

two articles have been published in English which summarize Poltoratsky's position. The first was published in the *Russian Review* (April 1962) and the second in the *Slavonic and East European Review* (January 1967). Both are almost verbatim translations from two separate portions of the second part of *Berdiaev i Rossiia*.

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THE CONTROVERSY OVER CAPITALISM: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE RUSSIAN POPULISTS. By *A. Walicki*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969. 197 pp. \$6.25.

Andrzej Walicki's subject is populism as a broadly conceived ideology rather than as any specific movement within that general ideology. He could have stated this simply and briefly at the outset. But the first of the book's three chapters is spent wandering, as through a dark wood, seeking to "avoid terminological confusion." Walicki simultaneously argues with and moderates the argument between Lenin, Richard Pipes, and B. P. Kozmin over the semantic content of the term *narodnichestvo*. The outcome of the argument is ambiguous in the extreme, although Lenin seems to win. But Walicki concludes that we must move on, beyond these entangling disputes, and give emphasis to aspects of populism not dealt with by Lenin at all. At this point the study emerges into the light of day.

The remaining two chapters deal, first, with the ideology of "classical populism" (Lavrov, Bakunin, Tkachev, Mikhailovsky, Vorontsov, and Danielson) and, second, with the close relation between populism and Marxism. On the firmer ground of these last two chapters, Walicki draws a number of important conclusions concerning the meaning and significance of Russian populism: the apparent peculiarities of populism correspond, in fact, to those of a developing rural state, such as Russia, peculiarities which are typical of "all the backward countries in the process of modernization" (p. 129); Populists were the first to postulate the noncapitalist industrial development of a backward agrarian country; in carrying out this historical mission, classical populism "was not only defined, and not merely influenced, but, in a sense, called into being by Marxism" (p. 132); and populism, in turn, influenced Marx and the reception of Marxism both in Russia and, by extension, in the whole developing rural world.

The conclusions are fresh and challenging, but the book is marred by a number of substantive and technical weaknesses. Walicki draws on an unexpectedly wide range of Soviet and Western studies related to his theme. But there are significant omissions—for example, monographs by Theodore Von Laue, Samuel Baron, and B. S. Itenberg. The interrelationship between populism and West European socialism could have been dealt with more fully. The reader is teased by a footnote (p. 173) on the agrarian program of the First International and the *Manifesto to Agricultural Workers* written by J. P. Becker (and issued in the name of a Swiss section, not a German section, of the International). The journal *Vpered!* did not close down with Lavrov's resignation as editor (p. 94); volume 5 appeared in 1877 without him and cannot be called his journal at that point. The system of transliteration from the Russian is curious and inconsistent (e.g., occasionally *c* for *ts*). *Prosvetitel'stvo* is prominently misspelled (p. 14).

The text should have been better edited, and the first chapter could have been left out altogether, but Walicki has offered a noteworthy and convincing reappraisal

of populism, "one of the most interesting chapters in the history of nineteenth-century social thought."

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RED OCTOBER: THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION OF 1917. By *Robert V. Daniels*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. xiv, 271 pp. \$6.95.

Professor Daniels has set out to separate myth from reality in the October Revolution, and all who value truth will be indebted to him. Instead of the inexorable march of the masses toward inevitable victory, we see confusion on every hand, even in the Bolshevik organization, and a welter of humanity as little willing to defend the Provisional Government as to install the Bolsheviks in power. Instead of the leadership of Lenin eventuating in the execution of a faultless plan, we see a furious little man absorbed in berating Kamenev and Zinoviev as the decisive hours of Russian history are slipping by, secluded from his own party as well as from the police, and frustrated in his attempt to goad his reluctant followers into upsetting the government before the Second Soviet Congress in order to secure the exclusive power that is his true objective. From this impasse he is rescued by the bumbling countermeasures of the Provisional Government, which give Bolshevik preparations the defensive coloration needed to bring their supporters into action. In the last analysis the Soviet regime is born as a result of chance developments and the fact that the Bolsheviks are less disorganized than their enemies.

One need not accept Daniels's thesis in its entirety to admire the way in which he has advanced it. Too often in American scholarship the footnotes seem to choke the narration. But not in this instance—Daniels has chosen the essay form, unencumbered by citations or tedious explanations. As a result, his story moves straight down the line, as interesting as it is authoritative, and sprinkled with formulations that attest to depth of understanding as well as to literary grace. A certain price is exacted, however, for the admirable continuity: even the expert on occasion will curse Daniels for having no footnotes at all, and the reader may be abandoned (as on page 118) to find his way with little help from the author amid the maze of committees, commissions, organs, and agencies.

The reviewer cannot agree with Daniels that the October Revolution was a "wild gamble" taken in the face of "incredible odds." It is not accurate to say that the overwhelming majority of the peasants and the army in the field were against the Bolsheviks; it would be better to say merely that they were not with them, remembering that neither were they with the Provisional Government. Nor is it correct to say that all agreed that a Leninist coup would end in speedy collapse and a military dictatorship, although that was certainly the prevailing view. One of the most extreme conservatives, Purishkevich, suspected that the Bolsheviks might get stronger, not weaker, the longer they stayed in power; and at the other end of the political spectrum Chernov, who had not underestimated Lenin even in April of 1917, feared in November that his rural constituency was endangered by a regime which did indeed become the greatest executioner of peasants in history. It was the almighty influence of the war that opened the way to Bolshevism by splitting up and paralyzing the potential opposition—peasant, party, and army. The earlier pages of the book bear witness to the crushing weight of the war, but toward the end its significance is played down (pp. 215, 224) in line with the author's emphasis upon the element of chance.