evant connotations of lions, such as yellow colour, nocturnal habits etc., are suppressed in order that the connotation 'bravery' may be brought out into the open. But not only does this confuse metaphor with simile, as one of Martin's authorities, Christine Brooke-Rose, has pointed out: it is founded upon an impossibility, namely the theory that concepts are formed by an 'abstracting' process of not concentrating on individual characteristics. It is a pity that, though he has read the book, Martin has not noticed page 84 pf Geach and Black's *Translations* from Frege, where the latter says wryly 'Inattention is a very strong lye: it must be applied at not too great a concentration, so that everything does not dissolve, and likewise not too dil-

ute, so that it effects a sufficient change in things. Thus it is a question of getting the right degree of dilution: this is difficult to manage, and I at any rate have never succeeded'. This abstractionist theory of universals has a long, if dishonourable history in logical theory, and seems a poor basis for a theory of literature. I am not sure how far Martin's general thesis can stand once this foundation stone is shown to be nothing but sand: but I fear the damage may be extensive, though many good things are said along the way, and the range of reference is extremely wide. Particularly good use is made of the author's knowledge of French as well as English literary sources.

BRIAN WICKER

SELF-DETERMINATION IN SOCIAL WORK. ed. F.E.McDermott. *Routledge and Kegan Paul,* **London and Boston, 1975. viii & 244 pp. £4.80.**

This is an admirable collection of papers or extracts from books. (With a couple of exceptions, all are noted as already published.) What is admirable about it is that it juxtaposes treatments of 'self-determination' by social work theorists and practising social workers with academic philosophers' treatments of concepts often presupposed in discussions of self-determination. Through the juxtaposition, the issues debated by the social work theorists – or in some cases the issues they should be debating – come out more clearly; and the treatments by the philosophers can – often – be seen to be using models which are too "thin", too simplified, to be applicable as they stand to the world of practising social workers. Pressure to consider "thinker" models of concepts supposed applicable to human affairs is more acceptable in moral philosophy today than it was in the days when philosophers appeared to agonise over extra helpings from overstocked donnish tables; and more philosophers (thanks, it should be added, to the tools sharpened by the donnish agonisers) need not be the losers by ceding to such pressures. I hope that the collection will also be welcome among social work theorists: more attention to points of the kind made by Sir

Isaiah Berlin or Professor McCloskey, for example, could have enabled them to avoid a certain amount of old-fashioned muddle which appears in too many places in their writings, including those presented here.

Papers or extracts collected here are: FP Biestek's, from *The Casework Relationship;* S.Bernstein, 'Self-determination: king or citizen in the realm of values?'; A Keith-Lucas, ' A critique of the principle of client serf-determination'; D.Soyer, 'The right to fail'; H.H.Perlman, 'Self-determination: reality or illusion?'; C Whittington, 'Self-determination re-examined'; R.F.Stalley, 'Determinism and the principle of client self-determination'; F.E.McDermott, 'Against the persuasive definition of "self-determination"'; I.Berlin, 'Two concepts of liberty'; H.McCloskey, 'A critique of the ideals of liberty'; H.L.A.Hart, 'Are there any natural rights?'; J.Wilson's, from *Equality;* A.I.Melden's, from *Rights and Right Conduct;* and finally, S.I.Benn, 'Freedom and Persuasion'. The book also has an introduction by the editor, a short bibliography and an index of names.

I commend the collection to moral philosophers and social work theorists alike.

L. MOONAN