

parts. On all these matters there are new pieces of information which, if accurate, will significantly amplify the historical record. Yet the scholar must look carefully before swallowing these tidbits, for many of Khrushchev's statements which *are* subject to verification contain errors of date and identity, and have misleading omissions.

For the student of Soviet politics there are many sidelights on leading officials and their mutual relationships; and on how particular decisions were made. More important, however, are the patterns that emerge incidental to or implicit in the narrative. For instance, while Khrushchev continually affirms his adherence to the principle of collective leadership, he relates many instances where policy was first initiated in discussions between himself and the experts, and then reached an advanced stage of decision before its referral to the Presidium (Politburo) for endorsement. One is also surprised at how frequently, according to Khrushchev's account, new policy departures originated in encounters among leaders, or between leaders and specialists, while on vacation (ironic, when one recalls the circumstances of Khrushchev's overthrow). The emphasis given in this volume to shared recreation as a means of cementing political relationships reveals the informal structure of Soviet politics, presumably of great and often crucial importance. This informal structure has been so poorly illuminated in the past that one must be doubly grateful for these few flashes of light.

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SMITH'S MOSCOW. By *Desmond Smith*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974. xii, 335 pp. \$8.95.

FODOR'S SOVIET UNION 1974-75. Edited by *Eugene Fodor* and *Robert C. Fisher*. New York: David McKay, 1974. 543 pp. \$10.95.

A Western guidebook to the Soviet Union for tourists seems almost like a contradiction in terms. Most visitors, whether traveling individually or in groups, sooner or later spend time sightseeing with an Intourist guide. Unless a traveler is particularly adventurous and/or equipped with a knowledge of Russian, he or she is not likely to stray far from the officially assigned hotel, use telephones and public transportation, queue up for meals and theater tickets, sample museums and other cultural activities, in short, to act as tourists normally act anywhere else in the world. Both of the guidebooks before us, the latest in a growing literature of this type, provide the prospective visitor with the useful information that the charge for a telephone call from a public booth is two kopecks, that a two-kopeck piece must be placed in the slot *before* picking up the receiver, and one must wait for the dial tone before dialing the desired number. The fact is that the casual Western tourist is not likely to venture anywhere near a public telephone in the Soviet Union.

Be that as it may, travel handbooks continue to be published and need to be judged on their merits. Of the two under review, *Smith's Moscow*, by a British-born journalist who worked in Moscow in 1966 on assignment for the American Broadcasting Company, is a chatty guidebook that gives a sense of immediacy, but is unfortunately badly out of date. *Fodor's Soviet Union*, covering the entire country, is a far more structured handbook in the Fodor manner, with 200 out of 500-odd pages devoted to background information about the Soviet scene, including

"A Mini History of Russia—From Rurik to the Romanovs" in the form of a chronology of five pages and a dissertation on "The Lively Arts," from the origins of Russian music to the Bolshoi Ballet. The two books contrast sharply in tone. The Smith guide is designed to encourage tourists to explore on their own and to drop the inhibitions that often accompany a visit to the Soviet Union. "Moscow is a secretive city, yes, but it is not a scary one," Smith says. "It can be as much fun to wander around alone in as London or Paris." Elsewhere he seeks to whet the appetite with passages like the following: "Moscow is an agglutination of districts that, like leaves in a book, have stuck together in the course of centuries; a city that is still as inward-turning as when it was walled and gated: acres of ruddy brick apartments built at the turn of the century, two-story wooden houses with fretted window frames, cheese-colored villas seen beyond the railed-in gardens." Descriptions like these sound true and rouse a responsive note in at least this long-time resident of Moscow. Fodor's approach is less spontaneous: "Let's face it," the editors say in the foreword, "you're not going to the Soviet Union to have fun. Almost everybody is aware of the fact that a visit to Russia has little to do with creature comforts, enjoyments of leisure, amusements, sun, sand, *après ski* or any of the other frivolous pursuits associated with having a good time."

Smith implements what he preaches by describing some walking tours in a chapter on "Getting About Moscow," which is the heart of his book. "Let Intourist show you the main sights," he recommends. "But when the official sightseeing is over, take to the streets and explore the city on your own." His walking tours are restricted to central Moscow, but at least they encourage the tourist to abandon Intourist cars and to get a feel of the place by walking the streets. Unhappily, some of the information is outdated. Mr. Smith advises the reader to enter the Kremlin through the Spassky Gate, at the lower end of Red Square. This gate has for some years now been restricted to official visitors and is barred to casual strollers, who enter through the Borovitsky Gate, on the other side of the Kremlin. Even more dismaying is the fact that all the telephone numbers listed in the Smith guide for foreign company representatives, airlines and embassies are the old six-digit numbers that were replaced by a seven-digit system more than a decade ago.

Fodor's Soviet Union has up-to-date phone numbers and gets you into the Kremlin through the right gate. But it suffers from other flaws. For one thing it contains far too many misspellings of Russian names. There is scarcely a page without a garble. Thumbing through at random, one finds Dzerzhinsky on p. 214, Sadoyava on p. 217, Nozdvizhenska on p. 219. The Moscow City Hall is spelled Mossoviet on one page and the theater is spelled Mossovyet on the next page; one paragraph has Leningradsky Prospekt and the next has Leningrad Prospekt. There seems to be a virtual absence of editorial control. Confusion is compounded in the section on the Baltic republics where some names are rendered in the original Baltic spellings and others are retransliterated out of the Russian. In a walk through Tallinn, for example, one finds the bastion Kiek in de Kök (Peep into the Kitchen) on the hill Haryu Magi (should be Harjumägi). In the lower town the word "jalg" (leg) is consistently misspelled "yalg," if not totally garbled as "yalf" (p. 345). In a note on spelling, in the foreword, the editors try to cover themselves by saying that "the Soviet authorities themselves are not consistent"! Fodor attempts to cover all parts of the Soviet Union open to tourists and even mentions, rather irrelevantly, places like Norilsk that are normally closed to for-

eign travelers. But an eight-day journey on the Trans-Siberian Railway is dismissed in just five pages. That is precisely a time when the foreign traveler could use a good guidebook, such as the fine Soviet guide *Moskva-Vladivostok*, edited by V. V. Pokshishevskii and V. V. Vorobiev (Moscow: "Mysl'," 1968).

After examining the two latest guidebooks, a devotee of travel guides still yearns for the perfect product. Will there ever again be one like Baedeker's *Russia*, published in 1914?

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THE SUPERPOWERS AND ARMS CONTROL: FROM COLD WAR TO INTERDEPENDENCE. By *Walter C. Clemens, Jr.* Lexington, Mass., Toronto, London: Lexington Books, D. C. Heath, 1973. xxvi, 181 pp. \$13.50.

Walter C. Clemens, Jr. has written a timely analysis of the problem of arms control. As the author states, this study is an attempt to explain the impact of the West upon Soviet policy with regard to arms control and "to learn what the Soviet leaders were doing—and why—so that Westerners could better decide what to do about it."

He proceeds to submit six propositions characterizing Soviet foreign policy directed at controlling the arms race. The first proposition is that Soviet external behavior since the death of Stalin has reflected a "hierarchy of values" which places the security of the Soviet rulers and the legitimization of their regime at the top. Second is the security of the Soviet state. Maintaining and influencing Soviet control over the bloc comes next, then industrialization of the country and improvement in living standards of the Soviet people. Finally there is the maintenance and strengthening of Soviet influence in the international Communist movement and the Third World. One cannot disagree with this order of priorities.

Nor can one quarrel with the author's other propositions: that Soviet military actions have been defensive—except to recover territories within the confines of the tsarist regime; that Soviet military policy stems from a perception of military inferiority; that Soviet proposals for arms control with the West have been influenced more by military-strategic interests than by the requirements of the Communist doctrine; that the more the United States and the USSR become similar in military structure the greater the likelihood of an arms agreement; and so forth. Professor Clemens does concede that Soviet actions in foreign policy have led to the atmosphere of suspicion that surrounds the East-West relationship. However, he points out that the fault is not always on the side of the USSR. The West, led by the United States, has often carried out policies toward the USSR which have exacerbated the mutual distrust. Clemens cites the West's rejection of the Rapacki Plan as an example. He also takes the position that the United States, with its strategic superiority over the USSR from the end of World War II to the late 1960s, will continue to have strategic superiority in the 1970s, in spite of the Soviets acquiring stronger nuclear and naval power. Clemens does believe that the Salt I—1972 agreements benefit both sides, and although both sides could intensify the arms race, they also could enact further agreements in Salt II.

As Clemens develops his essay he raises many other basic questions in regard to assessing the Soviet-American arms equation. The book is stimulating, scholarly