

This special issue is devoted to race relationships. It was conceived by my predecessor and by Fr Provincial, and the delay in parturition during the long, hot summer has served merely to emphasize its pertinence.

The articles explain themselves. Dr David Pitt speaks from a varied personal experience and does not mince his words. The facts are further evoked with deceptive restraint by the next two writers, Mrs Dummett and Mr Power, who again speak out of first-hand experience. These articles need no comment, except perhaps to note that Mr Power's unobtrusive linking of the problems of race and world poverty in the second half of the twentieth century may prove to be the densest single phrase in the whole issue.

It is with the fourth article that we begin the specifically intellectual task of reflecting on instinct and action so as to give that action coherence and that reflection relevance, as one whole on-going process. For Professor Cameron consciously sets out an anti-liberal model of moral thinking and action, and the peculiar aptness of this way of regarding our social relationships for our present purposes is that we can view legislation as but one in a range of those mutually educative measures by which a people grows. And Fr Fergus Kerr, using cultural philosophy as a fine tool with which to extend and articulate a deep, inchoate and common human apprehension of a world in terrible travail, suggests a vaster vision and context for our individual and puny efforts, by way of an alternative to the established one.

And here perhaps for the individual reader is the crux. Granted even that we begin to *see* and to judge and so perchance to act: is there not an overwhelming discrepancy between the universal size of the task and our individual capacity? The answer surely is to see that the structure of the problem is no more and no less than the structure of charity. Thus St Thomas was merely ordering the germinal complexity of the Gospel when he stated, on the one hand, that 'the love of one's enemies is a necessary part of charity, so that someone who loves God and his neighbour does not exclude his enemies from the generality of the love of his neighbour' (*Ila. Ilae.* Q. 25, art. 8), and, on the other hand, that 'a man loves those who are nearer to him with a greater intensity of affection so far as the good for which he loves them is concerned' (*ibid.*, Q. 26, art. 7).

The problem which in turn arises out of this can, to my mind, be

resolved if we follow a clue provided by Erich Fromm's restatement of essentially the same principle: 'Love for one person implies love for man as such. Love for man as such is not, as it is frequently supposed to be, an abstraction coming "after" the love for a specific person, or an enlargement of the experience with a specific "object"; it is the premise, although, *genetically*, it is acquired in contact with concrete individuals' (*The Fear of Freedom*, 1952, p. 99). The word I have stressed, *genetically*, surely points the way: the love of even one person, with a true love, is in principle the love of all men, though *genetically*, as a matter of the growth of love, any number of impediments may clog the unfolding.

And to see love in this way and the intimate connexion between the love of two and the love of all, to see that every circle of love is as it were but the nursery of the succeeding circle bursting through the narrower, is also surely to preserve the interiority of any merely institutional changes. As Roger Barnard in his quite excellent account of the London Congress for the Dialectics of Liberation wrote of the militant political activists: 'They do not seem to pause for a moment to consider the dismal record of attempts to take control of institutions, and they somewhat conveniently forget that so many angry but earnest reformers in our time have been corrupted and done in by the demon of power, their visions twisted or discarded. This is not to say that institutional changes are irrelevant but that they are insufficient' (*New Society*, 3rd August, p. 146).

This also, surely, is the Christian vision: for the characteristic and contemporary expression of which I cannot do better than to hand over the pen to a confrère who has been pondering these problems more years than I have been born:

'The Christian's greatest pain is to have to resort to violence. I think that this is what happened, as an extremity, in the case of Camillo Torres, in Columbia. I should even go so far as to allow that such a case might be not only heroic but saintly. Nevertheless to generalize this is today the most fearful temptation. "Christians, we have opted to be on the side of the weak and the oppressed." The poor—whether it is a question of classes or of the under-developed nations—know very well that the beneficiaries of the established disorder "will let go of none of their wealth or their prestige unless one tears it from them with one's very teeth". What a terrible temptation! How well does one understand it, from within the heart of the poor, which ought to be our own heart. It is this temptation, and the possible failure of Martin Luther King, and the famine to which two thirds of the world is succumbing, that is the measure of the urgency of the Christian becoming a man of Agape and of the beatitudes, an artisan of peace. This is the measure of his cross today' (Père Pie Raymond Régamey, O.P., 'La Violence', *Semaine des intellectuels catholiques*, 1967, Paris).

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