War, the State and Peace in two Sudans

Daniel Akech Thiong. *The Politics of Fear in South Sudan: Generating Chaos, Creating Conflict*. London: Zed Books, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2021. xxii + 217 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $35.95. Paper. ISBN: 9781786996787.

Sharath Srinivasan. *When Peace Kills Politics: International Intervention and Unending Wars in the Sudans*. London: Hurst, 2021. xv + 400 pp. $34.55. Paper. ISBN: 9781849048316.

Sonja Theron. *Leadership, Nation-Building and War in South Sudan: The Problems of Statehood and Collective Will*. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2022. x + 199 pp. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Index. $27.85. Paper. ISBN: 9780755622153.

Knowledge of African history aptly suggests that the quest for political independence in the continent is generally driven by the idea that such independence leads to statehood. By statehood, here, I refer to the ability of a sovereign country to exercise effective control over its territory, govern its people, and engage in international relations. Yet, political independence in Africa seldom leads to statehood without the experience of internal conflicts such as coup d'état or civil war. The three reviewed books, *The Politics of Fear in South Sudan: Generating Chaos, Creating Conflict* by Daniel Akech Thiong, *When Peace Kills Politics: International Intervention and Unending Wars in the Sudans* by Sharath Srinivasan, and *Leadership, Nation-Building and War in South Sudan: The Problems of Statehood and Collective Will* by Sonja Theron, attempt to explain why the quest for statehood in Sudan and South Sudan is characterized by diverse forms of conflicts and how the seemingly unending conflicts could be resolved. While the primary focus of each of the books differ, their respective positions concerning the key factors and actors fueling and sustaining violent conflicts in both Sudan and South Sudan are complementary.

Daniel Akech Thiong's book, *The Politics of Fear in South Sudan: Generating Chaos, Creating Conflict*—a work of eight chapters—begins with a Preface (xi–xvii). It highlights the complex mesh of political turmoil afflicting South Sudan. For Thiong, the politics of fear "refers to the elite politicization of group identity, the decentralization of fear and the mobilization of perceptions of danger, insecurity, resentment and hatred to discredit and dominate rivals and to control populations" (xv). A well-known political contrivance of the ancient empires and the contemporary states, the politics of fear constitutes a powerful phenomenon

orienting both human behavior and societal dynamics. In history, leaders employ it to instil fear, force compliance to their demands, and elicit assent from people. It is a known trademark of oppressive regimes. As a tool of governance, Machiavelli privileged it in his book, *The Prince*, where he enjoined rulers to make it a toolset for their subjects. Not only Machiavellism but also the infamous totalitarian regimes of the twentieth-century Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia and many others found in it an enormous means of manipulating their subjects. In the contemporary world, leaders shaping various political groups take recourse to it at unguarded moments: Cartel wars, the new wars, unscrupulous politicians, and even terrorist groups like Al-Quaeda and Boko Haram and many others, all buy into it. Its influence is as expansive as its use is destructive of civilizations, populations, lives, and property. One discovers that even political juggernauts make much of economic instability to justify policies that erode civil liberties. The central point of the politics of fear is the perpetuation of fear in the media as direly significant over and above any other forms of dialogue. Besides, this politics exaggerates threats and stokes anxieties above all. The media, on its own, makes its contributions. In fact, the media privileges misinformation, rapidly spreads and amplifies sources of fear and anxiety.

Thiong's analysis of the politics of fear explores principal chains of themes, exposing convoluted subtleties and interplay of power and ethnicity, violence and governance in South Sudan. The book offers a productive analysis of fear as a political tool. It shows also how this tool plays out with ethnicity during conflict, how violence impacts on civilian populations, and how external agents pursue their interests while negotiating for peace. Thus, it furnishes invaluable insights for many workers and practitioners: for scholars, policymakers, and diplomats facing up to the challenges of a war-torn South Sudan. Significant to Thiong's analysis remains this point: how political elites employed fear to maintain power and control over South Sudanese. Thiong puts in greater relief various avenues by means of which state repression, propaganda, and the politicization of ethnic identity are used to propagate both fear and insecurity. Which is why he underlines the insidious nature of fear as a means of manipulating the citizens, undermining democratic processes and impeding peacemaking efforts towards reconciliation.

Central to Thiong's book is the connection of ethnicity and conflict in South Sudan. For many thinkers writing on Africa, ethnicity explains most warfare and combats, tensions and battles. For such scholars, ethnicity is the divisive element that keeps Africans apart. To claim that it is the case in South Sudan's hostilities depicts a misunderstanding of the major issues in South Sudan. This element—ethnicity—alone does not explain South Sudan's tensions and conflicts. Although it plays some role, it is not solely the explanation. Hence, when Thiong discusses it, he makes this point abundantly clear. In fact, he sketches, historically, the origins of ethnic grievances and tensions, and how political leadership abuses ethnicity to maintain their hold on their members and clients to justify violence. To ensure that peace reigns, Thiong powerfully argues the need to address the hidden grievances of excluded ethnic groups so as to foster all-encompassing governance. He considers this line of thought as indispensable for the pursuit of peace and stability in South Sudan. Given his analysis, which

vividly sometimes draws the horrible consequences of violence on the citizenship population of South Sudan, he emphasizes the urgent need to forestall cycles of vengeance, violence and political leadership's acting with impunity. Thiong urges for accountability mechanisms and justice reforms to break the hideous cycle of violence and build constructive trust among communities.

Violence, fear and conflict are all too often pervasive in South Sudan. This is one of the convictions that Thiong's audience comes away with after reading his book. However, it is not the only one! Thiong balances out his narrative by highlighting tales of heartening resistance and resilience among ordinary South Sudanese. Further, he recognizes the attempts of various organizations like civil society, movements at the grass roots, and community leaders bent on protecting their communities—these types of people and organizations do challenge the cycles of grievances and injustice, while advocating for peace rather than the fear-driven narratives. Thiong's analysis furnishes some hope for peacebuilding in the future. It enshrines a vision of hope, since it offers some ray of hope for the return of "non-violent civil politics" to use Sharath Srinivasan's phrase in his book, *When Peace Kills Politics.* Thiong lays much emphasis on grassroots activism and an all-inclusive peacebuilding society. He isolates possible avenues for peace in his book: such ways comprise comprehensive political action, dialogue and reconciliation, and building trust among both the grassroots and the communities and villages. For Thiong, these avenues make for the best possible ways to foster peace, address community grievances, distrust of communities and ethnic nations against the other. In fact, Thiong recommends a holistic approach to tackling the hostilities of South Sudan and recognizes the agential action of community leaders in securing the future of their subjects.

External actors play an active role in the perpetuation of fear, chaos, and conflict in South Sudan. Not only does Thiong stress international and foreign meddling and mediation in South Sudan's conflicts, he also highlights the influences of South Sudan's neighbors, regional power dynamics and interests, but also the foreign countries like the USA, UK, Israel, and Russia. He did investigate the role of these foreigners in South Sudan's proxy warfare, offering to train the rebels of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and equipping them with ammunitions. This shows that foreign countries angled for their interests in South Sudan. Neighboring countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, Libya, and others have played various roles in the conflict—they acted as puppets to the foreign states to supply arms and backed the various sides to the war. Further, they also maintained the interests of their countries should South Sudan collapse eventually. Both regional and foreign powers helped exacerbate internal conflicts and thereby undermine efforts towards peace and stability. Equally, they vied with one another for influence and control over the country's vast natural resources and strategic location. Thiong exemplifies these things by highlighting how regional rivalries and alliances contribute to instability and conflict, as competing factions seek support from external patrons to advance their interests. Thiong also points out the role of the United Nations, Western governments, and humanitarian organizations, in addressing the worst world humanitarian crisis and their prominent roles in the search for peace in South Sudan.

Not only does Thiong acknowledge the efforts of the international community to provide humanitarian assistance and facilitate peace negotiations, he also criticizes the limited effectiveness of these interventions in addressing the root causes of conflict. Generally, Thiong's analysis emphasizes the intricate and hydra-headed function of foreign actors in forging the political dynamics of South Sudan. Overall, the foreign actors, on the one hand, pursue their interests, and on the other hand, sue for peace and pursue development initiatives. They also contribute to instability and conflict through their geopolitical calculations, economic interests, and interventions.

The book is enormously significant in a number of ways: it is both comprehensive as it is interdisciplinary. Its empirical and narrative content is enlightening and its critical analysis of the role of fear shapes the political landscape of South Sudan. Thiong employs a number of perspectives in making his analysis understandable and clear. He draws on the historical, the political, and the sociological perspectives so as to offer a holistic view of the complexities of the conflicts and the multifaceted sides to it. He painstakingly and laboriously emphasizes the various stances—the interdisciplinary just as the insights from political science, history, international peace intervention processes as well as sociology, and conflict studies. By appealing to these perspectives, he seeks to shed sufficient light on the multilayered nature and meaning of fear and its implications for governance and peacemaking. Again, Thiong sees the book as a contribution to the history of South Sudan. He consulted a number of resources, literatures, and conducted interviews. He pursued analysis and answered the critics, supporting his claims with empirical evidence to make his book stand out among a whole lot of others. This empirical evidence adduced in support of his claims enlivens the narrative content of the book and boosts his arguments. He thus furnishes his audience with poignant illustrations of his hard concepts. Thiong's analysis targets the political dynamics in South Sudan. He calls into question the established norms and political structure of the society. At the same time, he questions the underlying power structures that perpetuate fear and conflict. His readiness to interrogate the norms and assumptions of the political elite enriches the scholarly relevance and discourse of the book.

For all its intents and purposes, Thiong's book leaves much to be desired. For all the events taking place in South Sudan, he devoted his attention solely to the politics of fear. Inspiring as it is, Thiong's analysis and focus on this subject demonstrates often a narrow focus and is highly limited. This is because it lacks an in-depth investigation of related issues germane to the politics of fear. Most striking is the book's limited attention to alternative perspectives. The book reads as if only one point of view is possible—the author's. Dissenting opinions are indeed minimal and where they exist, they are not sustained sufficiently. Had he offered a more balanced view and left the audience guessing at his next move, the book's effect would have been arresting on the audience. Though his insights into the root causes of various conflicts are encouraging, the book seems to shy away from suggesting policy recommendations for the problems that irked South Sudan. A more explicit discussion of potential solutions and actionable

strategies for peacebuilding and governance reform could have enhanced the book's practical utility for policymakers and practitioners.

All things considered, *The Politics of Fear in South Sudan: Generating Chaos, Creating Conflict* by Daniel Akech Thiong is a promising contribution to the scholarly literatures on the history and governance of South Sudan. It offers invaluable insights into the mesh of problems and tasks facing political actors of South Sudan. The book makes for compelling reading for students and scholars of South Sudan as well as for the wider audience seeking to comprehend the roots of South Sudan's mayhem and instability as well as the possibilities for a brighter future.

Srinivasan's book, *When Peace Kills Politics: International Intervention and Unending Wars in the Sudans*, grapples principally with persistent failures of several peacemaking initiatives in Sudan and South Sudan, with a view to preventing recurrent and continuing wars and obviating political authoritarianism. In the context of the wider world, the book equally makes some invaluable contributions towards peacemaking processes. The book covers solely the contemporary period of the two Sudans, from 1983 to 2020. One notes that South Sudan has been engaged in the longest drawn-out civil war for years in Africa—twenty-two years! Alongside those decades, there abounds a "litany of peace intervention failures" (31). Hence it becomes a worthy preoccupation for Srinivasan to pursue the questions, why do peacemaking processes in Sudan fail? Why do peacemaking interventions lead to further violence, coercion and wars? "What can go wrong" with peacemaking and "why?" The book demonstrates how experts in peacemaking, like "diplomats, mediators, international organizations, rightly seek to make a world for civil political action, but peacemaking—because of how its ways of working inevitably collide with the politics of a civil war—can risk reproducing logics of violence" (52–53).

Srinivasan spent an enormity of years–fifteen years in all—on the book. He literally read nearly every material on Sudan and related areas. He even worked as a humanitarian aid worker, living in Sudan and interviewing key players. He knew them individually. Which is why he records tweeted messages of diplomats and personal conversations with mediators.

Srinivasan sets out three objectives of his book: (i) to investigate the possible reason(s) for the failures of peacemaking initiatives and interventions; (ii) to inquire into why failures of peacemaking processes have to do with the various forms of contemporary peacemaking; (iii) to "rethink" indeed the entire edifice of peacemaking. Srinivasan infuses new outlook and approach into peacemaking processes. For him, the basic challenge is to explore how peacemaking processes fail and not just how the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) failed to ensure peace in Sudan. In this way, he contributes not merely to Sudans' pursuit of peace but also to global peacemaking interventions and processes.

In the introduction, he advances two arguments and makes a proposal, thereby pointing to the orientation of the book. He first argues that during civil wars, peacemaking, all too often depends on the means and instrumental logics that are inherently essentially violent. For Srinivasan, "non-violent civil politics" (11–15) must be the goal of and "primary end" of peacemaking. Hence, he

emphasizes that "[w]e should at least commit to what peacemaking must be for: it is for bringing about non-violent civil politics" (228). The second argument (13–15) maintains that even though external, nonlocal, and international peacemaking sets out to promote nonviolent civil politics, the means, which it puts at its disposal and "the ends it pursues as enabling this, risk coercing and debilitating that very politics, in turn motivating political violence and reinforcing its currency" (13). The proposal, referred to above, consists of Srinivasan's suggested way for rethinking peacemaking processes. Really, Arendt never wrote any work on peacemaking processes. Rather her idea of politics, and of the relationship between politics, war, and violence, inspired Srinivasan to relate insights from Arendt's works to peacebuilding (42–46). According to this perspective, it is the means and instrumental logics of peacemaking during civil war that have failed *ab initio.* This is because the essentially and inherently violent feature of peacemaking reproduces violence and coercion.

Srinivasan preoccupies himself, in some portions of the book, with inquiring into the nature of peacemaking, with what inevitably goes wrong with peacemaking and why. Indeed, peacemaking targets the cessation of hostilities and hence peace. By consequence, it focuses its attention on the belligerent parties, their demands, resources, and power sharing. Srinivasan's outstanding contribution in his book is to disagree with the above attitude of diplomats and expert mediators. For him, maintaining nonviolent civil politics ought to be the principal objective of any peacemaking process even before ending armed struggle.

The book consists of eight chapters, with a postscript, a conclusion, and an index. The introduction is different from Chapter One, where he elaborately discusses his new outlook, rethinking. Chapters Two through Five constitute the first part of the book and the "core arguments" (15) relating to Sudan. These chapters furnish the analysis of events historically leading up to CPA, through variously significant episodes. In these chapters, Srinivasan effectively enquires into the "means-ends logics" (15) contrived to preclude nonviolent civil politics. Striking especially is the way in which he writes the intensification of Darfur hostilities into the CPA negotiations. For him, political violence in the Darfur region exploded in part because international peacemakers employed the smartly packaged "ideals of problem-solution" (83) and reduced the conflict through "simplification" so as to gun for peace. Further, Srinivasan portrays how the expert peacemakers distorted the aspect of political violence in the Darfur crisis beyond recognition. Not only did the expert peacemakers overlook the connection between the crude maneuvers of the Government of Sudan (GoS) and its weak position during negotiations, they also seemed unaware of the SPLM/A's strategies and involvement. They did all this to hold true their contrived North–South presumed peace arrangement.

The second part of the book (Chapters Six to Eight) consists of inter-linkages of peacemaking and violence from after post-CPA to the postscript. In these chapters, Srinivasan has succeeded in charting his originally new reconceptualization of peacemaking process. His outlook on peacemaking takes up a new approach and a completely new mentality. The uniqueness of his approach derives from his insightful application of Arendt's political thought to peacemaking. The postscript refers to the insights from Arendt about nonviolent civil

politics; in the postscript, Srinivasan enthuses about Sudan's 2019 protests, civil and political opposition (275, 279) in contradistinction to expert mediators' peacemaking. According to Srinivasan's view, peacemaking is better worked out with the civilian population, rather than forcing it, "neatly" packaged, upon the people.

The CPA is the result of the joint action of the regional peacemaking organization, Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), and the support of the Troika states (the USA, UK, Norway). For decades, IGAD negotiated the peace process until the Troika successfully backed its efforts. There was the unsettling danger portended for Sudan's neighbors and its region. Each group—the neighbors and the external actors—scoured the terrain for its interests: while the external actors aimed at preventing the possible terrorist bent in Sudan, the region guarded against bearing the brunt of Sudans' interminable wars.

To clinch the CPA deal in spite of the war in Darfur, IGAD duly prevailed on both parties, the GoS and the SPLM/A. The negotiations, which ended with the signing of the CPA on January 9, 2005, led to the sidelining of some groups and sections of the country. There was the undue importance ascribed to certain binaries: Instead of a peacemaking process comprehending the entire Sudan, diplomats and mediators sought to limit it to North-South parts. The excluded groups—the citizens of the Nuba Mountains, the Blue Nile, and the Abyei regions—were all disregarded as of little or no consequence. All negotiations were concealed from the public gaze. For the discarded groups, the CPA held rarely little value. Although CPA led to the self-determination of the South Sudan, the referendum, the eventual independence, and the six years of power sharing between GoS and SPLM/A, CPA never deeply affected the outlook and attitude of the public. Hence a year after the signing of the CPA, all warring parties recommended their hostilities, contrary to expectations. As Srinivasan's analysis clearly explains, CPA's failure to assure peace, change the people's outlook on reality, furnish security, and successfully implement peace derives from the exclusion of the public from negotiations.

Srinivasan places CPA negotiations side by side with the civilian populations' protests against President al-Bashir in 2019. Although the people's protests were nonviolent and locally inspired, it succeeded in the return of nonviolent civil politics. This comparison points to a significant view of Srinivasan: peacemaking enforced upon the public rarely holds water. To hold truly, the public necessarily needs always to form a part and parcel of any peacemaking process. Ultimately, Srinivasan does not restrict his principal aim to fashioning a new model or design. He does not agree that modeling peacemaking makes for the success of peacemaking, much less inventing any good-luck device to achieve peacemaking interventions during civil war possible. By proposing a reconceptualization (rethinking) of what peacemaking is (nature and meaning), he aims to arrive at effective peacemaking.

Srinivasan's book furnishes a significantly unique view among others: enforced peace does not last. To endure the test of time, peacemaking has to be people-centered. The book's empirical analyses are undeniably rich and the narrative content enlightening. Cutting across many disciplines, the book

remains highly promising for scholars and experts in many disciplines like political science, history, and peacemaking, as well as in other related fields. However, it still has to offer more concretely the practical dimensions of rethinking peacemaking processes.

Sonja Theron's book, *Leadership, Nation-Building and War in South Sudan: The Problems of Statehood and Collective Will*, offers a comprehensive analysis of the complex interplay between leadership dynamics, nation-building efforts, and the enduring challenges of war in the context of South Sudan's tumultuous journey towards statehood. The author meticulously dissects the multifaceted issues plaguing South Sudan to provide a nuanced understanding of principal factors hindering the emergence and consolidation of South Sudan as a stable and prosperous state. The book, which stems from a doctoral research conducted between 2015 and 2018, consists of an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion. Its findings derived from an extensive review of extant literature, "archival research, and interviews with members and former members of government, civil society members, and members of international governmental organizations, conducted in Juba and Nairobi in June 2017" (14). The historical approach was generously employed to examine what Theron identifies as the key components of nationhood—namely, identity, statehood, collective will, and responsibility.

The book begins with an introduction to the "fault lines" of identity and leadership in South Sudan (1–17). Identity and leadership count as significant fault lines because they are widely considered to be responsible for the series of violent conflicts and civil wars in South Sudan. While the historical composition of South Sudan as a place inhabited by members of diverse ethnic groups, who speak distinct languages makes the formation of a common national identity difficult, it behooves on leaders of the various ethnic, political, and rebel groups, who fought for the independence of the Sudan and secession of South Sudan, to unite their people and create a common South Sudanese identity. Due to the inability or unwillingness of South Sudanese leaders to create a common national identity, "[m]any people do things on the idea that tomorrow 'I will go to another country'" (1). This situation depicts the absence of what the author calls "collective will" and "collective responsibility"—which respectively refer to a people's ability to arrive at communal decisions and act accordingly, and to the loyalty, rights and responsibilities human beings place on each other as part of one country. Nonetheless, Theron argues against attempts to interpret the challenges of South Sudan as merely the product of historical rivalry between two dominant ethnic groups (the Dinka and the Nuer) or the incompetence of any particular leader.

In Part One (Chapters One and Two), Theron unearths the historical struggles of the people of South Sudan to foreground their shared experiences and problems as a people and a polity. While the first chapter traces South Sudan's history, from the time of external "conquest and colonization" (19–34) by the Turco-Egyptian regime (between 1821 and 1885), and the Mahdist regime (1885–98) to the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (1898–1956), the second chapter focuses on the independence of Sudan from Anglo-Egyptian colonial rule and the resultant rebellion of the people of southern Sudan against the government of

Sudan, which culminated into the first Sudanese civil war of 1955–72. Part Two of the book examines how unresolved issues of identity politics and marginalization reignite the quest for secession, ultimately leading to the second Sudanese civil war of 1982–2002. Accordingly, the third and fourth chapter respectively address emergent challenges of leadership and ingroup rivalries during the second civil war. Finally, Part Three of the book dwells on the secession, outbreak of civil war, and continuing quest for peacebuilding and state building in South Sudan. Chapter Five specifically explicates the challenge of "negotiating and implementing peace" in a war-torn nation-state, while Chapter Six reconsiders the price of freedom in a fragile and fragmented country. It is in the "conclusion" of the book that the author recapitulates some of the salient points captured in various chapters.

Central to Theron's book is the issue of why peace has continued to elude the people of South Sudan even after secession from Sudan in 2011. The outbreak of civil war in 2013, just two years after independence, exposed the fragility of the new nation-state and the unresolved tensions. Beneath the surface, South Sudan is admittedly a multiethnic state that lacks a cohesive national identity. Instead of laying the blame on any singular factor, Theron traces the enduring conflict, from historical grievances among ethnic groups, identity politics, and lack of collective will to contemporary power tussles by politico-military elites. First, she argues that ethnic diversity is a defining feature of South Sudan. The country has over sixty distinct ethnic groups. While diversity can be a source of strength, it has also been a driving force behind internal divisions and conflicts across the world. Ethnic rivalries, fueled by competition over resources, political power, and historical grievances, have perpetuated cycles of violence in South Sudan, thereby hindering efforts at building a cohesive national identity.

Second, the proliferation of armed groups and militias aligned along ethnic lines exacerbates identity politics that further complicates the peace process. Politicians often exploit ethnic divisions for political gain, deepening mistrust and undermining efforts at inclusive governance and reconciliation. The transition of the SPLM/A from a rebel movement to the ruling party has also posed significant challenges in building effective governance structures and institutions in South Sudan. This is because factionalism within the ruling SPLM/A has exacerbated political instability and undermined the coherence of the state. Power struggles among competing factions have hindered efforts at implementing reforms, fostering inclusive governance, and addressing the root causes of conflict. Third, another major factor responsible for incessant violent conflicts in the country is lack of mutuality. As used in the book, mutuality refers to the presence of a common situation or challenge confronting both leaders and followers who hold a common goal or purpose. The significance of the concept of mutuality derives from an interpretation of the leadership process approach that studies the relationship between leaders and followers in search of a viable solution to their common situation or challenge. Indeed, it is often difficult to create collective will and enforce collective responsibility in a society where there is no mutuality between leaders and followers.

One of the book's strengths is its examination of leadership paradigms within South Sudan. The author deftly explores how different leadership styles, from

authoritarianism to consensus-building, have shaped the country's trajectory, often exacerbating existing tensions or failing to address the root causes of conflict. Through insightful case studies and historical analysis, Theron illustrates the pivotal role of leadership in either perpetuating violence or fostering reconciliation and nation-building. Moreover, she delves into the intricacies of nation-building in a postconflict setting, shedding light on the formidable challenges inherent in creating a cohesive national identity amidst ethnic diversity and historical grievances. By elucidating the contestations over power, resources, and representation, the book underscores the arduous task of reconciling divergent interests and fostering inclusive governance structures essential for sustainable peace and development. Despite the comprehensive and insightful nature of Theron's book, some readers may find the academic depth and complexity of her analysis challenging to navigate. Nonetheless, the book is an invaluable resource for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners seeking a deeper understanding of the intricate dynamics shaping South Sudan's turbulent trajectory.

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