THE ROMANTIC CONCEPTION OF LIFE AND THE MARXIST CONCEPTION OF HISTORY[1]

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THE mystery of life has intrigued man's mind from the beginning, as his earliest ideas and beliefs show. Some men, indeed, have been so fascinated as to make it the focal point of all human experience and to see in it the basic type of reality on which everything else is modelled or to which, at least, it is ordered. There is, of course, one field in which such notions as 'life', 'soul' and 'organism' have a particularly powerful attraction, namely that of political philosophy. The ideal city-state of Plato is based on the conception of society as a great organism, a living universe animated by a single soul. Nor is it by accident that in his political philosophy Hegel was so greatly influenced by Plato's thought, even if in taking it over he modified it profoundly. And Hegel, in turn, is in this matter the principal source of Marx's thought.

If in fact we are to grasp Marx's thought in its original contours before these became ironed out under the successive manipulations of his chief disciples Engels, Lenin and Stalin, we must try to see it in the context of the Hegelian school which was its starting point. The main lines of Marxism were laid down in the philosophic climate of Germany—more exactly Prussia—of the years 1830-1845. Hegel himself had died in 1831, but his thought dominated succeeding thinkers who could do no more than repeat the Master's philosophy while at the same time struggling vainly against it. Their first reaction was that Hegel had said the last word and left nothing for the next generation to add to what seemed the completed edifice of philosophy. They consequently laboured under the malaise common to all who regard themselves as 'Epigonoi', the generation immediately following the mighty perpetration of heroic deeds. What, indeed, was there to do in the realm of philosophy if all, as seemed to them, had been thought and formulated? They were like workmen out of a job on the day after the world was supposed to end, dumbfounded that nothing had happened after all.

Very soon, however, some among them were moved by the

1 The translation of an article published in *Nova et Vetera*, for June 1957.

desire to assert themselves and leave some sort of mark on the history that flowed on beyond this quasi-Last Judgment. It was this desire which is the key to their attitude and their thought. It was by no means disinterested, nor, it can be well imagined, was it the best guarantee of complete objectivity or sincerity. This will to force into continuing movement at all costs—and to one's own profit—a course of history theoretically ended is clearly at work in the young Marx, himself the most brilliant of the 'Epigonoi'. The complete edifice of Hegelianism had to be scrutinized to see whether it really was as faultless in all its details as it seemed at first sight. The work of criticism thus begun inevitably revealed weak points and imperfections, and Marx and his companions were led in time to throw overboard more than one of the Master's positions. But the fundamental point for them at this stage was to retain Hegel's point of perspective. To begin with, the truth of Hegel's *vision* was never questioned. They were to end by saying that he did see falsely. But that was an unforeseen result. For the moment the problem was to see just a little further than him, to prolong his work, to out-Hegel Hegel. This, it seemed at the time, was the only way one could claim the name of philosopher. Hegelianism is, in fact, a sort of groundswell running through all Marxism. For that reason we must examine it briefly here.

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Hegel is the greatest philosopher of the romantic period. Now the place that *life* played in the thought of the romantics is well known. 'Life' is one of the keywords which, like all keywords and fashionable phrases of a school of thought or period—compare the word 'history' today—is vague and indefinite enough to bear the most varied meanings. But it is perhaps in the form of an aesthetic ideal that the romantic idea of life is best understood.

The eighteenth century, the century of the Enlightenment and of Reason, had a fixed canon of beauty whose leading characteristics were clarity, precision, firmness of outline and symmetry. Euclidean geometry served as the model for all the arts and sciences. Everything could be formulated and expressed. In fact it was this domination by clear-cut reason which constituted beauty. Eighteenth-century French prose is one field in which this aesthetic system was most successful.

The taste for order and proportion has its limits: there is more to man than these; and it was a reaction to this which gave birth to romanticism. Untamed nature, too, has its poetry, and popular treasures of folklore which a sophisticated, elaborated art disdains. The edifice built by reason was cosmopolitan, and its cosmopolitanism was that of the French language and of the French *philosophes*; but it was surely wrong to discount other languages, each with its own particular genius and natural spontaneity. Life (for it is life which is our subject) resists being confined within formulae which are applicable in the dead rigid world of mathematics; and it is this resistance which is a mark of its superior status.

Reason and the aesthetic canon associated with it, together with the ideal of knowledge which it represented, were discarded. To cope with life in all its dynamic spontaneity other faculties are required, poetry and feeling for example. The attempt to translate everything into clear ideas was given up. For rational analysis destroys its own object precisely by isolating it from the universal movement within which alone it has any actual being. It is like cutting off a limb to study it better, forgetting that the member is only a member in the whole living organism. Hegel frequently repeats this criticism of the 'reason' of the Enlightenment, the *Verstand*, understanding. Reality is different from the representation of it given by the understanding and, as we have said, a faculty different from the latter is required to apprehend it: feeling, poetry, 'enthusiasm'; it is this that Hegel calls reason, *Vernunft*.

What then are the characteristics of life? Life is seen as unity, movement, fluidity. These are the central themes round which the thought of Hegel is built. They are not peculiar to him, but his originality lies in having conceptualized the insights of the romantics.

(a). *Unity*. There are many examples in the history of sociology and economics of the conception of society based on the analogy of the *living organism*. Now we can distinguish between 'life' and an individual living thing. And in the first instance it is the latter which serves as a model for this conception. Romanticism pushed the analogy further. It admitted that life manifests itself in the individual organism as the unifying principle which gives it its structure. But it also held that the individual organism is never-

theless involved in the history of the species, is derived from the species and is replaced at death by another individual; it is a part of a vast process, the process of birth and death. 'The life of the child is the death of the parents.' If then, considered in itself, the individual living organism is a whole and its members only have existence within that whole, it can also be said, according to the romantics, that in regard to the species the individual in turn becomes the part and the species the whole.

As we have just said, however, romanticism did not stop short at a consideration of the world of living things. It was not merely marked by a predilection for the biological sciences. It was a vitalist philosophy, that is, it identified the whole of reality with life described in this way. Not only animals or plants are parts of their species: everything that exists, every individual, every human individual, every piece of matter, is a part of that vast unity, that ocean of flux, which makes up reality. Reality, the whole of reality, is 'life'; there is no reality other than this universal life, and the vocation of the individual is to identify himself with this life of the whole, to merge and lose himself in it, to attune himself to its rhythm and make the cosmic heartbeats his own.

In general this idea is pushed to extremes and that is why the romantic philosophers are mostly *pantheists*. God is not distinct from the world, the Creator above creation; he is the soul of this life, or this life itself. The romantic philosophers are philosophers of *immanence*: the kingdom of God is present in nature and in history. It is only on the most superficial glance that diversity and multiplicity appear as characteristics of the activity of men and things: behind this multiplicity we must know how to discern the whole, the unity present in the multiple. We must go back to the source. This source however is not remote: it is within the soul, close at hand, and the soul has only to have the necessary vision and not be misled by the laborious analysis carried on by the understanding or discursive reasoning.

We are therefore no longer in the realm of 'clear and distinct' ideas here: rather it is a question of intimate contact with deeper and more obscure forces. The disastrous decay in the meaning of mystery dates from the romantic period as the antithesis of the century of the Enlightenment. That it possesses a clarity which banishes all mystery is a concession readily granted to rational

understanding: it is for that very reason that it is judged to be impoverished, limited and sterile. Mystery, on the other hand, is to be sought in the realm of the irrational and the instinctive: the more obscure a thing is, the more profound it must be. This quickly led to philosophies of the unconscious, according to which the unconscious was superior to consciousness in power if not in content. The notion that mystery is clarity, an excess of light for a finite intelligence, and that contemplation of mystery in fact enriches the mind, was lost sight of.

In this respect, of course, Hegel went beyond the romantics, for his aim was the same as the rationalist aim of the Enlightenment. For him 'reason' or thought should grasp the substance of those things which, according to the romantic theory could only be apprehended by faculties other than reason. Men and things formed part of a totality, cosmic being. Their whole significance lay in their being parts and this was the view held by the vitalist philosophers of the romantic school.

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(b). The second dominant idea in Hegel's thought was that of *flux*. Movement distinguishes the living from the inorganic, which is static, inert and fixed. Life is a 'becoming' or development consisting of growth, maturity and decline. And this is true both of individual living things and of the larger unity to which they belong: both show movement—sometimes even agitated movement—renewal and decay. Life is like a stream perpetually replenished, flowing on continuously despite the alternation of the life and death of individuals. The individual life is, after all, only a brief episode in a continuous process, the surface ripple that is the outward appearance of the unmoving depths of endless duration. Thought should penetrate to this deeper level below individual histories.

> '[Philosophy] is the process that creates its own moments in its course, and goes through them all; and the whole of this movement constitutes its positive content and its truth. This movement includes, therefore, within it the negative factor as well, the element which would be named falsity if it could be considered one from which we had to abstract. The element that disappears has rather to be looked at as itself essential, not in the sense of being something fixed, that has to be cut off

from truth and allowed to lie outside it, heaven knows where; just as similarly the truth is not to be held to stand on the other side as an immovable lifeless positive element. Appearance is the process of arising into being and passing away again, a process that itself does not arise and does not pass away, but is *per se*, and constitutes reality and the life-movement of truth. In this way truth is the bacchanalian revel, where not a soul is sober; and because every member no sooner gets detached than it *eo ipso* collapses straightway, the revel is just as much a state of transparent, unbroken calm. Judged by that movement, the particular shapes which mind assumes do not indeed subsist any more than do determinate thoughts or ideas; but they are, all the same, as much positive and necessary moments, as negative and transitory.'[2]

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(c). Traditional logic assumed that the essential function of mind was to affirm truth which had an absolute value, and that 'yes' is irreconcilable with 'no'. To grasp totality entire a new logic is required, the Hegelian *dialectic*. Every affirmation, every thing, every aspect of the real is only a *transitory moment*; dialectic will allow us to grasp the contraries in their movement from one to the other, for it is this that makes up the immanent life of the whole. The 'yes' is the 'yes' of the 'no', and the 'no' is the 'no' of the 'yes', reality being the incessant passage of the one into the other.

The term 'dialectic' is fashionable: it has been used so much that it has lost all distinctness of outline. In the Hegelian sense, however, dialectic is inseparable from this immanentist monism; it is not simply methodological.

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Society and history are the main centre of interest in Hegel's reflections. His monism is peculiarly adapted to explaining social realities. It provides the special link connecting history with society and thus forms the basis of what is called historicism.

While the eighteenth century in general left history outside the range of its investigations the philosophy of the romantic period

2 Hegel: *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Preface. Translated by J. B. Baillie. London, Allen and Unwin, second edition (1931), p. 105.

set itself to understand it. For the Enlightenment, history dealt only with the contingent event, the isolated chance happening not susceptible to a general law and therefore of no interest to reason. One of their ideas was, however, taken over: namely the inevitability of human progress. Man, after all, is rational, and reason assures him of continual scientific conquest. Moreover, happiness, which results from a life in conformity with reason, lies well within his grasp.

This idea of inevitable progress was taken up by romantic vitalism, but was given a new form. The law of progress became the *law of growth*, of *development*. The whole universe, and in particular the sum total of civilization, can be likened to a developing organism: the picture is no longer that of mankind on an ascending path, leading to progressively greater insight and happiness; the entire universe, with consciousness as its highest manifestation, is seen in the making, building itself up like a growing plant.

This idea of a growing organism is the central idea of Hegel's philosophy of history. But here again the distinction must be drawn between life and the individual living thing: the former, as we have seen, amounts to more than the latter. Put in other words, the individual is a moment in the history of the species.

In Hegel's conception of things, in fact, two ideas overlap. History in its totality is conceived as a living thing, a living whole, which resembles the entire species rather than the individual. There is, indeed, a history of peoples and cultures, but in and through this history there is *universal history*. There is really only one living thing which changes continuously as individual living things succeed one another. Civilizations and empires rise and fall like so many manifestations of a more profound reality which Hegel identifies with God and which is universal history; the patterns characteristic of the succeeding ages form and dissolve. Behind these changes world history pursues its inexorable course. The stream of life sustains all living things. Thus it is that Hegel speaks of 'the progressive development of truth' through the dialectical flux of life and death.

> 'The bud disappears when the blossom breaks through, and we might say that the former is refuted by the latter; in the same way when the fruit comes, the blossom may be explained to be a false form of the plant's existence, for the fruit appears

as its true nature in the place of the blossom. These stages are not merely differentiated; they supplant one another as being incompatible with one another. But the ceaseless activity of their own inherent nature makes them at the same time moments of an organic unity, where they not merely do not contradict one another, but where one is as necessary as the other; and this equal necessity of all moments constitutes alone and thereby the life of the whole.'[3]

Just as the species lives on although individuals are born and die, the older generation making way for the younger, so too the succession of epochs results from a necessary law. In its turn every epoch too will pass through all the cycles from infancy through maturity to decline. Furthermore, it is the law of dialectic opposition which governs the transition from one epoch to another: the birth of one is the death of the other.

As an epoch advances in age, its successor lies hidden within it as a child which gradually devours its parent. The idea of revolution evidently has one of its sources here.

Thus Hegel speaks of his time as a time of gestation and of transition to a new period. He has broken with the past:

'The spirit of man has broken with the old order of things hitherto prevailing, and with the old ways of thinking, and is in the mind to let them all sink into the depths of the past and to set about its own transformation. It is indeed never at rest, but carried along the stream of progress ever onward. But it is here as in the case of the birth of a child; after a long period of nutrition in silence, the continuity of the gradual growth in size, of quantitative change, is suddenly cut short by the first breath drawn—there is a break in the process, a qualitative change—and the child is born. In like manner the spirit of the time, growing slowly and quietly ripe for the new form it is to assume, loosens one fragment after another of the structure of its previous world. That it is tottering to its fall is indicated only by symptoms here and there. Frivolity and again ennui, which are spreading in the established order of things, the undefined foreboding of something unknown—all these betoken that there is something else approaching. This gradual crumbling to pieces, which did not alter the general look and aspect of the whole, is interrupted by the sunrise, which, in a

3 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

flash and at a single stroke, brings to view the form and structure of the new world.'[4]

An epoch in history is thus an individual thing. But the individual living thing is endowed with its own organs and is distinct from its environment and from other individuals. No longer, then, is it a matter of affirming the permanence of human nature throughout the ages and in different environments, but rather of stressing the successive transformations which differentiate men of different epochs. Time, in fact, is the differentiating factor. Each epoch has its own religion, philosophy, art, law and political system, and these cannot be reduced to any common measure. Man is imprisoned in time, in his own time, and he no longer lives through contact with a non-temporal absolute, but by the spirit of the age. As it is the soul which gives life to the individual, so each epoch is animated by a spirit, the spirit of the age, what Hegel calls its *concept*. The potentialities of this, like those of an acorn, are only gradually developed. The measure of man is no longer the eternal. His perfection consists rather in being circumscribed by time, by his own age.

'When we want to see an oak with all its vigour of trunk, its spreading branches and mass of foliage, we are not satisfied to be shown an acorn instead. In the same way science, the crowning glory of a spiritual world, is not found complete in its initial stages. The beginning of the new spirit is the outcome of a widespread revolution in manifold forms of spiritual culture; it is the reward which comes after a chequered and devious course of development, and after much struggle and effort. It is a whole which, after running its course and laying bare all its content, returns again to itself; it is the resultant abstract notion of the whole. But the actual realization of this abstract whole is only found when these previous shapes and forms, which are now reduced to ideal moments of the whole, are developed anew again, but developed and shaped within this new medium, and with the meaning they have thereby acquired.'[5]

In fact the same living creature dies and is reborn continually; history is no more than the inevitable route followed in its successive metamorphoses. At each stage the forms already acquired

4 *Ibid.*, p. 75.
5 *Ibid.*, pp. 75-6.

are retained. Hegel therefore affirms that the accumulation of historical experience is progress. And since the whole which develops in this way is divine—the fundamental viewpoint is pantheistic—the history which unrolls is the history of God. God is the history of God. God is the result of a growth which is that of God himself, just as the oak is the completed growth of the acorn.

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The sequence of epochs is thus a succession of organisms. But an organism presupposes a principle of unity and life, a soul; and so each epoch has its 'spirit'. If we ask, how does this spirit express itself, how does it reach its full expansion, we are told: by being consciousness. History, or the epoch, are history, or the epoch, as self-conscious.

Consciousness, however, has varying degrees of perfection and power, just as there are several degrees in the growth and expansion of a living creature. It can remain shut up in itself, or it may, on the contrary, attain what Hegel calls effectiveness, reality. It is only at a certain age that a tree bears fruit. The acme of consciousness, the stage at which its fruits appear, is the sphere of society, and the State.

If, then, history is the history of consciousness, and of consciousness at its highest level, history culminates in the State.

> 'The State is the divine Idea as it exists on earth. . . . We must, therefore, worship the State as the manifestation of the divine on earth, and consider that, if it is difficult to comprehend nature, it is infinitely harder to grasp the essence of the State. . . . The State is the march of God through the world. . . . The State must be comprehended as an organism. . . . To the complete State belongs, essentially, consciousness and thought. The State knows thus what it wills. . . . The State is real. . . . True reality is necessity. What is real is eternally necessary. . . . The State exists for its proper end. . . . The State is the realization of the ethical idea, actually existing. . . .'[6]

The destiny of the individual finds its meaning in the life of the State. We have seen that the part lives with the life of the

6 *The Philosophy of Law*, translated by J. Loewenberg, in *Hegel: Selections* (Scribner, The Modern Student's Library), 1931, p. 443.

whole, and that it is only a living part by virtue of the whole. The destiny of the individual is to be a member of the State, which is the conscious whole, the realization of God. His vocation is to serve the State and make its will his own.

To fulfil his destiny it is not enough for the individual to be a member of civil society, by which Hegel means the whole network of economic exchange, labour and commerce; for on this plane, although there already is solidarity, the unity of the whole has not yet reached full consciousness. It is the *State* which is the realization of the absolute Mind, the State as judging and willing in the person of the monarch. In this way it can be said that society exists for and through the State.

There have indeed been progressive realizations of this absolute Mind. The Eastern empires, Greece and Rome were early stages in its upward progress. The Prussian monarchy was the contemporary realization, the 'realization of absolute truth', of 'liberty'. 'The history of the world is nothing else than the development of the idea of liberty; 'the realization of the spirit', 'the true natural theology', 'the justification of God in history . . . what has happened and what happens . . . is essentially his work'.

What does this mean? If the State is the incarnation of God, it is the creator of truth and law. Justice is nothing more than State power. In fact, an empire asserts itself by the State encountering other States and triumphing over them by force, imposing on them its own laws and conceptions. The dialectical process in history is the succession of empires each embodying the military power of the State. Conflict and war are good things: it is by them that the State triumphs and the incessantly changing character of life is affirmed.

Finally, if history is the judgment of God, this means that success, the *fait accompli*, is the ultimate justification of what men do.

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It was necessary to dwell at length on this Hegelian conception for it is the foundation of that of Marx. Marx, indeed, revolted against the Master's position, but not with sufficient violence to demolish his fundamental premises. *Historicism* remains characteristic of Marxism also; one has only to recall the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848. History is a progressive succession of worlds, each

coming to birth through its dialectical antagonism to its predecessor, and each representing a totality with its own conception of man, his religion, philosophy, law and institutions. An historical epoch is certainly no longer the epoch of a dominant State, universal history no longer a succession of empires. But the place of the dominant State and of the empires is taken by a dominant class and the régime typical of its supremacy.

In the famous drafts of 1844 which are known under the name of *Economico-philosophical Manuscripts* and contain the germ of his principal ideas, a first, very imperfect, outline, as it were, of what was to emerge as *Capital*, Marx retains the ambition of *developing* the whole of history from a single concept expressed in the image of the acorn and the oak. The idea of alienated labour solves the enigma of history by explaining the organic and necessary bond which links together all the stages of economic development as well as all the economic doctrines which are their conscious counterpart. It also allows the future development of history to be described: Marxist prophecy claims to be scientific; in fact it appeals to the law of the dialectical development of history and applies it to the future.

In a primary sense, then, Marx did no more than develop Hegel's line of thought. But he also criticized Hegel; and his criticism was directed principally against the myth of the State. The idea of the State as distinct from society and superior to it, he criticized as an abstraction, a product of idealism, what Marx called an ideology.

Marx indeed kept to the vitalist view of history. So much so, in fact, that it could be said that his rupture with idealism and his eventual materialism resulted from his treating history very much as a physiologist would. History is a living thing? Very well, then: what is the organ that makes it move, what are its glands and what are their secretions in sickness and in health? By this physiological examination the animating principle, the soul of society was revealed to be its economy, that is, production relationships, or, more precisely, the relationships of men as determined by the ownership of the instruments of production.

In historicism of the Hegelian stamp, the mere existence of a thing, an institution, an idea was its own justification. To all this Marx gave an ethical twist: epochs succeed one another by a necessary law, and history is the history of an *alienation*. Humanity

undergoes pathological states and these are the contrary of the normal state according to the dialectic. Capitalism is the extreme case of alienation and it will necessarily engender the state of *human re-appropriation.*

Moreover, what is characteristic of the pathological phase in history is ideology: the State is an ideological form. The alienation and frustration felt by the individual and Society are at the origin of the projection of the ideal State, in the imaginary, unreal heavens of religion and law: of the State, that is, which should exist and of which man has, in fact, been deprived. Thus the State which was born in 1789—and this for Marx was the prototype of the Hegelian State—proclaimed liberty, equality and fraternity and in so doing disguised and consolidated an economic or real situation, that of liberal capitalism in which, in fact, servitude, inequality and strife prevailed. What is required, and what the dialectical law of history will necessarily produce, is an actual state of affairs, a Society in which these values, instead of being affirmed on the plane of the ideal, will be actually experienced in reality; a Society, therefore, which will have eliminated the State in so far as it brings it out of the realm of thought into that of spontaneous action.

The point to be noted, however, is that the Society which renders the State obsolete is conceived on the model of the Hegelian State. For Hegel's selfconsciousness Marx substituted 'sensible reality', but this sensible reality retained more than one element proper to 'consciousness'. Real man, man who is repossessed, is first of all a *collective entity*, the *Gattungswesen*, a generic being: *all humanity*, in fact; the individual only exists in, through and for this totality; his vocation and fullest development is to live as a member of the community. On the other hand this totality represents divinity in the sense of being pure immanence, excluding all transcendence. Re-possessed man is man's God. Finally (and we lack sufficient space to dwell on this here), humanity is again conceived as a living entity endowed with an animating principle, work, *praxis*, from which all vital functions derive. Why, for example, is charity in the Christian sense avoided? In the first place charity is one of the illusions of ideology. But in the second place, and more fundamentally, both the egoism of alienated man and the altruism of social man are simply the natural functionings of an organism in sickness and

health. Altruism is no more than the normal heartbeat of the organism 'generic man'.

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Echoes of Hegelian vitalism are also found in other Marxist notions: for example, class-warfare, the fruitfulness of revolution, the Party, 'consciousness', the emanation of the proletariat which is the spearhead of history. It was this vitalism which made it easy for Engels and later his successors to graft on to Marxism the biological theories of Darwin on evolution and the struggle for existence. The romantics had prepared the ground.

Finally, it was of set purpose that I described the Marxist attempt to analyse the economic principles governing the course of history as a physiological examination. The theory of the infra-structure and the super-structure and their interaction does, in fact, presuppose an analogy between an epoch and a living creature endowed with a system of organs. It means that Marxist materialism, like the dialectic before it, has seized on the romantic images of life and the living thing and has subjected them to correction and modification rather than radical criticism. It may well be that, for all the talk of scientific materialism, it is this persistence of the romantic myth which in the last resort accounts for the fascination which Marxism has exercised.

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Our conclusion will be brief. The error of vitalism in the eyes of Christian thought is to think of all life, including the life of the spirit, as being of the same type as vegetative or animal life. Hegel's Spirit and Marx's History behave like the animals we see in the Zoo. The result, willed or not, is a primacy given to the irrational, to becoming and to force.

What these philosophies have failed to see is that where life is at its highest, where it participates most fully in the infinite life of God, it is divested of such distinguishing marks as are a sign of imperfection.[7] The life of the spirit is a life of knowledge and love, of dialogue and friendship with a transcendent God. It is because he or she is called to this life that every human person has an absolute value; in this respect he is nobler than the life of the

7 Cf. the fine study by Olivier Lacombe, 'L'Intelligence et la Vie', in *Chemins de l'Inde et Philosophie chrétienne* (Paris, 1956), pp. 105-125.

species and social life, and the whole purpose of society is to make it possible for each human being to develop fully his life as a person. Because the human person is called to enter into communion with the Absolute, that person is sacred, is an inviolable sanctuary, and its horizon is not limited by history or the epoch; its horizon and its measure are divine goods which are imperishable, and its vocation to share in them rests on no other title than personality itself.