists to protecting the system against the type of chaos that could bring a return of the generals. This consensus is manifest in the avoidance of divisive debates on contentious issues lest they threaten the fragile consolidating democracy (pp. 204–7). Gillespie concludes, "Uruguay's fundamental problem may be too much stability. A historical opportunity for political innovation provided by regime discontinuity was missed" (p. 228).

González's *Political Structures and Democracy in Uruguay* first surveys the roots of political institutions and democracy in Uruguay to show the nexus between structural factors relatively independent of the will of political actors (presidentialism and party fractionalization) and the idiosyncratic behavior of elites that have been treacherous and even traitorous to democracy. The middle chapters, much like those in Gillespie's study, center on the transition from military to civilian rule and the changed nature of the post-engagement state, but they also offer elite and mass relational perspectives that are missing in Gillespie's account. *Political Structures* is repetitious and heavy going at times, given González's rather dry and dense style. Yet the study is well grounded in the broader theoretical research concerning parties, institutions, and democratization, rendering it a pale complement to *Negotiating Democracy*.

Disconsolate conclusions consummate these books. Both Gillespie and González blame institutional structures, political actors, and their choices. Ominously, Uruguay's democratic restoration returned the nation to the same politico-structural configuration that proved inimical to democracy in the periods preceding the 1933 and 1973 coups: an economic

crisis, an increasingly polarized and fragmented party system, and strong presidentialism. Gillespie and González both argue that Uruguay's peculiar electoral system of double simultaneous voting, which encourages factionalism and precludes party responsibility, must be abolished if a consolidative democracy is to survive.

In a certain sense, *Represión, exilio y democracia: la cultura uruguaya*, compiled by Saúl Sosnowski, is both an odd and a complementary work among the six under consideration.¹¹ The only edited volume, its essays are uneven in quality and somewhat disjointed theoretically. These disparities, however, also highlight the radically different experiences and multiple meanings emanating from the most brutal dictatorship in Uruguay's history. The essays (particularly those by Juan Rial, Martin Weinstein, Eduardo Galeano, Alvaro Barros-Lémez, and Carina Perelli) remind readers that the pernicious influence of authoritarianism undermined more than political life in Uruguay—it also scarred the nation's cultural psyche indelibly.

The terroristic impulses of the military's utilization of mass arrests and torture to paralyze society and thus create a compliant aggregate are detailed in various sections: "Contexts" (Edy Kaufman, Rial, Weinstein); "Culture and Power" (Galeano, Leo Masliah, Mauricio Rosencof, Ruben Yáñez); "Literature and Repression" (Amanda Berenguer, Lisa Block de Behar, Hiber Conteris, José Pedro Díaz, Teresa Porzecanski); and "The Shores of Exile" (Hugo Achugar, Barros-Lémez, Jorge Ruffinelli).¹² Uruguayans responded in an emerging culture of fear characterized by a sullen wariness, self-censorship, a turning inward, and a longing to maintain anonymity against the brooding omnipresence of the state. Yet in spite of rudimentary attempts at educational indoctrination (by means of faculty purges and "civics and morality" courses), Nazi-style book burnings, and an Orwellian system that classified public employees as "A," "B," or "C" according to their perceived "democratic faith," the military failed utterly to create a brave new world in Uruguay.¹³ Despite the repression, civil society was sustained by a burgeoning underground, exile, and prison literature, art, and music.

The military dictatorship did, however, destroy the carefully structured symbolic and utopian official history for Uruguayans who once believed in their country's uniqueness. The halcyon days of the late 1980s following the demise of the authoritarian regime have given way to a disillusioned realization that the consensual "happy Uruguay" and "wel-

11. This book is due to appear in English in 1993, to be published by Duke University Press.

12. A concluding section entitled "Comparable Dimensions in the Southern Cone" offers perspectives on other countries: Juan Corradi on Argentina, Joan Dassin on Brazil, Carina Perelli on Uruguay, and Bernardo Subercaseaux on Chile.

13. For an extended analysis of the military's "project" in Uruguay, see Sondrol (1992c).

fare state" that once gave meaning to the saying "There's no place like Uruguay" is a chimera. Now a new and jaded counterimagery is being constructed on a more stringent, insipid foundation that Juan Rial terms "inverse Hobbesianism." Socioeconomic aspirations that once made Uruguay a secure and happy place are now sacrificed upon the altar of "democracy at any cost," dictated by the fear that pushing for too much reform could bring a return of militarism (pp. 85–86).

By the early 1980s, the modernization and development paradigm had fallen on hard times in the face of mounting criticisms and negative reactions. Spawned largely by U.S. and Northern European academics, modernization theory assumed a narrow, arrogant tone. The optimistic, even deterministic tenor pervading modernization theory, which stressed that "all good things go together" (economic growth, capitalism, democracy—the "Westernization" of Uruguay), clearly did not describe the Southern Cone in the 1970s. The strategy failed there: democracy did not flourish; the middle classes did not respond as predicted; the theory stressed economic growth over distribution and ultimately became preoccupied with political stability rather than polyarchy. Modernization theory was not so much completely wrong as incomplete. At the microsociological level, the paradigm remained ahistorical: it focused on changing individuals' values without ascertaining how and why those values had emerged (as did corporatism and culture). Finally, modernization never addressed the structural factors that situated Latin America in the context of the capitalist world economy (in dependency terms).

Blaming the United States: Dependency Theory

Dependency theory emerged as a vituperative reaction to the ethnocentrism of the modernization and development paradigm. Dependency theorists viewed modernization theory as a U.S. con job that first marginalized Latin Americans and then told them it was their own fault. The theory of *dependencia* focused instead on exogenous variables, specifically relationships with the developed countries, as the major cause of Latin America's developmental retardation. While *dependentistas* disagreed over various aspects, certain tenets remained discernible (Frank 1969; dos Santos 1970; Cardoso and Faletto 1979). According to this perspective, developed nations expand while underdeveloped nations languish because "peripheral" economies are conditioned by the development and expansion of "core" economies. This structure of dependence maintains authoritarian and demobilizing political regimes that serve Yankee imperialists and their local oligarchic minions. Because the United States has historically asserted such an imposing presence in Latin America and international capitalism, dependency theory sounded a distinctly anti-U.S. tone

replete with historically justifiable references to imperialism, intervention, and aid to anticommunist dictatorships.

None of the works on Paraguay reviewed here assume that the source of Paraguay's political turmoil and democratic failure is primarily external—the fault of either U.S. intervention, manipulation, or economic dependence. The reason is not that the authors are all from the United States (Miranda is Argentine) but that dependency is a necessary but not sufficient explanation of Paraguay's authoritarian leanings. While the analysis found in these three books describes politico-economic arrangements prevailing over the past century, it cannot account for the tyrannical nature of Paraguayan government anterior to the emergence of dependency. Sixty years of authoritarianism preceded the emergence of dependency in Paraguay. Hence dictatorship can in no sense have been “caused” by a condition of dependency that it predated by three generations. Nevertheless, international factors have affected Paraguay's political experience.

The beginnings of Paraguayan dependency rose from the ashes of the War of the Triple Alliance, when Paraguay repudiated the self-reliant developmental strategy of the previous half-century via foreign occupation, political domination, and economic dependence. André Gunder Frank has even suggested that war occurred because the autonomously developing economy of Paraguay would not yield peacefully to what he terms “satellization” to the “metropolis,” meaning Buenos Aires, Montevideo, and Rio de Janeiro, in turn dominated by London (see Frank 1969, 3–17). This argument has been refuted by careful analysis of the historical facts (Abente 1987), but few disagree about the war's legacy in terms of the foreign control still exercised over Paraguay's economy. As Paul Lewis notes, few large businesses remain in Paraguayan hands: “foreign investors control over 90 percent of private banking in Paraguay . . . , over 80 percent of the legitimate export trade, 30 percent of the land available for ranching or farming, and 20 percent of all cattle production” (p. 107).

Regarding Uruguay, only Rubén Yáñez (in the Sosnowski edited work) adopts an explicit dependency perspective. He argues that the *autogolpe* of 1973 culminated in a “fascist dictatorship . . . created as a means of preserving U.S. hegemony on that part of the continent” (p. 141) and that Uruguay's generals were an anti-nationalistic clientele class devoted to destroying “the people” in their struggle for an (undefined) “national program” (p. 149). Yáñez thus rather simplistically views both masses and elites as monolithically opposed to one another. He also ignores the role of the U.S. Congress and executive branch during the Carter administration in exerting pressure on the Uruguayan military to withdraw from power.

Dependency interpretations stress the consequences—including authoritarianism—that are said to flow from the particular structural patterns created by external linkages. Yet when certain dependency variables are analyzed and linked to the United States, the country with the most

ubiquitous record of economic penetration and support for rightist regimes in Latin America (Muller 1985), the hypothesis of a direct relationship between levels of dependency and authoritarianism is not supported empirically in the case of either Paraguay or Uruguay.

In another context, I have examined countries with populations of roughly the same size (Sondrol 1990b). The relative dependence of each nation on the United States is suggested by trade orientation, or the relative importance of the United States as a trading partner for the national economy; aid, or the degree of reliance on various foreign sources of developmental assistance; external debt, as measured by the degree of reliance on foreign loans for economic development; and U.S. direct private investment, or the relative importance of U.S. foreign capital in the domestic economy of a particular country.

The data show that in all four key areas, Paraguay and Uruguay exhibit less "dependence" on the United States than most other Latin American nations of similar scale.¹⁴ Although these are gross indicators, they show a surprisingly low correlation between levels of U.S. dependency and authoritarianism. But what the data may also suggest is that the relationship between dependence and domestic politics is more subtle, complicated, and manifest in various Latin American countries in sui generis ways.

Perhaps the validity of the dependency argument in Paraguay and Uruguay should not be assessed in terms of "center" and "periphery" but rather in terms of "semi-periphery" and "periphery." In both cases, distance from U.S. influence and contiguity with Argentina and Brazil, lack of valuable mineral resources, and a small industrial infrastructure and domestic market combine to obviate a pronounced U.S. presence. Yet these same factors perpetuate an agro-export economy dominated by a landowning oligarchy and by Argentine and Brazilian capital. In sum, perhaps the correct way to treat dependency is as a facilitating condition that serves to perpetuate authoritarian "enclaves" and political alliances between elites of the status quo (conservative *latifundistas*, national bourgeoisie elements, party government bureaucrats, and the military) who are interested in maintaining pacts of domination while perpetuating factors that produce underdevelopment and dependence.

The dependent development model raised significant normative questions by shifting analysis from microsociological factors like values (important in different ways in both the corporatist and modernization approaches) to macrosociological and systemic structural features (like terms of trade, multinational corporations, and the influence of the United States). Dependency theory has been criticized as ideology in the guise of

14. The sample included Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

academic scholarship (as if modernization theory were value-free). Perhaps a more valid criticism is that dependency theory ignores socialist forms of "core-peripheral" relations (whether capitalist or socialist, dependency is great-power chauvinism). Finally, the dependency model may be more interpretive than verifiable. For example, it is simply not possible to confirm or disconfirm that Latin America would have been "better off" without the United States or world capitalism.

Conclusion

Although the six books reviewed here vary in methodological approach, each one represents an important contribution to reexamining traditional perspectives on Paraguay and Uruguay and the larger state of developmental studies. Paraguay is no longer overwhelmingly rural, traditional, and authoritarian. Uruguay no longer conforms to the old stereotypes as a democratic antithesis of Paraguay. To paraphrase Martin Weinstein, Uruguay today is much more like Paraguay than it was not, or thought it was not, in the past: indebted, dependent, underdeveloped, and suffering from a politicized military (see Weinstein's essay in Sosnowski, p. 103).

Similarly, the once-dominant neat and coherent modernization paradigm of the 1960s, which was used to explain the Latin American "problem" of "underdevelopment," has been overshadowed in the 1970s and 1980s by the alternative corporatist and dependency approaches reflecting the changed realities of the region. These propositions, in turn, are now being examined and revised as the literature responds to the more recent democratic "regime cycle" in Latin America (Morris 1989).

The general reappraisal occurring in developmental studies represents a healthy shift away from unfounded exaggerations about the permanency of any regime type as well as a realistic reassessment of the likelihood of any single universal and teleological "grand theory" of development.¹⁵ This shifting focus in the literature, brimming with eclecticism, convergence, and "islands" of "middle-range" theories of change, is not a sign of fracture and lack of cumulation. Current analyses challenge, but also integrate and build on, the previously dominant approaches to illuminate newer paradigms and issues: political economy, political anthropology, theories of state and class, the debt crisis (perhaps the real dependency), modes of production, and comparative public policy. Indeed, proliferating theoretical approaches signal a vibrant maturation of Latin American studies and the dynamism of Latin American political development.

15. For examples, see Verba (1985), Bossert (1986), Almond (1987), and Garretón (1991).

REFERENCES

- ABENTE, DIEGO
1987 "The War of the Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models." *LARR* 22, no. 2:47-69.
- ALMOND, GABRIEL A.
1987 "The Development of Political Development." In *Understanding Political Development*, edited by Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, 437-90. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown.
- ALMOND, GABRIEL A., AND JAMES COLEMAN, EDS.
1960 *The Politics of the Developing Areas*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- BLACK, CYRIL
1966 *The Dynamics of Modernization*. New York: Harper and Row.
- BLACK, JAN KNIPPERS
1991 *Latin America: Its Problems and Its Promise*. 2d ed. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- BOOTH, JOHN A., AND MITCHELL A. SELIGSON
1984 "The Political Culture of Authoritarianism in Mexico: A Reexamination." *LARR* 19, no. 1:106-24.
- BOSSERT, THOMAS J.
1986 "The Promise of Theory." In *Promise of Development: Theories of Change in Latin America*, edited by Thomas J. Bossert and Peter Klarén, 303-34. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- CARDOSO, FERNANDO HENRIQUE, AND ENZO FALETTO
1979 *Dependency and Development in Latin America*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- DEALY, GLEN C.
1974 "The Tradition of Monistic Democracy in Latin America." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 35, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec.):625-46.
- DOS SANTOS, THEOTONIO
1970 "The Structure of Dependence." *American Economic Review* 60, no. 2 (May):231-36.
- FITZGIBBON, RUSSELL
1956 *Uruguay: Portrait of a Democracy*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- FRANK, ANDRE GUNDER
1969 *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America*. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- GARRETON, MANUEL ANTONIO
1991 "Political Democratization in Latin America and the Crisis of Paradigms." In *Rethinking Third World Politics*, edited by James Manor, 100-117. Essex, U.K.: Longman.
- GILLESPIE, CHARLES GUY
1986a "Uruguay's Transition from Collegial Military-Technocratic Rule." In *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy: Latin America*, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, 173-95. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
1986b "Activists and Floating Voters: The Unheeded Lessons of Uruguay's 1982 Primaries." In *Elections and Democratization in Latin America*, edited by Paul Drake and Eduardo Silva, translated by Sandra del Castillo, 215-44. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego.
- GILLESPIE, CHARLES GUY, AND LUIS GONZALEZ
1989 "Uruguay: The Survival of Old and Autonomous Institutions." In *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America*, edited by Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, 207-45. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- HICKS, FREDRICK
1971 "Interpersonal Relationships and Caudillismo in Paraguay." *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 13, no. 1 (Jan.):89-111.
- HUNTINGTON, SAMUEL
1968 *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- JOHNSON, KENNETH
1976 "Measuring the Scholarly Image of Latin American Democracy, 1945-1970." In *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* 17, edited by James Wilkie, 347-65. Los Angeles: Latin American Center, University of California.

- 1988 "Measuring the Scholarly Image of Latin American Democracy, 1945-1985." In *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* 26, edited by James Wilkie, 198. Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center.
- LIPSET, SEYMOUR M.
1959 "Some Social Requisites of Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 53:69-105.
- MORRIS, STEPHAN D.
1989 "Regime Cycles in Latin America." *Review of Latin American Studies* 2, nos. 1-2:139-58 (published by the Pacific Coast Council on Latin American Studies in San Diego, California).
- MULLER, EDWARD N.
1985 "Dependent Economic Development, Aid Dependence on the United States, and Democratic Breakdown in the Third World." *International Studies Quarterly* 29:445-69.
- ROSTOW, W. W.
1960 *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- SONDROL, PAUL C.
1990a "Intellectuals and the Political Culture of Latin America: A Survey of the Roots of the Authoritarian Presidency." *Governance* 3, no. 4:416-37.
1990b "Authoritarianism in Paraguay: An Analysis of Three Contending Paradigms." *Review of Latin American Studies* 3, no. 1:83-105 (published by PCCLAS in San Diego).
1991 "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Dictators: A Comparison of Fidel Castro and Alfredo Stroessner." *Journal of Latin American Politics* 32, no. 2:599-620.
1992a "The Paraguayan Military in Transition and the Implications for Civil-Military Relations." *Armed Forces and Society* 19, no. 1 (Fall):105-22.
1992b "The Emerging New Politics of Liberalizing Paraguay: Sustained Civil-Military Rule without Democracy." *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs* 34, no. 2 (Fall):127-63.
1992c "1984 Revisited: A Reexamination of Uruguay's Military Regime." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 11, no. 2:187-203.
- TAYLOR, PHILIP B.
1962 *Government and Politics of Uruguay*. New Orleans, La.: Tulane University Press.
- TIANO, SUSAN
1986 "Authoritarianism and Political Culture in Argentina and Chile in the Mid-1960s." *LARR* 21, no. 1:73-98.
- VELIZ, CLAUDIO
1980 *The Centralist Tradition of Latin America*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- VERBA, SIDNEY
1985 "Comparative Politics: Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going?" In *New Directions in Comparative Politics*, edited by Howard Wiarda, 26-40. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- WARREN, HARRIS G.
1949 *Paraguay: An Informal History*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
1978 *Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: The Post-War Decade, 1869-1878*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
1985 *The Rebirth of the Paraguayan Republic: The First Colorado Era, 1878-1904*. Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- WHITE, RICHARD A.
1978 *Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, 1810-1840*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- WIARDA, HOWARD
1981 *Corporatism and National Development in Latin America*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- WILLIAMS, JOHN H.
1979 *The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic, 1800-1870*. Austin: University of Texas Press.