

do not belong to that faith. From this point of view we can only regret the scornful way in which the authors frequently speak of the 'churches', the theologians and the faithful, and those who do not belong to their circles; one would almost say, to their coterie. There is sometimes an aggressiveness of tone, without mercy for the simple, and without charity for those who might disagree. But this can possibly be understood when one considers the situation they may have found themselves in.

There is another point which we cannot understand so easily. They think it their duty as university scholars to set out the objections of our time, and rightly so. But it seems to us that there remains a more important and urgent duty for a man who has been set free (this is what is meant by the Greek word *scholè*) to think about the foundations of our faith; that is to answer those objections, or at least to start answering them. We found a few solid suggestions for an answer only in the paper presented by Canon A. R. Vidler. It is easy to find and to express objections in matters of faith, but it is by no means so easy to give the proper answers. Our objections always ground on a particular point of view, and are immediately understood, but to answer them and to be understood at the same time, one has to master the full implications of the problem in all its aspects. And that is what a divine is for, certainly at a Christian university. If we restrain ourselves to a mere accumulation of objections, we may be listened to without any difficulty, because everybody feels more or less the same, but are we not indulging, at least unconsciously, in a kind of intellectual masochism? And are we honest if we do? That Christianity does not possess clearcut solutions for everything is evident. That we have to find God in the night of our faith is true, but is it necessary to reduce Christianity to a metaphysical puzzle? Even in honesty there is a certain amount of balance and wisdom. Honesty destroys itself when overstressed.

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ON PAUL AND JOHN, by T. W. Manson; Studies in Biblical Theology No. 38, S.C.M. Press, 13s. 6d.

These studies of selected themes in St Paul and in St John represent a shortened version of some of the late Professor Manson's lectures in the late forties and early fifties. The first half of the book considers the significance for Paul of Christ cosmically, and as Saviour, and in the Church. This section is dominated by an excellent discussion of the atonement in Paul, one passage of which I shall comment on in a moment. In the second half of the book we are given a connected sequence of studies on important Johannine themes, such as life, light, truth, and especially love. Manson uses these latter chapters to delineate Jesus as the revealer of God and, more particularly, of God as love, since Jesus is himself love incarnate. An outstanding (and concluding) study on St John's Logos doctrine examines its origins as well as its significance in the fourth gospel and first epistle. Unfortunately, in the last few pages the author attributes to the evangelist

the heretical opinion that the divine Logos entered into the human Jesus from the moment of his baptism, but not, at any rate in a 'complete way', from the first moment of the incarnation. Following upon this point too the argument seems to me to go astray on the problem of why the Logos is not mentioned, as such, in the gospel outside the prologue. Manson believed that there is no need for any mention after 1.14 because the Logos, having descended on Jesus at his baptism and remained on him, acts and speaks thereafter *in persona Christi*. The prologue was written, then, not as a preface added afterwards but as chapter 1 of the story, a statement in general terms of what is to be shown in detail in the rest of the gospel—namely that Jesus is the full and perfect revelation of God's nature made to man through man. This explanation rests on the assumption that the prologue was written first; and it fails, I think, to give an adequate reason for the remarkable disappearance of the key notion, Logos, after 'chapter 1 of the story'. But if the poetic parts of our prologue were grafted onto the gospel (together with the epilogue in chapter 21) after a decade or two of further meditation by John on the deeper eternal significance of the body of his book, the difficulty disappears. I should like to draw the attention of any one who has not yet seen it to the trenchant article on the prologue by Dr J. A. T. Robinson in the January number of *New Testament Studies*, where this solution is argued.

Professor Manson's book abounds in comparisons of the various possible sources, Jewish, Hellenistic and other, for the themes he discusses. The balanced judgment which he brings to bear on the attribution of origins to New Testament themes is an important feature of his work. In the case of his examination of Johannine themes, the discussion of sources forms a valuable supplement to the 'Leading Ideas' section of C. H. Dodd's famous book, *The Interpretation of the Fourth Gospel*, which showed a decided Hellenistic bias.

There is one passage where Manson justifiably attacks 'the full-blooded satisfaction theories based on Anselm', but also (perhaps unintentionally) leaves the reader with the impression that no doctrine involving satisfaction is acceptable. Since Catholic theology normally includes such a doctrine, at least since Aquinas, some comment seems desirable. Discussing Pauline theology, Manson says (p. 56): 'There are theories of the Atonement which suggest that God justifies men in consideration of satisfaction made for their sins by the death of Christ. These theories find no real support either in the teaching of Jesus or in that of Paul . . . God justifies 'by his grace as a gift' . . . no inducement is necessary to bring God to justify men. Least of all are we to suppose that God's justice can be vindicated by the punishment of the innocent'. To take the second point first, the doctrine of satisfaction by Christ need not include any idea of vindication of God's justice through punishing the innocent. It was Luther who rejected the Scholastic satisfaction theory, and taught instead that Christ bore by voluntary substitution the punishment due to man. Calvin went a step further in teaching that the Saviour 'bore in his soul the tortures of a condemned and ruined man'. But no; satisfaction is based not on punishment, but on love. 'To satisfy for an offence', wrote St Thomas (3a. 48. 2c), 'is to offer something that the person offended

loves as much as, or even more than, he detested the offence.' '... as when a man overlooks an offence on account of some pleasing service or honour done him' (49. 4c). The act from men's side that has pleased God more than he hates sin is of course not punishment but the obedience and love of his own Son, exhibited on the cross. It is satisfaction in this sense that forms the foundation of Paul's doctrine of our reconciliation to God. 'As by one man's disobedience the many were made sinners, so by one man's obedience the many will be made just' (Rom. 5. 19). The supreme redemptive act was freely performed by the Saviour on behalf of all men, and is effective for all who appropriate it to themselves, dying and rising with him through faith and baptism. For Paul, Christ redeemed us by acting representatively as man in solidarity with mankind. (A more detailed discussion of this will be found in LIFE OF THE SPIRIT, May 1962, pp. 455-468). Or, in the words of St Thomas, (3a. 49. 1c), 'At the price of his passion which he endured from obedience and love, Christ our Head set us free, as his own bodily members, from our sins; as if by the good work of his hands a man were to redeem himself from a sin committed with his feet.' Where St Thomas in his *Summa* does mention penal substitution in connection with satisfaction (in the 'conveniens' argument of 50. 1c), the emphasis is not on any notion of punishment itself somehow 'satisfying' God, but on Christ's *will* to submit himself to death for our salvation. It is by love that we are saved.

Manson's other point was that God justifies by his grace as a gift, without a *quid pro quo* of satisfaction being necessary as an inducement. This is of course true, as St Paul makes clear. But nevertheless Paul also insists that the free gift to all men of redemption through Christ's sacrifice is in fact (although it need not have been, had God so chosen) in some way the counterpart of the sin of Adam and all his descendants (Rom. 5. 12-21). It is in this way that God, without any inducement to do so from man's side, freely chose to accept satisfaction for sin. After all, the satisfaction was itself his free gift to men, the love that found expression on the cross. St Thomas explains it, in answering the objection that God's justice requires satisfaction (3a. 46. 2 and 3), by pointing out that even this aspect of justice depends on the divine will. If he had chosen to free men from sin without any satisfaction, this would not have been unjust, because he is himself the party offended by sin. It is open to any one mercifully to forgive an offence, without injustice, provided that the person offended is oneself, and not another or a higher authority. And so it follows that God was not bound in justice to exact satisfaction for sin. But he chose that his free gift of atonement should be the outcome of satisfaction for all men in Christ's representative act of filial obedience and love for the Father.

I hope that my criticism of some particular points in this valuable study in biblical theology will not be taken as derogatory of the whole. The work of Professor Manson, a non-Catholic, has been a contribution whose effects upon biblical study will persist; and in this sense the Preface is quite right when it says 'The work of a great scholar like Manson does not date'.

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